The document discusses containment methods for safely handling biohazardous agents in laboratories. Primary containment involves good microbiological techniques and safety equipment like biological safety cabinets to protect personnel and the immediate lab environment. Secondary containment uses facility design and practices to protect the external environment. Containment aims to reduce exposure risks for lab workers and prevent agents from escaping outside. The document then describes different biosafety levels based on the hazard level of the agents and appropriate safety measures for each level.
The application of knowledge, techniques and equipment to prevent a personal laboratory and environmental exposure to potentially infectious agents or biohazard is known as biosafety.
Biosafety defines the containment conditions under which infectious agents can be safely manipulated.
The objective of containment is to confine biohazard and to reduce the potential exposure of the laboratory worker, persons outside of the laboratory, and the environment to potentially infectious agents.
The application of knowledge, techniques and equipment to prevent a personal laboratory and environmental exposure to potentially infectious agents or biohazard is known as biosafety.
Biosafety defines the containment conditions under which infectious agents can be safely manipulated.
The objective of containment is to confine biohazard and to reduce the potential exposure of the laboratory worker, persons outside of the laboratory, and the environment to potentially infectious agents.
According to the Centre Of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Biosafety is the application of safety precautions that reduce a laboratorian’s risk of exposure to a potentially infectious material and limit contamination of the work environment and ultimately the community.
Biosafety is the precautionary measure that reduce laboratory risk to exposure of microbe . This power point by Lamria Agnes Meilani base on WHO standard .
In the U.S., the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and World Health Organization (WHO) specify four biosafety levels. Each level is a series of biosafety requirements for labs conducting research on biological agents.⠀⠀⠀
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We’ve put together this helpful carousel to understand each level, the agents researched at each, and the proper protocol and design incorporated to make sure each biosafety lab level is safe, secure, and best equipped to handle the research they conduct. ⠀⠀⠀
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For example, in relation to current events, the Coronavirus is studied at a level 3 biosafety lab (BSL-3) and less at-risk agents like E.coli are studied in a level 1 biosafety lab (BSL-1).⠀⠀⠀
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Follow OnePointe Solutions for more scientific related topics.
According to the Centre Of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Biosafety is the application of safety precautions that reduce a laboratorian’s risk of exposure to a potentially infectious material and limit contamination of the work environment and ultimately the community.
Biosafety is the precautionary measure that reduce laboratory risk to exposure of microbe . This power point by Lamria Agnes Meilani base on WHO standard .
In the U.S., the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and World Health Organization (WHO) specify four biosafety levels. Each level is a series of biosafety requirements for labs conducting research on biological agents.⠀⠀⠀
⠀⠀⠀⠀
We’ve put together this helpful carousel to understand each level, the agents researched at each, and the proper protocol and design incorporated to make sure each biosafety lab level is safe, secure, and best equipped to handle the research they conduct. ⠀⠀⠀
⠀⠀⠀
For example, in relation to current events, the Coronavirus is studied at a level 3 biosafety lab (BSL-3) and less at-risk agents like E.coli are studied in a level 1 biosafety lab (BSL-1).⠀⠀⠀
⠀⠀⠀
Follow OnePointe Solutions for more scientific related topics.
Biosafety is the application of safety precautions that reduce a Laboratory based risk of exposure to a potentially infectious material and limit contamination of the working and surrounding environment.
The primary principle of biosafety is “Containment”.
Containment
The action of keeping harmful things under control and within limits
Or
A series of safe methods for managing infectious bacteria in the laboratory.
Food hygiene is more than cleanliness ......
Protecting food from risk of contamination, including harmful bacteria, poison and other foreign bodies.
Preventing any bacteria present multiplying to an extent which would result in the illness of consumers or the early spoilage of the food.
Destroying any harmful bacteria in the food by thorough cooking
or processing.
Discarding unfit or contaminated food.
T-Cell Activation
• Concept of immune response
• T cell-mediated immune response
• B cell-mediated immune response
I. Concept of immune response
• A collective and coordinated response to the introduction of foreign substances in an individual mediated by the cells and molecules in the immune system.
II. T cell-mediated immune response
• Cell-mediated immunity is the arm of the adaptive immune response whose role is to combat infection of intracellular pathogens, such as intracellular bacteria (mycobacteria, listeria monocytogens), viruses, protozoa, etc.
Major Histocompatibility Complex
MHC:
• Major Histocompatibility Complex
– Cluster of genes found in all mammals
– Its products play role in discriminating self/non-self
– Participant in both humoral and cell-mediated immunity
• MHC Act As Antigen Presenting Structures
• In Human MHC Is Found On Chromosome 6
– Referred to as HLA complex
• In Mice MHC Is Found On Chromosome 17
– Referred to as H-2 complex
• Genes Of MHC Organized In 3 Classes
– Class I MHC genes
• Glycoproteins expressed on all nucleated cells
• Major function to present processed Ags to TC
– Class II MHC genes
• Glycoproteins expressed on macrophages, B-cells, DCs
• Major function to present processed Ags to TH
– Class III MHC genes
• Products that include secreted proteins that have immune functions. Ex. Complement system, inflammatory molecules
Antigen Processing and Presentation MID
Antigens and “foreignness”
• Antigens (or, more properly, immunogens) have a series of features which confer immunogenicity.
• One of these features is “foreignness.”
• So, we can infer that – most often – antigens – ultimately – originate externally.
• (There are exceptions, of course. Some cells become transformed by disease [e. g., cancer] or by aging. In such instances, the antigens have an internal origin.)
Extinction of a particular animal or plant species occurs when there are no more individuals of that species alive anywhere in the world - the species has died out. This is a natural part of evolution. But sometimes extinctions happen at a much faster rate than usual. Natural Causes of Extinction.
Difference between In-Situ and Ex-Situ conservation
Conservation of biodiversity and genetic resources helps protect, maintain and recover endangered animal and plant species. There are mainly two strategies for the conservation of wildlife: In-situ conservation and Ex-situ conservation. Although, both the strategies aim to maintain and recover endangered species, they are different from each other. Let us see how they differ from each other!
Evolution Of Bacteria
Bacteria have existed from very early in the history of life on Earth. Bacteria fossils discovered in rocks date from at least the Devonian Period (419.2 million to 358.9 million years ago), and there are convincing arguments that bacteria have been present since early Precambrian time, about 3.5 billion years ago. Bacteria were widespread on Earth at least since the latter part of the Paleoproterozoic, roughly 1.8 billion years ago, when oxygen appeared in the atmosphere as a result of the action of the cyanobacteria. Bacteria have thus had plenty of time to adapt to their environments and to have given rise to numerous descendant forms.
Impact of Environment on Loss of Genetic Diversity and Speciation
Genetic variation describes naturally occurring genetic differences among individuals of the same species. This variation permits flexibility and survival of a population in the face of changing environmental circumstances. Consequently, genetic variation is often considered an advantage, as it is a form of preparation for the unexpected. But how does genetic variation increase or decrease? And what effect do fluctuations in genetic variation have on populations over time?
GENE ENVIRONMENT INTERACTION
Subtle differences in one person’s genes can cause them to respond differently to the same environmental exposure as another person. As a result, some people may develop a disease after being exposed to something in the environment while others may not.
As scientists learn more about the connection between genes and the environment, they pursue new approaches for preventing and treating disease that consider individual genetic codes.
How to store food in hot
The Good News
To maximize benefit of preservation, keep your food as fresh as possible for as long as possible. You can do this, even in the heat, by creating a “cooler” made from two basic terra cotta pots, one larger than the other. Put the smaller pot in the larger one, fill the gap with sand, and saturate the sand with water. Then cover it with a cloth. To add additional insulation from the heat, bury the pot up to its rim. The evaporation of moisture from the wet sand will cool the air around the food and help keep it fresh.
What is IUPAC naming?
In order to give compounds a name, certain rules must be followed. When naming organic compounds, the IUPAC (International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry) nomenclature (naming scheme) is used. This is to give consistency to the names. It also enables every compound to have a unique name, which is not possible with the common names used (for example in industry). We will first look at some of the steps that need to be followed when naming a compound, and then try to apply these rules to some specific examples.
IUPAC Nomenclature
IUPAC nomenclature uses the longest continuous chain of carbon atoms to determine the basic root name of the compound. The root name is then modified due to the presence of different functional groups which replace hydrogen or carbon atoms in the parent structure.
