Us4ag 010005dp

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330401
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
JTF-GTMO-CDR 1 April 2008
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment
1. (S) Personal Information:
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Lakhdar Boumediene
2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.
3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention
Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 28 September 2007.
b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a member of the Algerian Armed Islamic
Group (GIA) and al-Qaida who was detained for his involvement with a GIA cell in Bosnia
(BK), suspected of plotting an attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo, BK1
. Detainee has an
1
Analyst Note: The GIA is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 3
target. Priority 3 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats other senior policymakers and IC managers
believe must receive attention from the IC that are not already identified as Priorities 1 or 2. These include
terrorist/extremist groups involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and the capability to attack
U.S. persons and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less threat than Priority 2 groups, or terrorist/extremist
Current/True Name and Aliases: Lakhdar Boumediene,
Ahmed, al-Muntasir
Place of Birth: Ain Soltgane Saeda, Algeria (AG)
Date of Birth: 27 April 1966
Citizenship: Algeria
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US4AG-010005DP

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
2
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for
extensive history as an extremist active in jihad and suspected terrorist activities in Bosnia,
Algeria, Pakistan (PK), and Afghanistan (AF). Detainee admits extensive travels throughout
the Greater Middle East. Detainee has long standing ties with non-governmental
organizations (NGO) tied to extremism. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:
A HIGH risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
A HIGH threat from a detention perspective
Of MEDIUM intelligence value
c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s
assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be
annotated by ¡ next to the footnote.)
Added a report indicating detainee was an Afghan war veteran and fought as part of
the Muslim Brigade in BK.
Added reports citing detainee’s admission of being approached to participate in a
terrorist plot in Jordan and being asked to join the jihad while working at the Hira
Institute.
Included a report indicating detainee was a member of al-Qaida and the GIA.
4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events:
The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account.
These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee studied at the Techweed al-Meckanie Trade School in
Saeda, AG, from 1984 to 1985 to become a mechanic. After completing trade school,
detainee served as a border guard in the Algerian Army from 1985 to 1987. Upon
completion of his military service, detainee spent 1987 to 1988 living with his parents while
seeking employment. From 1988 to 1990, detainee gained employment with the Drywall and
Cement Company in Saeda, working as a machinery mechanic. Detainee decided to look for
another job when his co-workers informed him the job was bad for his health.2
b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In November 1990, detainee learned that a former
co-worker and friend named Samahi Abdallah, aka (Saryah), aka (Abu Mustafa Ahmed), was
groups that have demonstrated intention to attack U.S. persons and interests and are taking action to develop or
acquire WMD capability.
2
IIR 6 034 0204 02

