Us4ag 010003dp

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330405
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JTF-GTMO-CDR 5 April 2008
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010003DP (S)
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment
1. (S) Personal Information:
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Muhammed Nechla
Current/True Name and Aliases: Muhammad Nechle,
Mohammed Sharaf al-Din, Mohamed Najjali, Sharfuldin, Abu
Anas
Place of Birth: Laghouat, Algeria (AG)
Date of Birth: 2 April 1968
Citizenship: Algeria
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US4AG-010003DP
2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.
3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention
Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued
Detention Under DoD Control on 26 September 2007.
b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a member of an Algerian Armed Islamic
Group (GIA) cell involved in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo,
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BK)1
Detainee has an extensive history as an extremist active in
1
Analyst Note: The GIA is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 3
target. Priority 3 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threat other senior policymakers and IC managers
believe must receive attention from the IC that are not already identified as Priorities 1 or 2. These include
terrorist/extremist groups involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and the capability to attack
U.S. persons and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less threat than Priority 2 groups, or terrorist/extremist

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jihad and suspected terrorist activities in Bosnia, Algeria, and Afghanistan. Detainee
admitted his association with several Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
including a NGO in the Philippines that reportedly indoctrinated students in extremism and
radical activities under the pretext of defending Islam. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee
to be:
A MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
A LOW threat from a detention perspective
Of MEDIUM intelligence value
c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s
assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be
annotated by ¡ next to the footnote.)
Due to a lack of additional reporting concerning detainee’s involvement with the US
Embassy plot and his high level of cooperation throughout detention, detainee’s risk level
has been reduced from HIGH to MEDIUM but the recommendation remains CD
Added report stating detainee fought in the Afghan War and was part of the
mujahideen network
Included information in detainee’s SCI supplement
Included details to detainee’s prior history
4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events:
The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account.
These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: After failing twice to get a bachelor’s degree, detainee worked
with his father in the family fruit business in Laghouat, AG from 1988 to 1990. In 1988,
detainee decided to leave Algeria because the economy was struggling and he needed to
continue to support his family financially. While working for his father he read
advertisements for charitable and relief organizations in Pakistan (PK). The advertisements
did not give any telephone numbers or contact addresses in Pakistan. During this time
period, he began to save his money from the fruit and vegetable stand to use for his travel
expenses. Detainee would give most of the money to his father for safekeeping and take
some with him in a metal box for business transactions. Detainee did not put any money in a
groups that have demonstrated intention to attack U.S. persons and interests and are taking action to develop or
acquire WMD capability.
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bank during this period of time as detainee’s father was responsible for making purchases
and paying any bills at home. Detainee left Algeria in 1990.2
(S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:b. Detainee departed Algeria for Pakistan (PK) in
November 1990, due to political and economic problems after the Algerian Islamic Front’s
(FIS) attempt to overthrow the government.3
In Peshawar, PK, detainee worked at the
Peshawar office of the Saudi-based al-Tameer Charitable Organization and earned a
certification as an Arabic language instructor from the Yemeni Institute in 1992. Due to
pressure from the Pakistani government on NGO operations, he lost his job. Detainee
remained in Pakistan for a few months looking for work. After learning about NGO jobs for
Arab instructors in the Philippines (RP), detainee traveled to Manila, RP, at the beginning of
1993. While at a mosque in Manila, detainee met Abd al-Salam al-Iraqi, and through him
was hired to teach Arabic language at the Emissa School in Marawi, Mindanao, RP. He
lived and taught at the school for nine months. Allegedly dissatisfied with his pay, detainee
contacted his friend Abdoun Tayib, director of the Islamic Relief Foundation in Albania
(AL), and asked him for a job.4
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: In late 1994, detainee traveled to Tirana, AL, to meet
with Tayib, and was hired by the Abu Dhabi-based organization Bin Hamoodah. In August
1995, detainee went to Bosnia for two months to look for a wife. Detainee later returned to
Albania and married an Algerian woman. Detainee was first introduced to his wife by the
wife of his good friend, Lakhdar Boumediene, ISN US4AG-010005DP (AG-10005), who
also worked with him in Albania.5
In 1997, after the civil war started in Albania, detainee
asked the Red Crescent for a transfer to Bosnia. He moved to Sarajevo with his family in
1998 and was placed in charge of a Red Crescent orphanage in Bihac, BK. Between 1998
and 2001, detainee made several trips to Hungary and Turkey to purchase goods for the
organization.6 7
Detainee worked in Bosnia until his arrest in 2001.