Hybridization describes the bonding atoms from an atom's point of view. For a tetrahedral coordinated carbon (e.g. methane CH4), the carbon should have 4 orbitals with the correct symmetry to bond to the 4 hydrogen atoms.
INTRODUCTION:
Hybrid Orbitals
Developed by Linus Pauling, the concept of hybrid orbitals was a theory created to explain the structures of molecules in space. The theory consists of combining atomic orbitals (ex: s,p,d,f) into new hybrid orbitals (ex: sp, sp2, sp3).
1. Why Firefly give light during night?
2. Why atomic mass and Atomic numbers are given to elements ?
3. Why elements have been characterized and classified into different groups?
4. What is the transition of elements and what they play their role in elements stability?
New Drug Discovery and Development .....NEHA GUPTA
The "New Drug Discovery and Development" process involves the identification, design, testing, and manufacturing of novel pharmaceutical compounds with the aim of introducing new and improved treatments for various medical conditions. This comprehensive endeavor encompasses various stages, including target identification, preclinical studies, clinical trials, regulatory approval, and post-market surveillance. It involves multidisciplinary collaboration among scientists, researchers, clinicians, regulatory experts, and pharmaceutical companies to bring innovative therapies to market and address unmet medical needs.
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Tom Selleck Health: A Comprehensive Look at the Iconic Actor’s Wellness Journeygreendigital
Tom Selleck, an enduring figure in Hollywood. has captivated audiences for decades with his rugged charm, iconic moustache. and memorable roles in television and film. From his breakout role as Thomas Magnum in Magnum P.I. to his current portrayal of Frank Reagan in Blue Bloods. Selleck's career has spanned over 50 years. But beyond his professional achievements. fans have often been curious about Tom Selleck Health. especially as he has aged in the public eye.
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Introduction
Many have been interested in Tom Selleck health. not only because of his enduring presence on screen but also because of the challenges. and lifestyle choices he has faced and made over the years. This article delves into the various aspects of Tom Selleck health. exploring his fitness regimen, diet, mental health. and the challenges he has encountered as he ages. We'll look at how he maintains his well-being. the health issues he has faced, and his approach to ageing .
Early Life and Career
Childhood and Athletic Beginnings
Tom Selleck was born on January 29, 1945, in Detroit, Michigan, and grew up in Sherman Oaks, California. From an early age, he was involved in sports, particularly basketball. which played a significant role in his physical development. His athletic pursuits continued into college. where he attended the University of Southern California (USC) on a basketball scholarship. This early involvement in sports laid a strong foundation for his physical health and disciplined lifestyle.
Transition to Acting
Selleck's transition from an athlete to an actor came with its physical demands. His first significant role in "Magnum P.I." required him to perform various stunts and maintain a fit appearance. This role, which he played from 1980 to 1988. necessitated a rigorous fitness routine to meet the show's demands. setting the stage for his long-term commitment to health and wellness.
Fitness Regimen
Workout Routine
Tom Selleck health and fitness regimen has evolved. adapting to his changing roles and age. During his "Magnum, P.I." days. Selleck's workouts were intense and focused on building and maintaining muscle mass. His routine included weightlifting, cardiovascular exercises. and specific training for the stunts he performed on the show.
Selleck adjusted his fitness routine as he aged to suit his body's needs. Today, his workouts focus on maintaining flexibility, strength, and cardiovascular health. He incorporates low-impact exercises such as swimming, walking, and light weightlifting. This balanced approach helps him stay fit without putting undue strain on his joints and muscles.
Importance of Flexibility and Mobility
In recent years, Selleck has emphasized the importance of flexibility and mobility in his fitness regimen. Understanding the natural decline in muscle mass and joint flexibility with age. he includes stretching and yoga in his routine. These practices help prevent injuries, improve posture, and maintain mobilit
TEST BANK for Operations Management, 14th Edition by William J. Stevenson, Ve...kevinkariuki227
TEST BANK for Operations Management, 14th Edition by William J. Stevenson, Verified Chapters 1 - 19, Complete Newest Version.pdf
TEST BANK for Operations Management, 14th Edition by William J. Stevenson, Verified Chapters 1 - 19, Complete Newest Version.pdf
Report Back from SGO 2024: What’s the Latest in Cervical Cancer?bkling
Are you curious about what’s new in cervical cancer research or unsure what the findings mean? Join Dr. Emily Ko, a gynecologic oncologist at Penn Medicine, to learn about the latest updates from the Society of Gynecologic Oncology (SGO) 2024 Annual Meeting on Women’s Cancer. Dr. Ko will discuss what the research presented at the conference means for you and answer your questions about the new developments.
Flu Vaccine Alert in Bangalore Karnatakaaddon Scans
As flu season approaches, health officials in Bangalore, Karnataka, are urging residents to get their flu vaccinations. The seasonal flu, while common, can lead to severe health complications, particularly for vulnerable populations such as young children, the elderly, and those with underlying health conditions.
Dr. Vidisha Kumari, a leading epidemiologist in Bangalore, emphasizes the importance of getting vaccinated. "The flu vaccine is our best defense against the influenza virus. It not only protects individuals but also helps prevent the spread of the virus in our communities," he says.
This year, the flu season is expected to coincide with a potential increase in other respiratory illnesses. The Karnataka Health Department has launched an awareness campaign highlighting the significance of flu vaccinations. They have set up multiple vaccination centers across Bangalore, making it convenient for residents to receive their shots.
To encourage widespread vaccination, the government is also collaborating with local schools, workplaces, and community centers to facilitate vaccination drives. Special attention is being given to ensuring that the vaccine is accessible to all, including marginalized communities who may have limited access to healthcare.
Residents are reminded that the flu vaccine is safe and effective. Common side effects are mild and may include soreness at the injection site, mild fever, or muscle aches. These side effects are generally short-lived and far less severe than the flu itself.
Healthcare providers are also stressing the importance of continuing COVID-19 precautions. Wearing masks, practicing good hand hygiene, and maintaining social distancing are still crucial, especially in crowded places.
Protect yourself and your loved ones by getting vaccinated. Together, we can help keep Bangalore healthy and safe this flu season. For more information on vaccination centers and schedules, residents can visit the Karnataka Health Department’s official website or follow their social media pages.
Stay informed, stay safe, and get your flu shot today!
Lung Cancer: Artificial Intelligence, Synergetics, Complex System Analysis, S...Oleg Kshivets
RESULTS: Overall life span (LS) was 2252.1±1742.5 days and cumulative 5-year survival (5YS) reached 73.2%, 10 years – 64.8%, 20 years – 42.5%. 513 LCP lived more than 5 years (LS=3124.6±1525.6 days), 148 LCP – more than 10 years (LS=5054.4±1504.1 days).199 LCP died because of LC (LS=562.7±374.5 days). 5YS of LCP after bi/lobectomies was significantly superior in comparison with LCP after pneumonectomies (78.1% vs.63.7%, P=0.00001 by log-rank test). AT significantly improved 5YS (66.3% vs. 34.8%) (P=0.00000 by log-rank test) only for LCP with N1-2. Cox modeling displayed that 5YS of LCP significantly depended on: phase transition (PT) early-invasive LC in terms of synergetics, PT N0—N12, cell ratio factors (ratio between cancer cells- CC and blood cells subpopulations), G1-3, histology, glucose, AT, blood cell circuit, prothrombin index, heparin tolerance, recalcification time (P=0.000-0.038). Neural networks, genetic algorithm selection and bootstrap simulation revealed relationships between 5YS and PT early-invasive LC (rank=1), PT N0—N12 (rank=2), thrombocytes/CC (3), erythrocytes/CC (4), eosinophils/CC (5), healthy cells/CC (6), lymphocytes/CC (7), segmented neutrophils/CC (8), stick neutrophils/CC (9), monocytes/CC (10); leucocytes/CC (11). Correct prediction of 5YS was 100% by neural networks computing (area under ROC curve=1.0; error=0.0).
