Pakistan is a member of the ‘nuclear club’ with an arsenal of ~120 warheads. However, Pakistan’s regular appearance in lists of ‘unstable governments’, rising religious
militancy in the region, and experience with A.Q. Khan Network have raised concerns globally. This paper provides an overview of Pakistan’s nuclear program, its regional/international cooperation, and key issues stirring international worry.
The prime objective of a state is to improve the quality of life of its citizens-security of life & property, the standard of living, political empowerment
For this, the state formulates a comprehensive set of interdependent policies. Foreign policy is one such policy formulated to achieve the above objectives by utilizing the foreign relations of a country
This presentation is an attempt to explain how the foreign policy of Pakistan is shaped, history, successes & failures, as well as challenges
Before going further, you are advised to read Part 1 of this series for acquainting yourself with theoretical aspects of foreign policy
intro duction of freign policy of pakistan,foreign policy of pakistan with u.s.a,foreign policy of pakistan with china,foreign policy of pakistan with russia,foreign policy of pakistan with central asian countries..
This document discusses the Foreign policy of Pakistan in detail along with its constituents. Attention is given to the challenges faced by policy makers and the prospects of our policy.
The prime objective of a state is to improve the quality of life of its citizens-security of life & property, the standard of living, political empowerment
For this, the state formulates a comprehensive set of interdependent policies. Foreign policy is one such policy formulated to achieve the above objectives by utilizing the foreign relations of a country
This presentation is an attempt to explain how the foreign policy of Pakistan is shaped, history, successes & failures, as well as challenges
Before going further, you are advised to read Part 1 of this series for acquainting yourself with theoretical aspects of foreign policy
intro duction of freign policy of pakistan,foreign policy of pakistan with u.s.a,foreign policy of pakistan with china,foreign policy of pakistan with russia,foreign policy of pakistan with central asian countries..
This document discusses the Foreign policy of Pakistan in detail along with its constituents. Attention is given to the challenges faced by policy makers and the prospects of our policy.
oBJECTIVE
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology
to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.
Foreign Policy of pakistan
Pakistan has a fiercely independent foreign policy, especially when it comes to issues such as development of nuclear weapons, construction of nuclear reactors, foreign military purchases and other issues that are vital to its national interests. Pakistan has a strategic geo-political location at the corridor of world major maritime oil supply lines, and has close proximity to the resource and oil rich central Asian countries. Pakistan is an important member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), is ranked by the US as a major non-NATO ally in the war against terrorism, and has a highly disciplined and professional military.
The foreign policy of Pakistan sets out in the way it interacts with foreign nations and to determine its standard of interactions for its organizations, corporations and individual citizens.Backed by the semi-agricultural and semi-industrialized economy, Pakistan is the 42th largest (nominal GDP) and 25th largest (purchasing power) economic power in the world, with a defence budget of $6.98 billion, which accounts for approximately ~0.37% of global military spending. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan is the official charged with state-to-state diplomacy, although the Prime minister maintains an ultimate authority over foreign policy. The state foreign policy includes defining the national interest, as well as the economic interest and strategies chosen both to safeguard that and to achieve its policy goals.Following the general election held on May 2013, Tariq Fatimi and NSA Sartaj Aziz are designated as advisers to the Prime Minister on foreign and strategic policies
Presentation Pakistan Regional Apparatus; Challenges & ResponseShahid Hussain Raja
The prime objective of a state is to improve the quality of life of its citizens. For this, the state formulates a comprehensive set of interdependent policies.
Foreign policy is one such policy formulated to achieve the above objectives by utilising the foreign relations of a country
This presentation attempts to explain foreign policy challenges of Pakistan in its rapidly changing regional apparatus and how to respond to them
Kindly do read Part 1 & 2 of this series for acquainting yourself with the basic concepts of foreign policy and history of foreign relations of Pakistan
Foreign policy of Pakistan in era of bilateralism 1962-1979Shabbir Hussain
Foreign policy of Pakistan in era of bilateralism 1962-1979
1-Defination Of Foreign Policy
2-Transition Phase (1962-1970)
3-Fall Of Dhaka (1970)
4-Bilateralism And Non-Alignment (1972-1979)
oBJECTIVE
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology
to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.
Foreign Policy of pakistan
Pakistan has a fiercely independent foreign policy, especially when it comes to issues such as development of nuclear weapons, construction of nuclear reactors, foreign military purchases and other issues that are vital to its national interests. Pakistan has a strategic geo-political location at the corridor of world major maritime oil supply lines, and has close proximity to the resource and oil rich central Asian countries. Pakistan is an important member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), is ranked by the US as a major non-NATO ally in the war against terrorism, and has a highly disciplined and professional military.