5. (U) Capture Information:
2
302 010003 30 Apr 2002, IIR 6 034 0207 02
3
Analyst Note: FIS was an opposition party banned by the Algerian government in 1991, prompting the Algerian
Civil War from 1991-2002. FIS supporters factionalized, spawning several armed splinter groups including the GIA
and GSPC, and fought a bloody ten-year insurgency. In 1999, the Algerian government issued a blanket amnesty to
former FIS members and began a national reconciliation campaign that ultimately contributed to the defeat of the
violent insurgency in 2002.
4
IIR 6 034 0207 02; Analyst Note: A variant of Abdun Tayib is Abdoun Tayib.
5
IIR 6 034 0207 02
6
IIR 6 034 0795 02
7
IIR 6 034 0207 02, IIR 6 034 0795 02
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a. (S//NF) In late October 2001, the Bosnian Federal Ministry of Interior Police (FMUP)
arrested detainee and several others, all suspected of being involved in a terrorist plot against
the US Embassy in Sarajevo.8
After exhausting the legal limits for detention and following
the Algerian government’s refusal to take custody, Bosnian authorities turned detainee and
the other Algerian captives over to US custody on 18 January 2002.9
b. (S) Property Held:
Two posters, one marked “G2-Nechle, Mohamed,” the other marked “El Belkachem,
Bensayah”
Miscellaneous personal items, including clothing, tissue packets, an analog
wristwatch, eyeglasses, and prayer beads
(S//NF) Though not held by JTF-GTMO, the following items were reportedly in
detainee’s possession at the time of capture. (Analyst Note: The following property was
reported by the Bosnian FMUP)10
A mobile phone
Three phone bills
Two Algerian passports
Two Bosnian passports
Business Card for Benmedakhen Qineddine
A diploma from the Republic of Yemen Ministry of Education for ”General
Secondary Graduation for Scientific Institutes”
An ID card issued by the Algerian Embassy in Islamabad, PK
A piece of stationary from “Red Crescent Society for United Arab Emirates”
with the following information: Lakhdar Boumediene; 27 April 1966,
Aynusultan; Number 0801081; 18 September 1998 to 18 September 2003
A phone book and slips of paper with various phone numbers
c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 20 January 2002
d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the
following:
Red Crescent Operations in Bosnia and Albania
6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Detainee demonstrates genuine concern and
compassion for his fellow Bosnian detainees. Detainee is cooperative and has provided
8
IIR 7 130 1022 02, TD-314/39634-01
9
IIR 6 034 0207 02, AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 29-DEC-2006, 010003 PROFILE 23-AUG-2002
10
TD-314/41818-01, TD-314/41670-01
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extensive information regarding the NGOs he has worked for. He has provided the names and
position titles of individuals who held high level positions within multiple NGOs. Detainee
continues to assert that he was never involved in a terrorist organization or any plots against the
US. He denies membership with the GIA or any affiliations with Bosnian mujahideen, which
reporting indicates to the contrary. Detainee continues to maintain that he never met Bensayah
Belkacem, ISN US4AG-010001DP (AG-10001), or Saber Mahfouz Lahmar, ISN US4AG-
010002DP, (AG-10002), until he was incarcerated. He claims to only be peripherally familiar
with them due to charity contributions that AG-10005 provided to them. Despite his cooperation
detainee is likely withholding information that insinuates his personal ties with extremists.
7. (U) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to
the US, its interests, and allies.
b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a member of an Algerian
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) cell involved in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US
Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee has an extensive history as an extremist active in jihad and
suspected terrorist activities in Bosnia, Algeria, and Afghanistan. Detainee was associated
with several Islamic NGOs in Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.
