Coercive-Diplomacy

UNIVERSITY
OF
KENT

Coercive
Diplomacy:

An
Effective
Tool
for
Maintaining
International
Security?

James
Peters

Word
Count:
2,950

2/26/2015

1

Introduction

Coercive diplomacy offers a credible alternative to violence. In an anarchic
international system, states can utilize means of their economic or diplomatic power in an
effort to coerce other states to their will. Normally, coercive diplomacy will take the form of
economic sanctions that target the elites of a ruling country.1
However, scholars like
McGillivray raise the point that with the many tools open to a modern nation-state to use
when trying to negotiate and influence other states in the international arena, the viability of
hard power techniques (like war and coercive diplomacy) are increasingly losing credibility
to enact effective change when compared to more normative soft power approaches2
or the
mixed methods of smart power.3
So that raises the question regarding the effectiveness of
coercive diplomacy’s role in the 21st
century. By use of examples ranging through the Cold
War to the War on Terror, I will look at examples from when coercive diplomacy has been
used successfully, unsuccessfully and, in the case of Russia today, where it seems to be
unclear as to which direction and degree of success Western sanctions will have in coercing
Russian withdrawal from the Ukraine crisis. By examining the historical impact of coercive
diplomacy as a foreign policy tool, it will be shown that in a globalized world, coercive
diplomacy only works when the international community stands in unity, and thus is a shaky
tool for upholding international security.
Coercive diplomacy is a reactionary hard power response to a political, economic or
cultural event: it is in nature a defensive policy instrument.4
While the tactics used to enact
this kind of diplomacy (cutting off diplomatic ties, economic sanctions, or travel restrictions
on the political elite of a target country) can be used offensively, George notes that it would
be better to label these tactics when applied offensively/proactively as a “blackmail
strategy”.5
Essentially, coercive diplomacy is a strategy that gives the receiving party a
chance to stop or undo the behavior abhorred by the sending party.6
Measuring the ‘effectiveness’ of coercive diplomacy is another question. As
McGillivray points out, there is a considerable difference in attitude towards upholding
sanctions and a state’s reaction depending on if the two states in question are democratic,

1

(McGillivray
and
Stam,
2004)

2

(Manners,
2006)

3

(Clinton,
2010)

4

(George,
1991,
p.
5)

5

ibid

6

(George,
1991,
p.
6)

2

autocratic, or one of each;7
the democratic state will be less flexible with lifting sanctions
when leadership changes due to a transfer of support groups from the old government to the
new versus an autocratic state.8
An autocratic state’s leader is often supported by a small
segment of the population and if a new leader comes to power then he is usually supported by
a new segment of the population, thus enabling him to much more quickly reverse a policy
(of enacting sanctions or ending a behavior that is the case for sanctions being placed on his
country).9
The democratic leader is unable to quickly react and change policies regarding the
placement or removal of sanctions because his political legitimacy normally comes from
several of the same groups that supported the policies of the previous government.
McGillivray and Stam make the argument that the duration of sanctions is likely to be
more flexible when they are being targeted at an autocratic state or the autocratic state is the
initiator.10
They use the example of Indonesia lifting sanctions against Malaysia after a coup
in Indonesia to show a change in leadership in a non-democratic state leads to fastest
sanctions policy reform.11
Even though they provide a persuasive model, it fails to take into
account the fact that we live in a globalized world. Their focus on a level one analysis
(personal level) does not take into account the fact that political elites are also playing on a
level two (state) and level three (systemic) game.
Because leaders democratic or non-democratic are constantly vying for legitimacy,
they can both gain resources and support from their domestic audience or from abroad.12
The
purpose of coercive diplomacy is to sever that international aspect of internal state support
whether that is cutting of access to goods, diplomatic legitimacy, or cooperation with the
current administration in achieving some end. But in an increasingly multi-polar economic
and political world, it can only take one major trading partner to undo sanctions being
enacted by another world power.
If China places sanctions on India but no other major power supports those sanctions,
they are much more likely to fail in coercing India than if other major powers supported those
sanctions too. This touches on the article by Toft, her notion that ideologies (her focus is on
religion in civil wars, but it also applies to transnational ideologies and geopolitical strategy)