The foreign policy of Pakistan sets out in the way it interacts with foreign nations and to determine its standard of interactions for its organizations, corporations and individual citizens.Backed by the semi-agricultural and semi-industrialized economy, Pakistan is the 42th largest (nominal GDP) and 25th largest (purchasing power) economic power in the world, with a defence budget of $6.98 billion, which accounts for approximately ~0.37% of global military spending. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan is the official charged with state-to-state diplomacy, although the Prime minister maintains an ultimate authority over foreign policy. The state foreign policy includes defining the national interest, as well as the economic interest and strategies chosen both to safeguard that and to achieve its policy goals.Following the general election held on May 2013, Tariq Fatimi and NSA Sartaj Aziz are designated as advisers to the Prime Minister on foreign and strategic policies
Presentation Pakistan Regional Apparatus; Challenges & ResponseShahid Hussain Raja
The prime objective of a state is to improve the quality of life of its citizens. For this, the state formulates a comprehensive set of interdependent policies.
Foreign policy is one such policy formulated to achieve the above objectives by utilising the foreign relations of a country
This presentation attempts to explain foreign policy challenges of Pakistan in its rapidly changing regional apparatus and how to respond to them
Kindly do read Part 1 & 2 of this series for acquainting yourself with the basic concepts of foreign policy and history of foreign relations of Pakistan
Foreign policy of Pakistan in era of bilateralism 1962-1979Shabbir Hussain
Foreign policy of Pakistan in era of bilateralism 1962-1979
1-Defination Of Foreign Policy
2-Transition Phase (1962-1970)
3-Fall Of Dhaka (1970)
4-Bilateralism And Non-Alignment (1972-1979)
These reports have been made by me and my classmates at IBA Karachi. The sole purpose of putting these reports here is to help the free flow of knowledge to everyone.
Last week, the architect of Pakistan's nuclear program, A Q Khan made an ominous-sounding statement about Pakistan's capability of nuking New Delhi in five minutes from Kahuta. While this veiled threat has stirred up the expected controversy, most experts in India areshrugging it off as mere grandstanding. Despite Khan being a reputed nuclear physicist and a trained metallurgist, military tactics and nuke war strategy are not his forte.
A few months prior to Khan's bragging, reports from two US think tanks predicted an upsurge in the Pak nuclear arsenal -- enough to make its stockpiles the third-largest in the world, after the US and Russia and with India lagging behind. India has followed a no-comment policy on this matter, which is still limited to academic speculation.
Pak china relations : Media & Current Affairs : Student CollaborationAli Haider Saeed
An illustration of student-teacher collaborative discussion model in the subject of Media & Current Affairs during the Fall session 2020, Students engaged in the discussion on Cino-Pak Relations
As part of our assessment of evolving PRC military capabilities, we have interviewed Rick Fisher, Jr., a leading expert on the PRC military. This brief is an excerpt of two longer briefs by Fisher and accompanies a Second Line of Defense interview.
In a recent development, India’s defence minister suggested that the “country may redesign it’s ‘No First Use’ policy of nuclear weapons”, raising stakes at a time of high tension due to abrogation of Article 370 with its “nuclear-armed” neighbour Pakistan.
Presentation1.pptxPakistan Nuclear Power Capacity.pptxlodhisaajjda
n Pakistan, nuclear power is provided by six commercial nuclear power plants with a net capacity of 3,262 megawatts (3.262 GW) from pressurized water reactors.[1] In 2020, Pakistan's nuclear power plants produced a total of 133 terawatt-hours of electricity, which accounted for roughly 10% of the nation's total electric energy generation.[1][2][3]
Pakistan is the first country in the Muslim world to construct and operate commercial nuclear plants, with first being commissioned in 1972.: 31–33 [4]
As of 2023, there is one nuclear power plant is that being constructed and the other is in design phases to produce gross energy capacity of 1,000 megawatts (1.0 GW), while one has been permanently shut down.[5] The nuclear power in Pakistan is regulated through the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), which grants licenses and their renewals, while the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) manages the operations of the nuclear power plants.[6][7]
Due to the country's refusal to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accept full-scope IAEA safeguards, the imports and access to the reactor technology has been restricted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Under its current policy to address its energy security, the country plans on constructing 32 commercial nuclear power plants by 2050-51.[8]
In the past, Canada partnered with Pakistan in providing the nation's first nuclear power plant in 1965 and later, China and the IAEA has provided support in providing the nuclear power plants since 1993 at address its challenges relating to energy security.[1]
History
In 1960, the plans on the construction for nation's first nuclear power plant were submitted to the Ayub administration by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, with support from the Abdus Salam who was serving in capacity as Science Advisor to the Government of Pakistan at that time.[9] In fact, it was Abdus Salam's efforts that led to the approval of the country's first commercial nuclear power plant at the Paradise Point in Karachi, Sindh.[9][10] During this time, the Ayub administration successfully negotiated the Canadian government that allowed the GE Canada to work with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in designing and constructing the country's first commercial nuclear power in 1965.: 54–55 [11]
In 1965, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission's Centre for Nuclear Studies (CNS) was able to design and construct its own small reactor, known as the Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor (PARR-I) in Nilore.: 94–95 [11] The fuel bundles were for this reactor were, however, provided by the United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for research and training purposes only.: 193 [11] The first commercial nuclear power plant was design on the basis of CANDU-type which was earlier offered to India (in 1955) but Canada had its priced at US$ 10 million ($96.7 million in 2023) which was too expensive for the country's
Producitivity Challenges of Small and Medium EnterprisesVikas Sharma
These are slides that I presented at the 2014 SME Biztech Summit in Singapore. I talked about productivity-related challenges that are particular to small and medium sized businesses.
