The document discusses issues relating to national security versus international security from the perspective of a potential National Security Advisor. It addresses topics like alliance-building, arms control, and international law. The main points are:
1) As National Security Advisor, the author would need to conduct thorough analysis of global issues and weigh national interests, while also accommodating changes to maintain good global relations.
2) Alliance-building can both benefit and harm national security, so the U.S. should take a realist approach and only form alliances to deal with direct threats.
3) Arms control agreements can stabilize relations but nations are reluctant to give up defenses, so the U.S. must prepare militarily
1. Kristina Console
International Relations
Final Paper
5/20/2007
National Security or International Security, That is the Question?
As National Security Advisor to the President, my job, done correctly, would
necessitate a comprehensive as well as thorough analysis of the global community and
the United States’ role within that community. Furthermore, it would be crucial to weigh
the importance of national interest in all decision-making thereafter. It would be my
responsibility to stress the importance of the preservation of our national sovereignty and
identity through self-interest, and at the same time recommend appropriate adjustments to
accommodate the ever-changing world order, all the while maintaining good relations on
the global stage. This principle would allow the Unites States to maintain our traditional
core values, but at the same time recognize the increasing dependence on others by way
of globalization; which ultimately beseeches us to change and adapt in order to stay alive.
Our hegemonic dominance is threatened as other nations evolve, grow, and align. The
United States must maintain hegemony by protecting our self-interest, but also appear
benevolent and cooperative in order to foster relationships abroad.
By concerning ourselves with the world outside of our borders, the question of
alliance-building becomes a necessary one as pertaining to national security.
Unfortunately, as with every political decision, there is no black and white answer
regarding the benefit or downfall of building alliances around the world. Typically
speaking, alliances are formed when nations face a common security threat. With regard
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2. to the United States, it seems more likely that smaller nations who are unable to defend
themselves against the U.S. would engage in significant alliance-building strategies. The
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U.S., on the other hand, is able to take a more “realist” stance toward alliance-building
due to its’ military prowess; which, in my opinion, is a wise approach. Weaker nations, in
the process of acquiring allies, increase their arms, obtain strength, and reduce the threat
of attack to their country through “deterrence”. ii
Unfortunately, different nations require
different foreign policy decisions. In that respect, the United States varies from smaller
nations. It would be ill-advised for the U.S. to get heavily involved with alliance building
to some regard, unless absolutely necessary. First, by committing ourselves to another
country, we ultimately bind ourselves to them and are bound even if the relationship
becomes unfavorable to our interests. What’s more, given the unpredictability of world
politics, this is not an unlikely situation. Second line of reasoning to consider is the
possibility that our alliance-building is viewed as a threat to other non-allied countries. In
turn, these nations will more than likely form counter-alliances, thereby reducing the
security all around, as well as breeding tension in an already uncertain environment. As a
direct effect of these newly-formed alliances, otherwise neutral countries would feel the
need to choose sides. This is exactly what the United States should try and avoid; unless,
of course, it is of great benefit to us. For example, alliance-building to combat terrorism
as well as other aggressive non-state actors appears to be advantageous, if not completely
necessary. In this regard, alliance formation’s benefits may outweigh its costs. In general,
though, it would serve the U.S. best to maintain a realist approach toward alliance-
building as well as balance of power; only forge alliances to deal with high priority
threats. iii
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3. In connection with alliance-building and its effect on national security, is the
notion of arms control. In our everlasting search for global utopia, the question of arms
control becomes that of utmost importance; especially with today’s possible threats from
Iran and North Korea, among others. It’s difficult to say if arms control agreements
would prevent further threats or attacks, but it is worth a shot, to some degree. The
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of 1972 and 1979, as well as the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty helped stabilize the political environment by soothing the nuclear arms
race. iv
Hence, the idea of arms control does hold some water. Other agreements,
including the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002, succeeded by reducing the
weapons from each side. v
To this effect, treaties might be considered beneficial,
depending on your viewpoint. Another positive consequence of these agreements is the
domino effect it has by inspiring other nations to reduce or halt their weapons production.
Sadly, there is a downside to arms control that interferes with treaty formation. Although
arms control may perhaps help nations preserve their money, cut down environmental
hazards, and even lessen the possible pained effects of war, most countries are shy about
giving up potential protective measures against other nations. Besides, given the
unpredictability of world conflict, as previously mentioned, it would seem irrational to
forfeit your best defense; it would be like giving away your umbrella when there’s a
chance of a thunderstorm. Not to be forgotten, weapons advancements are unceasing, and
once limits are placed on one weapon a new weapon already exists. To this effect, the
soundest advice available is, once more, that of the realist perspective; promises of self-
interested rivals can’t be trusted, there will always be ruthless leaders. Therefore, we
must prepare militarily since aggressive national leaders still exist in the world, and, at
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4. the same rate, keep our advancements to ourselves in order to prevent another arms race.