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working in Pakistan.3
He was told by others that Samahi’s job allowed him to send money
home to his family and yet still live comfortably. Detainee called Samahi and asked him
about traveling to Pakistan for work. Samahi told detainee to make arrangements, obtain a
visa, and travel to Peshawar. Detainee flew via Tunisia (TS), Russia (RS), and Karachi, PK,
to Peshawar where he met Samahi.4
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee stayed with Samahi for approximately six
months, during which time he obtained a job at a madrassa (Islamic religious school) known
as the Islamic Hira Institute in Babi, PK. In approximately December 1993, detainee
traveled to Sanaa, Yemen (YM), and became a member of the French Cultural Center.
Unable to find favorable employment and after speaking with his old neighbor from Algeria,
Akrish Moamer, detainee went to Tirana, Albania (AL), in July 1994. Detainee obtained a
job working at the Abu Dhabi Welfare Organization, which later became the United Arab
Emirates (AE) Red Crescent Society. Later, in 1995, detainee married an Algerian woman in
Albania. In April 1997, detainee asked the Red Crescent Society for a transfer to Sarajevo,
BK. Detainee’s close friend, Mohamed Nechle, ISN US4AG-010003DP (AG-10003), had
already moved to Bosnia with his wife and children. Detainee left Tirana and traveled to
Sarajevo via Istanbul, Turkey (TU), with his wife and daughter, arriving in Sarajevo on 16
April 1997. Detainee purchased Bosnian citizenship credentials in September 1998 through
illegal means for 5,000 Deutsche marks.5
On 28 December 1999, detainee returned to
Algeria with his daughter and wife, who was about to give birth to their second child.
Algerian authorities arrested detainee because his Algerian passport had expired and his
passport contained a Pakistani visa. The Algerian police proceeded to question detainee
about Afghanistan (AF). Detainee told police he had only been to Pakistan, not Afghanistan,
and was subsequently released when the Algerian government issued a blanket pardon to
Algerians previously involved with al-Jabha al-Islamyah Lil Inkaz, aka (Islamic Salvation
Front), aka (FIS).6
On 16 February 2000, detainee departed Algeria, leaving behind his wife
and children, and returned to Bosnia. In March 2000, detainee obtained a visa and traveled
to the hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA), via Istanbul and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (SA).
Approximately 20 days later, detainee returned to Sarajevo and continued working with the
3
Analyst Note: Detainee identified Abu Mustafa Ahmed and Saryah as aliases for Samahi Abdallah. Samahi
advised detainee that it was not a good idea to use his real name in Pakistan. For additional information see IIR 6
034 0203 02, IIR 6 034 0372 02.
4
IIR 6 034 0204 02
5
Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $2,860 US.
6
Analyst Note: FIS was an opposition party that was banned by the Algerian government in 1991, prompting the
Algerian Civil War of 1991-2002. FIS supporters factionalized, spawning several armed splinter groups including
the GIA and GSPC, and fought a bloody ten-year insurgency. In 1999, the Algerian government issued a blanket
amnesty to former FIS members and began a national reconciliation campaign that ultimately contributed to the
defeat of the violent insurgency in 2002.

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Red Crescent Society as an orphan relief manager. In July 2000, detainee traveled to
Istanbul to meet his wife and children, and returned with them to Sarajevo.7
5. (U) Capture Information:
a. (S//NF) In October 2001, a US intelligence source identified a group of men who were
reportedly planning to bomb the US Embassy in Sarajevo. After the source’s information
was corroborated, Bosnian authorities, at the behest of the US government, captured eight
individuals suspected in the plot in a series of mid-October arrests in the Zenica, BK area.
Detainee was among the eight and was arrested on or about 15 October 2001.8
The two non-
Algerian suspects were deported to their home countries. Bosnian authorities held detainee
and the other five Algerian suspects in custody until they could no longer be legally detained.
When the Algerian government refused to accept custody of the “Algerian Six,” Bosnian
authorities transferred them to US custody on 18 January 2002.9
b. (S) Property Held:
Casio Watch
Scrap of paper listing three phone numbers attributed to “Ambasade D’Algerie en
Italif” (Algerian Embassy in Italy)
Money:10
170 Deutsche marks
23 Bahraini dinar
Though not held at JTF-GTMO, the following items were reported to have been in
detainee’s possession at time of capture.11
Identity Documents: Algerian Passport Number 0705513, Bosnian Passport
Number 3817760, Bosnian Passport Number 0801081, and a French Identity
Document.
Arabic language documents with the letterhead for Lajnat al-Dawa al-Islamiah
(LDI), aka (Society of Social Reform); Arabic language document with the letterhead
for Abu Dhabi Welfare Organization; and an Arabic language document with the
letterhead for the AE Red Crescent Society.
7
IIR 6 034 0372 02, IIR 6 034 0203 02
8
IIR 6 034 0205 02, IIR 7 130 1022 02, DCS-G2 Special Assessment-Algerian Six 18-FEB-2004; Analyst Note:
Detainee was reportedly arrested on the evening of 20 October 2001 in Bihac, BK. For additional information see
TD-314/39634-01. Multiple dates are reported for detainee’s capture, ranging from 15th-20th October 2002.
9
IIR 6 034 0207 02 (Paragraph 12), AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 29-DEC-2006, 010003 PROFILE1 23-AUG-2002
Paragraph 4C
10
Analyst Note: Approximately $183 US based on conversion date of 15 October 2001.
11
TD-314/41396-01

