Us4ag 010004dp

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330630
S E C R E T / / / NOFORN / / 20330630
JTF-GTMO-CDR 30 June 2008
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172
SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010004DP (S)
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment
1. (S//NF) Personal Information:
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Mustafa Ait Idr
Current/True Name and Aliases: Mustafa Ait Idir, Mustapha
Itiolier, Mustafa Adir Ittidi, Mustapha Kader
Place of Birth: Sidimhamed, Algeria (AG)
Date of Birth: 9 July 1970
Citizenship: Algeria
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US4AG-010004DP
2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.
3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:
a. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a member of an Algerian Armed Islamic
Group (GIA) cell and is an assessed participant in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US
Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BK).1
Detainee planned to travel to
Afghanistan for jihad, in anticipation of a US coalition campaign following the 11 September
attacks, but was arrested in BK before his departure. While in BK, detainee threatened to
1
¡ Analyst Note: The GIA is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 3
target. Priority 3 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that other senior policymakers and IC
managers believe must receive attention from the IC that are not already identified as Priorities 1 or 2. These
include terrorist/extremist groups involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and the capability to
attack U.S. persons and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less threat than Priority 2 groups, or
terrorist/extremist groups that have demonstrated intention to attack U.S. persons and interests and are taking action
to develop or acquire WMD capability.

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2
attack Stabilization Force (SFOR) troops, to include US service members. Detainee also has
close ties to al-Qaida linked extremist in the Balkans. During the Bosnian War, detainee
served as chief martial arts instructor for an Islamic militant unit called the “al-Mujahid”
Brigade. The “al-Mujahid” Brigade later transformed into the al-Qaida financed Bedr Bosna
Corporation. In addition, detainee fought in the Afghan War as a member of the foreign born
Afghan mujahideen network. Over a 7-year period, detainee was employed by various
NGOs associated with terrorism. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:
A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
A MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective
Of HIGH intelligence value
b. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s
assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be
annotated by ¡ next to the footnote.)
Provided additional information on the GIA
Updated detainee’s account of events
Provided background information on the Muslim Brotherhood
Identified detainee’s family ties to the Muslim Brotherhood
Added reporting that points to detainee’s involvement in the Afghan War
Updated evaluation of detainee’s account
Added reporting that confirms detainee’s anti-US stance
4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events:
The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account.
These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee completed high school and then obtained a certificate
in computer studies from the Asten Institute in Algiers, AG in 1990.2
Detainee obtained an
unpaid internship position for two to three months at a newspaper called “Algeria Today.”
After his internship at the newspaper, detainee helped his brothers paint houses and assisted
his father with posting country flags around the city for the Algerian Government.3
b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee’s sister Saliha spoke to a local reporter
who worked at the “al-Irshad” newspaper about her brother having computer training and
looking for a job at a newspaper. The reporter told her there were no computer job openings
2
010004 KB 07-FEB-2002
3
IIR 4 201 2107 06
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with “al-Irshad”, but there were openings in Croatia (HR) with the Islamic World Relief
Organization (IWRO) for anyone with computer training or experience.4
In May 1993,
detainee departed Algiers and traveled to Zagreb, HR via Rome, Italy. Upon arrival in
Zagreb, detainee spoke with the director of the Zagreb IWRO office, an Algerian named
Zidan Boukhalfa, who informed detainee that he would be working for the IWRO office in
Split, HR.5
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Upon arrival in Split, detainee moved into an
apartment which he shared with other individuals who worked at the IWRO. In February
1995, detainee flew to Sarajevo to apply for Bosnian citizenship and later received his
citizenship papers in Zagreb. Detainee’s responsibilities at the IWRO consisted of
maintaining the merchandise inventory, keeping computer records of all immigrants and
orphans, and writing occasional reports. While working for the IWRO, detainee exercised at
a nearby sports center, where he played soccer and trained in karate. He obtained the level of
third degree black belt and won a regional karate championship while living in Split. During
this time, detainee made contact with several NGOs looking for work. In August 19956
,
detainee moved to Zenica, BK to work for the Qatar Charitable Society as a secretary to the
Director, Abdel Qader al-Kafawein.7
In April or May of 1996, detainee transferred to the
Qatar Charitable Society office in Tuzla, BK.8
In 1997, the Tuzla office manager, Dr. Said
Rafat, told detainee the workload was decreasing and detainee’s salary would be reduced by
half if he remained in Tuzla. Detainee quit his job and went to Sarajevo to look for work.
