2. AGENDA
1. Overview
2. Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT)
3. Philippine Constitution and Policies
4. Case Study on Ukraine-Russian Armed
Conflict
5. Exercise
3.
4. Could the way for peace and security
of a world without nuclear weapons
be possible?
5. INTRODUCTION
• Nuclear proliferation is a global security concern.
• Three general concept of nuclear security:
The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear/
radiological threats and disarmament.
The prevention of nuclear or radiological materials or devise from
being diverted to illicit or malicious purposes, e.g. building of
nuclear weapons or terrorism.
Consequence management of radiological or nuclear fallouts,
including attacks, that can be mitigated through prior planning of
an effective crisis response, emergency management and
rehabilitation.
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6. • All these are the concern of non-
proliferation and disarmament regime.
• international law
• established international institutions
• international cooperation mechanisms.
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7. NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT REGIME
Treaties and
Agreements
Regional and Other
Treaties
International
Organizations
Export Control
Groups
Non-
proliferation
NPT
CTBT/PTBT
Seabed
CPPNM
NSC
FMCT
Disarmament
1925 Geneva
Protocol
BWC
CWC
Geneva Protocol
NWC
NFWZ
• Antarctic
• Tlatelolco (Latin
America)
• Rarotonga
(South Pacific)
• Bangkok (South
East Asia)
• Pelindaba (Afria)
• Treaty on a
Nuclear-
Weapon-Free
Zone in Central
Asia (CANWFZ)
• Moon (Celestial
Bodies)
• Outer Space
• PAROS
ABACC (Nuclear
Threat Initiative)
IAEA
OPCW
CTBTO
CD
United Nations
-- UNSC
-- UNGA
-- UNDDA
Zangger
NSG
MTCR/HCOC
Wassenaar
Australia Group
• Agreement on Adaptation of
the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe
• Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention
• Arms Trade Treaty
• Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons
• Convention on Cluster
Munitions
• Convention on
Environmental Modification
Techniques (ENMOD)
• International Convention for
the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism
• Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE)
• Treaty on Open Skies
• Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons
9. SUMMARY OF NPT PROVISIONS
• The Preamble sets forth the principles that are embodied the treaty:
• the need “to avert the danger of such a war…[to conform with the UN resolution]
• calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of
nuclear weapons…
• to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards…
• [to make available] the benefits of peace application of nuclear technology… [which]
should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty…
• [declaring] their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the
nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear
disarmament. ”
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10. SUMMARY OF NPT PROVISIONS
• The Preamble sets forth the principles that are embodied the treaty:
“States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”.
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11. SUMMARY OF NPT PROVISIONS
Articles I and II
• Art 1 obligates the NWS to deny assistance to NNWS that would facilitate their quest for
nuclear weapons, while the latter obligates the NNWS themselves to refrain from
developing any such weapons or seeking assistance for developing them.
• Cutoff date for was 1967, a year before the treaty opened for signature.
• The 5 NWS known to have tested nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree no to assist other
states in acquiring nuclear weapons and move toward eventual disarmament.
• NNWS are guaranteed access to civilian nuclear technology and energy development.
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12. SUMMARY OF NPT PROVISIONS
Article III
• establishes the requirement of all NNWS to accept safeguards and to conclude an
agreement with the IAEA for this purpose.
Article IV
• affirms the right of all states to utilize nuclear energy and technologies to the fullest
extent, without discrimination, for peaceful purposes. It urges cooperation on this matter
by all parties to the treaty.
Article V
• deals with the possibility of making use of peaceful nuclear explosions.
N.B.: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted in 1996, did away with this
possibility.
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13. SUMMARY OF NPT PROVISIONS
Article VI
• undertaking by all parties to the NPT to pursue discussions on the cessation of the
production of nuclear armaments, leading to the ultimate aim of universal nuclear
disarmament.