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Photocopies of two articles written in Serbo-Croatian.
A Bosnian newspaper article detailing a youth camp organized by
the AE charity.
An article from the Croatian paper Globus, detailing an attack
against the United States Information Service office in Pristina,
Kosovo, in August 1998.
c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 20 January 2002
d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the
following:
¡ The Red Crescent Society NGO in Bosnia
¡ Employees in the Bosnian NGO office
¡ Banks used by the Red Crescent NGO in Bosnia
¡ Peshawar-based NGOs
¡ LDI NGO in the Babi, PK
6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Detainee has provided partially truthful, yet
incomplete accounts of his history and timeline. Detainee has consistently denied involvement
in terrorist organizations or plots of any kind against the US. He has denied membership in the
GIA and affiliation with Bosnian mujahideen despite reports indicating the contrary. Detainee
maintains he never met or barely knew the other members of the “Algerian Six,” which has been
proven false based on subsequent reports. Detainee has provided dates of travel and places of
occupation which have been corroborated; however, he is unable to account for phone numbers
captured in his pocket litter tied to extremists. Detainee has been uncooperative with
interrogators since approximately 2003 and his story contains multiple gaps requiring further
exploitation.
7. (U) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he may pose a threat to the
US, its interests, and allies.
b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention in DoD Control: Detainee is a member of
an Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) cell involved in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the
US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee has an extensive history as an extremist, active in jihad
and suspected terrorist activities in Bosnia, Algeria, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and admits
extensive travels throughout the Greater Middle East. He worked for more than two years
for the Hira Institute, an NGO in Pakistan.

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S//NF) Detainee is a member of a GIA cell in Bosnia, assessed to have been involved
in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee possibly has
additional information regarding other terrorist plots.
(S/NF) On 8 October 2001, the Bosnian Federal Ministry of Interior Police
(FMUP), in cooperation with US forces in Bosnia, apprehended suspected al-Qaida
facilitator Bensayah Belkacem, ISN US4AG-010001DP (AG-10001), after an
investigation into threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Bosnian authorities
also directed the investigation toward seven other individuals, including detainee,
who were suspected of involvement in the threats, which also led to their subsequent
apprehension.12
¡ (S//NF) Over the next two weeks, detainee, along with Saber Mahfouz
Lahmar, ISN US4AG-010002DP (AG-10002), AG-10003, Mustapha Ait Idir,
ISN US4AG-010004DP (AG-10004), and Al-Haj Omar Boudellaa, ISN US4AG-
010006DP (AG-10006) were arrested for false attestation of information and
suspected involvement in the threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo.13
This
group became known as the “Algerian Six.”
¡ (S//NF) The two other individuals arrested were identified as Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG) member Khaled al-Arbed and Atif Munassur, aka (Abu
Nasar), a suspected facilitator for the Salafist Group for Call and Combat
(GSPC).14
(S//NF) The Bosnian Federation Supreme Court stated that this group attempted
to attack the facility and the employees of the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Documents
identified those arrested as an organized terrorist group, whose activities constituted
an act of international terrorism. The group is suspected of conducting surveillance
of the embassy and its personnel, and coordinating with GZ-10016.15
¡ According to 2004 open source reporting, Bosnian prosecutors and police
formally exonerated the six Algerians of any criminal charges. No terrorism
charges were levied against them.16
¡ (S//NF) AG-10001 possessed the phone number of a Bosnian locksmith
employed at the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Further investigation by embassy
authorities revealed the individual was AG-10002’s father-in-law. The employee
was detained and subsequently failed a polygraph test given by US authorities.17
12
IIR 6 933 0021 02
13
IIR 6 933 0021 02
14
TD-314/11070-05, IIR 6 933 0021 02, 010001 Mantis ealin26398 21-Nov-2001, Analyst Note: LIFG is an NIPF
Priority 1 CT target.
15
TD-314/02606-02, BIH Court Doc BB-014 30-OCT-2001, DCS-G2 Special Assessment- Algerian Six 18-FEB-
2004
16
Washington Post Foreign Service 21 August 2006
17
IIR 7 130 1022 02,IIR 4 201 2111 06