(S//NF) Detainee is a member of a GIA cell in Bosnia and an assessed participant in
an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo.
(S/NF) On 8 October 2001, FMUP, in cooperation with US forces in Bosnia,
apprehended suspected al-Qaida facilitator AG-10001, after an investigation into
threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Bosnian authorities also directed the
investigation toward seven other individuals, including detainee, who were suspected
of involvement in the threats, which also led to their subsequent apprehension.11
¡ (S//NF) Over the next two weeks, detainee, along with AG-10002, Mustapha
Ait Idir, ISN US4AG-010004DP (AG-10004), AG-10005, and Al-Haj Omar
Boudellaa, ISN US4AG-010006DP (AG-10006), were arrested for false
attestation of information and suspected involvement in the threats against the US
Embassy in Sarajevo.12
This group became known as the “Algerian Six.”
¡ (S//NF) The two other individuals arrested were identified as Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG) member Khaled al-Arbed and Atif Munassur, aka (Abu
11
IIR 6 933 0021 02
12
IIR 6 933 0021 02
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Nasar), a suspected facilitator for the Salafist Group for Call and Combat
(GSPC).13
(S//NF) The Bosnian Federation Supreme Court stated this group attempted to
attack the facility and the employees of the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Documents
identified the arrested as an organized terrorist group, whose activities constituted an
act of international terrorism. The group is suspected of conducting surveillance of
the embassy and its personnel, and coordinating with senior al-Qaida lieutenant Zayn
al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-
10016).14
However, in 2004, Bosnian prosecutors and police formally exonerated the
six Algerians after a lengthy criminal investigation.15
(S//NF) AG-10001 possessed the phone number of a Bosnian locksmith
employed at the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Further investigation by embassy
authorities revealed that the individual was AG-10002’s father-in-law. The
employee was detained and subsequently failed a polygraph test given by US
authorities.16
(Analyst Note: AG-10002’s father-in-law could have provided
physical access to the embassy for the purpose of the attack.)
(S//NF) Analyst Note: Despite claims that they were not associated with each
other, communications between the members of the group known as the “Algerian
Six” demonstrated a close association between them:
(S//NF) Detainee first met AG-10004 in Croatia. While in Croatia, AG-
10004 assisted detainee with the paperwork for his Bosnian citizenship. Detainee
stated he came to know AG-10004 quite well when he transferred to Sarajevo in
1997.17
(Analyst Note: US Intelligence reporting indicated AG-10004 threatened
to attack NATO’s Peace Stabilization Force (SFOR) troops with “white
weapons,” such as knives. He reportedly also urged Bosnian mujahideen to
kidnap SFOR soldiers and “finish them off peacefully.”18
)
(S//NF) Detainee described AG-10005 as his closest friend in Albania and
Bosnia. Detainee stated AG-10005 used to assist AG-10001 and AG-10002 with
various charity activities. AG-10005’s wife introduced detainee to his wife while
13
TD-314/11070-05, IIR 6 933 0021 02, Analyst Note: GSPC is an NIPF CT Priority 1 terrorism target, defined as
issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice
President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor
terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to
U.S. persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ WMD. LIFG is also listed as a NIPF CT Priority
1 terrorism target.
14
TD-314/02606-02, BIH Court Doc BB-014 30-OCT-2001, DCS-G2 Special Assessment- Algerian Six 18-FEB-
2004
15
Washington Post Foreign Service 21-AUG-2006
16
IIR 7 130 1022 02
17
IIR 6 034 0208 02, 010003 FM40 24-MAR-2002
18
Global Harvest Ait Idir 31-Oct-2001
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19
they resided in Albania. Detainee’s phone records indicate he maintained
consistent contact with AG-10005.20
(Analyst Note: An Algerian government
source assessed AG-10005 to be associated with the GIA and possibly to al-
Qaida.21
)
(S) AG-10001 identified detainee as the local director of an orphanage based
in Bosnia for orphans whose parents were killed during fighting in Bosnia.
