CYBER ATTACK SCENARIOS - Part 1: Building The Red Team
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CyberCrime represents one of the biggest threats to society and human progress to be encountered in the past 70 years. As a business, it is by far the biggest on the planet with a balance sheet that would see it joining the G8 within the next 3 years given its continued exponential growth. With these criminal activities only attracting sensational reporting in the context of stolen passwords and account details, society soldiers on not understanding the detail and not understanding the growing threat. Attacks are tolerated in much the same way as a snowstorm! Military, national defense, and security organizations, along with police and government can no longer cope and are in large part unable to defend and protect their citizens. The IT industry and those engaged in Cyber Defence are struggling too and remain in a reactive defense mode - mostly responding after the fact/act! The Dark Side not only enjoy the first-mover advantage, they are unbounded by the Law, Ethics, or indeed any constraints! There are also rogue states and terrorists plus many other groups also leveraging the openness of societies to attack, and often straying into/exploiting criminal resources! At the same time the defenders tend to be far and few on the ground, generally underfunded and resourced, and often unappreciated and poorly paid/rewarded. For sure, it is time to rethink this arena and change our thinking on how we approach defense. This lecture is Part 1 of a rethink/reeducation process: ‘Attack Scenarios’ approaches the transformation process by getting students to think as if they are attacker so that in Part 2; ‘Defence Scenarios’ they can get ahead of the game to anticipate and respond ahead of an attack. This they do in RED Team mode with an opportunity to design their own criminal empire on screen!
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CYBER ATTACK SCENARIOS - Part 1: Building The Red Team
- 1. 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 C Y B E R A T T A C K SCENARIOS p e t e r c o c h r a n e . c o m Prof Pet er Coch rane OBE
- 2. STUDENT ALERT This Lecture is a primarily a RED TEAM exercise where we move between reviewing the field to a group looking to create a new Cyber Attack Business Be prepared to adapt an attacker mind-set and to think the unthinkable! The process will be highly interactive and to fully understand you will have to fully engage Te xt
- 3. Fun Fame Notoriety Vandalism Limited Skills Limited Resources Tend to be Sporadic Rogue States Criminals Hacker Groups Hacktivist Amateurs Money Sharing Organic Dispersed Unbounded Huge Effort Progressive Cooperatives Self Organising Vast Resources Massive Market Aggregated Skills Semi-Professional Substantial Networks Skilled Political Idealists Emotional Relentless Dedicated Cause Driven Vast Networks Varied Missions Targeted Attacks Evolving Community Drugs Fraud Global Extreme Extortion Business Unbounded Professional Well Managed Well Organised Ahead of the Curve Orchestrated Effort Extremely Profitable Syndicated Resources Massive Attack Surface Vast up-to-date Abilities Covert Money WarFare Influence Pervasive Disruption Espionage Professional Sophisticated Well Organised Extreme Creativity Orchestrated Effort Political Influencers ~Unlimited Resources Tech/Thought Leaders Regime Destabilisation Population Manipulation Military and Civil Domains Where do we start? T h e s p e c t r u m & S c a l e o f A t t a c k e r s !
- 4. Fun Fame Notoriety Vandalism Limited Skills Limited Resources Tend to be Sporadic Rogue States Criminals Hacker Groups Hacktivist Amateurs Money Sharing Organic Dispersed Unbounded Huge Effort Progressive Cooperatives Self Organising Vast Resources Massive Market Aggregated Skills Semi-Professional Substantial Networks Skilled Political Idealists Emotional Relentless Dedicated Cause Driven Vast Networks Varied Missions Targeted Attacks Evolving Community Drugs Fraud Global Extreme Extortion Business Unbounded Professional Well Managed Well Organised Ahead of the Curve Orchestrated Effort Extremely Profitable Syndicated Resources Massive Attack Surface Vast up-to-date Abilities Covert Money WarFare Influence Pervasive Disruption Espionage Professional Sophisticated Well Organised Extreme Creativity Orchestrated Effort Political Influencers ~Unlimited Resources Tech/Thought Leaders Regime Destabilisation Population Manipulation Military and Civil Domains Where do we start? T h e s p e c t r u m & S c a l e o f A t t a c k e r s ! Military Nat Defence Intelligence Services Terrorists
- 5. Fun Fame Notoriety Vandalism Limited Skills Limited Resources Tend to be Sporadic Rogue States Criminals Hacker Groups Hacktivist Amateurs Money Sharing Organic Dispersed Unbounded Huge Effort Progressive Cooperatives Self Organising Vast Resources Massive Market Aggregated Skills Semi-Professional Substantial Networks Skilled Political Idealists Emotional Relentless Dedicated Cause Driven Vast Networks Varied Missions Targeted Attacks Evolving Community Drugs Fraud Global Extreme Extortion Business Unbounded Professional Well Managed Well Organised Ahead of the Curve Orchestrated Effort Extremely Profitable Syndicated Resources Massive Attack Surface Vast up-to-date Abilities Covert Money WarFare Influence Pervasive Disruption Espionage Professional Sophisticated Well Organised Extreme Creativity Orchestrated Effort Political Influencers ~Unlimited Resources Tech/Thought Leaders Regime Destabilisation Population Manipulation Military and Civil Domains Where do we start? T h e s p e c t r u m & S c a l e o f A t t a c k e r s ! Medium Game Medium Gain Short Game Low Gain Long Game Massive Gain Boy In a Bedroom Start Up Small Business Medium Business Large Business Global Business Public Bodies Military Nat Defence Intelligence Services Terrorists
- 6. Fun Fame Notoriety Vandalism Limited Skills Limited Resources Tend to be Sporadic Rogue States Criminals Hacker Groups Hacktivist Amateurs Money Sharing Organic Dispersed Unbounded Huge Effort Progressive Cooperatives Self Organising Vast Resources Massive Market Aggregated Skills Semi-Professional Substantial Networks Skilled Political Idealists Emotional Relentless Dedicated Cause Driven Vast Networks Varied Missions Targeted Attacks Evolving Community Drugs Fraud Global Extreme Extortion Business Unbounded Professional Well Managed Well Organised Ahead of the Curve Orchestrated Effort Extremely Profitable Syndicated Resources Massive Attack Surface Vast up-to-date Abilities Covert Money WarFare Influence Pervasive Disruption Espionage Professional Sophisticated Well Organised Extreme Creativity Orchestrated Effort Political Influencers ~Unlimited Resources Tech/Thought Leaders Regime Destabilisation Population Manipulation Military and Civil Domains Where do we start? T h e s p e c t r u m & S c a l e o f A t t a c k e r s ! Medium Game Medium Gain Short Game Low Gain Long Game Massive Gain Boy In a Bedroom Start Up Small Business Medium Business Large Business Global Business Public Bodies Military Nat Defence Intelligence Services Terrorists Zip Planning Opportunistic Vision Plan £0 Vision Mission Partners Plan £X MD CEO Board Investors R&A £XX Military Civil Service Fully Funded MD CEO Board Investors Management MD CEO Board Divisions Management