CONCLUSIONS: 5YS of LCP after radical procedures significantly depended on: 1) PT early-invasive cancer; 2) PT N0--N12; 3) cell ratio factors; 4) blood cell circuit; 5) biochemical factors; 6) hemostasis system; 7) AT; 8) LC characteristics; 9) LC cell dynamics; 10) surgery type: lobectomy/pneumonectomy; 11) anthropometric data. Optimal diagnosis and treatment strategies for LC are: 1) screening and early detection of LC; 2) availability of experienced thoracic surgeons because of complexity of radical procedures; 3) aggressive en block surgery and adequate lymph node dissection for completeness; 4) precise prediction; 5) adjuvant chemoimmunoradiotherapy for LCP with unfavorable prognosis.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTHCARE.pdfAnujkumaranit
Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to the simulation of human intelligence processes by machines, especially computer systems. It encompasses tasks such as learning, reasoning, problem-solving, perception, and language understanding. AI technologies are revolutionizing various fields, from healthcare to finance, by enabling machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence.
Recomendações da OMS sobre cuidados maternos e neonatais para uma experiência pós-natal positiva.
Em consonância com os ODS – Objetivos do Desenvolvimento Sustentável e a Estratégia Global para a Saúde das Mulheres, Crianças e Adolescentes, e aplicando uma abordagem baseada nos direitos humanos, os esforços de cuidados pós-natais devem expandir-se para além da cobertura e da simples sobrevivência, de modo a incluir cuidados de qualidade.
Estas diretrizes visam melhorar a qualidade dos cuidados pós-natais essenciais e de rotina prestados às mulheres e aos recém-nascidos, com o objetivo final de melhorar a saúde e o bem-estar materno e neonatal.
Uma “experiência pós-natal positiva” é um resultado importante para todas as mulheres que dão à luz e para os seus recém-nascidos, estabelecendo as bases para a melhoria da saúde e do bem-estar a curto e longo prazo. Uma experiência pós-natal positiva é definida como aquela em que as mulheres, pessoas que gestam, os recém-nascidos, os casais, os pais, os cuidadores e as famílias recebem informação consistente, garantia e apoio de profissionais de saúde motivados; e onde um sistema de saúde flexível e com recursos reconheça as necessidades das mulheres e dos bebês e respeite o seu contexto cultural.
Estas diretrizes consolidadas apresentam algumas recomendações novas e já bem fundamentadas sobre cuidados pós-natais de rotina para mulheres e neonatos que recebem cuidados no pós-parto em unidades de saúde ou na comunidade, independentemente dos recursos disponíveis.
É fornecido um conjunto abrangente de recomendações para cuidados durante o período puerperal, com ênfase nos cuidados essenciais que todas as mulheres e recém-nascidos devem receber, e com a devida atenção à qualidade dos cuidados; isto é, a entrega e a experiência do cuidado recebido. Estas diretrizes atualizam e ampliam as recomendações da OMS de 2014 sobre cuidados pós-natais da mãe e do recém-nascido e complementam as atuais diretrizes da OMS sobre a gestão de complicações pós-natais.
O estabelecimento da amamentação e o manejo das principais intercorrências é contemplada.
Recomendamos muito.
Vamos discutir essas recomendações no nosso curso de pós-graduação em Aleitamento no Instituto Ciclos.
Esta publicação só está disponível em inglês até o momento.
Prof. Marcus Renato de Carvalho
www.agostodourado.com
New Directions in Targeted Therapeutic Approaches for Older Adults With Mantl...i3 Health
i3 Health is pleased to make the speaker slides from this activity available for use as a non-accredited self-study or teaching resource.
This slide deck presented by Dr. Kami Maddocks, Professor-Clinical in the Division of Hematology and
Associate Division Director for Ambulatory Operations
The Ohio State University Comprehensive Cancer Center, will provide insight into new directions in targeted therapeutic approaches for older adults with mantle cell lymphoma.
STATEMENT OF NEED
Mantle cell lymphoma (MCL) is a rare, aggressive B-cell non-Hodgkin lymphoma (NHL) accounting for 5% to 7% of all lymphomas. Its prognosis ranges from indolent disease that does not require treatment for years to very aggressive disease, which is associated with poor survival (Silkenstedt et al, 2021). Typically, MCL is diagnosed at advanced stage and in older patients who cannot tolerate intensive therapy (NCCN, 2022). Although recent advances have slightly increased remission rates, recurrence and relapse remain very common, leading to a median overall survival between 3 and 6 years (LLS, 2021). Though there are several effective options, progress is still needed towards establishing an accepted frontline approach for MCL (Castellino et al, 2022). Treatment selection and management of MCL are complicated by the heterogeneity of prognosis, advanced age and comorbidities of patients, and lack of an established standard approach for treatment, making it vital that clinicians be familiar with the latest research and advances in this area. In this activity chaired by Michael Wang, MD, Professor in the Department of Lymphoma & Myeloma at MD Anderson Cancer Center, expert faculty will discuss prognostic factors informing treatment, the promising results of recent trials in new therapeutic approaches, and the implications of treatment resistance in therapeutic selection for MCL.
Target Audience
Hematology/oncology fellows, attending faculty, and other health care professionals involved in the treatment of patients with mantle cell lymphoma (MCL).
Learning Objectives
1.) Identify clinical and biological prognostic factors that can guide treatment decision making for older adults with MCL
2.) Evaluate emerging data on targeted therapeutic approaches for treatment-naive and relapsed/refractory MCL and their applicability to older adults
3.) Assess mechanisms of resistance to targeted therapies for MCL and their implications for treatment selection
New Directions in Targeted Therapeutic Approaches for Older Adults With Mantl...
biosafety levels
1. The term "containment" is used in describing safe methods for managing biohazardous agents in
the laboratory environment where they are being handled or maintained. Primary containment,
i.e., the protection of personnel and the immediate laboratory environment from exposure to
biohazardous agents, is provided by good microbiological technique and the use of appropriate
safety equipment. The use of vaccines may provide an increased level of personal protection.
Secondary containment, i.e., the protection of the environment external to the laboratory from
exposure to biohazardous agents, is provided by a combination of facilitydesign and operational
practices. The purpose of containment is to reduce exposure of laboratory workers and other
persons to, and prevent escape into the outside environment of, potentiallybiohazardous agents.
The three elementsof containment include laboratory practice and technique, safety equipment,
and facility design.
Safety Equipment (Primary Barriers)
Safety equipment includes biological safety cabinets and a variety of enclosed containers.
The biological safety cabinet is the principal device used to provide containment of aerosols
generated by many microbiological procedures. Two types of biological safety cabinets
(Class II, III) used in microbiological laboratories are described in Appendix C. Open-fronted
Class II biological safety cabinets are partial containment cabinets that offer significant
levels of protection to laboratory personnel and to the environment when used with good
microbiological techniques. The gas-tight Class III biological safety cabinet provides the
highest attainable level of protection to personnel and the environment.
Safety equipment also includesitems for personal protection such as gloves, coats, gowns, shoe
covers, boots, respirators, face shields,and safety glasses. These personal protective devicesare
often used in combination with biological safety cabinets and other devices which contain the
agents, animals, or materials beingused. In some situations in which it isimpractical to work in
biological safety cabinets, personal protective devicesmay form the primary barrier between
personnel and biohazardous materials. Examples of such activitiesinclude certain animal studies,
animal necropsy, production activities,and activities relating to maintenance, service, or support of
the laboratory facility.
LABORATORY BIOSAFETY LEVEL CRITERIA
Three biosafety levels are specified which consist of combinations of laboratory practices
and techniques, safety equipment, and laboratory facilities which are commensurate with
the operations performed and with the potential hazard posed by the biohazardous agents
for which the laboratory is responsible.
2. I. BIOSAFETY LEVEL 1
Biosafety Level 1 is suitable for experiments involving agents of no known or minimal
potential hazard to laboratory personnel and the environment. The laboratory is not
separated from the general traffic patterns of the building. Work is generally conducted
on open bench tops. Special containment equipment is not required or generally used.
Laboratory personnel have specific training in the procedures conducted in the
laboratory and are supervised by a scientist with general training in microbiology or a
related science. The following standard and special practices apply to agents assigned
to Biosafety Level
A. Standard Microbiological Practices
i. Laboratory doors are kept closed when experiments are in progress.
ii. Work surfaces are decontaminated daily and after any spill of
biohazardous material.
iii. All contaminated liquid or solid wastes are decontaminated before
being disposed of or otherwise handled.
iv. Mechanical pipetting devices are used; mouth pipetting is prohibited.
v. Eating, drinking, smoking, storing of food, and applying cosmetics are
not permitted in the work area.
vi. Persons wash their hands after they handle biohazardous materials
and animals and when they leave the laboratory.
vii. All procedures must be carefully performed to minimize the creation of
aerosols.
viii. The wearing of laboratory coats, gowns, or uniforms is recommended.