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(Analyst Note: AG-10002’s father-in-law could have provided physical access to
the embassy for the purpose of the attack.)
(S//NF) Despite claims that they were not associated with each other, contacts
between the members of the group known as the “Algerian Six” demonstrated a close
association between them.
(S//NF) Detainee admitted the first apartment he stayed at in Sarajevo was
with AG-10006. Detainee stated he met with Muhammad Khalili, an official from
the Algerian government, as well as AG-10003, AG-10004, and AG-10006 in
December 1998 or January 1999.18
(S//NF) AG-10003 described detainee as his closest friend in Albania and
Bosnia. AG-10003 stated detainee used to assist AG-10001 and AG-10002 with
various charity activities. Detainee’s wife introduced AG-10003 to his wife while
they resided in Albania.19
AG-10003’s phone records indicate he maintained
consistent contact with detainee.20
(S//NF) Detainee stated he has known AG-10004 since they met in Bosnia
two or three years before their arrest, and AG-10004 worked for the Taibah NGO
in the Vogoca area of Bosnia where AG-10004 lived.21
(S//NF) Other reporting confirms the rest of the “Algerian Six” maintained
contacts with each other in Bosnia.
¡ (C//REL TO USA, SFOR) Detainee’s phone number is listed among AG-
10001’s phone number contacts. Additionally, another phone number on the
list was for “Abu Zubayda,” believed to be a reference to GZ-10016.22
¡ (S//NF) FMUP investigation found items confiscated during AG-10004’s
arrest listing detainee’s phone number.23
¡ (S//NF) AG-10002’s mobile phone number and his landline number are
listed among AG-10001’s contacts.24
AG-10001 stated that AG-10002,
whom he met in January 2001, was his only acquaintance while in Bosnia.25
(S//NF) Detainee admitted knowing, providing aid to, and obtaining a lawyer for
AG-10001. Detainee claimed he hired a lawyer without knowing the charges against
AG-10001.26
(S//NF) During an Algerian delegation visit in 2006, detainee engaged the
delegation with his biography information and his contact with a Jordanian who
18
IIR 6 034 0205 02
19
IIR 6 034 0208 02; IIR 6 034 0372 02(b)
20
TD-314/41670-01
21
IIR 6 034 0205 02(b), Analyst Note: Taibah is a NIPF Priority 2A CT target.
22
010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001
23
TD-314/39904-01
24
010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001, IIR 6 933 0021 02
25
IIR 6 034 0196 02, IIR 6 034 0896 02
26
IIR 6 034 0205 02(b)

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wanted him to bomb a target within Jordan.27
(Analyst Note: The bombing in Jordan
may have been referencing one of the millennium plots thwarted by Jordanian
security. GZ-10016, who’s phone number was found among the pocket litter of the
Algerian Six; has admitted prior involvement in the Jordanian millennium plot.)
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of the GIA and a probable member of
al-Qaida.
(S//NF) In September 2001, detainee, Abd al-Qadr al-Mukhtari, aka (Abu Maali);
AG-10003, and AG-10006, were included on an Algerian government list of
Algerians residing in Bosnia who were suspected of having terrorist ties to the GIA
and al-Qaida.28
¡ (S//NF) Abd al-Qadr al-Mukhtari was the head of the “al-Mujahid” Brigade
during the war in Bosnia (1992 to 1995). In the early 1990s, the Muslim Bosniac
government invited foreign mujahedeen to come to Bosnia to fight on its behalf.29
The “al-Mujahid Brigade” later transformed into the Bedr Bosna Corporation,
owned and managed by al-Mukhtari. Al-Qaida is reported to have provided
financial support to the Bedr Bosna Corporation, which serves as a cover for
terrorist activities such as providing financial support for its members, hiding
funds transfers, and providing facilities to support operations.30
(S//NF) Detainee’s name was one of 25 names on a Bosnian government list of
Algerians suspected of involvement with terrorist organizations abroad or involved
with humanitarian organizations suspected of providing logistical support to terrorist
groups.31
¡ (S//NF) Detainee was first arrested in Algeria on 28 December 1999 during
the Algerian Civil War. Detainee was arrested with an expired Algerian passport
which contained a Pakistani visa. Detainee was questioned by the Algerian
Military Police, the Algerian Civilian Police, and the Algerian National Police,
and taken into custody under suspicion of involvement with Algerian rebel
factions training in Afghanistan. Detainee was later released under a blanket
pardon for FIS members.32
(Analyst Note: Shortly before detainee’s arrest, FIS
claimed responsibility for an airline hijacking that took place in India on 25
December 1999.33
)
27
¢VARIOUS ISNS MFR 27-APR-2007, 010005 SIR 17-MAR-2006
28
¢010003 PROFILE 23-AUG-2002, TD-314/42368-01, IIR 2 199 0022 02
29
ACIC INTSUM 04-Apr-2002,Analyst Note: Many of these fighters later traveled to Afghanistan for jihad, as
detainee and the rest of the “Algerian Six” attempted to do, and as Ahmad Zayid Salim al-Zuhayri, aka (Handala),
US9SA-000669DP (SA-669), who was also a member of the al-Mujahid Brigade, succeeded in doing. SA-669 was
also convicted of involvement in a 1997 car bombing in Mostar.
30
ACIC INTSUM 04-Apr-2002
31
TD-314/07724-02 (see item D)
32
IIR 6 034 0372 02
33
¢OSC- FTS19991225000162