- 7. F r e e d o m s W h a t c a n b e d o n e ? Rogue States Criminals Hacker Groups Hacktivist Amateurs Terrorists Intelligence Services Military National Defence Police Government Bounded and constrained by G e n e v a C o n v e n t i o n , l e g a l s y s t e m s , h u m a n m o r a l i t y , s o c i a l n o r m s a n d p u b l i c opinion/acceptability… Unbounded & unconstrained Subject to nothing & no one! D e f e n d e r s
- 8. F r e e d o m s W h a t c a n b e d o n e ? Rogue States Criminals Hacker Groups Hacktivist Amateurs Terrorists Intelligence Services Military National Defence Police Government Bounded and constrained by G e n e v a C o n v e n t i o n , l e g a l s y s t e m s , h u m a n m o r a l i t y , s o c i a l n o r m s a n d p u b l i c opinion/acceptability… Unbounded & unconstrained Subject to nothing & no one! I n f i n i t e f r e e d o m f i n i t e l i m i t e r s D e f e n d e r s
- 9. a s s u m i n g A t T a c k e r M I N D S E T S W E A R E T H E R E D T E A M This turns out to be a really good stance in trying to understand the motivations, methods, structures and ethos of this ‘Dark Side’ of humanity and how they contrast with the governments, institutions, industries, and peoples they attack and exploit! Fr o m h er e o n w e s p ea k A N D th in k a s if w e a r e b la c k h a ts /a tta c k er s r ev iew in g a n d p la n n in g
- 11. A t t a c k e r Clarity of purpose is a must ! This is a minimal requirement before we start any form of enterprise - and time needs to be devoted to thinking, examining, evaluating every aspect if we are to achieve success ! What is our target sector to be? What role are we aiming for? What are the tools we have ? What is our unique offering ? Why choose a given sector? How are we going to enter? How do we select targets? How are we to attack?
- 12. T O S u c c e e d Essential to be professional & dedicated Defines the desired future position of the company Details the company’s business objectives, ambition and ethos General process/action(2) necessary to realise goals/long-term mission An ordered fine grain detailing/list of all that has to be done to achieve the objectives including all contingencies “ Great success does not happen by accident, it demands great effort, good investment, dedication to achieving the vision, professional management and leadership”
- 13. S e r i o u s We have to be professional “ All the failed start up ventures I have engaged with have suffered poor or inadequate staffing and/or management, funding or marketing , and at no time was it the idea or the tech after due diligence had been completed” “ We can learn a lot from the study of those that have gone before”
- 14. Business Model Who to attack - the why, how and what Like business or armies: Professionals do not waste resources or act in some random way: they have a Vision, Mission and a Plan!
- 15. Business Model Who to attack - the why, how and what Like business or armies: Professionals do not waste resources or act in some random way: they have a Vision, Mission and a Plan! Methodologies Access Points When/Where/ How/Teams & Tools/Duration Choose a Target: and Research, Assess Value/Worth and Potential RoI Quantify and Identify all Vulnerabilities/key opportunities Retribution, Disruption, Discrediting, Behavioural Change, Political Steer/ Gain, Commercial Damage, Reputation Damage, Business Disabling, Money Making, Propaganda +++++ Political, Economic, Market, Societal, Criminal Superiority, Global Order Change, Regime Change+++++
- 16. MODUS OPERANDI ? Professional = success/profitable Ape small, medium, large, national, multinational scale operations/business structures/practices with management chain, people recruiting and investments! Political, Economic, Market, Societal, Criminal Superiority, Global Order Change, Regime Change+++++ Recruit those who worked in legitimate businesses attended Business School, served in the Military & have been well trained & educated to meet commercial and defence needs Recruit well educated and qualified/experienced tech teams with deep knowledge of defence/attack methods
- 17. target space Published industry surveys help ! Organisations advertise where they are strong and where they are weak, who is rich and who is poor, and the likely attack complexity/challenges The commercial media provide company/product/sales reviews, and then there is the Stock Market for Valuations and Share Price. Companies House (UK), and The Securities & Exchange Commission USA hold all Company returns (Reports and Accounts) available for public inspection!
- 18. Pick a target Who to attack - the why and how We need to know and understand the target in order to formulate and execute an effective attack and realise the desired outcome/RoI Objective: Define precisely what is to be achieved - The RoI Target: Research, Assess RoI, Quantify, Identity Weaknesses and Opportunities Plan: Methodology, Point of Access, Tool(s) to be Deployed, When and Duration Deployment: Proceed as planned but be prepared to adapt in real time Ongoing: IFF successful/targets met - step and repeat , IFF not move on
- 19. C R A z y ta r g e t s Published and advertise what they do! Organisations give away so much information and we can infer where they are strong/weak, how rich/poor they are, and the likely attack complexity/effort required Trade Press: Service and Supplier deals and contracts visible Tech Papers: System and network detail - ie Block Chain Configs Job Adverts: Define experience and expertise and experience requirements WebSites: Often detail/divulge some customer, supplier, data operational info Presentations: Business models, modes of operation, mobility, equipment, nets Tech Support: So very knowledgable and helpful…along with Sales/Marketing
- 20. S i t e M a p s These are so very handy! Many big organisations are so very helpful in revealing how they are organised and provide short cuts to every corner of their on-liner and campus empires https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/site-map.html https://www.ourtesco.com/our-facilities-at-welwyn/interactive-3d-map/ https://www.tesco.com/help/site-map/ https://www.att.com/sitemap/ https://www.next.co.uk/site-map S m a l l s a m p l e
- 21. govuk should be gov.uk D E S I G N G U I D E S Suppose you want to spoof a site ! Many big organisations are so very helpful how they are organised and provide sh every corner of their on-liner and campus https://design.tax.service.gov.uk/hmrc-content-style-guide/ https://designnotes.blog.gov.uk/2014/02/18/two-new-design-guides/ DVLA:Your outstanding vehicle tax refund from an overpayment is pending. Please visit our secure link to process https://dvla.govuk-ol11.com/?c=2 ON MY SCREEN THIS WEEK: Nice Web Site :-) Really! https://design-system.service.gov.uk/sitemap/
- 22. govuk should be gov.uk D E S I G N G U I D E S Suppose you want to spoof a site ! Many big organisations are so very helpful how they are organised and provide sh every corner of their on-liner and campus https://design.tax.service.gov.uk/hmrc-content-style-guide/ https://designnotes.blog.gov.uk/2014/02/18/two-new-design-guides/ DVLA:Your outstanding vehicle tax refund from an overpayment is pending. Please visit our secure link to process https://dvla.govuk-ol11.com/?c=2 ON MY SCREEN THIS WEEK: Nice Web Site :-) Really! https://design-system.service.gov.uk/sitemap/ W E c a n D 0 M U C H b e t t e r T h is is a l a z y d e s ig n e r
- 23. Windfalls Just endless stuff ! We can buy acres of this on the DarkWeb!
