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![AEG - pwnable.kr
Program
Operations
Get random binary, pwn it in 10 seconds.
1) Takes input at argv[1]
2) Does some decode & operations on it
3) Calls sequence of 16 functions
4) Each function checks 3 characters of input
sequentially
5) If you pass them all, you get to the exploitable
memcpy!
Automated Exploit Generation
1) Generate input to get to vulnerability
2) Generate payload to exploit and get shell
10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 14/45](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/csw2016dantoineautomaticexploitgeneration-160402161242/75/Csw2016-d-antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration-14-2048.jpg)
![The image cannot be displayed. Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted. Restart your computer, and then open the file again. If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again.
AEG - pwnable.kr
fail ...
input
argv[1]
3
checks
... 15 more
functions ...
memcpy
fail ...
10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 15/45](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/csw2016dantoineautomaticexploitgeneration-160402161242/75/Csw2016-d-antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration-15-2048.jpg)
![Example: DBI
$pin -t inscount0.so -- binary
[BINARY LEVEL]
- Inject increment after each instruction
[STILL BRUTE FORCE]
- Return total instructions for fuzzed input
- Only true for that 1 executed path
(the possible CFG space may be
very large)
10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 23/45](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/csw2016dantoineautomaticexploitgeneration-160402161242/75/Csw2016-d-antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration-23-2048.jpg)
![Example: Symbolic Execution
[INT] a, b, c
[INT] x, y, z = 0;
fun( int a, b, c )
{
if (a) {
x = -2;
}
if (b < 5) {
if (!a && c) {
y = 1;
}
z = 2;
}
assert(x+y+z!=3)
}
. . .
fun( 0, 3, 1 );
. . .
Old Method:
Try all inputs until assert
[WARNING] inputs unbounded!
10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 26/45](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/csw2016dantoineautomaticexploitgeneration-160402161242/75/Csw2016-d-antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration-26-2048.jpg)
![Example: Symbolic Execution
[SYMBOL] a, b, c
[INT] x, y, z = 0;
if (a) {
x = -2;
}
if (b < 5) {
if (!a && c) {
y = 1;
}
z = 2;
}
assert(x+y+z!=3)
10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 27/45](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/csw2016dantoineautomaticexploitgeneration-160402161242/75/Csw2016-d-antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration-27-2048.jpg)
![Example: Concolic Execution
[INT] a, b, c
[INT] x, y, z = 0;
fun( int a, b, c )
{
if (a) {
x = -2;
}
if (b < 5) {
if (!a && c) {
y = 1;
}
z = 2;
}
assert(x+y+z!=3)
}
. . .
fun( 0, 3, 1 );
. . .
Old Method:
Try all inputs until assert
[WARNING] inputs unbounded!
10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 29/45](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/csw2016dantoineautomaticexploitgeneration-160402161242/75/Csw2016-d-antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration-29-2048.jpg)
![Example: Concolic Execution
[INT & SYMBOL] a, b, c
[INT] x, y, z = 0;
if (a) {
x = -2;
}
if (b < 5) {
if (!a && c) {
y = 1;
}
z = 2;
}
assert(x+y+z!=3)
STEPS
[ONE]
concrete execution of function
[TWO]
while building symbolic path model
[THREE]
constraints on input are modeled
[FOUR]
models used to generate concrete input
10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 30/45](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/csw2016dantoineautomaticexploitgeneration-160402161242/75/Csw2016-d-antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration-30-2048.jpg)
![Example: Flare-on Challenge 9
[ http://blog.trailofbits.com/2015/09/09/flare-on-reversing-
challenges-2015/ ]
• Pintool instruction count
• More instructions == Closer to correct input
10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 34/45
Input:
FLAGAAAA...