Singapore's transformation into an economic powerhouse has attracted adulation from developed and developing economies alike. In this paper, I discuss policies that fuelled this growth, and also highlight some negative side-effects/criticisms.
An Overview of the Electricity Industry in MyanmarVikas Sharma
This paper attempts to provide a comprehensive current-state assessment of Myanmar’s electricity sector, and goes on to offer some policy recommendations to tackle the key issues at hand.
As Myanmar embarks upon reversing the damage and realizing its potential, availability of electricity is crucial in all spheres – economic, health-related and educational. However, nowhere is the immensity of the task at hand more apparent than in the electricity sector. Less than 30% of households are connected to the electric-grid. Per capita consumption of power is lowest in ASEAN. There is over-reliance on hydropower and erratic demand-side management, especially in summer months. Current supply is almost 30% below demand, manifested in sweeping load-shedding. Planning is centralized, haphazard and seemingly untouched by market dynamics. Power plants have numerous breakdowns and abysmal efficiency. Transmission and distribution networks are antiquated and omit large expanses. Highly-subsidized electricity tariffs and resulting fiscal deficits have crippled public investment in infrastructure. Skepticism over political stability, heavy-handed government terms, and deficient financing ecosystem discourage private entrants.
Valuing Environmental Assets - Central Catchment Nature Reserve in SingaporeVikas Sharma
With increasing demands for fiscal prudence, governments worldwide are under pressure to show that net positive economic benefits are accrued from expenditures on environmental preservation and maintenance. In the land-constrained island-state of Singapore, maintaining 2000 hectares of green forests in the Central Catchment Nature Reserve (CCNR) may seem counter-intuitive and hence, a valuation exercise is warranted. This paper evaluates some candidate valuation methods.
Green ICT in Singapore - Path to responsible and sustainable growthVikas Sharma
A white paper I wrote back in 2009 for a government client in Singapore (publishing here since it is a non-confidential document available in the public domain). It provides an overview of the relevance of green ICT and how Singapore ICT companies are contributing in this space.
Global Developments in Food Safety and Resource Efficiency Vikas Sharma
Presentation given by me at the Accreditation and Conformance 2012 event organized by Singapore Accreditation Council. Touches upon the growing importance of accreditation; and convergence of standards in the areas of Food safety and Energy/Water efficiency.
Global Financial Crisis and Singapore Vikas Sharma
Starting with the genesis and global impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), this paper details drills down into its impact on Singapore's economy, and the measures that were taken by the island-state to limit the damage caused.
Policy Options to Tackle Haze Fires in IndonesiaVikas Sharma
This paper lays out three options to deal with the problem of recurrent fires and haze in Indonesia. Further, it presents a preliminary analysis of these options on a set of evaluation parameters.
This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
Presentation by Jared Jageler, David Adler, Noelia Duchovny, and Evan Herrnstadt, analysts in CBO’s Microeconomic Studies and Health Analysis Divisions, at the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Summer Conference.
Donate to charity during this holiday seasonSERUDS INDIA
For people who have money and are philanthropic, there are infinite opportunities to gift a needy person or child a Merry Christmas. Even if you are living on a shoestring budget, you will be surprised at how much you can do.
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-to-donate-to-charity-during-this-holiday-season/
#charityforchildren, #donateforchildren, #donateclothesforchildren, #donatebooksforchildren, #donatetoysforchildren, #sponsorforchildren, #sponsorclothesforchildren, #sponsorbooksforchildren, #sponsortoysforchildren, #seruds, #kurnool
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Russian anarchist and anti-war movement in the third year of full-scale warAntti Rautiainen
Anarchist group ANA Regensburg hosted my online-presentation on 16th of May 2024, in which I discussed tactics of anti-war activism in Russia, and reasons why the anti-war movement has not been able to make an impact to change the course of events yet. Cases of anarchists repressed for anti-war activities are presented, as well as strategies of support for political prisoners, and modest successes in supporting their struggles.
Thumbnail picture is by MediaZona, you may read their report on anti-war arson attacks in Russia here: https://en.zona.media/article/2022/10/13/burn-map
Links:
Autonomous Action
http://Avtonom.org
Anarchist Black Cross Moscow
http://Avtonom.org/abc
Solidarity Zone
https://t.me/solidarity_zone
Memorial
https://memopzk.org/, https://t.me/pzk_memorial
OVD-Info
https://en.ovdinfo.org/antiwar-ovd-info-guide
RosUznik
https://rosuznik.org/
Uznik Online
http://uznikonline.tilda.ws/
Russian Reader
https://therussianreader.com/
ABC Irkutsk
https://abc38.noblogs.org/
Send mail to prisoners from abroad:
http://Prisonmail.online
YouTube: https://youtu.be/c5nSOdU48O8
Spotify: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/libertarianlifecoach/episodes/Russian-anarchist-and-anti-war-movement-in-the-third-year-of-full-scale-war-e2k8ai4
Understanding the Challenges of Street ChildrenSERUDS INDIA
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-individuals-can-support-street-children-in-india/
#donatefororphan, #donateforhomelesschildren, #childeducation, #ngochildeducation, #donateforeducation, #donationforchildeducation, #sponsorforpoorchild, #sponsororphanage #sponsororphanchild, #donation, #education, #charity, #educationforchild, #seruds, #kurnool, #joyhome
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
A process server is a authorized person for delivering legal documents, such as summons, complaints, subpoenas, and other court papers, to peoples involved in legal proceedings.