B. Special Practices
1. Contaminated materials are to be decontaminated away from the laboratory and placed
in a durable leak-proof container that is covered before being removed from the
laboratory.
2. An insect and rodent control program is in effect.
C. Containment Equipment
Special containment equipment is generally not required for manipulations of
agents assigned to Biosafety Level 1.
D. Laboratory Facilities
1. The laboratory should be designed so that it is easily cleaned.
2. Bench tops should be impervious to water and resistant to acids, alkalis, organic
solvents, and moderate heat.
3. Laboratory furniture should be sturdy and spaces between benches, cabinets, and
equipment should be accessible for cleaning.
4. Each laboratory should contain a hand washing sink.
1. If the laboratory has windows that open, they should be fitted with fly screens.
2. An autoclave for decontamination of infectious laboratory wastes should be available in
the same building as the laboratory.
II. BIOSAFETY LEVEL 2
3. Biosafety Level 2 is similar to Level 1 and is suitable for work involving agents that
represent a moderate hazard for personnel and the environment. It differs in that:
Laboratory personnel have specific training in handling pathogenic agents and are
directed by the principle investigator;
Access to the laboratory is limited when work is being conducted; and
Certain procedures in which biohazardous aerosols are created need to be conducted in
biological safety cabinets or other physical containment equipment. The following
standard and special practices, safety equipment, and facilities apply to
agents assigned to Biosafety Level 2:
A. Standard Microbiological Practices
1. Access to the laboratory is limited or restricted by the supervisor when work with
biohazardous agents is in progress. Laboratory doors are kept closed when experiments
are in progress.
2. Work surfaces are decontaminated at least once a day and after any spill of
biohazardous material.
3. All contaminated liquid or solid waste is decontaminated before being disposed or
otherwise handled.
4. Mechanical pipetting devices are used; mouth pipetting is prohibited.
Eating, drinking, smoking, and applying cosmetics are not permitted in the work area. Food
must be stored in cabinets or refrigerators solely intended for this
purpose. Food storage cabinets and refrigerators should be located outside the work area.
6. Persons wash their hands after handling biohazardous agents and animals, and when
leaving the laboratory.
7. All procedures are performed carefully to minimize the creation of aerosols.
8. Laboratory coats, gowns, gloves, or uniforms must be worn in the laboratory. Laboratory
clothing or gloves must not be worn in non-laboratory areas.
9. Serological procedures with inactivated antigens known or shown to be free of residual
infectivity can be performed on the open bench.
B. Special Practices
1. Contaminated materials to be decontaminated away from the laboratory are placed in a
durable, leak-proof and properly labeled container, which is closed before being
removed from the laboratory.
Access to the laboratory is limited by the laboratory supervisor when experiments are being
conducted. In general, persons who are at increased risk of acquiring infection or for whom
infection may be unusually hazardous are not allowed in the laboratory or animal rooms.
Persons at increased risk may include children, pregnant women, and individuals who are
immunodeficient or immunosuppressed. The supervisor has the final responsibility for
assessing
each individual circumstance and determining who may enter or work in the area.
3. The laboratory supervisor will assure that only persons who have been advised of the
potential hazard and who meet any specific entry requirements (e.g., immunizations)
enter the laboratory or animal rooms.
4. When biohazardous materials or infected animals are present in the laboratory or animal
rooms, a hazard warning sign incorporating the universal biohazard symbol is posted on
all laboratory and animal room access doors and on such other items (i.e., equipment,
containers, materials) as appropriate to indicate the presence of biohazardous agents.
4. The hazard warning sign should identify the agent, list the name of the laboratory
supervisor or other responsible person(s), and indicate any special requirements for
entering the area (immunization, respirators, etc.).
5. An insect and rodent control program is in effect.
6. Animals not involved in the experiment being performed are not permitted in the
laboratory.
7. All wastes from laboratories and animal rooms must be appropriately decontaminated
before being disposed.
8. The use of hypodermic needles and syringes is restricted to gavage, parenteral injection,
and aspiration of fluids from laboratory animals and diaphragm vaccine bottles.
Hypodermic needles and syringes are not used as a substitute for automatic pipetting
devices in the manipulation of biohazardous fluids. Serial dilutions of biohazardous
agents should not be done in diaphragm bottles with needles and syringes because of
the hazards of autoinoculation and of aerosol exposure. Cannulas should be used
instead of sharp needles whenever possible.
1. If activities of lesser biohazard potential are conducted in the laboratory concurrently
with activities requiring Biosafety Level 2, all activities will be conducted at Biosafety
Level 2.
2. Gloves will be worn for all procedures requiring the handling of biohazardous materials
or infected animals. If feasible, hold small laboratory mammals with restraint devices
when they are receiving injections or otherwise being handled provides an additional
level of protection for personnel.
3. Serological procedures with inactivated antigens shown to be free of residual infectivity
can be performed on the open bench.
4. All spills, accidents, and overt or potential exposures to biohazardous materials must be
immediately reported to the laboratory supervisor. A written record must be prepared
and maintained. Appropriate medical evaluation, surveillance, and treatment must be
provided.
5. When appropriate, considering the agent(s) handled, baseline serum samples are
collected from and stored for all laboratory and other at-risk personnel. Additional serum
specimens may be collected periodically depending on the agents handled or the
function of the facility.
A safety or operations manual identifying known and potential hazards and
specifying practices and procedures to minimize or eliminate such risks
should be prepared or adopted. Personnel should be advised of special
hazards and are required to follow standard practices and procedures.
C. Containment equipment
1. Biological safety cabinets (Class II) or other appropriate personal protective or physical
containment devices are used whenever:
2. Procedures with a high potential for creating biohazardous aerosols are conducted.
These may include centrifuging, grinding, blending, vigorous shaking or mixing, sonic
disruption, opening containers of biohazardous materials whose internal pressures may
be different from ambient pressures, inoculating animals intranasally, and harvesting
infected tissues from animals or eggs.
3. High concentrations or large volumes of biohazardous agents are used. Such materials
may be centrifuged in the open laboratory if sealed heads or centrifuge safety cups are
used and if they are opened only in a biological safety cabinet.
5. D. Laboratory facilities
1. The laboratory should be kept clean.
2. Bench tops should be impervious to water and resistant to acids, alkalis, organic
solvents, and moderate heat. The use of plastic-backed absorbent toweling over work
surfaces facilitates clean up and minimizes aerosols from spills.
3. Laboratory furniture should be sturdy, and spaces between benches, cabinets, and
equipment should be accessible for cleaning.
4. Each laboratory should contain a hand washing sink, preferably foot or elbow operated.
5. If the laboratory has windows that open, they should be fitted with fly screens.
6. An autoclave for decontamination of biohazardous laboratory wastes should be
available in the same building with the laboratory.
III. BIOSAFETY LEVEL 3
Biosafety Level 3 is suitable for experiments involving agents of high potential risk to
personnel and the environment. Laboratory personnel have specific training in handling
pathogenic and potentially lethal agents and are supervised by competent scientists
who are experienced in working with these agents. Access to the laboratory is
controlled by the supervisor. The laboratory has special engineering and design
features and physical containment equipment and devices. All procedures involving the
manipulation of biohazardous material are conducted within biological safety cabinets
or other physical containment devices or by personnel wearing appropriate personal
protective clothing and devices.
The following standard and special practices apply to agents assigned to Biosafety
Level
3:
A. Standard microbiological practices
i. Laboratory doors are kept closed when experiments are in progress.
ii. Work surfaces are decontaminated at least once a day and after any
spill of biohazardous material.
iii. All contaminated liquid or solid wastes are decontaminated before
being disposed of or otherwise handled.
iv. Mechanical pipetting devices are used; mouth pipetting is prohibited.
v. Eating, drinking, smoking, storing food, and applying cosmetics are not
permitted in the work area.
vi. Persons wash their hands when they leave the laboratory.
vii. All procedures are conducted carefully to minimize the creation of
aerosols.
B. Special practices
1. Access to the laboratory is controlled by the laboratory supervisor and is restricted to
persons whose presence is required for program or support needs. Persons who are at
increased risk of acquiring infection or for whom infection may be unusually hazardous
are not allowed in the laboratory or animal rooms. Persons at increased risk may include
children, pregnant women, and individuals who are immunodeficient or
immunosuppressed. The supervisor has the final responsibility for assessing each
individual circumstance and determining who may enter or work in the area.
