This document defines coercive diplomacy and outlines its key elements and variants. It discusses how coercive diplomacy works through the coercing state's strategy, mechanisms used, and instruments of coercion. It also examines limitations of coercive diplomacy under international law and criticisms of the approach. Case studies of US coercive diplomacy against Iraq in 1990-1991 and ongoing EU/US efforts against Iran's nuclear program are presented to illustrate challenges in implementing coercive diplomacy.

1. Coercive Diplomacy
Peace and Conflict Studies
26.11.2012
Paulina Méndez
Stiven Tremaria

2. Summary
1.
Definitions and elements.
2.
Variants of the CD.
3.
How does CD work?
i. Coercer state strategy.
ii. Coercive mechanism.
iii. Coercive instruments.
4.
The adoption of coercive measures and the international law.
5.
Limitations and critics to the CD.
6.
Case studies.

3. 1. Definitions and elements
A) Definitions:
“Efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action […] coercive
diplomacy is a defensive strategy that is employed to deal with the efforts
of an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor” (George
and Simons, 1994, pp. 7-8).
“The use of threatened force, and at times the limited use of actual force to
back up the threat, to induce an adversary to change its behavior” (Byman
and Baxman, 2002, p. 1).
“Coercive diplomacy is ‘forceful persuasion’: the attempt to get a target –a
state, a group (or groups) within a state, or a non state actor– to change
its objectionable behavior through either the threat to use force or the
actual use of limited force” (Art and Cronin, 2003, p. 6).

4. 1. Definitions and elements
B) Elements:
- Three basic constitutive elements: demand, threat, time pressure.
- Limited and clear objectives: What to demand?
Defensive rather than offensive objectives. Typologies: A, B and C.
- Coercive but limited means: How to comply?
“It seeks to influence, but not to deny choice to the target”.
Proportionality between the demand and the threat.
- Sufficiently credible threat of punishment: How to convince?
Leverage + reputation/credibility + capacity.
Level of support of the public opinion.

5. 1. Definitions and elements
B) Elements:
- “Sticks and carrots” policy: How works the cost-benefits model?
Use of positive inducements: “if you do x, I will do y”.
C) Phases of coercion:
1. Threat to use force
CD depends on:
2. Demonstrative use of force
how much destruction is done to the target
how much of military power is drawn upon
3. Full-scale use of force
Failure of CD: War

6. 1. Definitions and elements
D) Relations and differences with other diplomatic related concepts :
-
Deterrence: “Not doing what it is not doing”.
Prevent an not initiated or not planned action from occurring.
-
Compellence:
Reverse an action already taken / happened.
Overturn the status quo.
-
Negotiation and Preventive Diplomacy:
CD as a way of conflict management (negotiation) and avoidance (PD).
-
Full-scale force / open war:
Use of brute military force to bludgeon an opponent.

7. 2. Variants of the CD
A) By type of participants:
Unilateral:
Unilateral:
It is understood as a
It is understood as a
single actor holding the
single actor holding the
coercion.
coercion.
USA --Cuba
USA Cuba
Coalition:
Coalition:
Collection of actors
Collection of actors
cooperating to achieve
cooperating to achieve
a common objective.
a common objective.
Lack of harmony and
Lack of harmony and
different interest of
different interest of
coalition’s countries.
coalition’s countries.
Word War II
Word War II
Humanitarian
Humanitarian
coercion:
coercion:
Use of force for
Use of force for
humanitarian
humanitarian
objectives
objectives
Difficult to identify
Difficult to identify
between military and
between military and
civilians.
civilians.
••To reconstitute a viable
To reconstitute a viable
central government in
central government in
Somalia
Somalia

8. 2. Variants of the CD
B) Level of pressure:
The Ultimatum, ,explicit or tacit, in which aadeadline is given for
The Ultimatum explicit or tacit, in which deadline is given for
compliance backed by a credible threat of strong punishment.
compliance backed by a credible threat of strong punishment.
The weaker, ,gradual turning of the screw, ,in which a sense of
The weaker gradual turning of the screw in which a sense of
urgency for compliance is diluted and backed only with the threat of
urgency for compliance is diluted and backed only with the threat of
incrementally severe punishment over time. .
incrementally severe punishment over time
The even weaker try and see, ,variant of the strategy that lacks both
The even weaker try and see variant of the strategy that lacks both
urgency for compliance and a clear threat of strong punishment.
urgency for compliance and a clear threat of strong punishment.

9. 3. How does CD work?
A) Coercer state strategy :
Strategy:
It constitutes the creative element in the
search for the optimum relationship between
political ends and the means available for
achieving them.
International, regional and local
actors
To support the strategy with diplomatic
weight and economic capacity.
Western
Europe
Libya
United Nations
Siria
Role of the leverage
A mediator who pressure the parties to make
concessions and to ensure that disputants
adhere to the agreements they have entered
into.
Not necessary a country even institutions
Malvinas Islands
Argentina - UK
USA

10. 3. How does CD work?
B) Commonly used mechanisms:

11. 3. How does CD work?
C) Coercive instruments:
1. Economic sanctions and international isolation:
Sanctions: place economic pressure on an adversary.
Political isolation: breaking-off of diplomatic relations and/or adoption of
multilateral resolutions that condemn adversary's behavior.
2. Support for an insurgency:
Create internal war environment by providing money, training and weapons
to insurgence forces.
Goals and limitations.

12. 3. How does CD work?
3. Air strikes:
Attacks by air of a few, selected targets.
4. Invasions and land grabs:
The use of threat of ground troops by the occupation and devastation
of valuable territory.
Useful when the coercer's demand involves withdrawal from disputed
geographic areas.
5. The threat of nuclear attacks:
Potentially powerful coercive tool, with very limited applicability.
Not recommended with nuclear-armed adversaries: risk of escalation.