Detainee obtained an apartment in Vogsca, BK. In July or August 1997, detainee began
working for the Saudi Arabia-based Taibah International.9
Detainee did computer work for
Taibah, which included working on software and hardware applications. He also taught
computer classes to Bosnians.10
In 1998, detainee spent 24 hours traveling by bus to
Munich, Germany, via Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria to purchase a 1986
4
Analyst Note: The Islamic World Relief Organization, aka (International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)) is a
NIPF CT Priority 2 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 2 TSEs have demonstrated sustained and active
financial support for terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational
support to Priority 2 terrorist groups.
5
IIR 4 201 2107 06
6
Analyst Note: Official records from the Bosnian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Service Center, indicate
that the detainee did not work for the Qatar Charitable Society during said timeframe. This is an indication that the
detainee is employing a cover story to deceive interrogators. See SFOR-2002-000577-HT
7
IIR 4 201 2107 06, Analyst Note: The Qatar Charitable Society is a NIPF CT Priority 3 TSE. Priority 3 TSEs have
demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US
persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups.
8
IIR 6 034 0050 02
9
IIR 4 201 2107 06, Analyst Note: Taibah International is assessed to be the Taibah International Relief
Organization, which is a NIPF CT Priority 3 TSE.
10
IIR 4 201 2107 06, Analyst Note: Detainee was an employee of the Taibah organization, which is closely linked
to the Bosnian Muslim Brotherhood, aka (Muslimanska Braca), a group with links to terrorism (see IIR 4 201 2202
06).
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Volkswagen Golf. In 1998, detainee traveled to Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia (SA), via
Romania, Istanbul, Turkey, Syria, and Jordan for the Hajj (pilgrimage). An Egyptian named
Ahmed al-Saghir, who worked for the Egyptian-based Human Relief NGO, coordinated his
travel.11
Detainee also traveled regularly to the Algerian mission in Budapest, Hungary,
where his passport was issued.12
Detainee stated he never received any military training.13
Detainee knows a Chinese-Japanese “Shotokan” style of Karate and has 17 years of martial
arts experience and 14 years as a trainer. Detainee was training for the Bosnian National
Karate Team.14
5. (U) Capture Information:
a. (S//NF) In late October 2001, the Bosnian Federal Ministry of Interior Police (FMUP)
arrested detainee and several others individuals suspected of being involved in a terrorist plot
against the US Embassy in Sarajevo.15
After exhausting the legal limits for detention and
following the Algerian government’s refusal to take custody, Bosnian authorities turned
detainee and the other Algerian captives over to US custody on 18 January 2002.16
b. (S) Property Held:
Passports
BK Passport Number 0866696
Republic of Algeria Passport Number 0189352, issued in Budapest, Hungary
A property receipt from a prison in Sarajevo dated 17 January 2002
Miscellaneous clothing
c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 20 January 2002
d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the
following:
Taibah Relief Agency in Sarajevo
Qatar Charity Society in Zeneca and Tuzla to include locations and persons involved
11
IIR 4 201 2107 06, Analyst Note: Saghir is likely Ahmed Ali Ahmed al-Saghir Muhammad Hussein. Saghir,
identified as a mujahideen fighter living in Bosnia, was an authorized signer for Human Relief International (HRI)
accounts there.
12
010004 KB 07-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: See 010004 SIR 15-JAN-2004 and 010004 SIR 21-JUL-2002 for
information on the purposes of his trips to Hungary.
