This slide has the brief overview regarding the Terrorism In Pakistan.
It's Types,Background,Causes,Effects Measures to stop terrorism & at the end Conclusion.
Made by the great effort plus contains the high quality visual Effects.
This short report was compiled within 24 hours of the terrorist attack on the In Amenas oil installation in Algeria. The report was built using open source analysis and created by Seven Questions Consulting Limited. The report has been cited by many intelligence agencies and been used to develop further reports and analysis. www.sevenquestions.co.uk
This slide has the brief overview regarding the Terrorism In Pakistan.
It's Types,Background,Causes,Effects Measures to stop terrorism & at the end Conclusion.
Made by the great effort plus contains the high quality visual Effects.
This short report was compiled within 24 hours of the terrorist attack on the In Amenas oil installation in Algeria. The report was built using open source analysis and created by Seven Questions Consulting Limited. The report has been cited by many intelligence agencies and been used to develop further reports and analysis. www.sevenquestions.co.uk
CompTIA exam study guide presentations by instructor Brian Ferrill, PACE-IT (Progressive, Accelerated Certifications for Employment in Information Technology)
"Funded by the Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Grant #TC-23745-12-60-A-53"
Learn more about the PACE-IT Online program: www.edcc.edu/pace-it
In addition to the usual Editor’s rants about security, this issue (March 2015) has papers about a nuclear security (physical) training model, attack-tree analysis for nuclear cyber security, security sensor testing, security of sealed radiological sources, adversary-based security engineering, airport and marina watch programs, and an essay on why security fails.
Previous issues can be viewed and downloaded at http://jps.rbsekurity.com
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its controlled withdrawal of personnel and leadership from Sirte, on Libya’s central coastline. The tactical withdrawal is intended to preserve ISIS in Libya’s capabilities and will enable the group to relocate for continued operations in the Maghreb region. It is unlikely that the Libyan armed factions involved in the counter-ISIS fight will prioritize the pursuit of ISIS over their own objectives.
2. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted Somali government sites in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab launched a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) that Somali security forces intercepted and cleared on July 14. The assessed target was a gathering of Somali politicians at the Makka al Mukarama Hotel. Somali security forces seized a second VBIED outside of Mogadishu on July 13.
3. CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Votel indicated that the U.S. military may expand its counter-terrorism presence in Yemen to combat al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) on July 15. AQAP has strengthened over the course of the Yemeni civil war, and a recent Emirati-led operation to roll back its territorial gains will not weaken the group for the long term. AQAP claimed three VBIED attacks in Aden and al Mukalla port cities, targeting Yemeni security forces.
This slide deck presents some of the insights gleaned from a data set in Ntrepid Corporation’s Timestream application that is an open-source collection of reported ISIS-linked activity in Yemen. The full case study is available: http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/exploring-isis-yemen-zimmerman-july-24-2015.
The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is attempting to expand its footprint in Yemen. ISIS declared an Islamic Caliphate on June 29, 2014, under the leadership of the new Caliph, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The return of the Caliphate under Baghdadi placed an obligation on all Muslims to pledge allegiance to him, according to ISIS. Al Qaeda broadly dismisses the legitimacy of the Caliphate under ISIS, and ISIS and al Qaeda are now in competition for the leadership of the global jihadist movement.
Al Qaeda’s Yemen-based affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), dominates the jihadist fight in the country and it remains the greatest direct threat to the United States from the al Qaeda network. AQAP leadership reaffirmed its allegiance to al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in November 2014, publicly rejecting the legitimacy of the Islamic Caliphate. The 2015 collapse of the central Yemeni state created opportunities for AQAP to exploit, and the group is expanding its presence in Yemen.
The initial reaction to ISIS in Yemen was muted, but the group has begun to make inroads as the conflict there protracts. ISIS began claiming regular attacks in Yemen as of March 2015 and now operates in at least eight Yemeni governorates.
