Us4ag 010006dp

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330505
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JTF-GTMO-CDR 5 May 2008
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010006DP (S)
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment
1. (S) Personal Information:
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Boudellaa al-Haj
Current/True Name and Aliases: Al-Haj Omar Boudellaa,
Abu Omar, al-Haj Khalad, Omar Abdul al-Aziz
Place of Birth: Laghouat, Algeria (AG)
Date of Birth: 18 April 1965
Citizenship: Algeria
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US4AG-010006DP
2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall fair health.
3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention
Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 17 October 2007.
b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a member of an Algerian Armed Islamic
Group (GIA) cell involved in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo,
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BK).1
Detainee is a veteran of the Bosnian Jihad and also served as a
1
Analyst Note: The GIA is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 3
target. Priority 3 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threat other senior policymakers and IC managers
believe must receive attention from the IC that are not already identified as Priorities 1 or 2. These include
terrorist/extremist groups involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and the capability to attack US
persons and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less threat than Priority 2 groups, or terrorist/extremist

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JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
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trainer at al-Qaida affiliated militant training camps in Bosnia and Pakistan (PK). Detainee
traveled to Bosnia to train and support mujahideen through his placement as a representative
of the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF).2
JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to
be:
A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
A LOW threat from a detention perspective
Of HIGH intelligence value
c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s
assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be
annotated by ¡ next to the footnote.)
Included details of the Human Appeal International’s (HAI) non governmental
organizations (NGO) elicit activities3
Included a report listing detainee as a close associate of extremist Hani Abdullah
Added the alias Omar Abdul al-Aziz4
4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events:
The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account.
These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee graduated high school in 1985. From 1985 until he
enlisted in the Algerian Army in 1987, detainee was a social worker at a middle school.
After serving his obligatory two years in the army delivering mail, detainee returned to social
work. In late 1989, detainee went on the hajj (pilgrimage) to Saudi Arabia (SA), and then
returned to Algeria for several months before traveling to Pakistan hoping to attend an
Islamic institute in Islamabad, PK. In Islamabad, detainee met Muhammad Gililah who
worked for the al-Tamir Charitable Organization.5
Detainee traveled to Peshawar, PK, and
groups that have demonstrated intention to attack US persons and interests and are taking action to develop or
acquire WMD capability.
2
Analyst Note: The BIF, aka (Islamic al-Bir), is listed as a Special Designated Global Terrorist organization on the
US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. For additional
information see SECSTATE 270564 Batterjee.
3
Analyst Note: The HAI is an NIPF Priority 3 TSEs. Priority 3 TSE’s are defined as having demonstrated intent
and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or
provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups.
4
¢(U//LES) ARNAOUT 302 12-FEB-2003
5
Analyst Note: A variant of Tamir is Tameer.