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(S//NF) A US State Department report describing background information on the
Algerian Six, listed detainee as an Afghan war veteran who also served in the El-
Mujahidin Brigade during the Bosnian conflict.34
(Analyst Note: This is the only
report directly tying detainee to prior conflicts.)
(S//NF) Detainee stated during the first six months he was in Peshawar during
1990, he lived with Abu Handala. While living with Abu Handala he heard
conversations about going to the “House of the Martyrs” and the “House of the
Mujahideen.”35
(S//NF) Detainee reportedly planned to travel to Afghanistan along with the other
Algerians, at the urging of AG-10001. Detainee and the others planned to travel as
soon as AG-10001 arrived in Afghanistan to make receiving arrangements.36
(S//NF) AG-10001 encouraged his Algerian associates to participate in jihad.
AG-10001 applied for an Iranian visa in Sarajevo for onward travel to
Afghanistan on 1 October 2001. He planned to provide travel assistance to help
the other Algerians join jihadist elements in Afghanistan, in anticipation of the US
campaign following the 11 September 2001 attacks. AG-10001 received financial
support from Shaykh Nasar al-Said, the director of the Saudi High Commission
for Relief (SHCR), for his travel to Afghanistan.37
(S//NF) A US intelligence assessment identified AG-10001 as the primary al-
Qaida facilitator in Bosnia, with ties to GZ-10016. AG-10001 possessed numerous
phone numbers linking him to UBL’s operational network in Afghanistan and the
global Sunni extremist network.38
(Analyst Note: Above information indicates AG-
10001’s relationship to al-Qaida and detainee’s subordination to AG-10001.)
(C//REL TO USA, NATO, SFOR) Shortly after detainee’s transfer to JTF-
GTMO, he was represented by a Bosnian lawyer Fahrija Karkin. Fahrija Karkin
is reported to be closely linked to extremist groups, Algerian groups, and known
criminals. (Analyst Note: Detainee was the only one of the six represented by
Karkin.)39
¡ (S//NF) Detainee worked at the Hira Institute, a Pakistan-based NGO that had direct
ties to al-Qaida’s external operations chief, Khalid Shaykh Muhammed, aka (KSM), aka
(Mukhtar), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024).
34
¢CIR 316/00277-02; Analyst Note: A variant of El-Mujahidin Brigade is al-Mujahid Brigade.
35
IIR 6 034 0204 02
36
TD-314/35452-01
37
TD-314/35452-01, IIR 6 933 0021 02, TD-314/14059-02, Analyst Note: SHCR is an NIPF Priority 2B TSE,
which includes organizations that have available resources and are in a position to provide financial support to
terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2B
terrorist groups.
38
TD-314/14059-02; IIR 7 130 1022 02, Paragraph 1; IIR 6 933 0021 02; DCS-G2 Special Assessment- Algerian
Six 18-FEB-2004
39
Kirikin Receives Security from GAMA 15-OCT-2002