It may, at times, be somewhat beneficial to attempt arms control, but bear in mind that
weapon advancements will always be a static condition. Since there is no real global
watchdog to oversee nations’ weapons productions, we must assume and prepare to
protect ourselves, and at the same time keep our plan as mum as possible. For example,
in 2002 Bush and Putin signed the S.O.R.T. which promised to cut their strategic nuclear
warheads by two-thirds over a span of 10 years. Although it sounds risky, they were still
left with enough firepower to prevent threats to their security. By in large, this treaty was
mainly symbolic in nature by pretending to step towards nuclear disarmament, even
though it never did.vi
This type of policy has the greatest advantage for the United States.
The U.S. must set the example through treaties such as S.O.R.T., and at the same time,
protect themselves by advancing and preparing themselves militarily. It is the
combination of self-protection, as well as an easing of the minds of other heads of nations
through public relations that will benefit the United States vis-à-vis national security.
The discussion thus far involving limiting a nation’s reach and power ultimately
concludes with the most controversial dilemma in connection with a nation’s interests;
the application of international law and organizations. It is believed that international law
is worthwhile simply because it attempts to encourage peace among nations.
Organizations such as the United Nations take a collective bargaining approach to the
world. Countries are represented and come together to solve world disputes and
problems. In theory and sometimes in practice, this is a great strategy; it can help U.S.
reputation abroad, can foster cooperation with other countries, and can prevent escalation
of war through resolutions. Unfortunately, akin to the other dilemmas examined
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5. throughout this recommendation, there are two sides to the coin. The U.S. must protect its
national interest, which differs greatly from the interest of many other nations. Non-
interference is a regarded approach to many foreign policies, and rightly so. However, if
your national interest is at stake, there are times, especially in U.S. history, when stepping
in might be necessary. Unfortunately for the U.S., the war in Iraq is a hot-button issue
regarding interference abroad. To others, the U.S. is viewed as controlling and
overbearing at times. Whatever criticism is projected this way can be considered relevant,
periodically, but the whole idea of criticizing interference reveals the main argument
against international law; what’s more important, the state or the global community? The
realist would say that the whole idea behind international law is to protect the sovereignty
of the state and protection of its national interests. The liberal theoretician would argue
against this idea and favor the placement of the global community above the
state.vii
Unfortunately the liberal perspective is exactly that, a nice theory. In reality,
putting the global community ahead of the sovereignty of the state is ludicrous and would
never work in the real world. At the very basic level is the problem of international law’s
inability to provide binding laws since there is no legislative body to do so. Rules are
only recognized when states willingly accept them. Consequently, there is no world
judicial body that will ascertain disobedience among nations. Moreover, there are too
many differing cultures, values, beliefs, and ways of life among nations to ever be able to
fully represent them all effectively. Alas, the conclusion on international law remains the
same; it can be a useful tool for the U.S., but it should ultimately serve the same purpose
as everything else, to help the U.S. maintain its interests.
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6. There has been a backlash against the United States lately. Maybe it sprung from
the war in Iraq; maybe it’s from the view of the United States as the leading hegemon
throughout the world. Either way, it’s apparent that the U.S. is in need of a strong plan
that will keep it moving forward, and sustain strong national security along the way. This
plan should take into consideration both sides of each issue, and find the common
ground. The most important thing the United States can do, nonetheless, is protect its
national interest. It is imperative to the survival of the U.S. at this point in time. Given the
resentment toward the U.S., it will only be a matter of time before nations rise up against
us and threaten to take away the power we hold. The best example of how and why we
must remain dominant lies in the negative aspects to balance of power theories. First, all
countries are potential adversaries, no matter how you slice it. We, as a country must
maintain military superiority because other nations will too. We cannot monitor other
countries closely enough to be certain of anything. With this in mind, we must prepare,
yet remain calm and collected. There is an even balance to everything we must do, but we
should always remember that hegemony will always exist; competition is a part of human
nature. If we are not the dominant power in the world, someone else will be. With that in
mind, as per national security, unfortunately, we must be the wolf in sheep’s clothing at
this point in time. That’s not to say aggressive, demanding, and unreasonable; but rather,
play the global political game with one thought in mind; how will we benefit and how
can we while still maintaining a positive image? Unfortunately, altruism is nothing more
than rhetoric on the global stage.
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8. i
Charles W. Kegley., World Politics: Trends and Transformation (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007),
ii
Charles Kegley, World Politics, 505
iii
Charles Kegley, World Politics, 507
iv
Charles Kegley, World Politics, 512
v
Charles Kegley, World Politics, 514
vi
Charles Kegley, World Politics, 514
vii
Charles Kegley, World Politics