This document discusses realist perspectives on alliances, arms control, and the balance of power. Realists believe states should prepare for war to maintain peace, remain vigilant as other states cannot be fully trusted, and avoid moralizing as standards only apply to individuals, not states. Alliances can increase military capabilities but also entangle states in others' disputes. Arms control is difficult as agreements only work where not needed and some weapons prevent wars but increase destructiveness. Maintaining a balance of power through deterrence of potential aggressors is ideal but information is imperfect and worst-case thinking can spark arms races.

1. Chapter 9: Alliances,
Arms Control, and
the Balance of Power

2. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Realist Road to Security Assumptions
and Policy Recommendations
Realist Policy Prescriptions Premises
Prepare for war: If you want peace, prepare for war.
Remain vigilant: No state is to be trusted further than
its national interest.
Avoid moralism: Standards of right and wrong apply to
individuals, but not states.
Remain involved and actively
intervene:
Isolationism is not an alternative to
active global involvement.
Protect with arms: Strive to increase military
capabilities; fight rather than submit.
Preserve the balance of power: Do not let any other state or coalition
become dominant.
Prevent arms races from resulting in
military inferiority with rivals:
Negotiate agreements with
competitors to maintain a favorable
military balance.
2

3. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Alliances
 Two or more states combine military
capabilities; formal agreements to
coordinate behavior
 Increase deterrence
 Increased defense capabilities
 Allies don’t ally with enemies
3

4. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Realist Criticisms
of Alliances (1 of 2)
 Can increase capabilities of aggressive
states
 Provoke formation of counter-alliances
 Can draw in otherwise neutral states
 Must try to control behavior of allies
 Today’s ally may be tomorrow’s enemy
 Foreclose options
4

5. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Realist Criticisms
of Alliances (2 of 2)
 Reduce adaptability
 Eliminate bargaining advantages that come
from ambiguity
 Provoke fears of adversaries
 Entangle states in disputes of allies
 Stimulate envy of states outside
the alliance
 Preserves existing rivalries
 But alliances can still be useful
5

6. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Balance of Power
 Peace most likely to be maintained when
military power is distributed so that no
single power or bloc can dominate
 An ambiguous concept
 Weakness invites attack, so countervailing
power must be used to deter potential
aggressors
 Size principle: competing alliances are
roughly equal in power
6

7. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Rules for an Effective
Balancing Process
 Stay vigilant—identify potential
threats and opportunities
 Seek allies when you cannot match the
armaments of an adversary
 Remain flexible in making alliances
 Oppose any state that seeks hegemony
 Be moderate in victory
7

8. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Criticisms of
Balance of Power Theory
 The theory’s rules are contradictory
 It assumes that policymakers possess
accurate, timely information about
other states
 The tendency of defense planners to engage
in worst-case scenario planning can spark
an arms race.
 It assumes that decision makers are
risk averse
 It has not been effective
8

9. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Alternatives to Balance
of Power
 Hegemonic Stability Theory
 A concert of great powers
• Common sense of duty
• Normative consensus is fragile
9

10. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
The Causes of War
 Realism-systemic; anarchic
nature of the system
 Capitalism and War
 Free Trade and Peace
10

11. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
State Level and Sub-State
Level Theories of War
 Regime Type
 Expected Utility Theory
 Aggressive States
 Imperialist States
 Nationalism
 War as a Diversion
11

12. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Individual Level Theories
 Human Aggression
 Theory of Natural Selection
12

13. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Individual Leaders: Madmen
and Megalomaniacs
 Will to power of Adolph Hitler
 Misperceptions
 ―The Fog of War‖
13

14. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Disagreement About Three
Different Main Causes
 Causes as permissive conditions: reasons
why war is possible: especially prominent
in realist theory.
 General sources of conflict: also known as
the underlying causes of war. This notion of
cause is found in many theories at the
systemic and state level.
 Causes as decisions to initiate war,
especially prominent at the state and
individual levels.
14

15. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Arms Control
 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(ABM)
 SALT I and SALT II
 The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
 The Campaign to Ban Landmines
15

16. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Limits to Arms Control
 Skeptics say it only works where it is
not needed.
 Some weapons may help prevent
wars, but increase destructiveness.
16

17. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Arms Agreements
 Arms control vs. disarmament
 Bilateral agreements
 Multilateral agreements
 Possibilities for cooperation are low
• Prisoner’s Dilemma
17

18. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Caging the Nuclear Threat:
The Negotiated Control and Reduction of
Deployed Strategic U.S. and Russian
Warheads
18

19. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Balance of Power Models
 Unipolarity
• United States just after World War II
• United States now?
 Bipolarity
• United States/Soviet Union 1949–1989
• NATO–Warsaw Pact
• Extended deterrence
 Multipolarity
19

20. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Future Multipolarity?
 United States
 China
 Russia
 European Union
 Japan
 Brazil
 India
20

21. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
A Power Transition in the
Global Hierarchy
21

22. Copyright 2010 Cengage Leaning
Web Links
 Center for Nonproliferation Studies
(CNS)
 Federation of American Scientists
 International Relations and Security
Network
 NATO
22