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lived with Gililah who assisted detainee in obtaining a job with the BIF. Detainee completed
a two year Arabic and Islamic correspondence program, purchasing the required books and
conducting self study with the al-Atharyah University in 1992. Detainee remained in
Peshawar working for Abd al-Salam at the Islamic Charitable Committee (ICC), until it
ceased operations in Peshawar and detainee moved to Bosnia in 1992.6
b. (C//REL USA AND GCTF) Recruitment and Travel: In 1992, at the urging of Abd
al-Salam, detainee traveled to Bosnia where he worked for the ICC office in Tesanj, BK.
After the ICC closed its office in 1994, detainee continued to work part time teaching at local
mosques.7
c. (S) Training and Activities: Detainee obtained a job teaching the Koran and Islam to
soldiers in the Bosnian Army at the end of 1994. Detainee reported he did not actually serve
in the Army, but was still able to obtain a Certificate of Bosnian Military Service, which
reported his service in the Army from 1992 to 1995. Detainee used his certificate and his
marriage to a Bosnian woman to obtain Bosnian citizenship in 1995. That same year,
detainee began working with the Islamic World Committee (IWC), a Kuwaiti NGO.
Detainee was in charge of the Cultural Center in Tuzla, BK and provided Arabic, English,
and computer training. In 1996, detainee quit his job at the IWC, moved to Sarajevo, and
started his own business selling watches and wholesale electronic items. In 1997, detainee
worked with the HAI NGO, where he supervised orphans living in Bosnia.8
5. (U) Capture Information:
a. (S//NF) In late October 2001, the Bosnian Federal Ministry of Interior Police (FMUP)
arrested detainee and several other Algerians (collectively known as the “Algerian Six”) who
were suspected of being involved in a terrorist plot against the US Embassy in Sarajevo.
After being exonerated by a Bosnian police investigation and following the Algerian
government’s refusal to take custody, Bosnian authorities transferred the detainees to US
custody on 18 January 2002.9
6
IIR 6 034 0201 02, Analyst Note: The ICC, aka (Lajnat al-Birr al-Islami) is an NIPF Priority 5 Terrorist Support
Entity (TSE). Priority 5 TSEs are defined as all other support entities considered to be anti-US but are not included
in Priorities 1-4, or provide witting operational support to Priority 5 terrorist groups. A variant of Abd al-Salam is
Abdel Salam.
7
IIR 6 034 0201 02, IIR 6 034 0076 05
8
IIR 6 034 0201 02, IIR 6 034 0076 05, IIR 6 034 0210 02, Analyst Note: The IWC, aka (Lajnat al-Alam al-Islami)
is an NIPF Priority 3 TSEs.
9
IIR 6 933 0021 02, TD-314/08126-05, TD-314/49994-02, AMEMBASSY SARJEVO 29-DEC-2006, Analyst
Note: In TD-314/39634-01, the date of capture is given as 21 October 2001. The FMUP is also abbreviated as
MUP. In addition to detainee, those arrested included Sabir Mahfouz Lahmar, ISN US4AG-010002DP (AG-
10002); Muhammad Nechla, US4AG-010003DP (AG-10003); Mustafa Ait Idir, US4AG-010004DP (AG-10004);
Lakhdar Boumediene, US4AG-010005DP (AG-10005); and Bensayah Belkacem, US4AG-010001DP (AG-10001).

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b. (S) Property Held:
Poster with photo
Republic of Algeria passport, number 3914142
Republic of Algeria photo identification card
Miscellaneous personal items
c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 20 January 2002
d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the
following:
Conspiracy to bomb the US Embassy in Sarajevo
6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Detainee’s account is incomplete and partially
untruthful. Detainee has provided several versions of his timeline denying any involvement with
the al-Qaida affiliated Sada Training Camp and the GIA, despite reporting, photographs, and
sworn testimony to the contrary. Detainee has failed to account for numerous countries that he
visited as reflected in his passport. Detainee denied being part of any plot against the US
Embassy or intending to travel to Afghanistan for jihad. Detainee denied serving in the Bosnian
Army, but used Bosnian military service to obtain Bosnian citizenship. Detainee claimed no
knowledge of recruitment of individuals through extremist affiliated NGOs.10
7. (U) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat
to the US, its interests, and allies.
b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a member of an Algerian
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) cell is assessed to have been involved in an al-Qaida linked plot
to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee is a veteran of the jihad in Bosnia and was
an instructor at al-Qaida associated training camps in Pakistan and Bosnia. Detainee planned
to travel to Afghanistan for jihad after the 11 September 2001 attacks, but was arrested in
10
Analyst Note: Demonstrating conflicts in his claims, detainee stated in 010006 SIR 05-JAN-2006 that the
following account was his story: Detainee was unable to gain admittance to the Islamic Institute and traveled to
Peshawar in hopes of finding another institute he could attend. Detainee was referred to the Islamic al-Birr
Committee and after obtaining information about the programs at al-Atharyah University, he began classes and
worked for al-Birr from 1990 to 1992.