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(S//NF) Detainee claimed he spent two and a half years working for the Hira
Institute in the village of Babi, approximately 40 km from Islamabad, PK. Muhamed
Hussein Abdallah, ISN US9SO-000704DP (SO-704), reported that the Hira Institute
in Peshawar received its funding from the Kuwaiti-based Lajnat al-Dawa al-Islamiya
(LDI).40
(S//NF) Detainee stated while working at the Hira Institute he knew a Sudanese
man named Abu Tujana, who was the accountant for the school.41
Abu Tujana is
assessed to be the alias of long time extremist and LDI employee Adel Hassan Hamid
Abdul al-Mutlib, ISN US9SU-000940DP (SU-940, transferred), whom, when asked
about detainee, claimed detainee worked with him at the refugee camp and left a good
mark in his heart.42
(S//NF) SU-940 worked for LDI in the Jelazee refugee camp for 10 years
from 1986 to 1996 as a teacher for the orphans in the refugee camp. SU-940
identified LDI as an organization that promoted Islamic solidarity. There was an
education center in the camp sponsored by Khalid Shaykh Muhammed, aka
(KSM), aka (Mukhtar), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024). This camp
provided Islamic indoctrination for young men 18-30 years old, including
showing jihadist videos. KU-10024 occasionally went to the camp to recruit new
fighters for jihad.43
(S) An Afghan national stated LDI vehicles and warehouses were used to
store and transfer weapons and supplies to the Taliban front lines and mujahideen
from Peshawar during the late 1990s.44
c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention
perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and
staff. He currently has 92 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most
recent occurring on 10 March 2008, when he spat on the guard force. He has 32 Reports of
Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 10 March 2008, when he
spat on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include failure to
follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, damage to
government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and
possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 18 Reports of
Disciplinary Infraction and 15 so far in 2008.
40
IIR 6 034 0372 02, IIR 6 034 0089 04
41
¡IIR 6 034 0204(b)
42
¡000940 SIR 03-NOV-2005; Analyst Note: Mammar Ameur, US9AG-000939DP (AG-939, designated for
transfer) also identified detainee, AG-10003, and AG-10006 as individuals who supported NGO’s in Peshawar
between 1992 and 1993. For additional information reference IIR 6 034 0903 03.
43
IIR 6 034 1523 03
44
IIR 7 724 0060 02

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8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee’s
most recent interrogation session occurred on 12 December 2007.
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Since the 1990s, detainee has worked for NGOs
known to support terrorist activities. Detainee has visited numerous countries in this
capacity. As a result, detainee associated with individuals who held high level positions in
various NGOs with ties to extremist activities. Detainee spent over two years working for
the Hira Institute and worked for LDI. Detainee was captured with a group suspected of
planning attacks against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee maintained strong personal
relationships with these individuals, who are assessed to be members of the GIA and have
links with the al-Qaida network.
c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Given detainee’s extensive involvement and
associations to terrorist-linked NGOs, he possesses first-hand information about the
organizations and their members. However, detainee has maintained his cover story that he
was never associated with the extremist activities or any extremist groups. Detainee gives
only cursory information pertaining to his duties with these organizations. Detainee has
substantial information about other “Algerian Six” detainees. Detainee continues to deny the
full extent of his relationships with these individuals. Detainee’s links and associations
indicate a deeper involvement in extremist activity, which have yet to be exposed.
Detainee’s travel and his links to extremist individuals and groups require additional
exploration.
d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:
Planned attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo
NGO support to extremist groups
GIA
Terrorist travel facilitators
Radicalization factors of terrorism
Terrorist biographical and psychological information
Detainee’s intentions after release from US custody

S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O33O4OI
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN US4AG-O10005DP(S)
9. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon I October2004,and
he remainsan enemycombatant.
t
vllt,
. | .t/)'/z/2. ,1// /<
y'//.d.z^/-/4/
2MARK H.BUZBY
RearAdmiral,USNavy
Commanding
.
Definitions for intelligenceterms usedin the assessmentcanbe found in the Joint Military Intelligence College
October2001 guideIntelligence l|arning Terminologt.
1 2
SE C RE T // NOFORNI I 2O33O4OI

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