- 24. Windfalls Beyond belief An infinity of personal accounts and passwords We can buy acres of this on the DarkWeb!
- 25. CRAzy Behaviour Just a few samples of on-line tips! Organisations give away so much information and we can infer where they are strong/weak, how rich/poor they are, and the likely attack complexity/effort required https://aws.amazon.com/solutions/case-studies Based on monthly spend: the top 10 Amazon AWS customers: •Turner- $10 M •BBC - $9 M •Baidu - $9 M •ESPN - $8 B •Netflix - $19 M •Twitch - $15 M •LinkedIn - $13 M •Facebook - $11M https://cloud.google.com/customers https://www.ibm.com/cloud/case-studies/
- 26. W at c h & L i s t e n In public and on line - unguarded chatter Very few organisations give their people any form of security training or advice on travel and meetings and they divulge so much when asked! Social Media Restaurants Coffee Shops Friends/Relatives Gatherings/Events Meetings of all kinds ++++++ So much can be gained from the minor investment of a few drinks, a meal, the hire of a professional snooper, direct purchases on the Dark Web et al
- 27. H a c k e r A n a t o m y A s k i l l e d s p e c i a l i s t f o r h i r e a n y t i m e
- 28. Cyber Crime Market W h a t ’ s o u r % t a r g e t o f t h i s g i a n t p o t ? “With entry costs relatively low and profits exceeding those of traditional crimes, cyber is an attractive choice for most criminals. Thus, we can expect cybercrime cases to reach new heights in 2020.”
- 29. Cyber Crime Market W h a t ’ s o u r % t a r g e t o f t h i s g i a n t p o t ? “With entry costs relatively low and profits exceeding those of traditional crimes, cyber is an attractive choice for most criminals. Thus, we can expect cybercrime cases to reach new heights in 2020.” C re a t i n g a n e w ‘ D a r k B u s i n e s s’ d e m a n d s t h a t s t u d y & f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y s p a c e & c o m p e t i t i o n
- 30. Assessment M a r k e t R e a l i t y 2 0 2 0 Attacks escalating Target surface growing Attackers winning the war Attacker rewards up by the year Defenders have ineffective defences Targets not collaborating or sharing Defenders disorganised and underinvesting People remain the biggest attack opportunity All security tools still reactive and mostly outdated An open/collaborative attacker market is far superior CyberCrime economy is now eligible to join G8 !
- 31. Assessment M a r k e t R e a l i t y 2 0 2 0 Attacks escalating Target surface growing Attackers winning the war Attacker rewards up by the year Defenders have ineffective defences Targets not collaborating or sharing Defenders disorganised and underinvesting People remain the biggest attack opportunity All security tools still reactive and mostly outdated An open/collaborative attacker market is far superior CyberCrime economy is now eligible to join G8 ! A G r ea t O p p o r tu n ity s p a c e fo r a n y n ew ed u c a ted c a p a b le a n d in n o v a tiv e en tr a n t S ta r tu p
- 32. SCENARIOs Description of possible events Creation Mechanisms: •Thinking •CopyCat •Searching •Workshops •Wargaming •Consultants •Brainstorming •BrownPaper Fair •Post It Note Panic •Follow The Heard •Dynamic Reactivity Can we ‘dream up’ and consider all the potential possibilities that we might exploit as attackers ?
- 33. SCENARIOs Description of possible events Creation Mechanisms: •Thinking •CopyCat •Searching •Workshops •Wargaming •Consultants •Brainstorming •BrownPaper Fair •Post It Note Panic •Follow The Heard •Dynamic Reactivity Can we ‘dream up’ and consider all the potential possibilities that we might exploit as attackers ? M e T o o O R N O T M e T o o V i s i b l e I n v i s i b l e o b l i q u e
- 34. P r i m e M o t i v a t i o n s A re we b r i n g i n g a n y t h i n g n e w t o t h e g a m e ? https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2017/01/11/ransom-motivation-behind-cyber-attacks/ Prime Motivation Making $$$$ Prime Motivation Trade Secrets Military Security Prime Motivation Domination and TakeOver
- 35. P r i m e M o t i v a t i o n s A re we b r i n g i n g a n y t h i n g n e w t o t h e g a m e ? https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2017/01/11/ransom-motivation-behind-cyber-attacks/ Prime Motivation Making $$$$ Prime Motivation Trade Secrets Military Security Prime Motivation Domination and TakeOver If w e a r e a n ew s ta r t s h o r t o f fu n d s w e n eed s o m e q u ic k a n d d ir ty to g et s o m e b itc o in fa s t
- 36. https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2017/01/11/ransom-motivation-behind-cyber-attacks/ P r i m e m e t h o d s A r e w e t o b e c r e a t i v e o r ‘ M e To o ’
- 37. https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2017/01/11/ransom-motivation-behind-cyber-attacks/ P r i m e m e t h o d s A r e w e t o b e c r e a t i v e o r ‘ M e To o ’ s im p le s in g le h it o r c o n tr iv ed /c o n v o lu ted m u lti/c o m b in a to r ia l h its w ith p r o v en tec h
- 38. https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2017/01/11/ransom-motivation-behind-cyber-attacks/ T h e T a r g e t s Who/What do we want to attack?