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Bosnia before his departure. Detainee was employed and affiliated with various NGOs
associated with terrorism.
(S//NF) Detainee is a member of a GIA cell in Bosnia and an assessed participant in
an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo.
(S//NF) In September 2001, detainee, along with AG-10003, AG-10005, and Abd
al-Qadr al-Mukhtari, aka (Abu Maali), were all included on an Algerian government
list of Algerians residing in Bosnia who were suspected of having terrorist ties to the
GIA and al-Qaida.11
¡ (S//NF) The Bosnian government included detainee among a list of foreigners
in Bosnia whose Bosnian citizenship was being investigated for irregularities.
Bosnian authorities believed these individuals were possibly connected to terrorist
organizations abroad, or to humanitarian organizations suspected of providing
logistical support to terrorism.12
(S//NF) On 8 October 2001, Bosnian FMUP, in cooperation with US forces in
Bosnia, apprehended suspected al-Qaida facilitator AG-10001, after an investigation
into threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Bosnian authorities also directed
their investigation towards seven other individuals, including detainee, who were
suspected of involvement in the threats, which also led to their subsequent
apprehension. Detainee, AG-10002, AG-10003, AG-10004, and AG-10005 were
arrested by Bosnian authorities for false attestation of information and suspected
involvement in the threats against the US Embassy Sarajevo.13
¡ (S//NF) The two other individuals arrested were identified as Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG) member Khaled al-Arbed and Atif Munassur, aka (Abu
Nasar), a suspected facilitator for the Salafist Group for Call and Combat
(GSPC).14
(S//NF) The Bosnian Federation Supreme Court stated this group attempted to
attack the facility and the employees of the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Bosnian
government documents identified the arrested individual as an organized terrorist
group, whose activities constituted an act of international terrorism. The group is
suspected of conducting surveillance of the Embassy and its personnel, and
coordinated with senior al-Qaida lieutenant GZ-10016.15
11
TD-314/42368-01, TD-314/41367-01, ACIC INTSUM 04-APR-2002, Analyst Note: In 2002, Bosnian members
of the former al-Mujahid Brigade were aware of a plan to conduct terrorist acts in Washington, DC.
12
TD-314/07726-02 (Paragraph H)
13
IIR 6 933 0021 02
14
TD-314/11070-05, IIR 6 933 0021 02, 010001 Mantis ealin26398 21-Nov-2001, Analyst Note: GSPC is an NIPF
Priority 1 terrorism target. The GSPC announced in 2006 its merger with al-Qaida and is now known as al-Qaida in
the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). LIFG is also an NIPF Priority 1 CT target.
15
TD-314/02606-02, BIH Court Doc BB-014 30-OCT-2001, DCS-G2 Special Assessment-Algerian Six 18-FEB-
2004

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(U) According to 2004 open source reporting, Bosnian prosecutors and police
formally exonerated the six Algerians of any criminal charges. No terrorism
charges were levied against them.16
(S//NF) AG-10001 possessed the phone number of a Bosnian locksmith
employed at the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Further investigation by embassy
authorities revealed the individual was AG-10002’s father-in-law. The employee
was detained and subsequently failed a polygraph test given by US authorities.17
(Analyst Note: This individual could have provided physical access to the
Embassy for the purpose of the attack.)
(S//NF) Despite claims they were not associated with each other, communication
between the members of the group known as the “Algerian Six” demonstrated a close
association between them.
(S//NF) Detainee’s mobile phone memory contained the phone numbers of
AG-10003, AG-10004, and AG-10005.18
¡ (S//NF) AG-10004 remarked that he thought detainee’s home phone was
528825 and his cell phone number was 160112.19
Detainee corroborated AG-
10004’s statements by providing the same phone numbers.20
¡ (S//REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR) AG-10004 reported he met detainee
in June or July 1996. Detainee was working for the Human Appeal Charitable
Organization. AG-10004 admitted his wife and detainee’s wife were friends.
AG-10004 also admitted he helped detainee download programs on his
computer.21
¡ (U) AG-10005 reported he lived with detainee for three to four months in
Sarajevo. AG-10005 also reported detainee and AG-10004 knew each other
for two to three years after meeting in Bosnia in 1997.22
(C//REL TO USA, SFOR) AG-10005’s phone number is also listed among AG-
10001’s phone number contacts. Additionally, another phone number on the list was
for “Abu Zubaydah,” believed to be a reference to GZ-10016.23
(S//REL TO GCTF) Mammar Ameur, ISN US9AG-000939DP (AG-939), stated
detainee and AG-10003 both worked for an NGO in Peshawar between 1992 and
1993.24
16
Washington Post Foreign Service 21 August 2006
17
IIR 7 130 1022 02 (Paragraph 1A)
18
TD-314/41367-01 (Paragraph E)
19
IIR 6 034 0050 02, Analyst Note: Detainee may have reported one number in error.
20
Analyst Note: IIR 6 034 0201 02 lists an alternate home phone number for AG-10006 from IIR 6 034 0050 02.
21
IIR 4 201 2107 06
22
IIR 6 034 0205 02, IIR 6 034 0205 02(b)
23
010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001
24
IIR 6 034 0971 04