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program - An overview and critique
1. Vikas Sharma
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program
An Overview and Critique
Vikas Sharma, PMP®
Associate Director,
Public Sector & Government Practice, Frost & Sullivan
April, 2014
Contains 14 pages (excluding the cover sheet and References)
2. Vikas Sharma
Section 1 – Introduction
While Pakistan had a civilian nuclear program since the 1960s aided by USA’s Atoms for Peace initiative; the
turning point in favor of acquiring nuclear weapons came in the wake of defeat in 1971 at the hands of India, and
secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh). A crucial blow to Pakistan’s strategic and political influence, the
defeat pushed Pakistani leadership towards pursuing nuclear weapons as essential levelers to combat India’s
conventional superiority; their resolve encapsulated in President Bhutto’s eminently quotable vow of acquiring
nuclear weapons even if it meant eating grass. Today Pakistan is a member of the ‘nuclear club’ with an arsenal
~120 warheads. However, Pakistan’s regular appearance in lists of ‘unstable governments’, rising religious
militancy in the region, and experience with A.Q. Khan Network (that was held responsible for illicit transfer of
nuclear technology in and out of Pakistan); have raised concerns globally. This paper provides an overview of
Pakistan’s nuclear program, its regional/international cooperation, and key issues stirring international worry.
3. Vikas Sharma
Section 2 – Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapon Program
This section provides an overview of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capabilities, command & control regime, and
instances of foreign assistance; and goes on to analyze key tenets of Pakistani nuclear engagement policy.
Infrastructure & Arsenal
• Pakistan is one of two countries (other being India) actively producing highly enriched Uranium (HEU).
Starting production in 1980s, Pakistan is believed to have produced 2-3.5 tonnes of HEU, with current
annual production of 120-180kg at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) at Kahuta, enough for 10-15
warheads. Pakistan also has a parallel Plutonium production capability, with four operational reactors at
Khushab (and one more under construction). Annual production from Khushab is estimated
conservatively at 33kg. As of 2011, Pakistan’s Plutonium stockpile was estimated at around 150kg, set
to rise fast as Pakistan’s seemingly aims to shift to a Plutonium-based nuclear program (evidenced by
expansions at Khushab and new facilities at Nilore and Chashma).
• Pakistan guards information on nuclear capability with extreme secrecy and doesn’t release official
statistics regarding the size of its nuclear arsenal. Estimates based on available information – number of
launchers, amount of fissile material produced and converted into weapon cores, amount used in each
weapon, declarations by senior army generals – place Pakistan’s nuclear warheads at 120 at end-2013.
These warheads are not believed to be operationally deployed but in central storage at various sites.
Pakistan’s HEU-based warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of approximately 15-20kg of
HEU, partly based on a similar Chinese warhead design.
Delivery Systems
• Presently, Pakistan has two delivery modes for nuclear weapons – missiles controlled by the Pakistan
Army and aircraft controlled by Pakistan Air Force (PAF).
4. Vikas Sharma
• The perceived need to display ability to execute a nuclear strike deep within India has been the key
motivation behind Pakistan’s interest in medium and long-range missiles. Pakistan has a variety of
nuclear-capable medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with ranges up to 2500km. The two flagship
ballistic missile series are:
o Shaheen – Solid-fueled ballistic missiles (BMs) with Chinese M-11 and M-18 lineage capable
of delivering conventional or nuclear payloads. Shaheen 1 is a short-range ballistic missile with
a range of 750km and Shaheen 2 is medium ranged at 2500km. While costlier, Shaheen missiles
are believed to have higher accuracy and shorter deployment time than Ghauri.
o Ghauri – Liquid-fueled BMs believed to be based on North Korea’s Rodong series. With a
range of 2300km, Ghauri-II improved on Ghauri-I (1500km). Being liquid-fueled, Ghauri
missiles can’t store fuel for extended periods and need to be fueled for hours before launching,
thus making them vulnerable to ‘first strike’. Because of this, Pakistan is believed to be moving
away from Ghauri as nuclear missiles of choice, using them for testing instead.
• In addition to BMs, Pakistan has also developed two families of cruise-missiles
o Babur – Can be launched from ground-based erector launchers, warships and submarines, with
a range of 700-1000km; and are designed to avoid radar detection. Development was motivated
by India’s reported plans to acquire Patriot missiles to counter Pakistan’s BMs. Work is
believed ongoing on developing sea-based and air-based launch platforms for Babur.
o Ra’ad – Is an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) operational with the PAF. Current range is
stated to be 350km and it can be armed with a 10-35kt nuclear warhead.