- 39. https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2017/01/11/ransom-motivation-behind-cyber-attacks/ T h e T a r g e t s Who/What do we want to attack? S o ft a n d r ic h is th e o b v io u s a n s w er h er e b u t th e p o ten tia l R o I is th e in v er s e o f d efen s iv e w ea k n es s
- 40. A l a r g e f i n a n c i a l P OT A w e l l d e f e n d e d c o r e & w i d e o p e n p e r i p h e r y !
- 41. A l a r g e f i n a n c i a l P OT A w e l l d e f e n d e d c o r e & w i d e o p e n p e r i p h e r y ! A target rich opportunity: • Wealthy technophobic (organisation?) customers • Processes, protocols and methodologies well known • Millions of people involved with dispersed offices • Multiple points of access PSTN, VOIP, Network+ • Staff trained to help customers BIG and small ++++ • Many possible attack modes: Phishing, Whaling, Malware, Man-in-the-Middle, Insider, Contractor, bribery, corruption, coercion
- 42. A l a r g e f i n a n c i a l P OT A w e l l d e f e n d e d c o r e & w i d e o p e n p e r i p h e r y ! A target rich opportunity: • Wealthy technophobic (organisation?) customers • Processes, protocols and methodologies well known • Millions of people involved with dispersed offices • Multiple points of access PSTN, VOIP, Network+ • Staff trained to help customers BIG and small ++++ • Many possible attack modes: Phishing, Whaling, Malware, Man-in-the-Middle, Insider, Contractor, bribery, corruption, coercion n o t ex a c tly v ir g in ter r ito r y b u t n o t s o ta r g eted a s w e m ig h t ex p ec t a n d th u s w o r th c o n s id er in g
- 43. “Exploit disguise, camouflage, human fallibility, do the unexpected - exploit first mover advantage” A t t a c k e r A d v a n t a g e U n b o u n d e d l e ve ra g i n g e ve r y d e g re e o f f re e d o m “Weaponise the position, knowledge, expectation, and easy to access resources of targets” “Take advantage of surprise in the time, place, method and direction of attack” “If possible design attack modes that can go undetected to be utilised many times and/or remain dormant until triggered
- 44. “Exploit disguise, camouflage, human fallibility, do the unexpected - exploit first mover advantage” A t t a c k e r A d v a n t a g e U n b o u n d e d l e ve ra g i n g e ve r y d e g re e o f f re e d o m “Weaponise the position, knowledge, expectation, and easy to access resources of targets” “Take advantage of surprise in the time, place, method and direction of attack” “If possible design attack modes that can go undetected to be utilised many times and/or remain dormant until triggered Th e id ea l s c en a r io is to a tta c k /s u c c eed a n d m o v e o n u n d etec ted a n d th en r ep ea t la ter
- 45. M o r e w i s d o m s A 650 BC book really worth reading “All warfare is based on deception” “The whole secret lies in confusing the target(s), so that he cannot fathom our real intent.” “Engage target(s) with what they expect; it is what they are able to discern and confirms their projections. It settles them into predictable patterns of response, occupying their minds while you wait for the extraordinary moment — that which they cannot anticipate.” Audio Book https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7rhovBK_eA
- 46. S tat u s Q u o D i s t r i b u t i o n o f a t t a c k s http://www.wordlistresearch.com/2017 B ro w s e rO t h e r s S c a m W W W M a l w a r e Wo r m B r u t e F o rc e D D o S A n i n d i c a t i v e a n a l y s i s o f a v a s t n u m b e r o f r e p o r t s g i v i n g g u i d a n c e i n o u r d e c i s i o n m a k i n g
- 47. market potent ial R e l a t i v e 2 0 1 9 C y b e r E a r n i n g s https://bit.ly/2Uu0QaD “With entry costs relatively low and profits exceeding those of traditional crimes, cyber is an attractive choice and we can expect cybercrime cases to reach new heights in 2020 and beyond.”
- 48. market potent ial R e l a t i v e 2 0 1 9 C y b e r E a r n i n g s https://bit.ly/2Uu0QaD “With entry costs relatively low and profits exceeding those of traditional crimes, cyber is an attractive choice and we can expect cybercrime cases to reach new heights in 2020 and beyond.” C y b er C r im e is th e s in g le b ig g es t a n d m o s t s u c c es s fu l b u s in es s o n th e p la n et
- 49. W h e r e d o w e f i t ? 2 0 1 9 R e l a t i v e E a r n i n g s b y S i l o https://bit.ly/2Uu0QaD Cyber-crime groups operate as regular companies hiring specialised staff and management. Some have public personas to maintain a good reputation. Most of their sales are on the dark web - reputation is key.