7

(McGillivray
and
Stam,
2004,
p.
2)

8

(McGillivray
and
Stam,
2004,
p.
8)

9

ibid

10

(McGillivray
and
Stam,
2004,
p.
17)

11

(McGillivray
and
Stam,
2004,
p.
10)

12

(Snyder,
2000)

3

can fuse transnational support networks that can supplement the lack of support or resources
that political elites have domestically.13
When this idea is applied to a multi-polar world, a
country that loses the support of one benefactor can then turn to another country to
supplement what it is losing from the sanctioning country. This then means that a rogue state
or a state considered a danger to international order like Iran or North Korea can only be
successfully sanctioned against if there is a consensus between the great powers that a danger
is present to international order, and coercive diplomacy measures like sanctions are
necessary to uphold international security.
Case
Studies

Examples
of
Successful
Application
of
Coercive
Diplomacy

Iran began enriching uranium domestically in 2000.14
This led the administration of
George W Bush to push the international community to sanction Iran in 2006.15
These
sanctions were then expanded five times to date.16
Each resolution was passed by the UN
Security Council, which showed international support in the calls for Iran to stop enriching
uranium. However, in a 2011 interview, the then-President of Iran, Ahmadinejad, stated that
his country would continue to enrich more uranium despite the mounting pressure applied by
the UNSC and the squeezing effect that sanctions were having on the Iranian economy.17
After Ahmadinejad’s defeat in the Iranian elections in 2013,18
Iran opened up to
negotiating on its nuclear program with direct negotiations with the United States since 1979
and even reached a deal to halt uranium enrichment by the end of 2013.19
Based on the theory
stipulated above, McGillivray and Stam would argue that the change in Iran’s autocratic
president signaled that a different interest group was calling the shots in Iran, and thus that
would signal a change in the sanctions régime. While that analysis is almost right, the
supreme authority of Iran, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is only the second
supreme leader of Iran to hold office and he has ruled since 1989.20
As the real figurehead of
government power in Iran, it would seem that there are more dynamics at play than the
change in leadership in the office of the President.

13

(Toft,
2007,
p,
104)

14

(Nuclear
Power
in
Iran
2014)

15

(Resolutions
on
Iran)

16

ibid

17

(Transcript
of
the
Ahmadinejad
interview
-‐
The
Washington
Post
2011)

18

(BBC,
2013a)

19

(Times,
2014)

20

(PBS)

4

Because Iran’s economy has suffered enormously in the energy and financial sectors,21
it
has lost the support of powerful international partners (Russia and China both participate in
the sanctions against Iran), and the sanction imposing countries have given no indication of
ending their coercive diplomacy, Iran has folded to international pressure to negotiate a
nuclear deal. The key factor in the success of this case is the role the international
community, and its unity against the development of a weapons-capable nuclear program.
While sanctions are still in place, the fact that Iran has come to the table to negotiate already
gives them strong credibility in this case. The case of Iran is one where a solid consensus of
the international community at the UNSC has shown that coercive diplomacy can be effective
in mitigating a threat to international security.
Another case of successful coercive diplomacy in enacting change would be the
international sanctions placed on South Africa as a response to its apartheid regime. The
UNSC began placing sanctions on South Africa in the 1960s. Throughout the 70s and 80s,
mounting pressure was placed on Western governments to punish the South African régime
for its apartheid practices. Coercive diplomacy seems to have worked in this case not because
the all-white government in South Africa decided out of the kindness of its heart to share
power with the black Africans. Rather, systemic level-three pressure seems to have coerced
the government into working out a power sharing system with the native African
population.22
The notion of political bidding comes into play here. So long as political elites can make
bids for support that counteract the negative effects of sanctions, they will be able to resist
sanctions. In the South African and Iranian cases, solidarity of the international community
proved to be a factor strong enough to get autocratic governments to change their policies in
exchange for the removal of sanctions. This stands in contrast to the argument made by
McGillivray and Stam that change in political leadership is the catalyst for autocratic
governments to change sanction-able behavior. In these cases, it would be the united hostility
of the international community that caused a change in behavior leading to the end (ending in
the Iran case as they are still in place) of sanctions, not a change in leaders.