Input:
AAAAAAAA...](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/csw2016dantoineautomaticexploitgeneration-160402161242/75/Csw2016-d-antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration-34-2048.jpg)
![AEG Demo: Assumptions
[ Assumptions ]
• Space of potential vulnerabilities too large
• Need to write tools to hunt for subset
– Target memory corrupt (memcpy)
• ROP from there…
[ Dynamically Acquire ]
• Path to target
• Solve for constraints
• Addresses of gadgets for ROP
[ Statically (Pre) Acquired ]
• Semantics of target & gadgets
10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 37/45](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/csw2016dantoineautomaticexploitgeneration-160402161242/75/Csw2016-d-antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration-37-2048.jpg)
![LLVM Pass
Download tool:
[ https://github.com/trailofbits/domtresat ]
10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 38/45](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/csw2016dantoineautomaticexploitgeneration-160402161242/75/Csw2016-d-antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration-39-2048.jpg)
![Angr Script
… acquire binary & some conditions ….
b = angr.Project("aeg")
ss = b.factory.blank_state(addr=entry_func)
ss.options.discard("LAZY_SOLVES")
ss.se._solver.timeout=10000
ss.memory.store(argv1_buff, ss.BV("input", 50*8))
pg = b.factory.path_group(ss, immutable=False)
angr.path_group.l.setLevel("DEBUG")
pg.explore(find=vuln_addr[0], avoid=fail_bbs)
argv1_win = pg.found[0].state.se.any_str(pg.found[0].state.memory.load(argv1_buff, 50))
#setup env
#fake input with no value
#target & bad branches, 4 speed
#solved for path to target, dump memory
10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 39/45](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/csw2016dantoineautomaticexploitgeneration-160402161242/75/Csw2016-d-antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration-40-2048.jpg)
![[ What We are (still) Working With ]
– Binaries
– Source is nice
• Need to lift bins to IR for LLVM
• Most concolic exec. tools would need to compile it
Conclusion: The Future
[ Difficulty ]
- Know how to express our targeted vulnerability
- Semantics for UAF, Memory Corruption, etc....
10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 41/45](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/csw2016dantoineautomaticexploitgeneration-160402161242/75/Csw2016-d-antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration-42-2048.jpg)
![References
[Good Course Material]
https://www.cs.umd.edu/class/spring2013/cmsc631/lectures/symbolic-exec.pdf
https://www.utdallas.edu/~zxl111930/spring2012/public/lec4.pdf
http://web.mit.edu/16.399/www/lecture_01-intro/Cousot_MIT_2005_Course_01_4-1.pdf
http://homepage.cs.uiowa.edu/~tinelli/classes/seminar/Cousot.pdf
[Site for Tool Documentation]
https://github.com/angr/angr-doc
https://github.com/llvm-mirror/llvm
https://github.com/trailofbits/domtresat [ Tool built on concepts in this talk ]
[Other Good Resources]
http://www.grammatech.com/blog/hybrid-concolic-execution-part-1
http://openwall.info/wiki/_media/people/jvanegue/files/aegc_vanegue.pdf
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Uploaded byCanSecWest
Csw2016 d antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration
The document discusses automated exploit generation through program analysis techniques. It introduces dynamic binary instrumentation, symbolic execution, and concolic execution as program analysis methods that can help automate finding the path to a vulnerability and generating an exploit. It provides examples of how these techniques work and common tools used like PIN, KLEE, Angr. The document concludes by discussing challenges like defining semantics of vulnerabilities precisely and the potential of program analysis to find more bugs through techniques like automated proving of program correctness.
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Csw2016 d antoine_automatic_exploitgeneration
- 1. Automatic Exploit Generation an Odyssey SophiaD’Antoine CanSecWest 2016
- 2. Introduction Programs have becomeincreasingly difficult to exploit • larger, changing surface area • mitigations • more bytes to siphon through 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 2/45
- 3. Introduction Reaction: people get smarterand tools get better - pentesters - government research - CTF! 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 3/45
- 4. CTF & Wargames A Binary PWN It A Flag 10/22/2015Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 4/45
- 5. The Past Manual labor • static analysis 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 5/45 - dynamic analysis
- 6. Dynamic Analysis Definition: • Runningit (concrete execution) • Collecting/ observing environment changes Popular Uses: - dump VM memory & grep - record/ replay & manual analysis - gdb (debuggers) & run 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 6/45
- 7. Dynamic Analysis Common tools: • gdb, windbg, cdb • python brute force (blind fuzzing) 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 7/45
- 8. step... step... step... step... step... step... step... step... step... step... step... step... step... step... step... step... step... step... Example: Dynamic Analysis 10/22/2015Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 8/45
- 9.