Insider threat: tackling cyber security risk from inside your organisation. This event provided an overview of the current state of understanding of who the “insiders” are; how they operate; what motivates them and what threats they pose to information systems.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun confirmed their rumored re-unification, citing their combined November 20 attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali as proof. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of al Murabitoun, split from AQIM in December 2012. This reconciliation of al Qaeda affiliates, which likely stems from their desire to counter ISIS’s influence in the region, increases the security threat to northern Mali as the groups integrate their resources, personal networks, and lines of communication.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) assassinated its first high-profile target in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that killed the Governor of Aden and threatened to launch additional attacks on Yemeni government officials. ISIS will likely attempt to leverage this spectacular attack to drive recruitment in the region, possibly in competition with AQAP elements regenerating in neighboring Abyan governorate. ISIS's growing strength in Aden will threaten the Saudi-led coalition's efforts to secure the city and restore President Hadi's government there.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is likely to close its investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program following the release of its report on December 2. The report assesses that while Iran made a “coordinated effort” to develop a “nuclear explosive device” before the end of 2003, there are no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the IAEA Board of Governors in December.
CTP’s Threat Updateseries is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy interdicted a dhow carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns in the Arabian Sea on March 28. French and Australian vessels seized similar shipments on March 20 and February 27, respectively. Increased Iranian involvement in Yemen may exacerbate regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may also threaten ongoing direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN-brokered talks set to begin in Kuwait on April 18.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader and military planner Hassan Ali Dhore in southern Somalia. Dhore was a member of al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s Amniyat brigade, which conducts the group’s security, intelligence, and assassination operations. Dhore planned the December 25, 2014, attack on Mogadishu International Airport and the March 27, 2015, attack on Mogadishu’s Makka al Mukarrama Hotel, which killed U.S. citizens. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook stated that Dhore was planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli and now controls the capital with support from international backers and some western Libyan militias. Members of the revolutionary Islamist government fled Tripoli, but the GNA still faces opposition from armed militias in the Libyan capital and its environs. The GNA lacks support from both the Libyan House of Representatives and any major political or military powerbrokers in eastern Libya. ISIS is likely resuming a campaign of attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that may inhibit the GNA’s ability to take control of this resource and deter armed groups from pledging support to the GNA. The international community is treating the GNA’s move to Tripoli as a major victory, but a significant number of actors remain capable of derailing the unity government.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for attacks against Western, particularly American, interests. Zawahiri also called on jihadist factions to unify in what he described as a war against a Russian-Iranian-American axis.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei forbade non-nuclear negotiations with the U.S. on November 1, indicating that Iran's participation in the Syria peace talks does not mark a new willingness to negotiate on regional issues. Khamenei also dismissed Western rhetoric regarding shifting foreign policy priorities in Iran.
3. Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham-linked group in Sirte, Libya, continued to consolidate control over the city’s population and the surrounding environs. Warplanes targeted ISIS positions in the vicinity of Sirte, Libya, on October 27.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Jamatul Ahrar, a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, conducted a suicide bombing targeting Pakistani Christians at a park in Lahore, Pakistan, on Easter Sunday. The attack killed at least 72 people and wounded more than 300 others. Jamatul Ahrar has expressed leanings in support of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), but has not formally affiliated with the group. It has targeted Christians before and will likely continue to attack non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan.
2. The imposition of the UN-backed Libyan unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA) is widening the divisions between Libya’s factions and hindering both local and international counter-ISIS efforts. Militias aligned with Libya’s self-declared Islamist government in Tripoli prevented the GNA from moving to the capital from its exile in Tunis. Anti-GNA militias suspended flights at Tripoli’s Mitiga airport and fired anti-aircraft munitions in the area as clashes between anti- and pro-GNA groups raged in the city. Armed groups from nearby Misrata pledged support to the GNA, further fracturing the tenuous Tripolitan-Misratan alliance that is instrumental for blocking ISIS’s westward expansion from Sirte. The unity government still lacks support from the internationally recognized parliament and powerful military factions in eastern Libya.