Article VII
• affirms the continued right of states to conclude separate regional treaties to promote the
absence of nuclear weapons in their territories. N.B: Nuclear Free Weapons Zones
(Antartica, South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Moon and Celestial bodies
Article VIII
• defines the provisions for amendments to the treaty and outlines the mechanisms for their
adoption.
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14. SUMMARY OF NPT PROVISIONS
Article X
• “each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the
Treaty” if it decides that extraordinary events, “related to the subject matter of this Treaty,
have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country”.
• It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United
Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of
the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests
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16. CHALLENGES OF NPT
• NPT does not include any enforcement provisions.
• The NPT does not address proliferation by non-state actors.
• The treaty does not provide for a technical secretariat. The IAEA may report to the UN
Security Council but according to the treaty, it is not obligated to do so.
• The only mechanism the treaty stipulates is a five-year review cycle (Review Conference).
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17. CHALLENGES OF THE NPT
NPT does not include any enforcement provisions, no provision of actions against state
violations and no consequences to their actions.
• Although ‘supply of sensitive technologies and materials were uncovered, it is debatable
whether the state knows about it or the entire blame rests on commercial entities
transacting with the offending states.
• India and Pakistan conducted underground nuclear tests in 1998;
• Iran conducting activities and procuring materials in 2002,
• Libya admitted clandestine uranium enrichment activities in 2003.
• North Korean testing near borders with other countries in 2002-2003 and other
occasions.
•
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18. CHALLENGES OF THE NPT
• The NPT does not address proliferation by non-state actors.
• The UNSC adopted Res 1540, a legally binding document required all UN member states to
enact and enforce measures to prevent nonstate actors from acquiring WMD.
• Many states in the UN General Assembly argued that the UNSC did not have the authority
to impose a binding resolution in the area. Some states resisted cooperation with the 1540
Committee.
• The legally binding Convention on Nuclear Terrorism, which defined nuclear terrorism and
requires international cooperation to prevent and punish such acts, had only 79 parties as
of June 2012. Hence, the Treaty is not enforced.
•
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19. CHALLENGES OF THE NPT
The treaty does not provide for a technical secretariat, IAEA is insufficient.
• The NNWS are subject to safeguards to ensure that materials and technology from civilian
activities are not diverted to weapons programs.
• IAEA is the only implementing body, serving only as the verification, monitoring compliance
with the treaty and assisting NNWS in developing civilian technology. IAEA may report to the
UNSC but not obligated to do so.
• No linkage between the export control system of Nuclear Supplier Group and verification by
IAEA. Hence, IAEA may not detect low levels of clandestine nuclear activity, e.g. Iran and
Libya.
• No sharing of actionable intelligence information where applicable.
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20. CHALLENGES OF THE NPT
The only mechanism the treaty stipulates is a five-year review cycle, “with a view to
assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being
realized.”
• Despite the emerging information of clandestine activities, the 1995 NPT Review Conference
only extended the NPT without changing the treaty provisions towards enforcement and
violations.
• 2010 Review Conference called for the recommitment of signatory members
• but were not able to follow through elimination of nuclear weapons from the Middle East
(the Middle nuclear weapons free zone)
• agreement on new US initiative for stronger verification were discarded in the Final
Agreement.
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21. CHALLENGES OF THE NPT
As stipulated in Art V, dealing with the possibility of making use of peaceful nuclear
explosions, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) adopted in 1996
But CTBT did not come into force largely because of resistance by the US and other
nuclear-armed states, China, India, Israel, and Pakistan, among the required 48 countries
with significant military or civilian nuclear capacity that did not ratify the Treaty.
Efforts to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) to ban production of weapons-
grade material was also stalled, mainly because of the US.
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22. The NPT helped to slow down proliferation. From a
prediction of 25-30 states which armed nuclear-
armed by the 1990s, there are 9 that remained
nuclear armed:
5 are recognized NWS (US, USSR, China, UK,
France) and 4 India, Pakistan and North Korea,
and Israel are de facto.
Reached near universality: total of 191 out of 193;
but India, Pakistan, Israel and South Sudan did not
ratify. North Korea withdrew in 2003.
Indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995; political
commitments of states to non-proliferation obligation
waning over the years as ambivalence prevail.
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The non-
proliferation
regime has
mixed
successes.
23. verification treaty observance through IAEA
safeguard: only 183 states signed as against 193
limited availability for most states of fissile materials
and the means to produce them, e.g. enrichment
and reprocessing; active black market proliferating
on fissile trade
23
The non-
proliferation
regime has
mixed
successes.
24. Given the deficiencies of the NPT regime and amidst
resistance mostly from NWS and de facto nuclear states
(that do not declare their nuclear weapons capability),
can disarmament be possible?
27. TREATIES RATIFIED
• Bangkok Treaty: Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-
Free Zone (EF 1997, R 2001)
• BTWC: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (EF 1975, R 1973
• CPPNM: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (EF 1987, R 1981)
• CTBT: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (NEF, R 2001)
• CWC: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction, EF 1997, R1996
• Geneva Protocol: Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, EF 1928, A 1973
28. TREATIES RATIFIED
• CCM: The Convention on Cluster Munitions, EF 2010, R2019
• CCW: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, EF1983, R1996
• CCW Amendment Article 1, EF 2004, Rnot
• CCW protocol I: Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments, EF 1983,
Consent to be bound 1996
• CCW protocol II: Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, EF 1983, Consent to be
bound 1996
• CCW Amended Protocol II: Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices EF1998, Consent to
be bound 1997
29. TREATIES RATIFIED
• CCW Protocol III: Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Incendiary Weapons, EF 1983, Consent to be bound 1996
• CCW Protocol IV: Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, R1998,
Consent to be bound 1997
• CCW Protocol V: Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, EF2006,
NotR
• The Hague Declaration (IV,3): Declaration (IV,3) concerning Expanding
Bullets, EF1990, NotR
• Mine Ban Convention: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
Their Destruction, EF1999, R2000
• Outer Space Treaty: Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, EF1967, R1967
30. TREATIES RATIFIED
• ICSANT: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, EF 2007, R2006
• NPT: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, EF 1970,
R1972
• Partial Test Ban Treaty: Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, EF 1963, R1965
• TPNW: Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, EF20.09.2017,
R2021
• Sea-Bed Treaty: Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and
the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, EF1972, R1993
• ATT: Arms Trade Treaty, EF2014, R2022
31. PHILIPPINE PARTICIPATION IN NON-
PROLIFERATION INITATIVES
Southeast Asian Nuclear Free Weapons Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) or
the Bangkok Treaty (1995). Coverage: the territories, including the
EEZ and continental shelves of the 10 ASEAN member states.
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NDPI) pushed for
transparency measures, as well as with a group of States that are
looking into nuclear verification systems.
Cracow/ Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in response to UNSCR 1540,
initiated by the US to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction,
delivery systems and related materials. Voluntarily endorsed by 107
countries.
goal is pre-emptive interdiction, which includes detaining and
searching ships and aircraft and boarding and searching ships
registered in a PSI member nation or operating under a flag of
convenience of another state prepared to authorize an interdiction in
a particular instance.
2nd Lecture on Non-Proliferation, NSSP-NDCP
33. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
• As a matter of policy, Philippines renounces war as instrument of national policy under Art II, Sec 2:
“Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.”
Cannot declare war, but can only declare a state of war as an act of defense.
• Art II Section 8 prohibits the presence of nuclear weapons in Philippine territory.
“Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons
in its territory.”
This includes the placement of foreign military bases with nuclear weapons in the country, unless
through a treaty duly concurred thereto by Philippine Senate.
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34. DOES THIS MEAN, THE PHILIPPINES CANNOT
DEVELOP NUCLEAR CAPABILITY?
• No, but only for civilian and peaceful use. Nuclear capability cannot be diverted for military
purpose.
• Sec 1, Article XII, Constitution adopts the general economic policy of more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income and wealth, including the promotion of industries,
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets:
“The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by
the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising
the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.”