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(S//NF) AG-10002’s mobile phone number and his landline number are listed
among AG-10001’s contacts.25
(S//NF) AG-10003 claimed AG-10004 first met AG-10003 in Croatia. While in
Croatia, AG-10004 assisted AG-10003 with the paperwork for his Bosnian
citizenship. AG-10003 stated he came to know AG-10004 quite well when he
transferred to Sarajevo in 1997.26
(S//NF) AG-10004 met AG-10003 in Zeneca while staying at the house provided
by the Qatar Charity Society. AG-10004 stated AG-10003 worked at the Red
Crescent in Bihac, BK.27
(Analyst Note: Bosnian officials identified AG-10003 as a
supporter of terrorist groups in Africa. AG-10003 is wanted by the Algerian
government on charges of terrorism.28
)
(S//NF) AG-10003’s phone records indicate he maintained consistent contact
with AG-10005.29
(S//NF) FMUP investigation found items confiscated during AG-10004’s arrest
listing AG-10003’s and AG-10005’s phone numbers.30
(S//NF) AG-10003 stated AG-10005 assisted AG-10001 and AG-10002 with
their respective charity work.31
(Analyst Note: AG-10005 claimed he first learned of
AG-10002 when he saw his name on court papers while in jail, and met him when
they were later transferred to US custody.)
(S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, AND GBR) AG-10004 claimed he was good
friends with AG-10005 and they worked together one or two days per week.32
AG-
10004 further reported AG-10005 and AG-10003 were friends.33
(S//NF) AG-10005 stated he knew AG-10004 since they met in Bosnia two or
three years before their arrest, and detainee worked for the Taibah NGO in the
Vogoca area of Bosnia where detainee lived.34
(Analyst Note: An Algerian
government source assessed AG-10005 to be associated with the GIA and
possibly to al-Qaida.35
)
(S) AG-10003 reported in December 1999 that he, detainee, AG-10004, AG-
10003, and AG-10005 were among about 15 Algerians who met with an official from
25
010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001
26
IIR 6 034 0208 02, 010003 FM40 24-MAR-2002
27
010004 302 23-FEB-2002, TD-314/43043-07
28
010003 Visa Viper 17-DEC-2001
29
TD-314/41670-01
30
TD-314/39904-01(Paragraph 2 FFFF) and (Paragraph 3C), Analyst Note: AG-10005’s phone number is 090-157-
269 and is identified in TD-314/41367-01 (Paragraph 4A). AG-10003’s phone number is 090-165-595 and is
identified in TD-314/41367-01 (Paragraph 4B).
31
IIR 6 034 0205 02, IIR 4 201 2433 06
32
IIR 6 034 0727 02
33
IIR 4 201 2107 06
34
IIR 6 034 0205 02(b), Analyst Note: Taibah is an NIPF Priority 3 TSE.
35
TD-314/42368-01

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the Algerian Embassy in Vienna, who had traveled to Sarajevo to discuss the needs of
Algerian citizens in Bosnia. AG-10003 stated the purpose of the meeting was to find
out if any Algerians in Bosnia needed help. The Algerian Embassy official read a list
of names of possible extremists and asked that if any of the attendees had met anyone
on the list that they should contact him. None of the attendees responded to the
questions about the names on the list.36
(Analyst Note: AG-10006 also reported on
this meeting, but denied having any discussion about extremists. Detainee stated he
attended the meeting in order to get a passport for himself and his seven children.37
)
(S//NF) Detainee has an extensive militant history in Bosnia and was an instructor at
al-Qaida associated training camps in Pakistan and Bosnia.
(S//NF) The Bosnian State Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA) identified
detainee as a commander in the al-Mujahid unit in Zenica, BK during the war in
Bosnia (1992-1995).38
In Bosnian media, detainee’s wife also stated detainee served
in the Army and was injured by a rifle-fired grenade in a clash near Zepce, BK. She
added any claims to the contrary were “stupid.”39
Detainee insisted he was not a part
of the Bosnian Army.40
(Analyst Note: Based on detainee’s activities in al-Mujahid,
he is probably associated with Abu Maali.)
¡ (S//NF) Abu Maali was the head of the al-Mujahid Brigade. In the early
1990s, the Muslim Bosniac government invited foreign mujahideen to come to
Bosnia to fight on its behalf. Most of these men fought in the “al-Mujahid”
Brigade, aka (the 7th Muslumski Brigade), in central Bosnia near Zenica and
Travnik.41
The al-Mujahid Brigade later transformed into the Bedr Bosna
Corporation owned and managed by Abu Maali. Al-Qaida is reported to have
provided financial support to the Bedr Bosna Corporation, which served as a
cover for terrorist activities such as providing financial support for its members,
hiding the transfers of funds, and providing facilities to support operations.42
(S//NF) Detainee served as a trainer at the al-Qaida affiliated Sada Training
Camp in 1992, and also operated a BIF schoolhouse, which provided accommodation
and training to mujahideen fighters.43
36
IIR 6 034 0134 02
37
IIR 6 034 0883 03
38
TD-314/43043-07 (Paragraph U)
39
http://www.ex-yupress.com/dani/dani75.html
40
IIR 4 201 2134 06
41
Analyst Note: Many of these fighters later traveled to Afghanistan for jihad, as detainee and the rest of the
“Algerian Six” attempted to do, and as Ahmad Zayid Salim al-Zuhayri, aka (Handala), US9SA-000669DP (SA-
669), who was also a member of the “al-Mujahid” Brigade, succeeded in doing. SA-669 was also convicted of
involvement in a 1997 car bombing in Mostar.
42
ACIC INTSUM 04-APR-2002
43
Arnaout 892 (Page 33), Analyst Note: Variants of Sada include Sadda and Saada.