• To diversify its nuclear-strike options and to address concerns that increasing number of nuclear assets and
bases make Pakistan a ‘target-rich’ environment; Pakistan maintains air-based strike capability. Between
dedicated squadrons of F-16s and Mirage V (soon to be replaced by Chinese JF-17s), Pakistan’s nuclear-
dedicated aircraft exceed 50. The development of above-mentioned Ra’ad has bolstered Pakistan’s aeriel
options in addition launching nuclear warheads from fighter-bombers (toss bombing).
5. Vikas Sharma
• Pakistan has developed ‘Nasr’, short-range nuclear-capable BMs that carry sub-kt warheads up to 60km.
This foray into tactical nuclear capability is believed to be in response to India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.
Command and Control
• Government’s command and control system is based on “C4I2SR” – command, control, communication,
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The current structure, referred to as Strategic
Command Organization (SCO), has three tiers – National Command Authority (NCA), Strategic Plans
Division (SPD), and three Strategic Forces Commands (SFCs).
• Established in 2000, NCA supervises all organizations involved in nuclear weapons, development, and
employment, including the military. With Pakistan’s prime minister as its chairperson, NCA comprises
top civilian and military officials. NCA has two committees – Employment Control Committee (ECC)
that defines nuclear strategy and establishes command and control systems; and Development Control
Committee (DCC) that is responsible for weapon development and oversight. Final authority to launch
nuclear strikes requires consensus within NCA, with chairperson casting the final vote.
• SPD, a 70-officer body headed by an Army director-general, acts as NCA’s secretariat, and is a key
power-center. Its functions include formulating nuclear policy/strategy, developing chain of command,
securing arsenals, and formulating/coordinating operational plans with the three SFCs for movement and
deployment of weapons. SPD also oversees selection and training of personnel to serve in the nuclear
complex. SPD has authority to investigate suspicious personnel conduct that may relate to proliferation;
and recommend punishments for retired/serving personnel that override other laws.
Foreign Assistance
• China and Pakistan have long been allies and have signed numerous agreements on peaceful use of
nuclear technology, whereby China has supplied nuclear power capability and equipment to Pakistan.
However, China has also been accused of assisting in Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program, with claims
6. Vikas Sharma
of sale of weapon technology and weapon-grade Uranium, and of conducting weapon testing on
Pakistan’s behalf. Evidence confirming these claims would hold China in direct breach of Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that it is a signatory to. China has repeatedly refuted these allegations.
• Reports by Congressional Research Service (CRS) in the US have alleged that Pakistan has secretly
obtained ballistic missile technology from North Korea, with flagship missile ‘Ghauri’ said to be
reverse-engineered from North Korea’s Rodong missiles.
• Officials from Israel and US have alleged since the 1990s that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons projects are
being financed by Saudi Arabia, with the understanding that Pakistan would make nuclear weapons
available to Saudi Arabia if called upon. This issue is discussed in detail later in this paper.
Key Tenets of Nuclear Engagement Policy
• Pakistan has stated that its nuclear weapons are solely intended to deter military aggression and would
be used only if its ‘national integrity was threatened’ (President Musharraf in 1999) or ‘only if the very
existence of Pakistan as a state is threatened’ (Lieutenant General Kidwai in 2001). Kidwai detailed
Pakistan’s nuclear threshold on various facets:
o Spatial – penetration by Indian forces on a large scale
o Military – destruction of large swathe of land or air forces that could lead to imminent defeat.
Nuclear retaliation is also threatened in case of pre-emptive strikes meant to destroy Pakistan’s
nuclear installations.
o Economic – strangulation via economic blockades, stopping Indus River’s flow, capture of
Karakoram Highway etc.
o Political – destabilization of Pakistan’s political stability by external forces
• Since 1999, Pakistan has a declared ‘minimum deterrence’ policy, whereby instead of seeking a nuclear
arsenal equivalent to India’s, Pakistan has set upon attaining one that is just large enough to inflict
‘unacceptable damage’ on India instead. By definition of guaranteed unacceptable damage, Pakistan is
7. Vikas Sharma
understood to use an Indian pre-emptive strike as planning assumption, to be calibrated further with
deployment of missile defense by India. Pakistan first declared attainment in 2005, and has reiterated
commitment to maintain it in line with changing bilateral relations and evolving understanding of
‘unacceptable damage’.
• It has been widely conjectured that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are kept on ‘low-alert’ mode. During
peacetime, missiles are stored separately separate from warheads; and possibly in a disassembled form.
However, these storage sites are located within military bases, which means that weapons can be
deployed with low latency. David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security
describes Pakistan’s stance as ‘partial deployment’. Once made operational, one of three defined
scenarios is to be executed – ‘launch on warning’; ‘launch under attack’; ‘launch on orders’.
• Pakistan is assumed to subscribe to NATO’s controlled escalation approach in its nuclear engagement
policy – having developed options for limited strikes on Indian bases near the border to signal resolve
before heading for full-scale war.