13. 3. How does CD work?
D) Coercing / target state approach:
Counter-coercive strategies:
-
Negotiations designed to fracture coalition support.
-
Take advantage of domestic constraints in the coercer state.
-
Tight control over media and internal propaganda.
-
Create counter-alliances.
-
Create actual or prospective coercer’s casualties.
-
Use peacekeepers or aid workers as hostages.
-
Increase nationalism at home.
-
Threat to use WMD against coercer’s troops and civilian targets.

14. 4. The adoption of coercive measures
and the international law
Charter of the United Nations:
Limitations and concessions.
Chapter I
Article 2.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.

15. Chapter VII
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES
OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Articles 39 - 42

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace and shall make recommendations or decide what
measures shall be taken.

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions.
Chapter VIII
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Article 53
•
No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.

16. In 1989, the General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/44/215,
which called upon the developed countries to refrain from
exercising political coercion through the application of
economic instruments with the purpose of inducing changes in
the economic or social systems, as well as in the domestic or
foreign policies of other countries

17. 5. Limitations and critics to the CD
A) Critics:
-
CD as interference in internal affairs: Sovereignty-related issues.
-
CD as status quo strategy:
“The coercer defends the status quo because of the benefits it confers,
the target tries to overthrow the status quo because of the injury it
inflicts” (Art and Cronin, 2003, p. 8).
Reluctance of super powers to adopt revisions of “unfair” situations or
attend “rightful” demands.
- Differences between “genuine” CD vs. “disingenuous” CD.
-
The question of lawfulness of CD measures and human rights.

18. 5. Limitations and critics to the CD
B) Limitations and challenges:
-
The question of effectiveness of CD: why is CD difficult?
Credibility and power are at stake.
Will this be the coercer’s last demand, or is it only the first in a series of demands?
Multiple coercers and multiple targets.
Boomerang and domino effects: Escalation.
The role of positive inducements or “carrots”.
Military superiority is not guarantee of success.
Si vis pacem, para bellum.

19. 5. Limitations and critics to the CD
B) Limitations and challenges:
-
What are the prerequisites for success?
1. Clarity about the objectives.
2. Sufficient domestic and international support.
3. Strong leadership and motivation: accept cost and risks.
4. Dissuasion: Target’s fear of unacceptable escalation.
5. Effectiveness of instruments and mechanisms.
CD case reports
Success
Failure
Ambiguous
1945-1990 data: 7 cases.
George (1994)
29%
43%
28%
1990-2001 data: 8 cases.
Art and Cronin (2003)
25%
63%
12%
Combined cases (average)
27%
53%
20%
Source: Art and Cronin, 2003, p. 387.

20. 6. Case studies:
A) By the United States: Iraq (1990-1991):
Goal
Withdrawal Iraqi forces of Kuwait (in the scope of the Gulf War, 1990-1991).
Mechanisms
1) Diplomatic pressure:
Build a strong UN supported international coalition: 10 + 29 country members.
Political isolation: UNSC Res. 660 (Aug. 2).
2) Economic pressure:
Economic sanctions: UNSC Res. 661 (Aug.6): full trade embargo.
3) Military pressure:
Air strikes: UNSC Res. 670 (Sep. 25): civil aviation sanctions + aerial attacks.
Ground troops invasion: Operation Desert Storm (open war): ~956.600 men.
Limitations
Saddam Hussein as a complex target for CD: individual interests.
Impossibility to manage Iraqi internal situation (Kurdish und Shiite’s uprisings)
as a mean of coercion.
“US decision makers wanted Iraq weakened but not destroyed” (Alterman,
2003, p.283).

21. 6. Case studies:
A) By the United States: Iraq (1990-1991):
Desired
outcomes
Iraq removed forces from Kuwait.
No spread of the conflict, ex. to Saudi Arabia.
Blockade Iraq’s possibilities for counter-coercion.
Undesired
outcomes
Requirement of direct use of force.
High number casualties:
- Coalition: 482 men / Iraq: ~35.000 men, ~75.000 wounded, ~3.664 civilians.
Negative socio and economical consequences for the Iraqi population.
Iraq’s defiance of cease-fire resolutions: chemical and biological weapons.
Conflictive relations between US and Iraq → US-led invasion in 2003.
Final
outcome
FAILURE

22. 6. Case studies:
B) By the European Union and USA: Iran (2003- until now):
Goal
Contain the Iranian nuclear program.
Mechanisms
The EU-3 adopted a coercive diplomatic approach vis-à-vis Iran.
Sticks and carrots strategy.
- Agreements
Weakening
Economic pressure:
- Seizure of assets
- Sanctions on exports to Iran (the energy, shipping and insurance)
Limitations
-The
first military intervention of the European Union.
- Asymmetry of motivation.
- The EU had the additional problem of being the spokesperson for the rest of
the world, including the USA, and sometimes Russia and China as well.

23. 6. Case studies:
B) By the European Union and USA: Iran (2003- until now):
Desired
outcomes
Iran continues reporting in a irregular way to IAEA about the nuclear
activities.
Undesired
outcomes
Iran declares itself to be a nuclear state
Avoid uranium enrichment and ensure that uranium is exported to other
countries reached
Final
outcome
-The first session of fresh negotiations in April went well (April 2012)
- United States toughens economic sanctions against Iran

24. • Are all countries able to exercise coercive diplomacy?
• Have they succeed in its coercive diplomacy efforts?
• What have the difficulties been?
• What lessons can be drawn?

25. Thanks for your attention