13
IIR 6 034 0209 02
14
IIR 6 034 0553 02, IIR 4 201 2202 06
15
IIR 7 130 1022 02, TD-314/39634-01
16
IIR 6 034 0207 02, AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 29-DEC-2006, 010004 SIR 16-APR-2003, TD-314/39239-01,
010002 DIPLOMATIC 16-OCT-2001, TD-314/49994-02, TD-314/41670-01
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Structure and organization of IIRO relief agency in Split
6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Detainee has been deceptive concerning his
involvement with NGOs in Bosnia, prior military service, travels to the UK, and role as the
director of an Islamic preschool. For instance, detainee stated that from 1995 until 1997 he
worked for the Qatar Charitable Society. However, official records from the Bosnian Ministry of
Internal Affairs, Security Service Center, indicate that the detainee did not work for the Qatar
Charitable Society during said timeframe.17
In addition, detainee has failed to provide
information concerning the NGOs that he did work for and their connections to extremist acts
and organizations. Other questionable accounts in the detainee’s story involve his denial of
military service. According to official documents and sensitive reporting, detainee has prior
military experience and was the chief martial arts instructor for an Islamic military unit called the
“al-mujahid” Brigade. Formed during the Bosnian War, the “al-mujahid” Brigade is reported to
have committed numerous atrocities, to include burning villages, torture, and decapitation of
prisoners. The detainee is likely denying involvement with the “al-mujahid” Brigade in order to
distance himself from the crimes that are associated with this military unit. Detainee has also not
accounted for several trips that he reportedly made to Manchester, UK in 2000 and 2001 or his
role as director of an Islamic preschool in Saravejo, BK.18
Throughout his detainment detainee
has kept to his cover story, continually stating that he and his associates were involved in only
charitable activities, denying any involvement with the “al-mujahid” Brigade, and avoiding
questions that could further associate him with terrorism.
7. (U) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat
to the US, its interests, and allies.
b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a member of a GIA cell
involved in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Saravejo. Detainee planned
to travel to Afghanistan for jihad, in anticipation of a US campaign following the 11
September 2001 attacks, but was arrested in Bosnia before his departure. While in Bosnia,
detainee threatened to attack Stabilization Force (SFOR) troops, to include US service
members and was associated with al-Qaida linked extremist in the Balkans. Detainee is
reportedly a military trained Bosnian extremist and chief martial arts instructor for the “al-
mujahid” Brigade, who fought in both the Bosnian and Afghan War. Over a seven year
period, detainee was employed by various NGOs associated with terrorism. Since arriving at
JTF-GTMO, detainee has repeatedly expressed anti-US sentiment.
(S//NF) Detainee is a member of a GIA cell in Bosnia and an assessed participant in
an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo.
17
¡ SFOR-2002-000577-HT
18
¡ IIR 7 131 0030 02
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(S/NF) On 8 October 2001, the FMUP, in cooperation with US forces in Bosnia,
apprehended suspected al-Qaida facilitator Bensayah Belkacem, ISN US4AG-
010001DP (AG-10001), after an investigation into threats against the US Embassy in
Sarajevo. Bosnian authorities also directed the investigation toward seven other
individuals. Over the next two weeks, detainee, along with Sabir Mahfouz Lahmar,
ISN US4AG-010002DP (AG-10002); Muhammad Nechle, ISN US4AG-010003DP
(AG-10003); Lakhdar Boumediene, ISN US4AG-010005DP (AG-10005); and al-Haj
Omar Boudellaa, ISN US4AG-010006DP (AG-10006), were arrested for false
attestation of information and suspected involvement in the threats against the US
Embassy in Sarajevo.19
This group became known as the “Algerian Six.”