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35. RECENT NUCLEAR POLICY
Duterte
• Executive 164, was issued on February 2022, on Adopting a National Position or a Nuclear Energy
Program and for other Purposes to help the country into gaining the capabilities and development of
nuclear power in compliance with international standards on “safety, security and safeguard on peaceful
development of nuclear energy”.
• Executive Order No. 116, s. 2020 for the conduct of studies for the adoption of a National Position for
a Nuclear Energy Program and establishment of the National Energy Program Inter-Agency Committee
(NEP-IAC) to oversee preparation.
Marcos
• President Marcos and US Vice President Kamala Harris announced the commencement of bilateral
negotiations on a civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement (123 agreement) to boost cooperation on
clean energy and non proliferation with the use of Small Modular Reactor technology.
• Marcos is also exploring a nuclear energy partnership with France, conveyed this at the sidelines of
APEC summit in Bangkok last Nov.
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36. NEED FOR A PHILIPPINE NUCLEAR
DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK IN
RELATION TO NUCLEAR SECURITY
• Further study has to made in amending the complex
and outdated regulatory and legislative frameworks
on nuclear power and energy security. In the absence
of an acceptable model of commercial SMRs, licensing
and regulatory standards for this technology would
remain abstract.
• This should be harmonized with the IAEA safeguards.
Congress is deliberating on amending legislative and
regulatory frameworks on nuclear safety, security and
safeguards.
Julius Cesar Imperial Trajano. CO22125 | Small Modular Reactors in
the Philippines’ Journey Toward Nuclear Energy. 5 Dec 2022.
RSISPublications@ntu.edu.sg.
•
Presentation title 36
37. RECENT PHILIPPINE LEGISLATIVE MEASURES TO
PREVENT TERRORISTS FROM ACQUIRING WMD
• Related to UNGA Re 72/42, Republic Act No. 10697, “An Act Preventing the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction by Managing the Trade in Strategic goods, the Provision of
Related Services, and for Other Purposes” or Strategic Trade Management Act (STMA).
• The law enforces measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of
WMD and their means of delivery to, from or within the Philippines.
• the DTI-STMO was designated as the technical arm for the regulation and monitoring of
strategic goods and precent their unlawful acquisition.
• The NSC-Strategic Trade Management Committee (NSC-STMCom), is hereby constituted and deemed the
central authority on any and all matters relating to strategic trade management
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38. • Republic Act No. 11479 (Ant-Terrorism Act of 2020)
• among its mandates, the ATC is responsible for taking up measures to prevent the
acquisition and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
• The act defined Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction as referring to the ‘transfer
and export of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, their means of
delivery and related material”.
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40. UKRAINE-RUSSIAN WAR
40
• Nexus of nuclear security and international
humanitarian law
• Putin has threatened the use of nuclear
weapons in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and
recently escalated the threats as he
pledged that Russia “would use all
weapons systems available” to protect its
“territorial integrity”, “Russia’s people” as
well as Russia’s “independence and
freedom”.
Lecture on Non-Proliferation, NSSP-NDCP
41. • International humanitarian law (IHL) prohibits the use of nuclear weapons during an ongoing-
armed conflict
• nuclear weapons are not selective in their deployment
• results upon impact which is indeterminate due loss of control over radiation fallout
• causing massive short term and long term loss of human life and environmental damage.
• Use of nuclear weapons in war is also in contravention of the principles of proportionality
and distinction.
• However, International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion ruling established that while the
threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally prohibited by IHL, it is unclear whether such a
threat or use of nuclear weapons would be permissible in extreme circumstances where a
state’s survival is at stake. (Reports of Judgements, Advisor Opinions and Orders: Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapon Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996)
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42. The Ukraine-Russian conflict exposes existing gaps between IHL and the nuclear security legal
framework
In relation to jus ad bellum (just war theory), Russia needs only to establish the pretext
of an threat or use of nuclear weapons as an attack to its sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
In the context of global disarmament and nonproliferation efforts and jus in bello (justice
in war), such remarks of Putin heightens nuclear security risks and a humanitarian
catastrophe at the expense of collective efforts by NWS to propel disarmament and
collective nuclear security regime.