- 50. W h e r e d o w e f i t ? 2 0 1 9 R e l a t i v e E a r n i n g s b y S i l o https://bit.ly/2Uu0QaD Cyber-crime groups operate as regular companies hiring specialised staff and management. Some have public personas to maintain a good reputation. Most of their sales are on the dark web - reputation is key. C y b er C r im e h a s s o m e o f th e b es t b u s in es s p r a c tic es /m a n a g er s a n d EV IL p eo p le o n th e p la n et
- 51. d a r k w e b U l t i m a t e To o l B o x Cheat Sheet: https://tek.io/2UhhRpA A TOR (or similar) Browser or similar required to gain access WARNING This is the Devils Domain - SEE NEXT SLIDE Fully developed hacker tools Tech support and tutorials Latest attack tips & methods Consultant hackers for hire Password/Account databases R&D Programmes to join Investors and money handling +++++ On-line SuperStore for the hacker and criminal communities with a vast army of professional contributors and leading edge products
- 52. STUDENT WARNING I d o n o t re c o m m e n d e n t e r i n g t h i s d o m a i n , BU T i t i s t h e o n l y re a l wa y o f a p p re c i a t i n g t h e f u l l p o t e n t i a l - S O i f yo u d o d e c i d e t o h a ve l o o k , t h e n : 1) Use an old machine/fake ID in a coffee shop 2) Have your camera, mic, tracking turned off 3) Make sure all location service options are off 4) Employ security (Norton et al) throughout 5) Only have a single app (TOR) installed 6) DO NOT complete any transactions 7) Reveal no personal info whatsoever 8) Factory reset machine when done 9) Security scan machine on boot RECOMMENDATION: Enter, take a look, get a taste, get out
- 53. M O R E R E A D I N G O t h e r d i m e n s i o n s o f D a r k N e t s How the Dark Web works (ZDNet) 10 things you didn't know about the Dark Web (ZDNet) This dark web market is dedicated to compromising your emails (ZDNet) Dark Web 101:Your guide to the badlands of the internet (CNET) The United Nations: "We're all facing the same global cyber-threat" (TechRepublic) Four misleading myths about the Dark Web (TechRepublic) The light side of the Dark Web (TechRepublic) IBM Security takes us on a tour of the Dark Web (TechRepublic)
- 54. 2019 TOP 10 ATTACKS Human instinct, emotion, rational is at the wheel The skilled attackers have access to a global market of data and well honed tools via the Dark Web •Malware: A growing catalogue of brutality and sophistication •Phishing: Preying on the naive, gullible, tired, unprepared •Man-in-the-Middle: Pretending to be someone/something else •Denial of Service: Disrupting business, services, access, nets •SQL Injection: Introduces false instructions and requests •Zero/Day One: Invisible and lying in wait for an opportunity •Cross Scripting: Reprogramming appearance/purpose/function •ID Spoofing: Log-On illegal access/entry to accounts and sites •Password: Stolen, Brute Force, Cracked, Directory Trial & Error •Drive By: Malicious script embedded in an insecure website
- 55. 2019 TOP 10 ATTACKS Human instinct, emotion, rational is at the wheel The skilled attackers have access to a global market of data and well honed tools via the Dark Web •Malware: A growing catalogue of brutality and sophistication •Phishing: Preying on the naive, gullible, tired, unprepared •Man-in-the-Middle: Pretending to be someone/something else •Denial of Service: Disrupting business, services, access, nets •SQL Injection: Introduces false instructions and requests •Zero/Day One: Invisible and lying in wait for an opportunity •Cross Scripting: Reprogramming appearance/purpose/function •ID Spoofing: Log-On illegal access/entry to accounts and sites •Password: Stolen, Brute Force, Cracked, Directory Trial & Error •Drive By: Malicious script embedded in an insecure website W e h a v e to d ec id e to fo llo w th e c r o w d o r a d o p t a d iffer en t s tr a teg y /a p p r o a c h
- 56. Why attack ? What is the primary motivation
- 57. Why attack ? What is the primary motivation Always nice to have a target in mind! Really useful for business planning !
- 58. Why attack ? What is the primary motivation Always nice to have a target in mind! Really useful for business planning ! Yummy! >100Bn by 2525 >1000Bn by 2030 What a great and growing attack portal !
- 59. attack TYPE? A b ro a d c h u rc h o f o p t i o n s Most attack modes are easily detected and rendered visible, but there are skilled and undetected attackers who come and go…& the damage shows up (much) later ! •Unauthorised access to a digital network, system and/or its data •To access personal/secure people/businesses information •Hacking for criminal/illegal/unsolicited purposes •Unauthorised use of a computer/network •Malware installation/infection •Denial of service •Mischief •++++ The intentional distortion of communication and the purposeful corrupting of data can be devastating for societies, commerce & democracy, but profitable for Dark Businesses
- 60. attack TYPE? A b ro a d c h u rc h o f o p t i o n s Most attack modes are easily detected and rendered visible, but there are skilled and undetected attackers who come and go…& the damage shows up (much) later ! •Unauthorised access to a digital network, system and/or its data •To access personal/secure people/businesses information •Hacking for criminal/illegal/unsolicited purposes •Unauthorised use of a computer/network •Malware installation/infection •Denial of service •Mischief •++++ The intentional distortion of communication and the purposeful corrupting of data can be devastating for societies, commerce & democracy, but profitable for Dark Businesses M is c h ief c a n b e a p o w er fu l w a y o f c r ea tin g d is tr a c tio n fr o m th e m a in ev en t
- 61. R a n d o m H a c k s Domain of the opportunistic amateur The small fry nuisance that occasionally strike it lucky and gain access to web sites and other facilities and get headline coverage/featured in the media “ A keyboard is a very poor substitute for thinking, investigating, planning, and a good business model” “ But very occasionally this army of hams stumble onto something useful - and we should watch them just in case”
- 62. R o g u e S t a t e Military-business professional approach May be military and/or security service based or indeed outsourced to peripheral pseudo-companies in or out of country Their vision, mission and plan is generally wide and diverse with everything from stealing money and intellectual property to military defence/attack, political subversion and regime change… Beyond technology we might expect spies, collaborators, plants, blackmail victims, the duped and more/much worse
- 63. Every malware type is speciated and we are also seeing a deal of interbreeding using Artificial Life Top 10 Malware 2019 A highly dynamic profile changing by the Quarter
- 64. Every malware type is speciated and we are also seeing a deal of interbreeding using Artificial Life Top 10 Malware 2019 A highly dynamic profile changing by the Quarter Th is is s u c h a s a fe a r ea to en g a g e in a s th e s o u r c e c a n r em a in h id d en w h ils t b o ts d o a ll th e w o r k
- 65. Almost everything imaginable is available at a price on The Dark Net including ‘call-off-contact’ support, workforce and consultants! Assembling a Tool Box What can we access and exploit that involves no work? Let’s make a start by looking at the most popular recently in use but not forget that a lot of the old can be got at zero, or near zero costs & reused, resurrected, repurposed, modified, and used as ‘seeds’ for new configurations and types!
- 66. Attack Tools 2020 Just one of numerous ‘stores’ on the Dark Web We don’t have to code as we can download all the tools required to become a super Hack - and there are skilled ‘dark consultants’ available for hire if help is needed!
- 67. M a l w a r e / O S Attacks by Mobile Device Android Windows Other iPhone >20M Species of Malware Recorded for Android Alone Best Ball Park Estimate of different/speciated malware types >60M This is fundamentally a display of basic design weakness and a good indicator of where to focus attacks! Where should we target if you were are to maximise the RoI and minimise the cost of entry?