(S//NF) The two other individuals arrested were identified as Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG) member Khaled al-Arbed and Atif Munassur, aka (Abu
Nasar), a suspected facilitator for the Salafist Group for Call and Combat
(GSPC).20
(S//NF) The Bosnian Federation Supreme Court stated this group attempted to
attack the facility and the employees of the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Documents
identified those arrested as part of an organized terrorist group, whose activities
constituted an act of international terrorism. The group is suspected of conducting
surveillance of the embassy and its personnel, and coordinating with senior al-Qaida
lieutenant Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-
010016DP (GZ-10016).21
However, in 2004, Bosnian prosecutors and police
formally exonerated the six Algerians after a lengthy criminal investigation.22
(S//NF) AG-10001 possessed the phone number of a Bosnian locksmith
employed at the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Further investigation by embassy
authorities revealed that the individual was AG-10002’s father-in-law. The
employee was detained and subsequently failed a polygraph test given by US
authorities.23
(Analyst Note: AG-10002’s father-in-law could have provided
physical access to the embassy for the purpose of the attack.)
(S//NF) Despite claims that they were not associated with each other,
communications between the members of the group known as the “Algerian Six”
demonstrated a close association between them.
19
IIR 6 933 0021 02
20
TD-314/11070-05, IIR 6 933 0021 02, Analyst Note: GSPC is an NIPF CT Priority 1 terrorism target, defined as
issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice
President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor
terrorism or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to
U.S. persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ WMD. LIFG is also listed as a NIPF CT Priority
1 terrorism target.
21
TD-314/02606-02, BIH Court Doc BB-014 30-OCT-2001, DCS-G2 Special Assessment- Algerian Six 18-FEB-
2004
22
Washington Post Foreign Service 21-AUG-2006
23
IIR 7 130 1022 02
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(S) AG-10003 reported in December 1999 that he, detainee, and AG-10005
met with an official from the Algerian Embassy in Vienna, who had traveled to
Sarajevo to discuss the needs of Algerian citizens in Bosnia. (Analyst Note: AG-
10004 denies having attended this meeting.24
) AG-10003 stated the purpose of the
meeting was to find out if any Algerians in Bosnia needed help. The Algerian
Embassy official read a list of names of possible extremists and asked the
attendees to contact him of they met anyone on the list. None of the attendees
responded to the questions about names on the list.25
(Analyst Note: AG-10006
admitted attending this meeting, but denied having any discussion about
extremists.26
)
(S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Detainee claimed he was good friends
with AG-10005 and that they worked together one or two days per week.27
Detainee further remarked that he called AG-10005 “Ahmed” and that he and AG-
10005 taught Karate to orphans sponsored by the Red Crescent. They also played
soccer on Saturdays with other Arabs who worked with other NGOs and
embassies. Detainee further reported AG-10005 and AG-10003 were friends.28
¡ (S//NF) AG-10005 stated he knew detainee since they met in Bosnia two
or three years before their arrest, and that detainee worked for the Taibah NGO
in the Vogoca area of Bosnia where detainee lived.29
(Analyst Note: The
Algerian government assessed AG-10005 to be associated with the GIA and
possibly to al-Qaida.30
)
(S//NF) Detainee first met AG-10003 in Croatia. While in Croatia, detainee
assisted AG-10003 with the paperwork for his Bosnian citizenship. AG-10003
stated he came to know detainee quite well when he transferred to Sarajevo in
1997.31
¡ (S//NF) Detainee stated he met AG-10003 in Zenica while staying at a
house provided by the Qatar Charitable Society. Detainee stated AG-10003
worked for the Red Crescent in Bihac, BK.32
(Analyst Note: AG-10003 was
identified by the Bosnian Government as a supporter of terrorist groups in
Africa. AG-10003 is wanted by the Algerian government on charges of
terrorism.33
)
24
¢ IIR 6 034 0915 04
25
IIR 6 034 0134 02
26
IIR 6 034 0883 03
27
IIR 6 034 0727 02
28
IIR 4 201 2107 06
29
IIR 6 034 0205 02
30
TD-314/42368-01,
31
IIR 6 034 0208 02, 010003 FM40 24-MAR-2002
32
010004 302 23-FEB-2002, TD-314/43043-07
33
010003 Visa Viper 17-DEC-2001
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(S//NF) FMUP investigation found items confiscated during detainee’s
arrest listed AG-10003’s and AG-10005’s phone numbers.34
¡ (S//NF) AG-10006’s mobile phone memory contained the phone numbers of
detainee, AG-10003, and AG-10005.35
(Analyst Note: AG-10006 is assessed to
be a former al-Qaida instructor and GIA member.36
)
(S//NF) Detainee remarked that he thought AG-10006’s home phone was
528825 and his cell phone number was 160112.37
AG-10006 corroborated
detainee’s statements, providing the same phone numbers.38
(S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Detainee remarked that he met AG-
10006 in June or July 1996. AG-10006 was working for the Human Appeal
Charitable Organization. Detainee claimed his wife and AG-10006’s wife
were friends. Detainee also admitted he helped AG-10006 download programs
on his computer.39
¡ (S//NF) Other reporting confirms the rest of the “Algerian Six” maintained
contact with each other in Bosnia.