6. 2. The laboratory supervisor will assure that only persons who have been advised of the
potential biohazard, meet any specific entry requirements (e.g., immunization, if
available), and comply with all entry and exit procedures may enter the laboratory or
animal rooms.
3. When biohazardous materials or infected animals are present in the laboratory or animal
rooms, a hazard warning sign incorporating the universal biohazard symbol is posted on
all laboratory and animal-room access doors and on such other items (i.e., equipment,
containers, materials) as appropriate to indicate the presence of biohazardous agents.
The hazard warning sign should identify the agent, list the name of the laboratory
supervisor or other responsible person(s), and indicate any special conditions of entry
into the area (immunizations, respirators, etc).
4. All activities involving biohazardous materials are conducted in biological safety cabinets
or other physical containment devices. No work in open vessels is conducted on the
open bench.
5. The work surfaces of biological safety cabinets and other containment equipment are
decontaminated when an experiment is finished. The use of plastic-backed paper
toweling on non-perforated work surfaces within biological safety cabinets facilitates
clean-up following the completion of activities.
6. An insect and rodent control program is in effect.
7. Laboratory clothing that protects street clothing (e.g., solid-front or wrap-around gowns,
scrub suits, coveralls, etc.) is worn in the laboratory. Front-button laboratory coats are
unsuitable. Laboratory clothing is not worn outside the laboratory and is decontaminated
before being laundered.
8. Gloves are worn when handling biohazardous materials or animals. Gloves should be
removed aseptically and autoclaved with other laboratory wastes before being disposed
of.
9. Molded surgical masks or respirators are worn in rooms containing infected animals.
10. Animals and plants not related to the experiment being conducted are not permitted in
the laboratory.
1. All laboratory and animal room waste is decontaminated before being disposed of or
reused.
2. Vacuum lines are protected with high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and liquid
traps.
3. The use of hypodermic needles and syringes is restricted to gavage, parenteral
injection, and aspiration of fluids from laboratory animals and diaphragm vaccine bottles.
Hypodermic needles and syringes are not used as a substitute for automatic pipetting
devices in the manipulation of biohazardous fluids. Serial dilutions of biohazardous
agents should not be done in diaphragm bottles with needles and syringes because of
the hazards of autoinoculation and of aerosol exposure. Cannulas should be used
instead of sharp needles.
4. If activities of lesser biohazard potential are conducted in the laboratory concurrently
with activities requiring Biosafety Level 3, all work will be conducted at Biosafety Level
3.
5. Serologic procedures with inactivated antigens shown to be free of residual infectivity
can be performed on the open bench.
7. 6. All spills, accidents, and overt or potential exposures to biohazardous materials must be
immediately reported to the laboratory supervisor. A written report must be prepared and
maintained. Appropriate medical evaluation, surveillance and treatment must be
provided. Baseline serum samples should be collected and stored for all laboratory and
other at-risk personnel. Additional serum specimens may be collected periodically
depending on the agents handled or the function of the laboratory.
1. A safety or operations manual which identifies known and potential hazards and which
specifies practices and procedures to minimize or eliminate such risks should be
prepared or adopted. Personnel should be advised of special hazards and must read
and follow required practices and procedures.
C. Biosafety equipment
1. Biological safety cabinets (Class II or III) or other physical containment devices are used
for all procedures and manipulations involving biohazardous material.
2. Activities requiring Biosafety Level 3 physical containment can be conducted in Biosafety
Level 2 laboratories if:
a. All standard and special practices specified for the Biosafety Level 3 are followed, and
b. All operations and procedures are contained in Class III biological safety cabinets, and
c. Materials are removed from these cabinets only through an attached autoclave or in a non-
breakable, sealed container that is passed through an attached disinfectant dunk tank or
fumigation chamber.
D. Laboratory facilities
1. The laboratory is separated from areas that are open to unrestricted traffic flow within
the building. Separation is provided by either a double-door change room and shower or
an airlock or other access facility that requires passage through two sets of doors to
enter the laboratory. Access to other laboratory area is designed to prevent entrance of
free-living arthropods.
1. The surfaces of walls, floors and ceilings are water resistant and can be easily cleaned.
Openings in these surfaces are sealed or capable of being sealed to facilitate
decontaminating the area.
2. Bench tops are impervious to water and resistant to acids, alkalis, organic solvents, and
moderate heat.
3. Laboratory furniture is of simple, sturdy construction.
4. A foot-or elbow-operated hand washing sink is provided near each laboratory exit door.
5. Windows in the laboratory are closed and sealed.
6. Access doors to the laboratory are self-closing and self-locking.
7. An autoclave for decontamination of laboratory wastes is available preferably within the
laboratory. Biohazardous wastes which must be removed to another area in the same
building for decontamination must be held and transported in a covered, leak proof
container.
8. An exhaust air ventilation system is provided. This system creates directional airflow that
draws air into the laboratory through the entry area. The building exhaust system can be
used for this purpose if the exhaust air is not recirculated to any other area of the
building. Personnel must verify that proper directional airflow (into the laboratory) is
achieved. However, air within the laboratory can be recirculated. The exhaust air from
8. the laboratory is discharged directly to the outside or through the building exhaust
system so that it is dispersed away from occupied buildings and air intakes.
9. The exhaust air from the laboratory that does not come from the biological safety
cabinet can be discharged to the outside without being treated.
10. In laboratories that have supply air systems, the supply air and exhaust air systems are
interlocked to assure inward (or zero) airflow at all times.
11. The HEPA-filtered exhaust air from Class II biological safety cabinets or other primary
containment devices is discharged directly to the outside or through the building's
exhaust system. Exhaust air from these primary containment devices may be
recirculated within the animal room if the cabinet is tested and certified at least every 12
months. If the HEPA-filtered exhaust air from Class II biological safety cabinets is
discharged to the outside through the building exhaust system, it is connected to this
system in a manner (e.g., thimble-unit connection) that avoids any interference with the
air balance of the cabinets or building exhaust system.
Biosafety Level 4
Biosafety Level 4 is required for work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a
high individual risk of life-threatening disease, aerosol transmission, or related agent
with unknown risk of transmission. Agents with a close or identical antigenic relationship
to agents requiring BSL-4 containment must be handled at this level until sufficient data
are obtained either to confirm continued work at this level, or re-designate the level.
Laboratory staff must have specific and thorough training in handling extremely
hazardous infectious agents. Laboratory staff must understand the primary and
secondary containment functions of standard and special practices, containment
equipment, and laboratory design characteristics. All laboratory staff and supervisors
must be competent in handling agents and procedures requiring BSL-4 containment.
Access to the laboratory is controlled by the laboratory supervisor in accordance with
institutional policies.
There are two models for BSL-4 laboratories
(1) A Cabinet Laboratory where all handling of agents must be performed in a
Class III BSC.
(2) A Suit Laboratory where personnel must wear a positive pressure protective
suit.
BSL-4 Cabinet and Suit Laboratories have special engineering and design features to
prevent microorganisms from being disseminated into the environment.
The following standard and special safety practices, equipment, and facilities apply to
BSL-4:
A. Standard Microbiological Practices
1. The laboratory supervisor must enforce the institutional policies that control
access to the laboratory.
2. All persons leaving the laboratory must be required to take a personal body
shower.
3. Eating, drinking, smoking, handling contact lenses, applying cosmetics, and
9. storing food for human consumption must not be permitted in laboratory
areas. Food must be stored outside the laboratory area in cabinets or
refrigerators designated and used for this purpose.
4. Mechanical pipetting devices must be used.
5. Policies for the safe handling of sharps, such as needles, scalpels, pipettes, and
broken glassware must be developed and implemented. Precautions, including
those listed below, must be taken with any sharp items. These include:
A. Brokenglassware mustnotbe handleddirectly.Instead,itmustbe removedusingabrushand
dustpan,tongs,or forceps.Plasticwareshouldbe substitutedforglassware wheneverpossible.
B. b. Use of needlesandsyringesorothersharpinstrumentsshouldbe restrictedinthe laboratory,
exceptwhenthere isnopractical alternative.
C. c. Used needlesmustnotbe bent,sheared,broken,recapped,removedfromdisposable
syringes,orotherwise manipulatedbyhandbefore disposalordecontamination.Used
disposable needlesmustbe carefullyplacedinpuncture-resistantcontainers usedforsharps
D. disposal,locatedasclose tothe pointof use as possible.
E. Whenever practical, laboratory supervisors should adopt improved engineering and work
practice controls that reduce risk of sharps injuries.