21

(Gordon,
2010)

22

(DOS,
2009)

5

Examples
of
Failed
Application
of
Coercive
Diplomacy

The success of coercive diplomacy is mixed at best.23
A prime example of a huge
failure for coercive diplomacy would be the failed American sanctions régime in place
against Cuba. A legacy of the Cold War, Cuba has been plagued by American sanctions since
the beginning of the 1960s shortly following Fidel Castro’s communist takeover of the
island.24
Starting with Eisenhower as a response to the communist threat, the US has tried to
use its economic leverage to coerce the Cuban government into changing from a single party
system to a multiparty system.25
At the time that the sanctions were put in place, the US made
up roughly 40% of global GDP, and a total embargo was a devastating reality for the Cuban
market.26
Based on the findings of the McGillivray and Stam study, we would not expect to see
a change in either side of the sanction policy. The US lawmakers are beholden to their
democratic audience, and the Cuban Americans of Florida play a key role in presidential
elections because of their community’s key status as a large voting bloc in that state’s
Electoral College representation.27
Therefore, McGillivray argues that the Cubans would be
the first to blink. Once the leadership of Cuba changes, she says that sanctions would be
lifted.28
Regardless of political party leadership in the US, McGillivray and Stam make the
claim that the democratic process will not allow for the US to change its policy first. Thus, if
there was no leadership change in Cuba or a political willingness to address the situation
another way, sanctions were the tool utilized by the United States to maintain its security.
But as we know with President Obama’s speech last December,29
the US made the
first move in dismantling its sanctions regime against Cuba. After 60 years of a failed policy,
it would seem long overdue. And despite the prediction that a change in leader would change

23

(McGillivray
and
Stam,
2004,
p.
12)

24

(Baker,
2014)

25

(McGillivray
and
Stam,
2004,
p.
2)

26

(Peters,
2015)

27

(McGillivray
and
Stam,
2004,
p.
10)

28

(McGillivray
and
Stam,
2004,
p.
2)

29

(Obama,
2014)

6

the state thus ending sanctions,30
when Raul Castro came to power in 2008, policies stayed
the same. Moreover, it was in Obama’s second administration that change finally happened.
It can be argued that the Obama administration opted to end the coercive diplomacy
strategy against Cuba because Obama did not have to worry about re-election and thus was
beyond the influence of the political support groups that democratic leaders depend on for
legitimacy. However, it would then have to be asked why didn’t any of the other six of 11
presidents (two of whom were Democrats like Obama) since the sanctions went into place lift
them in their second term?31
And more importantly, why did the sanctions fail to enact
change in Cuba over the past 60 years?
Sanctions failed to enact change in Cuba because the relatively comparable level of
economic and political support that Cuba got from the USSR canceled out the negative
effects that US sanctions had on Cuba. This trend has only been exasperated with time.
Today, the US makes up close to 22% of global GDP, while Cuba is free to trade with the EU
(who makes up nearly 24% of global GDP) and China (12.3% of GDP).32
The UN General
Assembly has voted 23 years in a row asking the US to remove its sanctions against Cuba.33
Moreover, Russia has spoken about reopening Soviet-era bases on Cuba34
whilst carrying out
long distance military flights to the Caribbean.35
Together, these factors speak against the notion that leadership in given countries are
the drivers of the duration or effectiveness of a sanctions policy. Rather, systemic factors are
the determinant factors in the effectiveness of sanctions policy. Even though the US is a large
viable market to trade with, in today’s globalized world, Cuba can trade with growing
economies in Asia, with the European Union, and with its other neighboring countries in
Latin America. Without the support of other powers, trade sanctions from the United States
alone are fairly ineffective at coercing Cuba. Moreover, the aggressive position of the United
States towards Cuba has been a push factor for it to seek stronger ties with former military
allies (like Russia). Clearly, it would not be in the interest of US security for Cuba to become
friendly with Russia and for the Russians to reopen their bases there. Security factors, not