- 10. Agenda 1. Intro 2. AutomatingExploitation a. what, how? b. the target 3. Program Analysis a. background b. types we care about c. how this helps with AEG 4. Application a. tools b. demo 5. Conclusion 10/22/2015 Automatic Exploit Generation 10/45
- 11. - Focus ondiscovery and combination of write and read primitives Some Background What is Automated Exploitation? The ability to generate a successful computer attack with reduced or entirely without human interaction. • Existing AE work focused on Restricted Models: – Sean Heelan’s “Automatic Generation of Control Flow Hijacking Exploits for Software Vulnerabilities” – David Brumley (@ Carnegie Mellon) et al. (AEG, MAYHEM, etc) – Cyber Grand Challenge! (CGC) - Focus on discovery and combination of write and read primitives - Focus on discovery and combination of write and read primitives 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 11/45
- 12. Break up AEGinto 2 parts: • Generating input to get to vulnerability • Generating “payload” to profit from vulnerability Automating Exploitation - Both are hard - Work being done in both areas - Focus today on first problem 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 12/45 github.com/programa-stic/ropc-llvm
- 13. TARGET? 10/22/2015 Automatic ExploitGeneration 13/45 Automating Exploitation
- 14. AEG - pwnable.kr Program Operations Get random binary, pwn it in 10 seconds. 1) Takes input at argv[1] 2) Does some decode & operations on it 3) Calls sequence of 16 functions 4) Each function checks 3 characters of input sequentially 5) If you pass them all, you get to the exploitable memcpy! Automated Exploit Generation 1) Generate input to get to vulnerability 2) Generate payload to exploit and get shell 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 14/45
- 15. The image cannotbe displayed. Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted. Restart your computer, and then open the file again. If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again. AEG - pwnable.kr fail ... input argv[1] 3 checks ... 15 more functions ... memcpy fail ... 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 15/45
- 16.
- 17.
- 18. Agenda 1. Intro 2. AutomatingExploitation a. what, how? b. the target 3. Program Analysis a. background b. types we care about c. how this helps with AEG 4. Application a. tools b. demo 5. Conclusion 10/22/2015 Automatic Exploit Generation 18/45
- 19. The process ofautomatically analyzing the behavior of applications What is program analysis - set of paths == expected paths - minimum expense => expected paths - In terms of a property: - program correctness - program optimization 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 19/45
- 20. How This Helpswith AEG Analysis helps us hunt for bugs automatically. • Fuzzing/ Instrumenting • Symbolic Execution • Concolic Execution ==> Pro move: combine analyses 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 20/45
- 21.
- 22. Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Definition: • ‘Hijacked’ environment, binaries, or source • Monitor specific system artifacts • Attempts at complete (concrete) execution Popular Uses: - Force program states - Gather and report observations at runtime - Types of hooking: source & binary 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 22/45
- 23. Example: DBI $pin -t inscount0.so -- binary [BINARY LEVEL] - Inject increment after each instruction [STILL BRUTE FORCE] - Return total instructions for fuzzed input - Only true for that 1 executed path (the possible CFG space may be very large) 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 23/45
- 24.
- 25. Symbolic Execution Definition: • Generate1 sym path for a set of paths (could still be extremely expensive) • Satisfies path conditions • Composed of some concrete values Popular Uses: - Determine program state at particular basic block - Create ‘equation’ to feed to SAT/SMT solvers - Faster than brute forcing all conditions 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 25/45
- 26. Example: Symbolic Execution [INT] a, b, c [INT] x, y, z = 0; fun( int a, b, c ) { if (a) { x = -2; } if (b < 5) { if (!a && c) { y = 1; } z = 2; } assert(x+y+z!=3) } . . . fun( 0, 3, 1 ); . . . Old Method: Try all inputs until assert [WARNING] inputs unbounded! 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 26/45
- 27. Example: Symbolic Execution [SYMBOL] a, b, c [INT] x, y, z = 0; if (a) { x = -2; } if (b < 5) { if (!a && c) { y = 1; } z = 2; } assert(x+y+z!=3) 10/22/2015Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 27/45