3. The U.S. and the Saudi-led coalition intensified their air campaigns against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Hadramawt, Lahij, and Abyan in Yemen. U.S. airstrikes on March 22 targeted a training camp. Breaking reports indicate AQAP leader Qasim al Raymi, previously the group’s military commander, may have been killed in the airstrike. The air campaigns may limit AQAP’s ability to consolidate new gains, but they are unlikely to expel AQAP from its strongholds. AQAP is exploiting the civil war in Yemen to expand. Planned UN-sponsored talks between the al Houthi-Saleh government and Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government may be more productive than a previous round of talks based on recent direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials. These national-level talks are unlikely to stabilize Yemen, however.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network, including its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel.
Alqaeda a name of terror is an organization which actually is a misinterpretation of Islam. They use terror and violence which has nothing to do with the teaching of Muhammad S.A.W and Quran.
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – A Threat to Global Peace and Securityiosrjce
The Islamic state of Iraq and Syria which precisely is named ‘ISIS’ is an Islamic fundamental sect
that came in the world scene two decades ago under the leader of an Islamic extremist named Abu Musab alZarqawi.
Though, before the emergence of this deadly group, there had been other Islamic groups that had
unleash terror in our time. No matter the nomenclature they assume, all we know is that they have one aim. And
that is to carry out a jihadist movement that is hell-bent in converting everyone to Islam if possible. One of the
mission statements of Islamic state of Iraq and Syria is that anyone who dares to resist any Islamic system of
worship in the world would be dealt ruthlessly with. Iraq which abi initio have been termed axis of evil secured
a veritable ground to hatch their evil plans by liaising with troubled Syria to attack the west which they accused
of being enemy to Islam. Operating within Iraq and Syria alone could not have constituted a global threat by
this social miscreants, but their encroachment into other neighbouring countries like Turkey and other countries
around the middle-east is worrisome to the entire world. The U.S plan of using airstrikes to attack this group
may not yield the desired result unless land troops are used. This has been the useful suggestion of some
militant analysts. So this text is geared towards discussing or describing the situation in Iraq and Syria caused
by this deadly group nicknamed (ISIS) and to proffer possible means of curtailing their excesses before their
plan of obliterating non—Islamic groups is successfully carried out by them. All hands should be on deck to
support the U.S. and U.N in attacking this group until they are eliminated from the world scene.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Iranian officials censured President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing the IRGC’s arrests of individuals suspected of promoting foreign influence, indicating that disagreements over how to block foreign influence will continue alongside greater crackdowns.
2. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya are high due to border disputes and allegations that Kenyan military figures participated in al Shabaab’s illegal smuggling operations. The Somali parliament passed a motion to expel both regular Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) units and the KDF’s African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent from Somalia. A breakdown in cooperation among security forces will provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand.
3. Malian forces under Operation Seno conducted successful clearing operations in central Mali, with particular success against the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), associated with the AQIM-affiliated Ansar al Din. The MLF will continue to retaliate against Malian and UN security forces.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The expected increase in U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen prompted Iran to bolster support for the al Houthi movement. Reuters reported that Iran surged arms shipments to Yemen in recent months and may have sent advisors. An aggressive American policy against the Iranian-backed al Houthis risks driving the group further into Iran’s orbit.
2. The Libyan National Army’s declared offensive to seize strategic locations in southwestern Libya will draw opposing forces back into the ongoing contest for Libya’s resources. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda both retain Libyan safe havens. Spiraling conflict would give both al Qaeda and ISIS the opportunity to co-opt factions within the civil war and could erase the recent progress made in degrading ISIS’s strength in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab’s provision of humanitarian assistance to famine-stricken populations extends its shadow governance and builds popular support. The group distributed food aid to more than 200 families in Galgudud region, central Somalia on March 19. Al Shabaab may strengthen in regions where the Somali Federal Government is unable to facilitate the delivery of food aid.
this was made by me before 3 years so it is not based on the latest updates...will make those updates and post it very sonn.....yet this is one of the greatest presentations on terrorism!