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43. • With the legal regimes of IHL and nuclear security relevant and present for
application in this conflict, each area does not provide comprehensive support
for nuclear security and complete adherence by parties involved.
• Therefore, this reinforces that need for dual application of IHL and nuclear
security legal framework vis-à-vis armed conflict.
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45. 2nd Lecture on Non-Proliferation, NSSP-NDCP 45
AR Global Security
www.baserate.io
46. • The US and China are two contending NWS. Thinking of
the non-proliferation and/or IHL frameworks, where
should the Philippines locate itself in the contest of
hegemony between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific
Region?
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47. THANK YOU
Maria Cristina B Exmundo, MNSA
Institute of National Security Governance,
National Security Council
mexmundo2004@gmail.com
mexmundo2004@yahoo.co.uk
Editor's Notes
In Aug 1945, the US dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, after Tokyo attacked of Pearl Harbour, Hawaii. Definitely, these bombings have hastened the conclusion of WWII.
The bombing left Hiroshima and Nagasaki in ruins, and killed instantly tens of thousands of lives (estimated 140,000 in Hiroshima and 74,000 in Nagasaki) and had profound and long-term human cost, e.g increase in incidence of cancer and chronic diseases, and other long-term side effects of radiation.
The aftermath of WWII was the beginning of the nuclear arms race between nuclear-armed US, the Soviet Union, Britain and France that adopted a policy of nuclear deterrence. This headed off to the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union -- “cold” because the nuclear rivalry avoided direct confrontation under the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), while many fronts became their battlefield - political, economic, military, cultural, ideological and the Space Race. Their support to their allies led to proxy wars, e.g. the Korean War (1950-53), the Vietnam War (1055-1975) and Afghanistan (1979-1989).
The wars paved the way for global attempts at non-proliferation to stop the spread to nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) so that no new nuclear armed state will emerge, and to establish the conditions for nuclear weapons states (NWS), to honour their treaty commitments to disarm. Hence, non-proliferation is inextricably linked with nuclear disarmament.
From a realist perspective, of course not. The non-proliferation regime may have only preserved the status quo, and commitments on disarmament remained unfulfilled.
But from a constructivist lens, it is just a matter of current updating the non-proliferation framework and cooperative reinforcing it to effectively address today’s proliferation threats. The non-nuclear proliferation regime can still be improved and lead to ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear proliferation is a global security concern. Nuclear security encompasses many objectives. But for the purpose of our discussion, we look into the general concept of nuclear security to mean three things:
The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear/ radiological threats and disarmament, hence, their proliferation is discouraged, detected and/or dissuaded while systems that support peaceful uses, e.g. nuclear energy are encouraged.
The prevention of nuclear or radiological materials or devise from being diverted to illicit or malicious purposes, and the security of these materials to reduce opportunities for malefactors who are stopped, investigated and effectively countered.
Consequences management of radiological or nuclear fallouts, including attacks, that can be mitigated through prior planning of an effective crisis response, emergency management and rehabilitation.
Here is a quick look of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The UN website provides for the list of the international treaties/convention and states that ratified them. Ratification is important because it spells out the obligation of member states under International Law. But not all 193 states would. For non-proliferation, the commitment of states is very important because of the total devastation of nuclear weapons that could wipe out humanity as we know it.
We start our discussion on the NPT. The Treaty was opened for signature in 1968, and entered into force in 1970. More than any other treaty, 191 out of 193 countries signed and/or ratified the treaty. There had been international humanitarian law-related treaties on warfare in the past, but the NPT was the first treaty dedicated to non-proliferation and it attained near universality. We will see later how analysts assessed the NPT in addressing nuclear security and what were missed opportunities pertaining the measure.
The IAEA which is the only enforcement institution of the NPT.
The Review Conference is also not an enforcement mechanism.