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(U) Detainee was selected by BIF to provide militant training to mujahideen
in Bosnia. BIF director and Usama Bin Laden (UBL) confidant, Enaam Arnaout,
directed BIF employee Khudeira to travel to Pakistan in 1992. In Pakistan,
Khudeira was to select nine individuals from the Sada Training Camp to provide
training to the mujahideen in Bosnia.44
Detainee was one of the nine trainers
selected.45
(Analyst Note: Detainee’s activities in 1992 and his move to Bosnia
are assessed to be in support of militant training and fighting, not education and
humanitarian work as he claimed. Arnaout was convicted of conspiracy in 2003
in Chicago and sentenced to 20 years after pleading guilty to criminal
racketeering conspiracy for diverting BIF funds to supply armed extremists in
Bosnia and Chechnya.)
¡ (U) The Sada Training Camp was identified in the founding minutes of
al-Qaida as an open camp from which the best [fighters] would be selected to
join al-Qaida.46
(S//NF) OSA identified detainee as an instructor at camps located in Tesanj,
Zeljezno Polje (located near Zepce, BK), and Bistricak (near Zenica, BK).47
(S//NF) Detainee was identified as the director of the BIF office in Zenica.
Detainee has acknowledged only being a low-level employee and named Abu
Mahmud al-Suri as the director of the Zenica office.48
(Analyst Note: Abu
Mahmud al-Suri is Enaam Arnaout’s alias.)
(U) Arnaout claimed detainee was primarily in charge of the BIF schoolhouse
in Tesanj where detainee trained Bosnian fighters. Arnaout further reported the
BIF offices and facilities were used to facilitate the movement of dozens of
fighters into Bosnia from Croatia. The fighters were brought through Croatia to
the BIF schoolhouse in Tesanj.49
¡ (S//REL TO SA) Arnaout worked with members of al-Qaida to purchase
and distribute rockets, mortars, rifles, and bombs to various mujahideen
camps, including camps operated by al-Qaida. Correspondence seized in the
44
The Sada Training was located on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan near Peshawar, 000039 302
1AUG02;000039 MFR 20-JUL-2002
45
EUP20030711000360, Arnaout 892 (pages 33 and 34), usarnaout10603prof, SECSTATE 270564 BATTERJEE,
Analyst Note: Enam Arnaout maintained electronic files that included scanned images of the minutes of al-Qaida’s
founding meetings in August 1988. See IIR 1 663 4809 06, EUCOM AZ-GE NGO Overview, and TD-314/35035-
01 for more information regarding the BIF and its links to terrorist organizations. In 1993, Batterjee resigned as the
head of the BIF and was replaced by Enaam Arnaout, aka (Abu Mahmoud al-Hamnawi), who had a reputation for
securing money for the jihad in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
46
Arnaout 892 (page 33), usarnaout10603prof (page 35 and 36)
47
TD-314/43043-07, Paragraph U; Analyst Note: This document also reports detainee was appointed to head the
Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE) in 2005. The statement associating detainee with the FIOE is
a probable misidentification, though the other information in the document is accurate.
48
Arnaout 892 (Page 34), usarnaout10603prof (Page 72 and 73), 010006 SIR 23-DEC-2005
49
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search of BIF's Sarajevo office included letters from Arnaout to Shaykh
Batterjee (Adel Batterjee) asking for ammunition, transportation, and cash to
support the terrorist activities of Hezb-e-Islami.50
(S//NF) OSA identified detainee as financing mujahideen training camps
while working at the BIF office in Zenica.51
(U) According to a Bosnian government service, BIF engaged in the illegal
smuggling of individuals from African and Asian countries to Western countries.
Arnaout sent official invitations to individuals to visit Bosnia from 1997 to 1999.
When the individuals arrived, they were transported to Western countries.52
(Analyst
Note: Due to detainee’s position within BIF, he was most likely aware of this
operation.)
(S//NF) Detainee is listed as a close associate of extremist Hani Abdullah, aka
(Djafer), aka (Mirshad Hodzic), who was wanted by Italian and Egyptian
authorities.53
(S//NF) Abdullah is reported as being a part of an armed extremist cell in
Bosnia which met on a weekly basis and maintained close contact with Abu
Maali.54
It was alleged that Abdullah participated in the kidnapping of two
Bosnian priests in Travnik in 1993, and as a member of al-Gamaat al-Islamiyyah
(IG), which committed numerous murders in villages near Travnik.55
¡ (S//NF) Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan for jihad, but was arrested in
Bosnia before his departure.
(S//NF) Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan along with the other “Algerian
Six” detainees at the urging of AG-10001. The group planned to travel as soon as
AG-10001 arrived in Afghanistan to make arrangements.56
(S//NF) AG-10001 encouraged his Algerian associates to participate in jihad.
AG-10001 applied for an Iranian visa on 1 October 2001 in Sarajevo. AG-10001
intended to travel to Afghanistan through Iran and then assist the other Algerians
who were planning to join extremist elements in Afghanistan in anticipation of the
50
STATE 189074, Analyst Note: Hezb-e-Islami is likely identifiable with Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). The
HIG is a NIPF Priority 2 CT target. Priority 2 are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are
expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already
identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor
terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and
capability to attack US persons or interests.
51
TD-314/43043-07
52
TD-314/49082-01
53
¢TD-314/34036-02
54
¢TD-314/30485-03
55
¢TD-314/34036-02, Analyst Note: The IG is listed as an NIPF Priority 3 CT target. Priority 3 targets are defined
as issues, opportunities, or threats other senior policymakers and IC managers believe must receive attention from
the IC that are not already identified as Priorities 1 or 2.
56
TD-314/35452-01,