31052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
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हम आग्रह करते हैं कि जो भी सत्ता में आए, वह संविधान का पालन करे, उसकी रक्षा करे और उसे बनाए रखे।" प्रस्ताव में कुल तीन प्रमुख हस्तक्षेप और उनके तंत्र भी प्रस्तुत किए गए। पहला हस्तक्षेप स्वतंत्र मीडिया को प्रोत्साहित करके, वास्तविकता पर आधारित काउंटर नैरेटिव का निर्माण करके और सत्तारूढ़ सरकार द्वारा नियोजित मनोवैज्ञानिक हेरफेर की रणनीति का मुकाबला करके लोगों द्वारा निर्धारित कथा को बनाए रखना और उस पर कार्यकरना था।
In a May 9, 2024 paper, Juri Opitz from the University of Zurich, along with Shira Wein and Nathan Schneider form Georgetown University, discussed the importance of linguistic expertise in natural language processing (NLP) in an era dominated by large language models (LLMs).
The authors explained that while machine translation (MT) previously relied heavily on linguists, the landscape has shifted. “Linguistics is no longer front and center in the way we build NLP systems,” they said. With the emergence of LLMs, which can generate fluent text without the need for specialized modules to handle grammar or semantic coherence, the need for linguistic expertise in NLP is being questioned.
role of women and girls in various terror groupssadiakorobi2
Women have three distinct types of involvement: direct involvement in terrorist acts; enabling of others to commit such acts; and facilitating the disengagement of others from violent or extremist groups.
03062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
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‘वोटर्स विल मस्ट प्रीवेल’ (मतदाताओं को जीतना होगा) अभियान द्वारा जारी हेल्पलाइन नंबर, 4 जून को सुबह 7 बजे से दोपहर 12 बजे तक मतगणना प्रक्रिया में कहीं भी किसी भी तरह के उल्लंघन की रिपोर्ट करने के लिए खुला रहेगा।
01062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
2. Objectives
(1.1) Describe phases and characteristics of
terrorist operations and potential indicators of
terrorist activity
(1.2) Identify Iraqi Insurgent Groups
(1.3) Explore the Foreign Jihadist in Iraq
(1.4) Review lessons learned from past terrorist
operations.
3. Terrorist Operations
Intended to coerce or intimidate
governments or societies in the pursuit of
goals that are generally:
Political
Religious
Ideological
4. Characteristics
Dynamic
Instantaneous media events
Hit and run tactics
Impeccable OPSEC
Multiple targets may be hit
Detailed Planning
Detailed Surveillance
Simple
Relatively easy to command, control, and support
Limit numbers to a small group of well trained and
dedicated individuals
6. Potential Indicators
Unusual or prolonged interest in security measures
Starring or quickly looking away from personnel or
motorcades entering or leaving
Observation of security drills
Use of cameras, video recorders or note-taking
Attempts to penetrate or test security and response
Rehearsal and dry runs
Mapping out routes
Timing traffic flow or signals
Monitoring key facilities
7. Iraqi Insurgent Groups
Al- Faraq Brigades
Operate in the Al- Anbar province and Ramadi
region
Incredibly resourceful, continually evolving tactics
Operations
Responsible for numerous attacks on US personnel
Destroyed three armored vehicles in Ramadi, killing ten us
personnel
Claimed to have infiltrated port city of Al- Bakr and fired
French made missiles at us vessels
8. “The Jihadi resistance in Iraq is able to use
means that do not occur to the Americans.
The future holds yet more surprises.”
9. Iraqi Insurgent Groups
Armed Vanguards of Mohammad’s Second Army
Mission: To wage holy war on coalition forces in order to force
foreigners from their land
Goals: “To fight every foreigner until victory or martyrdom and to
make every American regret their occupation of Mohammad’s
land.”