30

(BBC,
2013b)

31

(The
Presidents
|
Whitehouse.Gov)

32

(Peters,
2015)

33

(Nations,
2014)

34

(Luhn,
2014)

35

(Peters,
2014)

7

change in leadership, were the cause for the Obama administration begin its process of
reversing 60 years of negative ties between the two countries.
Briefly, another clear case where coercive diplomacy fails to contain threats to the
international community would be the case of US sanctions on North Korea and its continued
pursuance of nuclear weapons. Like Cuba did throughout the cold war, North Korea also
benefits from a strong benefactor: China. China has usually, though not always, vetoed
UNSC resolutions aimed at controlling the actions of the hermit kingdom.36
While the US
and its allies have their own set of sanctions against North Korea,37
the effectiveness of their
ability to maintain international security and keep North Korea from devolving long range
missiles38
and nuclear weapons39
has failed.

Coercive
Diplomacy,
an
effective
tool
at
maintaining
security
when

employed
against
other
great
powers
or
non-‐state
actors?

The current Ukraine crisis has brought Russia under criticism and has seen the US and
its allies impose sanctions on the Russian elite. This has pushed Russia into a dangerous
position for its geopolitical grand strategy. To re-assert dominance in Eastern Europe, it has
to find substitutes for its former good ties and trading partners in Europe. While Europeans
continue to buy most of their natural gas from Russia, political alienation from the West will
push Russia further east. While a marriage of convenience with China is good for Russia
today, it is unsustainable,40
mainly because of Chinese interest in the resources of Siberia and
land claims against Russia. The more resources that Russia gives to China, the stronger China
becomes, and is more able to act on its claims.41
This then raises an interesting challenge
regarding security and coercive diplomacy. Vladimir Putin is going to have to decide what is
less harmful to Russia: enduring Western sanctions while selling goods to help his future
rivals in Beijing grow stronger, or abdicate to Western demands and abandon the conflict in
Ukraine.

36

(Choo,
2008)

37

(US
Department
of
the
Treasury,
2015)

38

(BBC,
2014)

39

(Nuclear
Threat
Initiative,
2014)

40

(Peters,
2014)

41

(Florcruz,
2013)

8

Another nuance in examining the security effectiveness of coercive diplomacy would
be to consider its role as a policy weapon when organized states engage the leaders of violent
non-state groups. How do you place sanctions on a terrorist organization like ISIS? By using
sanctions against the assets of such a group, the international community would be
legitimizing a group that they are hoping will disintegrate. But as the West is war weary after
intervening in Iraq and Afghanistan, it seems unlikely they will use more traditional ground
methods and bring the fight to ISIS on the ground any time soon.
And, that returns us to the question regarding the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy
in promoting international security. Without consensus from the international community,
that security is very hard to come. As was shown in the examples of successfully applied
coercive diplomacy, international consensus is needed for sweeping sanctions to work. As in
the case of Cuba and North Korea, international political bidding enables weaker states that
are the targets of stronger states to fish for other benefactors. And as the world becomes more
multi-polar, the pool of benefactors grows while the direct effect of one country placing
sanctions on a second are mitigated by the relative strength of other trading partners.
Conclusively, this then stipulates that coercive diplomacy is only an effective method for
promoting enhanced inter-state security when the international community holds a consensus
that the actions of one player endanger the security of the community as a whole.

9

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Coercive-Diplomacy

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