- 68. To o l s c r e at i o n A well funded/distributed global industry Growth curve for just one mobile sector and one particular OS up to early 2019 extracted from operational data Extrapolating out to the end of 2020 and this will have grown to ~ 35k Number of new & speciated tools
- 69. Attack Tools 2020/1 A ‘very small’ sample of what is available
- 70. Attack Tools 2020/2 A ‘very small’ sample of what is available
- 71. So how good is IT all E x h a u s t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n s / f e a t u r e s l i s t
- 72. Airbash Auto W PA PSK Captures the full handshake script reveals client
- 73. hacker e d uc at i on Qui te an online ‘University’ Availa ble
- 74. YEAR-ON -Y e ar Attack tool rankings change “Follow the flow - Go with what is working and realising a good RoI”
- 75. Defence Rating Directly related to target wealth!
- 76. Defence Rating Directly related to target wealth! R ic h C o u n tr ies w ith g o o d d efen c es o ffer v er y b ig r ew a r d s IFw h en a s u c c es s is r ea lis ed p o o r C o u n tr ies w ith p o o r d efen c es s ee v er y s m a ll r ew a r d s ev en w h en s u c c es s es a r e p len tifu l
- 77. Attack strategies M i n d g a m e s b a s e d o n w h a t we k n o w •Access: A growing catalogue of brutality and sophistication •Phishing: Preying on the naive, gullible, tired, unprepared •Man-in-the-Middle: Pretending to be someone/something else •Denial of Service: Disrupting business, services, access, nets •SQL Injection: Introduces false instructions and requests •Zero/Day One: Invisible and lying in wait for an opportunity •Cross Scripting: Reprogramming appearance/purpose/function •ID Spoofing: Log-On illegal access/entry to accounts and sites •Password: Stolen, Brute Force, Cracked, Directory Trial & Error •Drive By: Malicious script embedded in an insecure website
- 78. t h e w e a k e s t L i n k Pe o p l e a r e b y f a r t h e s i n g l e b i g g e s t r i s k I n o r g a n i s a t i o n s l a r g e a n d s m a l l , i t o n l y t a k e s o n e t o m a k e a n e r r o r, b e c o m e c o r r u p t e d , g e t u p s e t , g i v e i n t o t e m p t a t i o n , t u r n t o t h e D a r k S i d e ! “ Pe o p l e a re i n h e re n t l y k i n d a n d h e l p f u l a n d w i l l r u s h t o y o u r a i d s h o u l d t h e y t h i n k y o u a r e h a v i n g d i f f i c u l t y o r a n d s o m e k i n d o f d i f f i c u l t y ” “ T h e y a re a l s o ve r y p l e a s e d t o f o l l o w y o u r i n s t r u c t i o n s i f t h e y p e r c e i v e t h a t y o u a r e k i n d a n d t r y i n g t o h e l p t h e m ”
- 79. Exploiting Human traits D y n a m i c a n d N o n - L i n e a r - E a s y t o A c c e s s Sa http://www.wordlistresearch.com/2017/12/negative-words H app ignoran vengef trustin corruptibl helpfuinnocen careles gullible fallibl kin carin Naiveunthinkin frustrate reckless unaware competitiv depresse angr caring carefuldeceptive crafty selfish selfless cunning sill dum scheming open close
- 80. W e a k P a s s w o r d s C a t a l o g u e s a va i l a b l e o n t h e D a r k We b People in organisations and at home use these and make their accounts easy to crack
- 81. O p e n & C l o n e d C a t a l o g u e s o n t h e D a r k W e b Vast amounts of our data are public or have been stolen and/or cloned
- 82. enraged employee F r u s t r a t e d b y f a i l u r e t o a d v a n c e Feels unappreciated and undervalued Always overlooked for promotion Really dislikes management chain At odds with the company values Stays on site & creates damaging failures and/or data changes Leaves the company and plants software bombs/backdoors Open to bribery and corruption and the stealing of IP
- 83. i n n o c e n t e m p l o y e e Feels insecure and has become over helpful Naive, open, careless, needs to be seen to be useful Gullible and careless with information Talks too much when care is needed Unquestioning and so very supportive Random information and data Tends to be careless and make mistakes Open to being ‘steered’ by a skilled manipular
- 84. M a l i c i o u s e m p l o y e e Hates successful, happy, people & feels cheated Perhaps a bad, poor, disrupted, deprived home/childhood/education Probably something of a social misfit and/or sociopath/psychopath Likely intolerant less empathic - with fewer friends than most Normally angry and upset about almost everything Random acts of physical and software damage Open to suggestion and acting as an agent of crime Open to bribery and corruption and the stealing of almost anything
- 85. H O N E Y P O T S Applies equally to both sexes Older man - younger woman Older woman - younger man Careless talk, briefcase, laptop access Access to some informal meetings Overhearing telephone calls Listening device planting Geo tracking/bugging Spyware install Long term investment and strategy most often used by rogue states for .Gov & industrial spying with operations spanning years
- 86. T h e V i s i t o r S Consultants, Contractors, Temps Long term investment and strategy most often used by rogue states for spying government & industrial spying operations spanning tears On site(s) and embedded inside the company Online and general info/document access Engaged with management/workforce Hidden cameras and sound recording Eyes and ears engaged 24 x 7 HD/Thumb Drive Theft Bugging device planting Software installs +++++ Rogue States, Criminals, Hackers Opportunists, The Corrupted and Corruptible
- 87. A long-game investment by rogue states Enjoy a normal (looking) career and life Undercover for their country full-time Likely to progress and be promoted Fully trusted as team members Usually well educated/capable Seldom engage in sabotage Mainly gathering data/info +++++ S p o t T h e S p y Recruited in as bona fide employees
- 88. Wireless to 3,4,5G, WiFi connection wide open to theft, eaves dropping, link hacking device in hand N o w t h e d o m i n a n t m o d e
- 89. Cyber Risk Realities opportunity space V i r t u a l a t t a c k s m o s t l y f a v o u r e d