OPS
Claimed responsibility for attack on UN HQ in Baghdad,
killing 23 and wounding 100
Multiple attacks on US and Coalition forces
10. Iraqi Insurgent Groups
Iraqi Resistance Islamic Front
Formed by smaller Sunni resistance groups brought
together by common political goals
OPS
Numerous martyrdom operations
Shelling of coalition commands
Shelling of Mosul Airport
Specifically targeting US Intel members
Promised to “Break America’s Back”
11. Iraqi Insurgent Groups
Army of Ansar al –Sunna
Sunni Muslim militant group fighting the US led occupation
and declared war on Iyad Allawi.
OPS
Responsible for beheading of Nepali civilian and
shooting death of eleven of his countryman. The deaths
were videotaped and sparked Anti-Muslim riots in
Nepal
Beheading of Iraqi security force personnel
Responsible for an attack on US dining hall in Mosul
which killed 14 US personnel
12. Iraqi Insurgent Groups
Army of Ansar al –Sunna (Continued)
Jan 22, 05 bombing of Shiite wedding, killing 11
Beheaded Iraqi national guardsman in broad daylight and
left warning attached to the body in the middle of the road
“Emir of the group’ has warned Iraqis not to
deal with US forces, and threatens to kill and
send to hell all who disobey”
13. Iraqi Insurgent Groups
Ansar al Islam
Goal: To seek to transform Iraq’s Kurdish land into an Islamic State
Receives logistic support from Iran and Syria. Provides route
into Iraq for foreign jihadist to join Ansar
OPS
Seized control of several villages in Northern Iraq and
governed according to Sharia Law.
Aug. 7, 2003 bombing of Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad.
Bombing of UN HQ in Baghdad.
Suicide bombings of Shiite Shrines in Baghdad and Karbala.
VBIED Mount Lebanon hotel in Baghdad
Continues to operate as part of Zurqawi network
14. Iraqi Insurgent Groups
Al – Mahdi Army
“Americans invaded
Iraq to seize and kill the Mahdi”
Little or no formal religious standing
Advised by Iran based cleric
15. Iraqi Insurgent Groups
Al – Mahdi Army (Continued)
Goals: To replace the more traditional faction as the voice of
Iraq’s Shiite majority
Redress decades of suppression by Sunni Muslims under
Saddam’s rule
16. Iraqi Insurgent Groups
OPS
Mob killings of rival clerics
Surrounded the house of Grand Ayatollah Al – Sistani
Target US, British, Italian, and Polish troops
Has occupied police stations and government buildings
Anyone who captured female soldiers could keep them as
slaves
“ The Army belongs to the Mahdi, and
therefore cannot be disbanded ”
17. Iraqi Insurgent Groups
Jamaat al – Tawhid wa’l Jihad
Abu Musab Al – Zarqawi
Jordanian citizen, who
joined Islamic Mujaheedin in
AFG in 1980’s
Contacted AQ to train his Jordanian
operatives in AFG in 1990’s
18. Iraqi Insurgent Groups
Jamaat al – Tawhid wa’l Jihad (Continued)
Eventually established his own cell and
training camps
Was paid to work with Hizballah to
smuggle JTJ operatives into Palestine
for follow-on operations in Israel
Additional cells operate in Germany
under JTJ banner
19. Iraqi Insurgent Groups
Goals: Originally to overthrow the Jordanian Government
Force withdrawal of US led forces from Iraq, topple the
interim government and assassinate collaborators.
Set Iraq’s minority Sunni population against it’s majority
Shiites
Targets
Beheadings
Kidnapping
Suicide bombings
ISF
Shiite
Kurds
Political / Religious figures
Targeted Assassinations
20. Iraqi Insurgent Groups
Jamaat al – Tawhid wa’l Jihad (Continued)
“We deliver to the nation the news that both Jama’at Al –
Tawhid wa’l Jihad and soldiers have pledged allegiance to
the sheik of the Mujaheedin, Osama bin Laden, and that they
will follow his orders in Jihad for the sake of God”
22. Foreign Insurgents
“We know that the pathway into Iraq for many
foreign fighters is through Syria. It’s a fact.