6. Performall procedurestominimize the creationof splashesand/oraerosols.
7. Decontaminate worksurfaceswithappropriate disinfectantaftercompletionof workandafterany
spill orsplashof potentiallyinfectiousmaterial.
8. Decontaminate all wastesbeforeremoval fromthe laboratory byaneffective andvalidatedmethod.
9. A signincorporatingthe universal biohazardsymbol mustbe postedatthe entrance tothe laboratory
wheninfectiousagentsare present.Postedinformationmustincludethe laboratory’sbiosafetylevel,
the supervisor’sname (orotherresponsible personnel),telephone number,andrequiredproceduresfor
enteringandexitingthe laboratory.Agentinformationshouldbe postedinaccordance withthe
institutional policy.
10. Aneffective integratedpestmanagement programisrequired.See Appendix
11. The laboratorysupervisormustensure thatlaboratorypersonnel receiveappropriatetraining
regardingtheirduties,the necessaryprecautionstopreventexposures,andexposure evaluation
procedures.Personnel mustreceiveannual updatesoradditionaltrainingwhenproceduralorpolicy
changesoccur. Personal healthstatusmayimpactan individual’ssusceptibilitytoinfection,abilityto
receive immunizationsorprophylactic interventions.Therefore,all laboratorypersonnelandparticularly
womenof child-bearingage shouldbe providedwithinformationregardingimmune competence and
conditionsthatmaypredispose themtoinfection.Individuals havingthese conditionsshouldbe
encouragedtoself-identifytothe institution’shealthcare providerforappropriate counselingand
guidance.
B. Special Practices
10. 1. All personsenteringthe laboratorymustbe advisedof the potential hazardsandmeetspecific
entry/exitrequirementsinaccordance withinstitutional policies.
Onlypersonswhose presence inthe facilityorindividual laboratoryroomsisrequiredforscientificor
supportpurposesshouldbe authorizedtoenter.
Entry intothe facilitymustbe limitedbymeansof secure,lockeddoors.A logbook,orothermeansof
documentingthe date andtime of all personsenteringandleavingthe laboratorymustbe maintained.
While the laboratoryisoperational,personnel mustenterandexitthe laboratorythroughthe clothing
change and showerroomsexceptduringemergencies.Allpersonalclothingmustbe removedinthe
outerclothingchange room.Laboratoryclothing,includingundergarments,pants,shirts,jumpsuits,
shoes,andgloves,mustbe usedbyall personnel enteringthe laboratory.All personsleavingthe
laboratorymusttake a personal bodyshower.Usedlaboratoryclothingmustnotbe removedfromthe
innerchange roomthroughthe personal shower.Theseitemsmustbe treatedascontaminated
materialsanddecontaminatedbeforelaundering.
Afterthe laboratoryhasbeencompletelydecontaminated,necessarystaff mayenterandexitwithout
followingthe clothingchange andshowerrequirementsdescribedabove.
2. Laboratory personnel andsupportstaff mustbe providedappropriate occupational medical service
includingmedical surveillance andavailableimmunizationsforagentshandledorpotentiallypresentin
the laboratory.A systemmustbe establishedforreportinganddocumentinglaboratoryaccidents,
exposures,employee absenteeismandforthe medical surveillance of potential laboratory-associated
illnesses.Anessential adjuncttosuchan occupational medical servicessystemisthe availabilityof a
facilityforthe isolationandmedical care of personnel withpotentialorknownlaboratoryacquired
infections.
3. Each institutionmustestablishpoliciesandproceduresdescribingthe collectionandstorage of serum
samplesfromat-riskpersonnel.
4. A laboratory-specificbiosafetymanual mustbe prepared.The biosafetymanual mustbe available,
accessible,andfollowed.
5. The laboratorysupervisorisresponsible forensuringthatlaboratorypersonnel:
o Demonstrate highproficiencyinstandardandspecial microbiological practices,and
techniquesforworkingwithagentsrequiringBSL-4containment.
o Receive appropriatetraininginthe practicesandoperationsspecifictothe laboratory
facility.
o Receive annual updatesoradditional trainingwhenproceduralorpolicychangesoccur.
6. Removal of biological materialsthatare to remainina viable orintactstate fromthe laboratorymust
be transferredtoa non-breakable,sealedprimary container and then enclosed in a non-breakable,
sealed secondary container.
11. These materials must be transferred through a disinfectant dunk tank, fumigation chamber, or
decontamination shower. Once removed, packaged viable material must not be opened outside
BSL-4 containment unless inactivated by a validated method.
7. Laboratory equipment must be routinely decontaminated, as well as after spills, splashes, or
other potential contamination.
a. Spills involving infectious materials must be contained, decontaminated, and
cleaned up by appropriate professional staff, or others properly trained and
equipped to work with infectious material. A spill procedure must be developed
and posted within the laboratory.
b. Equipment must be decontaminated using an effective and validated method
before repair, maintenance, or removal from the laboratory. The interior of the
Class III cabinet as well as all contaminated plenums, fans and filters must be
decontaminated using a validated gaseous or vapor method.
c. Equipment or material that might be damaged by high temperatures or steam
must be decontaminated using an effective and validated procedure such as a
gaseous or vapor method in an airlock or chamber designed for this purpose.
8. Incidentsthatmay resultinexposure to infectious materials must be immediately evaluated and
treated according to procedures described in the laboratory biosafety manual. All incidents must
be reported to the laboratory supervisor, institutional management and appropriate laboratory
personnel as defined in the laboratory biosafety manual. Medical evaluation, surveillance, and
treatment should be provided and appropriate records maintained..
9. Animals and plants not associated with the work being performed must not be permitted in the
laboratory.
10. Supplies and materials that are not brought into the BSL-4 laboratory through the change
room, must be brought in through a previously decontaminated double-door autoclave,
fumigation chamber, or airlock. After securing the outer doors, personnel within the laboratory
retrieve the materials by opening the interior doors of the autoclave, fumigation chamber, or
airlock. These doors must be secured after materials are brought into the facility. The doors of
the autoclave are interlocked in a manner that prevents opening of the outer door unless the
autoclave has been operated through a decontamination cycle.
The doors of a fumigation chamber must be secured in a manner that prevents opening of the
outer door unless the fumigation chamber has been operated through a fumigation cycle.
Only necessary equipment and supplies should be stored inside the BSL-4 laboratory. All
equipment and supplies taken inside the laboratory must be decontaminated before removal
from the facility.
12. 11. Daily inspections of essential containment and life support systems must be completed and
documented before laboratory work is initiated to ensure that the laboratory is operating
according to established parameters.
12. Practical and effective protocols for emergency situations must be established.
These protocols must include plans for medical emergencies, facility malfunctions, fires, escape
of animals within the laboratory, and other potential emergencies. Training in emergency
response procedures must be provided to emergency response personnel and other
responsible staff according to institutional policies.
C. Safety Equipment (Primary Barriers and Personal Protective Equipment)
Cabinet Laboratory
1. All manipulations of infectious materials within the facility must be conducted in the Class III
biological safety cabinet.
Double-door, pass through autoclaves must be provided for decontaminating materials passing
out of the Class III BSC(s). The autoclave doors must be interlocked so that only one can be
opened at any time and be automatically controlled so that the outside door to the autoclave can
only be opened after the decontamination cycle has been completed.
The Class III cabinet must also have a pass-through dunk tank, fumigation chamber, or
equivalent decontamination method so that materials and equipment that cannot be
decontaminated in the autoclave can be safely removed from the cabinet. Containment must be
maintained at all times.
The Class III cabinet must have a HEPA filter on the supply air intake and two HEPA filters in
series on the exhaust outlet of the unit. There must be gas tight dampers on the supply and
exhaust ducts of the cabinet to permit gas or vapor decontamination of the unit. Ports for
injection of test medium must be present on all HEPA filter housings.
The interior of the Class III cabinet must be constructed with smooth finishes that can be easily
cleaned and decontaminated. All sharp edges on cabinet finishes must be eliminated to reduce
the potential for cuts and tears of gloves.
Equipment to be placed in the Class III cabinet should also be free of sharp edges or other
surfaces that may damage or puncture the cabinet gloves.