During the summer of 2001, AG-10001’s family traveled with detainee’s family
on vacation to Split, Croatia.22
(S//NF) Detainee claimed to know AG-10006, whom he had met in Algeria
and was later reintroduced to in Bosnia. AG-10006’s mobile phone memory
contained the phone numbers of detainee, AG-10004, and AG-10005.23
(Analyst
Note: 24
AG-10006 was an al-Qaida instructor and an assessed GIA member. )
(S//NF) Other reporting confirms that the rest of the “Algerian Six”
maintained contacts with each other in Bosnia.
¡ (S//NF) AG-10002’s mobile phone number and his landline number are
listed among AG-10001’s contacts.25
AG-10001 stated that AG-10002,
whom he met in January 2001, was his only acquaintance while in Bosnia.26
¡ (C//REL TO USA, SFOR) AG-10005’s phone number is also listed
among AG-10001’s phone number contacts. Additionally, another phone
number on the list was for “Abu Zubayda,” believed to be a reference to GZ-
10016.27
(S//NF) FMUP investigation found that items confiscated during AG-10004’s
arrest listed AG-10005’s phone number.28
¢ (S//NF) Detainee has an extensive history as an extremist active in jihad and
suspected terrorist activities in Bosnia, Algeria, and Afghanistan.
(S//NF) In September 2001 detainee, Abd al-Qadr al-Mukhtari, aka (Abu Maali),
AG-10005, and AG-10006 were included on an Algerian government list of
Algerians residing in Bosnia who were suspected of having terrorist ties to the GIA
and al-Qaida.29
19
IIR 6 034 0208 02, IIR 6 034 0372 02(b)
20
TD-314/41670-01
21
IIR 4 201 2433 06, TD-314/42368-01
22
010001 FBI INTERVIEW 14-NOV-2001
23
TD-314/41367-01
24
TD-314/41818-01, 010006 SIR 01-DEC-2005, IIR 6 034 0205 02, TD-314/42368-01, TD-314/43043-07
25
010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001, IIR 6 933 0021 02
26
IIR 6 034 0196 02, IIR 6 034 0896 02
27
010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001
28
TD-314/39904-01
29
TD-314/42368-01
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(S//NF) Abd al-Qadr al-Mukhtari was a commander of the “al-Mujahid”
Brigade during the war in Bosnia (1992 to 1995). In the early 1990s, the Muslim
Bosniac government invited foreign mujahedeen to come to Bosnia to fight on its
behalf. The al-Mujahid Brigade later transformed into the Bedr Bosna
Corporation owned and managed by al-Mukhtari. Al-Qaida is reported to have
provided financial support to the Bedr Bosna Corporation, which serves as a
cover for terrorist activities, such as providing financial support for its members,
hiding funds transfers, and providing facilities to support operations.30
(S//NF) Detainee was identified by the Bosnian government as a supporter of
terrorist groups in Africa and wanted by the Algerian government on charges of
terrorism dating back to 2001.31
(S//NF) According to the Bosnian government, detainee was a member of the
“al-Mujahid” Brigade during the Bosnian war.32
(See SCI addendum for additional
information)
(S//NF) Detainee was reported to have fought in the Afghan war and being a
member of the foreign born Afghan mujahideen network.33
(Analyst Note: This is
the only reporting found tying detainee’s involvement in the Afghan War.)
¡ (S//NF) Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan for jihad, but was arrested in
Bosnia before his departure.
(S//NF) Detainee reportedly planned to travel to Afghanistan along with the other
Algerians, at the urging of AG-10001. Detainee and the others planned to travel as
soon as AG-10001 arrived in Afghanistan to make receiving arrangements. Detainee
was arrested before his planned trip.34
(S//NF) AG-10001 encouraged his Algerian associates to participate in jihad.