- 90. S tat u s Q u o C y b e r C r i m e E c o n o m y E A S Y E N T R Y 1 M o s t l y v e r y p o o r p r o t e c t i o n B e h i n d t h e F i r e W a l l i n o n e s m a l l s t e p N o P a s s w o rd s E a s y P a s s w o r d s F a c t o r y D e f a u l t
- 91. E A S Y E N T R Y 2 M o s t l y v e r y p o o r p r o t e c t i o n
- 92. E A S Y M o n e y L o w c o s t h u m a n / ro b o t a t t a c k s
- 93. P h i s h i n g E x p o n e n t i a l G r o w t h Always in a race against security teams looking to shut them down Security teams report phishing URLs regularly, but some use web hosts/domains that ignore reports Most kits have a short life, and the phishing window is growing smaller H i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l / p r o f i t a b l e ; a n d v e r y e a s y t o a u t o m a t e f o r e M a i l , T X T a n d s p e e c h
- 94. P h i s h i n g E x p o n e n t i a l G r o w t h o f S p e c i e s s e e s a ra p i d S h o r t e n i n g L i f e t i m e s Days to Deactivation Cumulative%ofKitsDeactivated 25% 50% 75% 100% Cumulative % of kits deactivated 0 40 80 120 160 200
- 95. P h i s h i n g E x p o n e n t i a l I n n o v a t i o n Akamai
- 96. soft target 1 Ol d p eople and technophobes Potential RoI Savings + Pension Pot + Bank + Cards + eAccounts Point of Access Old laptop with no SW updates Ineffective Malware Protection Ineffective firewall and Passwords Default settings on smart TV et al WiFi visible and easily accessible Already part of a BOTNET… Human Weakness Kind, Helpful, Compliant! Naive, uneducated, unaware Subject to Phishing, SPAM, SCAM, Default settings on smart TV et al WiFi visible and easily accessible Below par passwords/security settings Passwords recorded in a little book Prone to being taken in by: MS Support, ISP Fault/Testing/ Service Cut Off, A call from the bank …
- 97. soft target 2 Hard working & busy families Potential RoI Savings + Services + Sales Bank + Cards + eAccounts Point of Access PC, laptop, tablets, games consoles Ineffective FireWalls and Malware Protection across multiple machines and platforms, weak/no passwords Default settings on smart TV et al WiFi @ home and mobile - visible and easily accessible Human Weakness Busy tired parents + innocent children Not well educated/fully aware, disconnected from children activity. Unable to keep up with software/OS upgrades across all machines, no one has oversight… Passwords used multiple times Prone to being taken in by: Spoof URL, RansomeWare, Freebies and low cost kit Day One plus too good to be true offers, Surveys…
- 98. soft target 3 The frantic/busy mobile worker Potential RoI Customer, Project, Contract, Sales, Production, Delivery Data +Account/Co Access Point of Access Laptop, tablet, mobile(s), open Blue Tooth/WiFi, weak MalwareProtection across multiple machines/platforms, repeated/reused simple passwords, automated log on to known/regular wifi providers Human Weakness Busy, in a hurry, stressing environment Not well trained, briefed, supported Subject to Phishing, SPAM, SCAM, Default settings on smart TV et al WiFi visible and easily accessible Below par passwords/security settings Passwords used multiple times Prone to being taken in by: Spoof WiF, URL, Device Request to Link, blind to shoulder surfing and device theft + USB Plants…
- 99. soft target 4 T h e S M E / S t a r t U p S e c t o r Potential RoI B i l l i n g +eAccounts+Bank+IP+ User/Customer Info Point of Access Laptop, tablet, mobile(s), open Blue Tooth/WiFi, weak MalwareProtection across multiple machines/platforms, passwords/access management, many visitors and meetings, automated log on to known/regular wifi providers Human Weakness Busy, in a hurry, stressed environment Equipment self provision, sharing culture, subject to Phishing, SPAM, SCAM, numerous home and office wifi appliances et al No dedicated security team and no oversight Passwords used multiple times Prone to being taken in by: Spoof WiF, URL, Device Request to Link, blind to shoulder surfing and device theft + USB Plants…
- 100. T h e V I S I TO R ( S ) S a l e s m a n , C o n t r a c t o r + + Potential RoI: Collects random/ targeted info-Plants, USB/LAN Dongles - removes drives/discs Human Weakness Exploitation Escorted/Freedom of movement - allowed to be alone, given LAN/Net access, observes screens, fax, papers, whiteboards. Conversations overhead vacuum up all logistic and other info, observes personal device numbers, brand variations, mobiles & cameras for that later planning of an attack Inadequate visitor checks/validation in the interest of serving a fast moving economy and relationships Prone to being taken in by: Spoof WiF, URL, Device Request to Link, shoulder surfing blind & device theft + USB Plants…
- 101. h a r d ta r g e t 1 C o mpanies that don’t divulge detail How is the Network Configured? All protected by strong encryption 128/256 keys and disparate routing
- 102. h a r d ta r g e t 3 L a r g e / I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m p a n i e s What is actually in this Cloud? All protected by strong encryption 128/256 keys and disparate cloud connects
- 103. T h e soft SIDE OF HARD L o c a l L o o p , H o m e , M o b i l e , W i F i , B l u e To o t h , L A N VPN PN VPN PN Dedicated Fibre VPN PN Dedicated Fibre VPN PN VOIP Network Service Reseller with direct routing
- 104. T h e soft SIDE OF HARD L o c a l L o o p , H o m e , M o b i l e , W i F i , B l u e To o t h , L A N VPN PN VPN PN Dedicated Fibre VPN PN Dedicated Fibre VPN PN VOIP Network Service Reseller with direct routing Inherently Insecure Wired & Wireless Inherently Secure Fibre PN/VPN Strong Encryption Hidden VPN & Routings
- 105. R E A L L Y h a r d t a r g e t s G o ve r n m e n t , I n s t i t u t i o n s , M i l i t a r y, I n f ra s t r u c t u re + + N o t re a l l y a g o o d i d e a t o a t t a c k : T h e f o rc e s o f M I 5 , M I 6 , G C H Q , Po l i c e w o u l d r a i n d o w n ! T h i s d o m a i n i s o n e f o r t h e r o g u e s t a t e s & t h o s e t h o s e c o n t e m p l a t i n g s o m e f o r m o f w a r / s a n c t i o n s
- 106. T I M E TO AT TAC K O n t h e b a s i s o f w h a t w e h a v e c o v e r e d s o f a r !