- 28. Concolic Execution Definition: • Dynamicsymbolic execution • Instrumentation of symbolic execution as it runs • One path at a time to maintain concrete state underneath symbolic variables Popular Uses: - Concretization (replace symbols with values to satisfy path condition) - Handle system calls & library loading - Cases which SMT can’t solve 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 28/45
- 29. Example: Concolic Execution [INT] a, b, c [INT] x, y, z = 0; fun( int a, b, c ) { if (a) { x = -2; } if (b < 5) { if (!a && c) { y = 1; } z = 2; } assert(x+y+z!=3) } . . . fun( 0, 3, 1 ); . . . Old Method: Try all inputs until assert [WARNING] inputs unbounded! 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 29/45
- 30. Example: Concolic Execution [INT & SYMBOL] a, b, c [INT] x, y, z = 0; if (a) { x = -2; } if (b < 5) { if (!a && c) { y = 1; } z = 2; } assert(x+y+z!=3) STEPS [ONE] concrete execution of function [TWO] while building symbolic path model [THREE] constraints on input are modeled [FOUR] models used to generate concrete input 10/22/2015Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 30/45
- 31. Creating a FeedbackLoop In practice using the results of different analyses finds bugs quicker. Example Pairing: • Concrete execution • Fuzz input • Symbolic/ Concolic execution • Examine results • Craft new input 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 31/45
- 32. Agenda 1. Intro 2. AutomatingExploitation a. what, how? b. the target 3. Program Analysis a. background b. types we care about c. how this helps with AEG 4. Application a. tools b. demo 5. Conclusion 10/22/2015 Automatic Exploit Generation 32/45
- 33. Common tools: • PINTool • Valgrind (before/during runtime) • DynamoRIO • Qemu 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 33/45 Dynamic Binary Instrumentation
- 34. Example: Flare-on Challenge9 [ http://blog.trailofbits.com/2015/09/09/flare-on-reversing- challenges-2015/ ] • Pintool instruction count • More instructions == Closer to correct input 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 34/45 Input: FLAGAAAA... Input: AAAAAAAA...
- 35. Symbolic Execution Common tools: • KLEE (runs on LLVM bc) • SAGE (MS internal tool) feed it to z3 to solve 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 35/45
- 36. Concolic Execution Common tools: • Angr • Pysymemu • Triton 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 36/45
- 37. AEG Demo: Assumptions [Assumptions ] • Space of potential vulnerabilities too large • Need to write tools to hunt for subset – Target memory corrupt (memcpy) • ROP from there… [ Dynamically Acquire ] • Path to target • Solve for constraints • Addresses of gadgets for ROP [ Statically (Pre) Acquired ] • Semantics of target & gadgets 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 37/45
- 38. LLVM Pass Using thestructure of the binary: • Dominator Tree – Longest path of CFG is the “winning” path • Use-def chain – Each cmp of this path comprises the “constraints” “Flow-sensitive constraint analysis" LLVM: - Makes this analysis easier - DomTree & Use-def construction - Semantics of cmp and vars easy to pull out - Runs statically over bitcode (lift with Mcsema) - Fast 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 38/45
- 39. LLVM Pass Download tool: [https://github.com/trailofbits/domtresat ] 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 38/45
- 40. Angr Script … acquirebinary & some conditions …. b = angr.Project("aeg") ss = b.factory.blank_state(addr=entry_func) ss.options.discard("LAZY_SOLVES") ss.se._solver.timeout=10000 ss.memory.store(argv1_buff, ss.BV("input", 50*8)) pg = b.factory.path_group(ss, immutable=False) angr.path_group.l.setLevel("DEBUG") pg.explore(find=vuln_addr[0], avoid=fail_bbs) argv1_win = pg.found[0].state.se.any_str(pg.found[0].state.memory.load(argv1_buff, 50)) #setup env #fake input with no value #target & bad branches, 4 speed #solved for path to target, dump memory 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 39/45
- 41.
- 42. [ What Weare (still) Working With ] – Binaries – Source is nice • Need to lift bins to IR for LLVM • Most concolic exec. tools would need to compile it Conclusion: The Future [ Difficulty ] - Know how to express our targeted vulnerability - Semantics for UAF, Memory Corruption, etc.... 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 41/45
- 43. Automatic program analysis • translate program (IR) • define program in-correctness goal: proving existence or absence of bugs Finding (More) Bugs 10/22/2015 Program Analysis to Find Vulnerabilities 42/45
- 44. Acknowledgements • Trail ofBits • pwnable.kr • RPISEC 10/22/2015 Automatic Exploit Generation 43/45
- 45.
- 46. Any Questions? IRC: quend email:sophia@trailofbits.com 10/22/2015 Automatic Exploit Generation 45/45