AG-10001 applied for an Iranian visa in Sarajevo for onward travel to
Afghanistan on 1 October 2001. He planned to provide travel assistance to help
the other Algerians join militants positioned in Afghanistan in anticipation of the
US campaign following the 11 September 2001 attacks. AG-10001 received
financial support from Shaykh Nasar al-Said, the director of the Saudi High
Commision for Relief (SHCR), for his travel to Afghanistan.35
¢ (S//NF) A US intelligence assessment identified AG-10001 as the primary
al-Qaida facilitator in Bosnia, with ties to GZ-10016. AG-10001 possessed
30
TD-314/16990-05, ACIC INTSUM 04-APR-2002
31
010003 Visa Viper 17-DEC-2001
32
TD-314/43043-07
33
£CIR 316/00277-02
34
TD-314/35452-01
35
TD-314/35452-01, IIR 6 933 0021 02, TD-314/14059-02
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numerous phone numbers linking him to UBL’s operational network in
Afghanistan and the global Sunni extremist network.36
(S//NF) Detainee was associated with several Islamic NGOs that are known to have
supported terrorist activities.
(S//NF) Detainee admitted teaching for the Saudi Relief Organization (SRO)
under the recommendation of the director, Abd al-Salam al-Iraqi.37
(Analyst Note:
Abd al-Salam al-Iraqi is likely identifiable with Abd al-Salam Zubayr.)
¡ (S//NF) The SRO is believed to serve as one of many terrorist related NGOs
based in the Philippines. This NGO is believed to have indoctrinated students on
extremism and radical activities under the pretext of defending Islam. The school
in Marawi, RP instructed students of 16 years and older, and was sponsored by
the SRO, which was run by Abd al-Salam al-Iraqi. Abd al-Salam served as
director for the organization and visited the school about once per year.38
¡ (S//NF) Abd al-Salam al-Iraqi is an Iraqi national and business partner of
Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, an al-Qaida financier and Usama Bin Laden’s (UBL)
brother-in-law, who was director of the IIRO in the south Philippines and head of
the Benevolence International Corporation.39
Abd al-Salam al-Iraqi and
Muhammad Jamal Khalifa established and oversaw the operation of a number of
entities in the Philippines, including offices of the Benevolence International
Foundation (BIF), the International Research and Information Center (IRIC), and
several manpower recruiting agencies.40
¡ (S//NF) Khalifa was implicated for providing funding for Abdallah
Kashikeh’s Jordanian terrorist plot. Kashikeh arrived in the Philippines in 1993,
roughly around the same time detainee was present. 41
(S//NF) Detainee worked for the Red Crescent Relief Agency in Bosnia and
Albania. In this capacity, detainee communicated and interacted with associates and
relief organizations with ties to extremist activities.42
36
TD-314/14059-02, IIR 7 130 1022 02, IIR 6 933 0021 02, DCS-G2 Special Assessment- Algerian Six 18-FEB-
2004
37
010003 SIR 20-NOV-2006
38
TD-314/02275-04, TD-314/51981-02, IIR 6 034 0107 07, IIR 4 201 2433 06, 010003 FM40 24-MAR-2002, IIR 6
034 0107 07, Analyst Note: A variant of Marawi includes Marawa.
39
TD-314/02275-04, TD-314/51981-02, IIR 6 044 0077 06, Analyst Note: Muhammad Jamal Khalifa was shot
dead by unidentified gunmen in Madagascar on 31 January 2007.
40
TD-314/02275-04, TD-314/51981-02; Analyst Note: The US froze the accounts of BIF in 2003 due to its ties to
financing for mujahideen groups in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir, and Chechnya. For additional information see
Executive Order 13224 5-31-2005. IRIC is involved in Islamic missionary work, and encourages radical Islamic
teaching. It had previously been financed by UBL, and some of its members have been involved in terrorist
activities. For additional information see TD-314/02275-04.
41
¢TD-314/02275-04
42
010003 FM40 24-OCT-2002, IIR 6 034 0076 02, IIR 6 034 0077 02, 010003 SIR 06-SEP-2006
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(S//NF) Detainee worked for an Abu Dhabi-based organization called Bin
Hamoodah, which merged with Red Crescent in 1996.43
(S//NF) Detainee worked for the al-Tameer Charitable organization in Pakistan
between 1990 and 1992.44
(S//NF) Both detainee and AG-10006 claimed to have been associated with
the al-Tameer Charitable organization in Pakistan. However, neither detainee nor
AG-10006 acknowledges associating with each other during this period. AG-
10006 stated that he traveled to Pakistan in October 1992 and worked for BIF,
and lived with Muhammad Gililah, who ran the al-Tameer.45
(S//NF) Detainee is also associated with other individuals who worked in various
Islamic NGOs.