(S//NF) AG-10002’s mobile phone number and his landline number are
listed among AG-10001’s contacts.40
(C//REL TO USA, SFOR) AG-10005’s phone number is also listed among
AG-10001’s phone number contacts. Additionally, another phone number on
the list was for “Abu Zubayda,” believed to be a reference to GZ-10016.41
(S//NF) AG-10002’s mobile phone number and his landline number are
listed among AG-10001’s contacts.42
(S//NF) AG-10003’s phone records indicate he maintained consistent
contact with AG-10005.43
(S//NF) AG-10003 stated that AG-10005 assisted AG-10001 and AG-
10002 with their respective charity work.44
(Analyst Note: AG-10005 claimed
he first learned of AG-10002 when he saw his name on court papers while in
jail, and met him when they were later turned over to the US.)
34
TD-314/39904-01, Paragraph 2 FFFF and Paragraph 3C; Analyst Note: AG-10005’s phone number is 090-157-
269 (see TD-314/41367-01). AG-10003’s phone number is 090-165-595 (see TD-314/41367-01).
35
TD-314/41367-01, Analyst Note: Detainee’s number is Paragraph E.
36
TD-314/41818-01, 010006 SIR 01-DEC-2005, IIR 6 034 0205 02, TD-314/42368-01, TD-314/43043-07
37
IIR 6 034 0050 02, Analyst Note: Detainee may have reported one number in error.
38
IIR 6 034 0201 02, Analyst Note: IIR 6 034 0201 02 lists a different home phone number for AG-10006 than in
IIR 6 034 0050 02.
39
IIR 4 201 2107 06
40
010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001, IIR 6 933 0021 02
41
010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001
42
010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001
43
TD-314/41670-01
44
IIR 6 034 0205 02, IIR 4 201 2433 06
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(S//NF) Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan for jihad, but was arrested in
Bosnia before his departure.
(S//NF) Detainee reportedly planned to travel to Afghanistan along with the other
Algerians, at the urging of AG-10001. Detainee and the others planned to travel as
soon as AG-10001 arrived in Afghanistan to make receiving arrangements. Detainee
was arrested before his planned trip.45
(S//NF) AG-10001 encouraged his Algerian associates to participate in jihad.
AG-10001 applied for an Iranian visa in Sarajevo for onward travel to Afghanistan on
1 October 2001. He planned to provide travel assistance to help the other Algerians
join militants positioned in Afghanistan in anticipation of the US campaign following
the 11 September 2001 attacks. AG-10001 received financial support from Shaykh
Nasar al-Said, the director of the Saudi High Commission for Relief (SHCR), for his
travel to Afghanistan.46
¡ (S) Detainee admitted knowledge of the SHCR. Detainee reported that the
Islamic Center of the SCHR was located in Sarajevo. Detainee remarked that he
had visited the Islamic Center on several occasions, and he identified Shaykh
Nasser as the general manager of the High Council.47
¡ (S//NF) A US intelligence assessment identified AG-10001 as the primary al-
Qaida facilitator in Bosnia, with ties to GZ-10016. AG-10001 possessed
numerous phone numbers linking him to UBL’s operational network in
Afghanistan and the global Sunni extremist network.48
(S//NF) Detainee threatened to attack US and Coalition forces in Bosnia and was
associated with other extremists in the Balkans.