We know it. The Syrians know it.”
- General Richard Myers
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
24. Foreign Insurgents
Non-State Organizations
Sent in as package team
More formidable than individual
foreign jihadist
Create logistical infrastructure for
smuggling weapons across
borders
Need the support of Iraq fighters to
be successful
25. Foreign Insurgents
Salafist in Iraq
Foreign jihadist who adhere to strict interpretation of Sunni
Islam
Deliberate campaigns against other muslim communities
Hatred for Iraqi Christians
26. Foreign Insurgents
State Support for the Insurgency
Syria inclined to support former Ba’ath party members
Iran may support Shi’a insurgents
Fear ally regime would be formed in Iraq, facilitating US
bases in Iraq
Both countries openly deny being pathway into Iraq
27. Past Terrorist Operations
KEY
T
T
Neutral
vehicle
Neutral
person
Terrorist vehicle
Terrorist – Dicker
[lookout]
Terrorist -
gunman
Hostile gunfire
Terrorist -
explosion
Friendly
vehicle
B Bandit
Victim vehicle
(crime)
Victim (crime)
Source: Blackwater, USA, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/ btw2004/articles/ttp1.ppt
28. 2. Gunman fires at passing
vehicle before escaping to
waiting car
1. Dicker gives warning
of approaching vehicles
to gunman
Alley Way Ambush
‘Shoot and Scoot’ style ambush. Dicker warns gun team of
approaching target. The gun team fire a burst at the target before
escaping to waiting get-away vehicle parked nearby. This tactic has
been used in both rural and urban areas.
T
T
Source: Blackwater, USA, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/ btw2004/articles/ttp1.ppt
29. T
3. When ordered by the controller,
the crowd parts, allowing gunman to
fire, before escaping to waiting car..
Staged Accident Ambush
2. Crowd controlled by activist
1. Car accident is staged
and a crowd gathers.
The target vehicle is forced to stop by a
staged accident. A crowd gathers, hemming
in the target vehicle - the crowd controlled by
an activist. On command, the crowd parts,
allowing a gunman to fire, before escaping to
a waiting vehicle. This tactic has also been
used against security forces vehicles/
personnel responding to the accident.
T T
Source: Blackwater, USA, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/ btw2004/articles/ttp1.ppt
30. T
As target vehicle enters underpass, terrorist waiting on the
overhead parapet drop an IED onto roof of vehicle.
Overhead IED
As an alternative, a dicker on the entry parapet signals that a target vehicle
is approaching to a terrorist waiting at the exit parapet.
Source: Blackwater, USA, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/ btw2004/articles/ttp1.ppt
31. Rolling Ambush (choke point) - Assassination
T T
T
T
T
1
2
3
4
1. Gunmen on overlooking vantage
point initiate ambush.
2. Blocking vehicle moves behind
convoy
3. Roadside gunmen rake vehicles
as they pass.
4. Blocking vehicle moves in front
of convoy to prevent escape
from killing area.
Source: Blackwater, USA, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/ btw2004/articles/ttp1.ppt
32. Place of Residence – Assassination (Dr. Akila Hashimi)
T T
T
T
1
2
3
4
1. Dickers posing as road
sweepers warn gun-group in
pick up truck that entourage is
leaving residence.
2. Ambush initiated by RPG
(misses target)
3. Pick-up overtakes convoy,
rakes second vehicle with Dr
Hashimi, fatally wounding her.
4. Overtakes second vehicle and
rakes with gunfire before
speeding away
T
Source: Blackwater, USA, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/ btw2004/articles/ttp1.ppt
33. Introduction To Terrorism: Review
Describe phases and characteristics of terrorist
operations and potential indicators of terrorist
activity
Identify Iraqi Insurgent Groups
Explore the Foreign Jihadist in Iraq
Review lessons learned from past terrorist
operations