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330505
JTF-GTMO-CDR
11
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330505
for
US campaign following the 11 September 2001 attacks. AG-10001 received
financial support for this travel from Shaykh Nasar al-Said, the director of the
Saudi High Commission for Relief (SHCR).57
(S//NF) AG-10001 was identified as the primary al-Qaida facilitator in
Bosnia. AG-10001 had ties to Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Hussayn, aka (Abu
Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016). AG-10001 possessed numerous
phone numbers linking him to UBL’s operational network in Afghanistan and the
global Sunni extremist network.58
(S//NF) Although AG-10001 has denied ever traveling to Pakistan, GZ-10016
reported he met AG-10001 in 1993 or 1994 in Pakistan.59
AG-10001 visited GZ-
10016’s guest house in Pakistan and returned to Afghanistan again in 1997 after
traveling to Bosnia for jihad.60
(Analyst Note: AG-10001’s extended periods in
Afghanistan provide him with the experience and connections necessary to make the
noted arrangements for the other “Algerian Six” members.)
¡ (S//NF) Detainee was employed and affiliated with various NGOs associated with
terrorism.
(S//NF) Detainee admitted serving as the director of the HAI and working for the
IWC while in Bosnia.61
(S//NF) The American Embassy in Sarajevo reported the HAI’s activities
included providing financial and other support for mujahedeen, and is suspected
of supporting terrorists, to include al-Qaida operatives and financiers.
Specifically in Bosnia, the HAI is suspected of having engaged in mujahideen
support, probable cover activity, smuggling, and has suspected links to the al-
Mujahid Brigade.62
(S//NF) The Bosnian-based Pomoc NGO provided detainee’s wife and the wives
of other “Algerian Six” members a monthly stipend throughout 2004. (Analyst Note:
Pomoc also provided a stipend to the wife of convicted terrorist Said Atmani, who
was associated with convicted Millennium plot conspirator Ahmed Ressam.63
The
57
TD-314/35452-01, IIR 6 933 0021 02, TD-314/14059-02, Analyst Note: SHCR is an NIPF Priority 4 TSE.
Priority 4 TSEs are defined as organizations with available resources and are in a position to provide financial
support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to
Priority 4 terrorist groups.
58
TD-314/14059-02, IIR 6 933 0021 02, DCS-G2 Special Assessment- Algerian Six 18-FEB-2004, IIR 7 130 1022
02 (Paragraph 1)
59
010001 302 19-NOV-2002
60
TD-314/57979-05
61
IIR 6 034 0201 02, 010006 SIR 05-JAN-2006
62
¢AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 19-MAY-2003
63
TD-314/50199-05