(S//NF) According to sensitive reporting, in early 1999, detainee said that
Bosnian mujahideen fighters should try to isolate, kidnap, and kill SFOR troops.49
(S//NF) In early 2001, separate reporting indicated that detainee intended to
attack SFOR troops using “white weapons,” meaning knives or other weapons that do
not involve gun powder. Detainee was reportedly in financial trouble and would do
anything for money. Detainee was also reportedly associated to a group of Algerians
in Bosnia who are members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).50
¡ The Muslim Brotherhood, begun in 1928, is a widespread Islamic revivalist
movement which today maintains a following in over 70 different countries.
Although the Muslim Brotherhood emphasizes engaging in the political arena of
Arab countries to achieve its goal of establishing Islamic governments worldwide,
45
TD-314/35452-01
46
TD-314/35452-01, IIR 6 933 0021 02, TD-314/14059-02
47
IIR 6 034 0050 02
48
TD-314/14059-02, IIR 7 130 1022 02, IIR 6 933 0021 02, DCS-G2 Special Assessment- Algerian Six 18-FEB-
2004
49
TD-315/13831-99
50
TD-314/02680-01
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some Muslim Brotherhood leaders have endorsed violent “resistance” in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories.51
(S//NF) Known MB member and Egyptian national, Yasser Lila aka (Jasir
Lejleti), is the brother-in-law of detainee and is married to detainee’s sister.
Detainee’s wife currently lives in Lila’s house in Saravejo.52
(S//NF) Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad, who since 1997 has been serving a 12-year
prison sentence for his involvement in a car bombing in Mostar, BK reported that
detainee was a friend of Ahmad Zayid Salim al-Zuhayri, ISN US9SA-000669DP
(SA-669). Ali Hamad said that SA-669 believed that America was the greatest
enemy of Islam, so he decided to remain in Bosnia after the war and continue the
fight against Americans.53
(Analyst Note: SA-669 later traveled to Afghanistan
and was captured there. SA-669 is also the subject of US Federal Grand Jury
proceedings investigating the murder of an American citizen in Sarajevo in
1995.54
Separately, Croat authorities believe AG-10002 was also involved in the
1997 bombing in Mostar.55
)
(S//NF) SA-669 initiated a movement to recruit a small group of mujahideen
to join him. Ali Hamad reported that those who joined this group were actively
looking for American targets. Ali Hamad knew that SA-669 specifically asked
detainee to join his group. Ali Hamad could not confirm whether detainee agreed
to join SA-669, but Ali Hamad knew that thereafter they were constantly in one
another’s company.56
(S//NF) Detainee admitted having close personal ties with two suspected Islamic
extremists, Jamel Lamrani, aka (Abu Musab al-Djazairi) and his brother Sarhane
Lamrani (currently held in Bosnia), but refused to elaborate on their relationship and
the activities of the Lamrani brothers.57
(S//NF) On 16 August 2002, Italian Carabinieri elements of the Kosovo
Stabilization Force (KFOR) arrested Jamel and Sarhane Lamrani. The two
brothers made threats against KFOR and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
Jamel Lamrani is directly tied to detainee. Sarhane Lamrani recently stated he has
ties to al-Qaida, and in late June 2005, he stated that Kosovar-Albanians should
conduct suicide attacks against UNMIK and KFOR facilities.58
51
¡ Muslim Brotherhood CIA Report 28-MAR-2008, Muslim Brotherhood AFOSI Report 26-MAY-2008
52
¡ TD-314/37989-06
53
000669 FM40 08-NOV-2004, Open Source 11-8-04 Former AQ Member writes book
54
000669 FM40 08-NOV-2004, Analyst Note: Also involved in the Mostar bombing was Nabil Ali al-Hila, the
brother of Abd al-Salam al-Hilah, ISN US9YM-001463DP (YM-1463).
55
TD-314/21465-00
56
000669 FM40 08-NOV-2004
57
IIR 6 034 0718 02, EUCOM INTSUM 9-Aug-2002, Analyst Note: A variant of Djazairi is Jazaieri. A variant of
Jamel Lamrani is Gamal Amrani.