• While Pakistan has pledged no-first-use against non-nuclear-weapon states, it hasn’t ruled out first-use
against nuclear-armed aggressors. This can be construed as an attempt to balance the scale against
India’s conventional nuclear superiority. Also, it has possibly given Pakistan leeway to support low-
intensity border conflicts or proxy-wars in Kashmir; while effectively deterring India at strategic level
• While not officially declared, Pakistan’s nuclear targeting strategy is understood to be counter-value
(targeting population and industrial areas) vis-à-vis counter-force (targeting military installations).
India’s military bases are widely dispersed across its huge geography, which makes counter-force less
viable given Pakistan’s paucity in both number and range of weapons. On the contrary, several major
Indian cities and industrial centers are within Pakistan’s striking range.
8. Vikas Sharma
Section 3 – Participation in Arms Control and Disarmament Measures
Pakistan’s posturing towards agreements and efforts directed at disarmament, non-proliferation and weapons-
control is determined predominantly by its relationship with India. Pakistan typically offers to sign treaties that
India declares willingness to, and refuses cooperation where India does the same. In view of that, this section
analyzes Pakistan’s stance on international measures and organizations; followed by a discussion on bilateral
efforts with India.
Involvement in International Measures and Organizations
• Pakistan is a non-signatory to Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Since Pakistan developed
nuclear weapons post-1967, it can’t enter NPT as a nuclear-weapon state (NWS), and entering NPT as a
non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) would entail dismantling its nuclear arsenal and placing nuclear
materials under IAEA safeguards. Pakistan’s enduring stance since 1967 had been that it would sign
NPT as a NNWS if India did likewise. However, nuclear cooperation agreements between US-India and
NSG waivers secured by India have left Pakistan aggrieved and it has changed its position, claiming it
would only join as a NWS. Pakistan has cited growing military asymmetry with India as justification for
needing to maintain adequate nuclear deterrence.
• Pakistan has blocked negotiations on UN’s Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that seeks to
prohibit further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Pakistan argues that FMCT should
also require states to reduce current stocks of fissile material, since without this requirement; Pakistan
would be disadvantaged against India’s larger existing fissile stocks and production capability, and its
capacity to maintain minimum deterrence curtailed. Pakistan’s opposition has been hardened by
nuclear-trade waivers granted to India by NSG in 2008 on US backing, since India can now ostensibly
purchase foreign uranium for power-reactors while utilizing domestic reserves for developing nuclear
weapons. Pakistan has expressed openness to FMCT if granted similar NSG waivers to access nuclear
9. Vikas Sharma
material for civilian energy use, a move opposed by USA on grounds of Pakistan’s unsatisfactory
proliferation record. Interestingly, Pakistan’s FMCT opposition marks a rare occasion where Pakistan
has taken a position independent of and contrary to India’s.
• Although India and Pakistan have an unspoken moratorium on testing, both are non-signatories to
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) that bans nuclear explosions in all environments.
Ostensibly, neither country is not facing undue pressure on this count since USA itself hasn’t ratified
CTBT. Analysts consider it unlikely that Pakistan will test first, cognizant of the international sanctions
and criticism it may draw. Three scenarios for possible future Pakistani testing can be painted:
1. Pakistan tests after an Indian test campaign, either for political posturing or for technical reasons
(for example, enhancing reliability and security, testing new types of warheads such as
thermonuclear devices, or new designs for smaller warheads).
2. Pakistan follows France’s example, conducts a final test-campaign, and joins CTBT
3. Pakistan detects critical design flaws in its warheads and has to test to correct them
• Pakistan is party to some multilateral organizations and programs, including the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). It is part of USA’s Secure Freight Initiative, having stationed
systems at Port Qasim to scan containers for nuclear materials. Pakistan has made its export control
mechanisms more stringent, including the 2004 Export Control Act and establishing Ministry of Foreign
Affairs’ Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) to regulate biological, nuclear and missile-related
exports. Pakistan also maintains control lists of dual-use goods that are in line with standards maintained
by organizations like NSG, Australia Group (AG), and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Bilateral Efforts with India
• Negotiations to dial-down nuclear war posturing have been mired by multiple instances of failure to
reach agreement and rejected proposals. Some examples:
o Pakistan has repeatedly rejected India’s offer of a treaty on ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons
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o India rejected proposal for a South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (1978)
o India rejected proposal for mutual inspections of each other’s nuclear facilities (1979)
o India rejected proposal for simultaneous adherence to NPT (1979)
o India rejected simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards (1979)
o India rejected a bilateral nuclear test-ban treaty (1987)
o India rejected a proposed South Asia Zero-Missile Zone (1994)
• The first few proposals were raised by Pakistan when it hadn’t as yet perfected nuclear weapons
technology, and were treated with suspicion by India as time-biding measures. Even in later years,
India’s declared distrust of Pakistan’s intentions and contention that Pakistan may run a covert weapons
program has blocked bilateral agreements. Seemingly, India’s distrust has been vindicated on several
occasions such as revelations on A.Q. Khan Network, and Pakistan’s inability to garner trust from
international community at large, including long-time ally USA.