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330505
JTF-GTMO-CDR
12
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330505
for
Pomoc NGO is suspected of having ties to the Active Islamic Youth Organization
(AIO).64
)
c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a LOW threat from a detention
perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and rarely hostile to the guard force
and staff. He currently has three Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the
most recent occurring on 6 July 2007, when he damaged government property. He has one
Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault occurring on 20 August 2003, when he threw
water on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include failure to
follow guard instructions/camp rules, assaults, and damage to government property. In 2007,
he had a total of two Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and none so far in 2008.
8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainee’s
most recent interrogation session occurred on 12 March 2008.
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was involved with extremist activities since
the founding of al-Qaida in the early 1990s. He was a trainer at the al-Qaida affiliated Sada
Training Camp, and was brought to Bosnia to train other mujahideen. He is assessed to be a
GIA member affiliated with several terrorist support NGOs and extremist organizations, and
was implicated in the conspiracy to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo.
c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee claimed NGO associations in Pakistan
during the early 1990s and was engaged in militant training up to 1992 at the Sada camp. He
continues to discuss NGO associations after moving to Bosnia while he’s been identified
again with training and with extremist combat elements. Detainee was employed by BIF and
Enaam Arnaout. Detainee probably has extensive knowledge of NGO support to terrorism,
including NGO cover stories, NGO front company activities, financing, and other support.
Detainee will probably be able to discuss extremist training in Afghanistan and will have
specific information on al-Qaida’s historical support to the training programs, as well as
those members who provided and received training. Detainee likely has information on the
other members of the “Algerian Six” and the suspected terrorist plot against the US Embassy
in Sarajevo. Detainee will have information on GIA operations in Bosnia.
d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:
Plot against US Embassy in Sarajevo
64
IIR 7 114 0256 04, Analyst Note: AIO is an NIPF Priority 1 TSE. Priority 1 TSE’s are defined as provide witting
operational support to Priority 1 terrorist groups.

SE C R E T // NOFORNI I 20330505
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT:Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnderDoDControl(CD)for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISNUS4AG-010006DP(S)
o GIA operationsandpersonnelin Bosnia,includingthe "Algerian Six" members
o Tiesto terrorism
o Linksto GZ-10016
o Historicalandbiographicaldataof the "Algerian Six"
. Al-Qaida in Afghanistan,Pakistan,andthe Balkans
o SadaTraining Camp
o Links to NGOs
o Al-Qaida supportto Bosniaextremistelements
o Al-Qaidalinks to BIF
o Al-Qaidaexpansioninto Europeincludingpersonnel,facilities,goals,andfunding
o NGOs andlinks to extremismincludingpersonnel,facilities,financing,andlinks
o BIF andLBI
I EnaamArnaout
. Adel Batterjee
o HumanAppeal Intemational
o HumanitarianRelief
o Al-TamirCharitableOrganization
o Terroristsand foreign fighters recruitment,training, andmotivation
o Terroristbiographicalandpsychologicalinformation
9, (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon 18October2004,and
he remainsan enemycombatant.
I
vttL
)//h,//-4WMARK H. BUZBY A
RearAdmiral, US Navy
Commanding
.
Definitions for intelligence termsusedin the assessmentcanbe found in the Joint Military Intelligence College
October2001 guideIntelligence Warning Terminology.
1 3
SE C R E T //NOFORN I I 20330505

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