Class III cabinet gloves must be inspected for leaks periodically and changed if necessary.
Gloves should be replaced annually during cabinet recertification.
The cabinet should be designed to permit maintenance and repairs of cabinet mechanical
systems (refrigeration, incubators, centrifuges, etc.) to be performed from the exterior of the
cabinet whenever possible.
13. Manipulation of high concentrations or large volumes of infectious agents within the Class III
cabinet should be performed using physical containment devices inside the cabinet whenever
practical. Such materials should be centrifuged inside the cabinet using sealed rotor heads or
centrifuge safety cups.
The Class III cabinet must be certified at least annually.
2. Protective laboratory clothing with a solid-front such as tie-back or wraparound
gowns, scrub suits, or coveralls must be worn by workers when in the laboratory. No
personal clothing, jewelry, or other items except eyeglasses should be taken past the
personal shower area. All protective clothing must be removed in the dirty side change
room before showering. Reusable clothing must be autoclaved before being laundered.
3. Eye, face and respiratory protection should be used in rooms containing infected animals as
determined by the risk assessment. Prescription eyeglasses must be decontaminated before
removal through the personal body shower.
4. Gloves must be worn to protect against breaks or tears in the cabinet gloves. Gloves must
not be worn outside the laboratory. Alternatives to latex gloves should be available. Do not wash
or reuse disposable gloves. Dispose of used gloves with other contaminated laboratory waste.
SuitLaboratory
1. All procedures must be conducted by personnel wearing a one-piece positive pressure suit
ventilated with a life support system.
All manipulations of infectious agents must be performed within a BSC or other primary barrier
system.
Equipment that may produce aerosols must be contained in devices that exhaust air through
HEPA filtration before being discharged into the laboratory. These HEPA filters should be tested
annually and replaced as needed.
HEPA filtered exhaust air from a Class II BSC can be safely re-circulated into the laboratory
environment if the cabinet is tested and certified at least annually and operated according to
manufacturer’s recommendations.
2. Protective laboratory clothing such as scrub suits must be worn by workers before entering
the room used for donning positive pressure suits. All protective clothing must be removed in
the dirty side change room before entering the personal shower. Reusable laboratory clothing
must be autoclaved before being laundered.
3. Inner gloves must be worn to protect against break or tears in the outer suit gloves.
Disposable gloves must not be worn outside the change area.
Alternatives to latex gloves should be available. Do not wash or reuse disposable gloves. Inner
gloves must be removed and discarded in the inner change room prior to personal shower.
Dispose of used gloves with other contaminated waste.
14. 4. Decontamination of outer suit gloves is performed during operations to remove gross
contamination and minimize further contamination of the laboratory.
D. Laboratory Facilities (Secondary Barriers)
Cabinet Laboratory
1. The BSL-4 cabinet laboratory consists of either a separate building or a clearly demarcated
and isolated zone within a building. Laboratory doors must have locks in accordance with the
institutional policies.
Rooms in the facility must be arranged to ensure sequential passage through an inner (dirty)
changing area, a personal shower and an outer (clean) change room prior to exiting the room(s)
containing the Class III BSC(s).
An automatically activated emergency power source must be provided at a minimum for the
laboratory exhaust system, life support systems, alarms, lighting, entry and exit controls, BSCs,
and door gaskets. Monitoring and control systems for air supply, exhaust, life support, alarms,
entry and exit, and security systems should be on an uninterrupted power supply (UPS).
A double-door autoclave, dunk tank, fumigation chamber, or ventilated anteroom/airlock must
be provided at the containment barrier for the passage of materials, supplies, or equipment.
2. A hands-free sink must be provided near the door of the cabinet room(s) and the inner
change room. A sink must be provided in the outer change room. All sinks in the room(s)
containing the Class III BSC and the inner (dirty) change room must be connected to the
wastewater decontamination system.
3. Walls, floors, and ceilings of the laboratory must be constructed to form a sealed internal shell
to facilitate fumigation and prohibit animal and insect intrusion. The internal surfaces of this shell
must be resistant to liquids and chemicals used for cleaning and decontamination of the area.
Floors must be monolithic, sealed and coved.
All penetrations in the internal shell of the laboratory and inner change room must be sealed.
Openings around doors into the cabinet room and inner change room must be minimized and
capable of being sealed to facilitate decontamination.
Drains in the laboratory floor (if present) must be connected directly to the liquid waste
decontamination system. Services, plumbing or otherwise that penetrate the laboratory walls,
floors, ceiling, plumbing or otherwise, must ensure that no backflow from the laboratory occurs.
These penetrations must be fitted with two (in series) backflow prevention devices.
Consideration should be given to locating these devices outside of containment. Atmospheric
venting systems must be provided with two HEPA filters in series and be sealed up to the
second filter.
Decontamination of the entire cabinet must be performed using a validated gaseous or vapor
method when there have been significant changes in cabinet usage, before major renovations
15. or maintenance shut downs, and in other situations, as determined by risk assessment.
Selection of the appropriate materials and methods used for decontamination must be based on
the risk assessment of the biological agents in use.
4. Laboratory furniture must be of simple construction, capable of supporting anticipated loading
and uses. Spaces between benches, cabinets, and equipment must be accessible for cleaning
and decontamination. Chairs and other furniture should be covered with a non-porous material
that can be easily decontaminated.
5. Windows must be break-resistant and sealed.
6. If Class II BSCs are needed in the cabinet laboratory, they must be installed so that
fluctuations of the room air supply and exhaust do not interfere with proper operations. Class II
cabinets should be located away from doors, heavily traveled laboratory areas, and other
possible airflow disruptions.
7. Central vacuum systems are not recommended. If, however, there is a central vacuum
system, it must not serve areas outside the cabinet room. Two in-line HEPA filters must be
placed near each use point. Filters must be installed to permit in-place decontamination and
replacement.
8. An eyewash station must be readily available in the laboratory.
9. A dedicated non-recirculating ventilation system is provided. Only laboratories with the same
HVAC requirements (i.e., other BSL-4 labs, ABSL-4, BSL-3 Ag labs) may share ventilation
systems if each individual laboratory system is isolated by gas tight dampers and HEPA filters.
The supply and exhaust components of the ventilation system must be designed to maintain the
laboratory at negative pressure to surrounding areas and provide differential
pressure/directional airflow between adjacent areas within the laboratory.
Redundant supply fans are recommended. Redundant exhaust fans are required. Supply and
exhaust fans must be interlocked to prevent positive pressurization of the laboratory.
The ventilation system must be monitored and alarmed to indicate malfunction or deviation from
design parameters. A visual monitoring device must be installed near the clean change room so
proper differential pressures within the laboratory may be verified.
Supply air to and exhaust air from the cabinet room, inner change room, and
fumigation/decontamination chambers must pass through HEPA filter(s). The air exhaust
discharge must be located away from occupied spaces and building air intakes.
All HEPA filters should be located as near as practicable to the cabinet or laboratory in order to
minimize the length of potentially contaminated ductwork. All HEPA filters must to be tested and
certified annually.
16. The HEPA filter housings should be designed to allow for in situ decontamination and validation
of the filter prior to removal. The design of the HEPA filter housing must have gas-tight isolation
dampers; decontamination ports; and ability to scan each filter assembly for leaks.
10. HEPA filtered exhaust air from a Class II BSC can be safely re-circulated into the laboratory
environment if the cabinet is tested and certified at least annually and operated according to the
manufacturer’s recommendations.
BSCs can also be connected to the laboratory exhaust system by either a thimble (canopy)
connection or a direct (hard) connection. Provisions to assure proper safety cabinet
performance and air system operation must be verified.
Class III BSCs must be directly and independently exhausted through two HEPA filters in series.
Supply air must be provided in such a manner that prevents positive pressurization of the
cabinet.
11. Pass through dunk tanks, fumigation chambers, or equivalent decontamination methods
must be provided so that materials and equipment that cannot be decontaminated in the
autoclave can be safely removed from the cabinet room(s). Access to the exit side of the pass-
through shall be limited to those individuals authorized to be in the BSL-4 laboratory.
12. Liquid effluents from cabinet room sinks, floor drains, autoclave chambers, and other
sources within the cabinet room must be decontaminated by a proven method, preferably heat
treatment, before being discharged to the sanitary sewer.
Decontamination of all liquid wastes must be documented. The decontamination process for
liquid wastes must be validated physically and biologically. Biological validation must be
performed annually or more often if required by institutional policy.