• There have been instances of successful bilateral diplomacy too as detailed below:
o Agreement to not attack each other’s nuclear facilities (1989). Ever since, both countries have
exchanged lists of nuclear installations at the start of each year
o Agreement to set up a hotline to warn each other of accidents that may be mistaken for attacks
(2004), followed by agreement to alert each other on ballistic missile tests. These were seen as
necessary given persistent tensions and extremely short response-times available to react to
perceived attacks
o It merits noting that none of these agreements limited nuclear programs in either country
• Strategic analysts concur that India’s securing NSG waivers has dented prospects of further nuclear-
weapon related diplomacy between the neighbors, as Pakistan has perceived this development with great
indignation and as a signal of preferential treatment for India, in effect recognizing India as a NWS, a
status coveted by but declined to Pakistan.
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Section 4 – Areas of Concern
Other than looming threat of mutually-destructive nuclear war in the Indian sub-continent, Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program has given the broader international community several other causes for trepidation that can be
classified into two buckets – 1) concerns over proliferation of weapons and related technology to other nations
and 2) concerns over Pakistan’s ability keep its nuclear arsenal safe. This section details and analyzes various
facets of these concerns.
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
• Pakistan’s biggest proliferation black-mark is the black market network set up and operated under Abdul
Qadeer Khan (A.Q. Khan), who headed Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and is revered as ‘father of
the Pakistani bomb’. It found its origins in Pakistan’s extensive use of clandestine procurement networks
in 1970s to obtain technology for its fledgling nuclear-weapons program (a fact admitted by Pakistan’s
intelligence agency ISI). Khan directed this procurement effort, and subsequently ‘re-wired’ the
networks to provide key nuclear weapon components – material, enrichment technology, warhead
designs, names of middlemen/manufacturers – to willing buyers for profit. Confirmed buyers include
Libya, Iran and North Korea, though suspicion is attached to Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Syria too. This
episode remains the severest loss of control over nuclear technology ever, and an enduring
embarrassment for Pakistan’s government that scrambled to deny links with the culprit it once hailed as
a national hero. Pakistan’s continued reluctance to provide access to A.Q. Khan for IAEA questioning
has been criticized, and the network’s complete dismantling is unconfirmed.
• Past incidents of Al-Qaeda contact with Pakistan’s nuclear intelligentsia have raised eyebrows, most
notably the verified collaboration between retired Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
scientists – Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed – and Al-Qaeda leadership. Under
umbrella of UTN humanitarian organization, discussions were held with Osama bin Laden and Ayman
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al-Zawahiri in August 2001 on nuclear bomb design and construction of radiological dispersal devices.
UTN’s alleged work on biological weapons and ‘dirty-bombs’ also came to light. Post 9/11, Pakistan
interrogated these scientists and placed them under house-arrest.
• Saudi Arabia’s long-standing relationship with Pakistan (especially in military domain), is an open
secret. Speculation is rife over a ‘pact’ that in return for financial assistance, Pakistan would make
nuclear weapons available to Saudi Arabia if needed. Saudis’ interest in nuclear deterrents stems
primarily from concern over Iran’s covert nuclear program. Saudis have threatened for years that if Iran
gains nuclear weapon capability, Riyadh would follow. US efforts to relax sanctions in return for
curtailed enrichment activities by Iran are believed to have strained US-Saudi relations, and raised the
specter of Saudis turning to Pakistan. While Riyadh could just be posturing to pressurize US to be firmer
with Iran, there exists clear recent precedent (2011) of Saudis requesting and receiving Pakistani military
forces to quell a Shi’ite uprising in Bahrain. Some possible scenarios Pakistan could follow:
1. Promises nuclear retaliation from sites in Pakistan in event of nuclear attack on Riyadh
2. Commits nuclear-armed airplanes into Saudi airfields
3. Houses nuclear-capable missiles and crews to Saudi Arabia (would require Saudi development
of requisite infrastructure – launch-pads, storage, control)
4. Sells nuclear missiles and technological know-how to Riyadh
Interestingly (and worryingly), scenarios 1-3 don’t violate NPT and are similar to US stationing of
nuclear-weapons in Europe during Cold War.
• While chances of state-approved proliferation are assessed as low (except in Saudi Arabia’s case),
concerns over proliferation by knowledgeable ‘insiders’ (such as A.Q. Khan and Bashiruddin Mahmood)
persist. Pakistan has taken concrete steps to ensure such individuals’ reliability. SPD has instituted a
Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP) similar to USA’s for officials and scientists working on
sensitive projects. All individuals undergo security clearance by ISI, Intelligence Bureau, Military
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Intelligence and SPD; and are subjected to checks every two years or when transferred from one area of
programme to another. Checks encompass all aspects related to family, education, political affiliations
and fundamentalist inclinations. Similarly, a Human Reliability Programme (HRP) has been started for
all military personnel involved in Pakistan’s nuclear program. Crucially, the 2007 Ordinance that legally
institutionalized NCA, gave SPD authority to investigate suspicious conduct and prosecute any guilty
personnel (whether retired or serving) with upto 25 years imprisonment, notwithstanding any other laws.
• Another attempt to prevent recurrence of ‘Khan Network’-like debacles has been 2004’s Export Act,
established to strengthen controls over export of material, equipment and technologies related to nuclear
weapons. A control-list of dual-use goods that is consistent with international regimes like NSG, MTCR
and Australia Group, is maintained and updated regularly. Exporters found guilty of violations face
heavy fines, lengthy imprisonment, and seizure of all assets and property. As another show of intent,
Pakistan has joined GICNT.