- 107. STUDENT Attack Scenario O u r s e l e c t e d / r i c h Ta r g e t s : R e t a i l , S M E s , L o g i s t i c s A l l Ta r g e t s a r e p r o f i t a b l e a n d o p e n t o r a n s o m a t t a c k s T h e y c a n s u r v i v e a a 2 0 - 2 5 % o f t u r n o v e r o f d e m a n d A l l a r e d e a d i n t h e w a t e r i f t h e y c a n n o t a c c e s s t h e i r d a t a
- 108. STUXNET (2011) Variant H i g h l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d c u s t o m i s a b l e c h e a p
- 109. A c c e s s m e t h o d s A l l a v a i l a b l e h u m a n a n d n e t m o d e s p o s s i b l e G a i n p h y s i c a l a c c e s s a s a v i s i t o r L e a v e a d r i v e i n W C o n c o r r i d o r f l o o r, a n o f f i c e d e s k H a n d b r o c h u r e s a n d d r i v e s t o t h e f r o n t d e s k L e a v e b r o c h u r e s a n d d r i v e s i n r e c e p t i o n a r e i f p o s s i b l e I n s e r t U S B a n d C AT 5 / 5 d o n g l e s i n t o a c c e s s i b l e s o c k e t s L e a v e a d u l t e r a t e d AV a d a p t e r s / d o n g l e s i n m e e t i n g r o o m s D i s g u i s e S T U X m a x a s a P D F E m b e d o n b l a n k t h u m b d r i v e s E m b e d o n s a l e s t h u m b d r i v e s E m b e d i n e M a i l s a n d We b S i t e C r e a t e a d u m m y c o m p a n y S e e d w e b s i t e , e M a i l s , C a t a l o g u e , S u p p o r t M a t e r i a l s L i k e w i s e a l l b r o c h u r e s t h u m b d r i v e s a n d f r e e b e e s C l o s e / E x p u n g e a l l t r a c e s o f c o m p a n y d a y b e f o r e i s s u i n g r a n s o m n o t e s
- 110. S p e c i a t i o n A r t i f i c i a l L i f e B r e e d i n g M a l w a r e
- 111. A t t a c k A l g o r i t h M G e t t i n g S T U X m a x o n t o L A N s a n d M a c h i n e s S T U X m a x A c t i v i t y ( t a k e s p l a c e o u t o f h o u r s ) 1 ) S e a r c h o u t P C s , L a p t o p s , Ta b l e t s , M o b i l e s S w i t c h e s , S e r v e r s 2 ) S e a r c h o u t b a c k u p d r i v e s a n d C l o u d A c c o u n t s 3 ) I n f i l t r a t e a n d s i t q u i e t f o r 3 0 d a y s d o i n g n o t h i n g 4 ) S T U X m a x n o t a c h i e v i n g ( 1 - 2 ) i n 2 0 d a y s s e l f d e s t r u c t 5 ) R e p o r t b a c k p e n e t r a t i o n a n d p o s i t i o n i n g i m m e d i a t e l y 6 ) S i t q u i e t f o r a f u r t h e r 1 0 d a y s d o i n g n o t h i n g 7 ) O n d a y a d e f i n e d d a t e ( ~ d a y 4 1 ) e n c r y p t a l l f i l e s a n d d r i v e s 8 ) W h e n ( 7 ) c o m p l e t e d a l l S T U X m a x e l e m e n t s t o s e l f d e s t r u c t
- 112. C o l l e c t i n g t h e $ $ $ B y t h e c o m p a n y o r b y t h e d e v i c e / s e r v i c e / f a c i l i t y ? 1 ) D i r e c t P a y m e n t i n t o B I T C O I N o n l y 2 ) D e s t r o y a l l e v i d e n c e a n d e r a s e a n y a u d i t t r a i l s 3 ) L a y f a l s e t r a i l s a n d p l a n t e r r o n e o u s e v i d e n c e 4 ) W h e n p a y m e n t c o m p l e t e d r e l e a s e e n c r y p t i o n k e y ( s ) 5 ) W h e n p r o j e c t e d R o I a c h i e v e d s l o w l y ‘e v a p o r a t e ’ ( 3 ) 6 ) W h e n c o m p l e t e d r e v i e w c o m p l e t e a 3 6 0 r e v i e w o f s u c c e s s 7 ) R e f i n e a t t a c k f r o m t h e l e s s o n s l e a r n e d 8 ) L a u n c h a s e c o n d b u t b i g g e r w a v e f u n d e d b y A t t a c k O n e 9 ) R e p e a t ( 6 - 8 ) u n t i l t h e t a r g e t s r e s p o n d w i t h e f f e c t i v e d e f e n c e s 1 0 ) D o ( 9 ) a t t h e p o i n t w h e r e R o I f a l l s s h o r t o f t a r g e t e a r n i n g s 1 1 ) I t i s t i m e t o c o n f i g u r e a n e w f o r m o f m o n e y m a k i n g a t t a c k !
- 113. C o l l e c t i n g t h e $ $ $ B y t h e c o m p a n y o r b y t h e d e v i c e / s e r v i c e / f a c i l i t y ? 1 ) D i r e c t P a y m e n t i n t o B I T C O I N o n l y 2 ) D e s t r o y a l l e v i d e n c e a n d e r a s e a n y a u d i t t r a i l s 3 ) L a y f a l s e t r a i l s a n d p l a n t e r r o n e o u s e v i d e n c e 4 ) W h e n p a y m e n t c o m p l e t e d r e l e a s e e n c r y p t i o n k e y ( s ) 5 ) W h e n p r o j e c t e d R o I a c h i e v e d s l o w l y ‘e v a p o r a t e ’ ( 3 ) C L A S S D I S C U S S I O N P r o s a n d C o n s o f ( 1 - 5 )
- 114. P r e p a r e f o r C L A S S D I S C U S S I O N A f t e r t h e D e f e n c e S c e n a r i o s M o d u l e n e x t w e e k
- 117. F U T U R E S P r o j e c t e d n e a r & f a r Multiplexed Attacks M&A Resource Hi-Jacks AI + AL Attack Scenario Creation AI Behavioural Analysis of People, Machines, Networks
- 118. Things that Think want to Link and Things that Link want to Think F I N - Q & A ? www.petercochrane.com