58
EUCOM INTSUM 17-AUG-2002, Analyst Note: See IIR 6 034 0209 02 (b), 3509R01, IIR 7 100 0040 03 for
more information on Lamrani.
S E C R E T / / / NOFORN / / 20330630

S E C R E T / / / NOFORN / / 20330630
JTF-GTMO-CDR
11
(S//NF) The Bosnian government included detainee among a list of foreigners in
Bosnia whose Bosnian citizenship was being investigated for possible irregularities.
Bosnian authorities believed that these individuals were possibly connected to
terrorist organizations abroad or to humanitarian organizations that were suspected of
providing logistical support to terrorist.59
(S//NF) Detainee had the phone number and e-mail address for an individual
named Ahmad Adilovic in his pocket litter when he was arrested.
(S//NF) Ahmad Efendi Adilovic and his brother Zuhdija, were in charge of a
school called the Ibrahim Pasa Madrassa, probable variant (Ilci Ibrahim Pasinara),
in Travnik, BK. The school sent students to a camp located in the area of Guca
Gora, BK. According to the Bosnian government, detainee was also involved in
this camp, providing karate training. Detainee’s employer, the Taibah NGO,
subsidized the school. Detainee’s associate, Ahmed Faraj, and another Taibah
manager, Umar Sulayman al-Hamidi, would frequent the school where al-Hamidi
had a close relationship with Ahmad and Zuhdija Adilovic.60
(Analyst Note:
Detainee has denied any affiliations with the Guca Gora training camp.61
)
(S//NF) In March 2004, the Adilovic brothers were among a group of Islamic
extremists preparing an attack against Camp Bondsteel, a US military base
located at Urosevac, Kosovo. Additionally, al-Hamidi had contacts with Abu
Zubayr, probably al-Qaida operative Abu Zubayr al-Haili, who was a militant
leader in Bosnia and financed fighters through him.62
¡ (S//NF) Detainee is reportedly a military trained Bosnian militant who fought in both
the Bosnian and Afghan War.
(S//NF) According to sensitive reporting, detainee is a former member of the “al-
Mujahid” Brigade, serving as a chief martial arts instructor.63
(S//NF) The Bosnian government listed detainee among militants that had fought
in the 1992-1995 Bosnian war and had gained Bosnian citizenship. (Analyst Note:
Detainee has denied having any military training or service.64
)
(S//NF) In the early 1990s, the Muslim Bosniac government invited foreign
fighters to come to Bosnia to fight on its behalf. Most of these foreign fighters
were in the “al-Mujahid” Brigade, aka (the 7th Muslumski Brigade), in central
Bosnia, near Zenica and Travnik. These fighters were more fundamentalist than
most native Bosniacs, and spread their beliefs as they fought.65
The “al-Mujahid
59
TD-314/07723-02, Paragraph N
60
TD-314/12271-04
61
010004 SIR 28-Jun-2004
62
TD-314/13719-04, AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 000816 6-Apr-2004, TD-314/25790-03
63
TD-314/35452-01, IIR 4 201 2202 06
64
TD-314/01116-02
65
Analyst Note: Many of these fighters later traveled to Afghanistan for jihad, as detainee and the rest of the
“Algerian Six” attempted to do, and as SA-669, who was also a member of the “al-Mujahid” Brigade, succeeded in
doing. SA-669 was also convicted of involvement in the 1997 car bombing in Mostar.
S E C R E T / / / NOFORN / / 20330630

S E C R E T / / / NOFORN / / 20330630
JTF-GTMO-CDR
12
Brigade” was later transformed into the Bedr Bosna Coroporation, owned and
managed by Abd al-Qadr al-Mukhtari. Al-Qaida is reported to have provided
financial support to the Bedr Bosna Corporation, which serves as a cover for
terrorist activities, such as providing financial support for its members, hiding
funds transfers, and providing facilities to support operations.66
o (S//NF) Detainee was reported to have fought in the Afghan war.67
(Analyst
Note: This is the only reporting found tying detainee’s involvement in the Afghan
War.)