Security of Nuclear Weapons
• There is considerable international concern regarding security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, especially in
light of increased insurgent and terrorist violence, and areas of Pakistan coming under Taliban control.
Taliban-linked groups have led successful attacks on numerous government and military targets. Attacks
on Minhas Air Force Base (which is conjectured to house nuclear weapons though denied by authorities)
in 2007-09 and temporary gain of access to base by terrorists in a 2012 gunfight made global news.
Pakistan’s HEU facility at Khushab lies close to Taliban-heavy territory. Also, there have been
attempted kidnappings of officials and technicians working at nuclear power sites in west-Pakistan.
Additionally, while Pakistan’s widely-known policy of separate storage of warheads and delivery
vehicles provides protection against accidental launch, it has been argued that it makes it easier for
unauthorized personnel to gain access and remove weapons’ fissile material.
• Other worrisome scenarios that have been painted include –
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o loss of control to weapons to rogue military units
o ascension to power of a radical Islamist government that is liberal with proliferation to Islamist
terrorists or ignites mutually-destructive war with India
o attack on civilian nuclear facilities to release large amounts of radioactivity or to acquire spent
fuel to make ‘dirty bombs’
• Cognizant of the importance of security, Pakistan has a 10,000-strong security force headed by a two-
star general deployed at its nuclear facilities. Facilities are geographically distributed and feature multi-
layered security – air defence systems, no-fly zones, fencing, monitoring by close-circuit camera and
sensors – supported by counterintelligence teams. Additionally, warheads are equipped with Permissive
Action Links (PALs) that prevent activation by unauthorized personnel. For safe transportation, Pakistan
has ratified Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and has met stated
guidelines. Post 9/11, Pakistan has welcomed US assistance (both financial and technical) in the area of
security, while pointedly reserving the right to ‘pick and choose’ measures to undertake. As for securing
spent fuel from nuclear power plants, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) has devised a 5-
year Nuclear Security Action Plan that includes procedures for handling spent fuel in accordance with
IAEA standards. Additionally, PNRA has established safety and security centers, campaigns to locate
and secure orphan sources, and detection equipment at strategic points to strike down smuggling.
• There is little genuine evidence to suggest deficiencies in Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal upkeep. Senior US
officials from government, military and intelligence bureaus have repeatedly expressed confidence in
Pakistan’s nuclear security. Other governments (including France, U.K. and even India) have concurred
on Pakistan having a solid command-and-control system and having made significant investments to
heighten security at nuclear facilities. Analysts have likened Pakistan’s nuclear facilities to sanctuaries
of stability amidst an otherwise chaotic country. A 2014 security study by Nuclear Threat Initiative
(NTI) ranked Pakistan as ‘most-improved’ among the ‘nuclear club’ and rated its overall nuclear
security above India’s. Looking deeper, the threat of Islamic fundamentalists coming to power seems
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far-fetched given past election performance record of Islamist parties. Similarly, a Taliban takeover
scenario seems to dramatically over-estimate Taliban’s influence and goodwill, which has eroded with
multiple terrorist attacks carried out by them on Pakistani soil. In fact, government is plotting to wipe
out their threat, revealing its first counter-terrorism policy in February 2014. While continuing down the
negotiation route, Pakistan has made clear its intent to react to Taliban-perpetrated terrorism with force,
conducting aerial bombing of Taliban headquarters and sending troops to tribal hideouts. It also merits
mention that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has successfully survived a military coup (rise of Musharraf to
power in 1999) and a major constitutional change (Eighteenth Amendment in 2010 directed at diluting
Presidential powers). These are positive indicators for continued nuclear integrity in the face of future
instability in the country.
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Section 5 – References
The key sources referred to for developing this paper are listed below:
1. Bruno Tertrais, July 2012. “Pakistan’s Nuclear and WMD Programmes: Status, Evolution and Risks”
EU Non-Proliferation Consortium
2. Henry D. Sokolski, Jan 2008. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War” Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College
3. A.H Nayyar, August 2008. “A Pakistani Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation”
Freidrich Ebert Stiftung
4. Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, March 2013. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and
Security Issues” Congressional Research Service (CRS)
5. Toby Dalton and Jaclyn Tandler, September 2012. “Understanding the Arms Race in South Asia”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
6. Malik Qasim Mustafa, March 2009. “Are Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Safe?” Institute of Strategic
Studies, Islamabad
7. Malik Qasim Mustafa, March 2011. “FMCT and Pakistan: Futuristic Perspectives” Institute of Strategic
Studies, Islamabad
8. Rajesh M. Basrur, May 2009. “Nuclear Weapons and India-Pakistan Relations” Strategic Analysis
Vol.33, No.3, Routledge
9. David E. Sanger, June 2004. “The Khan Network” Stanford Institute for International Studies
10. Moeed Yusuf, January 2009. “Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons”
Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution
11. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert Norris, September 2013. “Global Nuclear Inventories, 1945-2013”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2013 69:75