Effluents from showers and toilets may be discharged to the sanitary sewer without treatment.
13. A double-door, pass through autoclave(s) must be provided for decontaminating materials
passing out of the cabinet laboratory. Autoclaves that open outside of the laboratory must be
sealed to the primary wall. This bioseal must be durable and airtight. Positioning the bioseal so
that the equipment can be accessed and maintained from outside the laboratory is strongly
recommended. The autoclave doors must be interlocked so that only one can be opened at any
time and be automatically controlled so that the outside door to the autoclave can only be
opened after the decontamination cycle has been completed.
Gas and liquid discharge from the autoclave chamber must be decontaminated. When feasible,
autoclave decontamination processes should be designed so that over-pressurization cannot
release unfiltered air or steam exposed to infectious material to the environment.
14. The BSL-4 facility design parameters and operational procedures must be documented. The
facility must be tested to verify that the design and operational parameters have been met prior
to operation. Facilities must also be re-verified annually. Verification criteria should be modified
as necessary by operational experience.
17. 15. Appropriate communication systems must be provided between the laboratory and the
outside (e.g., voice, fax, and computer). Provisions for emergency communication and
access/egress must be considered.
Suit Laboratory
1. The BSL-4 suit laboratory consists of either a separate building or a clearly demarcated and
isolated zone within a building. Laboratory doors must have locks in accordance with the
institutional policies.
Rooms in the facility must be arranged to ensure exit by sequential passage through the
chemical shower, inner (dirty) change room, personal shower, and outer (clean) changing area.
Entry into the BSL-4 laboratory must be through an airlock fitted with airtight doors. Personnel
who enter this area must wear a positive pressure suit with HEPA filtered breathing air. The
breathing air systems must have redundant compressors, failure alarms and emergency
backup. A chemical shower must be provided to decontaminate the surface of the positive
pressure suit before the worker leaves the laboratory. In the event of an emergency exit or
failure of chemical shower system a method for decontaminating positive pressure suits, such
as a gravity fed supply of chemical disinfectant, is needed.
An automatically activated emergency power source must be provided at a minimum for the
laboratory exhaust system, life support systems, alarms, lighting, entry and exit controls, BSCs,
and door gaskets. Monitoring and control systems for air supply, exhaust, life support, alarms,
entry and exit, and security systems should be on a UPS.
A double-door autoclave, dunk tank, or fumigation chamber must be provided at the
containment barrier for the passage of materials, supplies, or equipment.
2. Sinks inside the suit laboratory should be placed near procedure areas and contain traps and
be connected to the wastewater decontamination system.
3. Walls, floors, and ceilings of the laboratory must be constructed to form a sealed internal shell
to facilitate fumigation and prohibit animal and insect intrusion. The internal surfaces of this shell
must be resistant to liquids and chemicals used for cleaning and decontamination of the area.
Floors must be monolithic, sealed and coved.
All penetrations in the internal shell of the laboratory, suit storage room and the inner change
room must be sealed.
Drains if present, in the laboratory floor must be connected directly to the liquid waste
decontamination system. Sewer vents and other service lines must be protected by two HEPA
filters in series and have protection against insect and animal intrusion.
Services, plumbing or otherwise that penetrate the laboratory walls, floors, ceiling, plumbing or
otherwise, must ensure that no backflow from the laboratory occurs. These penetrations must
be fitted with two (in series) backflow prevention devices. Consideration should be given to
18. locating these devices outside of containment. Atmospheric venting systems must be provided
with two HEPA filters in series and be sealed up to the second filter.
Decontamination of the entire laboratory must be performed using a validated gaseous or vapor
method when there have been significant changes in laboratory usage, before major
renovations or maintenance shut downs, and in other situations, as determined by risk
assessment.
4. Laboratory furniture must be of simple construction, capable of supporting anticipated loading
and uses. Sharp edges and corners should be avoided. Spaces between benches, cabinets,
and equipment must be accessible for cleaning and decontamination. Chairs and other furniture
should be covered with a non-porous material that can be easily decontaminated.
5. Windows must be break-resistant and sealed.
6. BSCs and other primary containment barrier systems must be installed so that fluctuations of
the room air supply and exhaust do not interfere with proper operations. BSCs should be
located away from doors, heavily traveled laboratory areas, and other possible airflow
disruptions.
7. Central vacuum systems are not recommended. If, however, there is a central vacuum
system, it must not serve areas outside the BSL-4 laboratory. Two inline HEPA filters must be
placed near each use point. Filters must be installed to permit in-place decontamination and
replacement.
8. An eyewash station must be readily available in the laboratory area for use during
maintenance and repair activities.
9. A dedicated non-recirculating ventilation system is provided. Only laboratories with the same
HVAC requirements (i.e., other BSL-4 labs, ABSL-4, BSL-3 Ag labs) may share ventilation
systems if each individual laboratory system is isolated by gas tight dampers and HEPA filters.
The supply and exhaust components of the ventilation system must be designed to maintain the
laboratory at negative pressure to surrounding areas and provide differential
pressure/directional airflow between adjacent areas
within the laboratory.
Redundant supply fans are recommended. Redundant exhaust fans are required. Supply and
exhaust fans must be interlocked to prevent positive pressurization of the laboratory.
The ventilation system must be monitored and alarmed to indicate malfunction or deviation from
design parameters. A visual monitoring device must be installed near the clean change room so
proper differential pressures within the laboratory may be verified.
Supply air to the laboratory, including the decontamination shower, must pass through a HEPA
filter. All exhaust air from the suit laboratory, decontamination shower and fumigation or
decontamination chambers must pass through two HEPA filters, in series, before discharge to
19. the outside. The exhaust air discharge must be located away from occupied spaces and air
intakes.
All HEPA filters must be located as near as practicable to the laboratory in order to minimize the
length of potentially contaminated ductwork. All HEPA filters must be tested and certified
annually.
The HEPA filterhousingsshouldbe designedtoallow for in situ decontamination and validation of the
filter prior to removal. The design of the HEPA filter housing must have gas-tight isolation
dampers; decontamination ports; and ability to scan each filter assembly for leaks.
10. HEPA filtered exhaust air from a Class II BSC can be safely re-circulated back into the
laboratory environment if the cabinet is tested and certified at least annually and operated
according to the manufacturer’s recommendations. Biological safety cabinets can also be
connected to the laboratory exhaust system by either a thimble (canopy) connection or a direct
(hard) connection. Provisions to assure proper safety cabinet performance and air system
operation must be verified.
11. Pass through dunk tanks, fumigation chambers, or equivalent decontamination methods
must be provided so that materials and equipment that cannot be decontaminated in the
autoclave can be safely removed from the BSL-4 laboratory. Access to the exit side of the pass-
through shall be limited to those individuals authorized to be in the BSL-4 laboratory.
12. Liquid effluents from chemical showers, sinks, floor drains, autoclave chambers, and other
sources within the laboratory must be decontaminated by a proven method, preferably heat
treatment, before being discharged to the sanitary sewer.
Decontamination of all liquid wastes must be documented. The decontamination process for
liquid wastes must be validated physically and biologically. Biological validation must be
performed annually or more often if required by institutional policy.
Effluents from personal body showers and toilets may be discharged to the sanitary sewer
without treatment.
13. A double-door, pass through autoclave(s) must be provided for decontaminating materials
passing out of the cabinet laboratory. Autoclaves that open outside of the laboratory must be
sealed to the primary wall. This bioseal must be durable and airtight. Positioning the bioseal so
that the equipment can be accessed and maintained from outside the laboratory is strongly
recommended. The autoclave doors must be interlocked so that only one can be opened at any
time and be automatically controlled so that the outside door to the autoclave can only be
opened after the decontamination cycle has been completed.
Gas and liquid discharge from the autoclave chamber must be decontaminated. When feasible,
autoclave decontamination processes should be designed so that over-pressurization cannot
release unfiltered air or steam exposed to infectious material to the environment.
14. The BSL-4 facility design parameters and operational procedures must be
20. documented. The facility must be tested to verify that the design and operational parameters
have been met prior to operation. Facilities must also be re-verified annually. Verification criteria
should be modified as necessary by operational experience.
15. Appropriate communication systems must be provided between the laboratory and the
outside (e.g., voice, fax, and computer). Provisions for emergency communication and
access/egress should be considered.
Prepared by
Date 11 / 10/ 2015