(S//NF) Detainee’s close associate, Abdoun Tayib, was the Albanian Director
for the Islamic Relief Organization (IRO). Abdoun Tayib recommended detainee
for a position in Albania.46
(S//NF) Detainee admitted one of his frequent contacts while in Bihac was
Kemal Muslih, the director of the Islamic World Committee. Muslih is reported
to be a former member of the mujahideen during the Bosnian war.47
(S//NF) Detainee stated that AG-10006 worked for Human Appeal
International in Bosnia.48
(S//NF) Detainee has traveled through Egypt, Philippines, Croatia, Albania,
Hungary, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Russia in association with his NGO work, and has
provided limited information regarding these travels.49
c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a LOW threat from a detention
perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and
staff. He currently has 1 Report of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most
43
IIR 6 034 0207 02, IIR 4 201 2433 06
44
IIR 6 034 0207 02, 010006 SIR 21-MAR-2002
45
IIR 6 034 0084 06
46
IIR 4 201 2433 06; Analyst Note: The IRO is assessed to be the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO),
aka Hayat al-Igatha al-Islamiyya al-Alamiyah. The IIRO is an NIPF CT Priority 2 terrorism target. Priority 2 targets
are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the
Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist
groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state
organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or
interests.
47
TD-314/50145-05, TD-314/41818-01, TD-314/42005-01; Analyst Note: A variant of Muslih includes Mosleh.
The Islamic World Committee may be identifiable with the Islamic World Commission, aka (Lajnat al-Alam al-
Islami). The Islamic World Committee is a NIPF CT priority 3 target.
48
IIR 6 034 0343 02, TD-314/42005-01; Analyst Note: Human Appeal International is an NIPF CT Priority 3
terrorism target.
49
TD-314/41818-01
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8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee’s
most recent interrogation session occurred on 13 February 2008.
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Since 1990, detainee has worked for several NGOs and
visited numerous countries in this capacity. As a result, detainee associated with individuals
who held high level positions in various NGOs with ties to extremist activities. He spent
time in the Philippines, Pakistan, and the Balkans while employed with two NGOs known for
their connections with extremist groups. He has reported connections with the other five
Algerians with whom he was arrested, who were suspected of planning a terrorist attack
against the US Embassy in Sarajevo.
c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Given detainee’s extensive involvement and
associations to multiple NGOs, although dated, he possesses first-hand information about the
organizations and their members. Detainee’s activities in the early 1990s need to be further
exploited. Detainee has traveled in Egypt, the Philippines, Croatia, Albania, Hungary,
Pakistan, Tunisia, and Russia. Detainee has yet to discuss much of this travel in detail.
Detainee can possibly provide historical information on the former al-Mujahid Brigade and
its members, leadership, and training camps in Bosnia. Detainee’s travel and his links to
extremist individuals and groups in the Balkans, Pakistan, and the Philippines require
additional exploitation.
d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:
Planned attack of US Embassy in Sarajevo
NGO support to extremist groups in the Balkans, Pakistan, and the Philippines:
Islamic Relief Foundation
IIRO
¡ Abdoun Tayib in Albania
¡ Abu Suhaib in the Philippines
BIF
Human Appeal International
Information on AG-10001
Plans for activities once they reached Afghanistan in late 2001
GIA in Bosnia
Mosque support for terrorist and extremist related activity in EUCOM AOR
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330405

9. (S) EC Status:Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon 19October2004,and
heremainsanenemycombatant.
,l n,
?/%,///5,D-MARKH. BUZBY U
RearAdmiral,USNavy
Commanding
SE C R E T //NOFORN I I 20330405
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT:Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnderDoD Control(CD)for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISNUS4AG-010003DP(S)
'
Definitionsfor intelligencetermsusedin theassessmentcanbefoundin theJointMilitary IntelligenceCollege
October2001guideIntelligenceWarningTerminologt.
t2
SE C RE T // NOFORNI I 20330405

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