Most usual for states to have the UN Security Council issue a resolution on their violations, actions that needed to be done concerning inspections and monitoring by the IAEA.
NPT does not include any enforcement provisions. Its language demonstrates that when the treaty was conceived, it was viewed as a proclamation of good will, and as such, did not provide for any action against those who choose to disregard their obligations. No consequences to violators of the treaty.
Although many states did not fulfill their obligation to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA, this was not seen as a serious violation of NPT, and no action other than mention of the fact was taken.
There were innumerable instances where supply of sensitive technologies and know-how to developers of weapons were uncovered. It is still debatable whether a state had done so either knowingly or turning a blind eye, or whether the entire blame rested on commercial entities for having conducted illicit transactions with the offending states.
Serious cracks in the treaty appeared in Iran and North Korea, both parties to the NPT but were found to have been developing nuclear weapons. Although the international community reacted by dealing with the offending states and improving the verification mechanism, loopholes in the treaty were not closed. In 1998, India and Pakistan began conducting underground nuclear tests. In 2002, information began to emerge that Iran was conducting activities and procuring materials contrary to its obligations. In late 2003, Libya admitted that it was involved in clandestine uranium enrichment activities. But the international community cannot legally confirm or negate them.
After the Sept 11 attacks, the UNSC adopted Res 1540, a legally binding document required all UN member states to enact and enforce measures to prevent nonstate actors from acquiring WMD. Many states in the UN General Assembly argued that the UNSC did not have the authority to impose a binding resolution in the area. As a result, some states resisted cooperation with the 1540 Committee, established to oversee the implementation of the resolution. UNSC recommitted itself to 1540 with Res 1977 (April 2011) extending the mandate of the 1540 Committee by 10 years. In addition to resistance facing the implementation of Res 1540, the legally binding Convention on Nuclear Terrorism, which defined nuclear terrorism and requires international cooperation to prevent and punish such acts, had only 79 parties as of June 2012 and has not entered into force.
The NNWS are subject to safeguards to ensure that materials and technology from civilian activities are not diverted to weapons programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is the implementing body for the NPT, serves as the verification, monitoring compliance with the treaty and assisting NNWS in developing civilian technology.
The scope and mandate of NPT and IAEA are relatively broad that is a critical gap in coverage: 189 states are parties to the treaty, but 3 of the world’s 9 nuclear powers – India, Israel and Pakistan never joined and North Korea withdrew in 2003.
The IAEA deals only with NPT issues related to verification and not with issues of enforcement or the treaty’s legal issues. Thus, even if enforcement of the existing regime were not an issues, nearly half of the world’s nuclear armed states are excluded from its provisions.
The IAEA may report to the UN Security Council but according to the treaty, it is not obligated to do so. The system of verification relies on informal arrangements that is not only non-binding, but also limited in membership and many countries with growing industrial capacity are not included. There is no linkage between the export control system and verification system, asd export control information is not systematically shared with the IAEA, not even fully among the members of the Nuclear Supplier Group. Result? The IAEA may not reliably detect low levels of clandestine nuclear activity, e.g. Iran and Libya for many years, unless at the very least supported and supplemented by the sharing of actionable information from an effective system of export controls and intelligence information where applicable.
The review cycle is also not an enforcement mechanism. It is done every 5 years “with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.” However, this does not provide the mechanism that is essential if adherence to the treaty is to be followed closely.
Despite the emerging information of clandestine activities, the 1995 NPT Review Conference only extended the NPT indefinitely without changing the treaty provisions of its language.
Meanwhile, the 2010 Review Conference concluded with modest success because in the final outcome document, that called for recommitment of signatory members to the principles of the treaty, specific action plans for nonproliferation and disarmament, elimination of nuclear weapons from the Middle East thru a regional Nuclear weapons free zone did not pull through and the unanimous agreement for some new US initiative for stronger verification requirements was eliminated from the final document.
As stipulated in Art V, dealing with the possibility of making use of peaceful nuclear explosions, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) adopted in 1996, did away with this possibility.