(S//NF) Detainee was employed by various NGOs associated with terrorism over a
seven year period.68
(S//NF) Detainee claimed that he arrived in Split in May 1993 to work for the
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO).69
(Analyst Note: The IIRO was
known to support extremist/terrorist groups in the Balkans from 1992 to 1996.)
(S//NF) Detainee worked for the Qatar Charitable Organization and Taibah
International.
(S//NF) The Bosnian-based NGO Pomoc provided detainee’s wife and the wives
of the other “Algerian Six” members a monthly stipend throughout 2004. (Analyst
Note: Pomoc also provided a stipend to the wife of convicted terrorist Said Atmani,
who was associated with Millennium plot participant Ahmed Ressam.70
The Pomoc
NGO is also suspected of having ties to the Active Islamic Youth Organization
(AIO). Pomoc is suspected of collecting funds for the “Algerian Six” detainees.71
)
(S//NF) Since arriving at JTF-GTMO, detainee has repeatedly expressed anti-US
sentiment.
o (S//NF) During an interview by an official from the Algerian Delegation visit to
JTF-GTMO, detainee became vocally abusive and belligerent with anti-US rhetoric.72
o (S//NF) In a separate incident, detainee stated that “America was evil and he
hopes that God will strike America down.” 73
c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a MEDIUM threat from a
detention perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile to the guard
force and staff. He currently has 39 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with
the most recent occurring on 15 April 2008, when he damaged government property by
creating a hole in his cell. He has three Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the
66
ACIC INTSUM 04-APR-2002
67
¡ CIR 316/00277-02
68
IIR 6 034 0188 02, IIR 6 034 0050 02
69
IIR 4 201 2107 06, IIR 6 034 0718 02
70
TD-314/50199-05, Paragraph 3D
71
IIR 7 114 0256 04, Analyst Note: AIO is an NIPF CT Priority 1 TSE that provides witting operational support to
Priority 1 terrorist groups.
72
¡ VARIOUS ISNS MFR 27-APR-2006
73
¡ 000653 BSCT ObsRpt 08-JUN-2002
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S E C R E T / / / NOFORN / / 20330630
JTF-GTMO-CDR
13
most recent occurring on 9 July 2004, when he threw his medication. Other incidents for
which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure
to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, exposure of
sexual organs, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-
weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of six Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and
three so far in 2008.
8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainee’s
most recent interrogation session occurred on 28 January 2008.
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Since 1993, detainee has worked for several NGOs
associated with extremist activities. Detainee, along with other GIA members, planned to
travel to Afghanistan to fight against US and Coalition forces. During the Bosnian War,
detainee served as a member and instructor of the “al-Mujahid” Brigade. Additionally,
detainee is associated with multiple extremist, some of whom are al-Qaida affiliated and
active to this day.
c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee’s links and associations suggest a deeper
involvement in extremist activity than he has admitted. The depth of detainee’s involvement
in extremist activities and his interactions with other Algerian extremists requires additional
investigation. Detainee can probably provide information on the alleged plan to launch a
terrorist attack against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. He can provide information about his
intended travel to Afghanistan, along with travel plans and facilitators. Detainee can provide
historical information on members of the “Algerian Six”, other extremists, and the illicit
activities of NGOs in Bosnia.
d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:
Al-Qaida and extremist attacks in Bosnia
Personnel linked to al-Qaida and other extremist groups
NGO support to al-Qaida, GIA, and other extremist groups in Bosnia
Financing of foreign fighters
International travels document facilitation
S E C R E T / / / NOFORN / / 20330630

SE C R E T // / NOFORN// 20330630
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT:DetaineeAssessmentBriefICOGuantanamoDetainee,ISNUS4AG-010004DP(S)
9. (S) EC Status:Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon20October2004,and
heremainsanenemycombatant.
D. M. THOMAS,
I
RearAdmiral, US
Commanding
Navy
-
Definitions for intelligenceterms usedin the assessmentcanbe found in the Joint Military Intelligence College
October2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminologt.
T4
s E c R E T // / NOFORN// 20330630

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