But CTBT did not come into force largely because of resistance by the US and other nuclear-armed states, China, India, Israel, and Pakistan, among the required 48 countries with significant military or civilian nuclear capacity that did not ratify the Treaty. Efforts to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) to ban production of weapons-grade material was also stalled, mainly because of the US.
In short, the NPT regime has mixed results.
The 5 NWS are UNSC permanent members by the way. So in any event of a resolution against them, one can only veto and the resolution will not push through like a resolution against Russia on the Russia-Ukraine armed conflict.
There was chance to change the language of the treaty in 1995 to provide the needed sanctions to violators, But part of the effectiveness of a goodwill treaty is gaining as much members.
NPT limited the availability for most NNWS states to acquire fissile materials, but the black market is actively proliferating on fissile trade, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Start with Philippine ratification and ratification, then the Phil Constitution and Laws/Policies. The Philippines as a dualist attitude when it comes to international law, meaning even though we have agreed to the general principles of law and therefore, we enforce as far as those principles go, we still need a domestic law to enable the complete fulfillment of the treaty.
EF means the time the treaty came into force, NEF not enforced, R is the time the Philippines has ratified the treaty, NotR as not ratified
It is noticeable that in the CCW protocols, the Philippines consented to be bound. Why is this so? 1996-1997 was a time that the country is transitioning after EDSA 1, a constitutional convention was formed and a new constitution was drafted and approved by the Philippine public in a plebiscite. At that time, an executive issuance is considered as good as an enacted law, a republic act. But the consent to be bound just as effective as ratification? Yes, according to the Vienna Convention “The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.”
If you notice, that earlier treaties also made use of prohibitions against any use of weapons that would have disproportional or indiscriminate results like expending bullets or anti-personnel land mines and seamines, etc etc.
But it was only in 1968 onwards that nuclear weapons and later weapons of mass destruction (CBRN) became the subject matter of treaties, be they be used on land, at sea, and as far as the moon (and back) and the outer space, with a view on preventing environmental crisis from nuclear weapons. Today, we use the term environmental justice which also includes the universal protection from nuclear testing, extraction, production, and disposal of toxic/hazardous wastes and poisons and nuclear testing that threaten the fundamental right to clean air, land, water, and food.
Through SEANWFZ Treaty or Bangkok Treaty, ASEAN affirms the NPT in ASEAN countries whose coverage are their territories, EEZ and continental shelves.
The Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty welcomes the signing and early ratification of the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), and efforts are underway towards the accession of the NWS to the Protocol.
NDPI started in 2010 as a consequence of the NPT Review Conference. It was founded by Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates as Ministerial level group of states that seeks achieve a number of goals, first among them advancement of the nuclear disarmament agenda and greater transparency in the way nuclear weapons states fulfill their disarmament commitments. The organization is based in New York.
PSI’s goal is pre-emptive interdiction of WMD on board ships and aircraft. One may ask, does the PSI go beyond the mandates of UNSCR 1540 by being pro-active in interdiction, especially of boarding and inspection of vessels? No we have various IMO (International Maritime Organization) and ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) regulations transport of WMD and their precursors in ships and aircraft.
Nonetheless, the international community has intervened for Ukraine and filed with the ICJ, the case of genocide against the Russian Federation under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment on the Crime of Genocide, not only in view of the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war, but Russia’s annexation of Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine in 2013-2014.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is investigating war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine - going back as far as 2013, before Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. Its chief prosecutor, British lawyer Karim Khan, believes there is a reasonable basis to believe war crimes have been carried out. However, the ICC has no powers to arrest suspects, and Russia is not a signatory to the agreement which set up the court - so it is unlikely to extradite any suspects. The ICC generally takes over prosecutions for war crimes in countries where the court systems are too weak to carry out the prosecutions themselves. So far, however, it seems Ukraine's courts have been able to mount their own cases. By the end of August 2022, its prosecutor general had charged 135 suspected war criminals.
