WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) was the original security protocol for 802.11 wireless networks. It uses RC4 encryption with a weak 40-bit key. WEP has significant flaws like small keys, key reuse, and IV reuse that allow attackers to decrypt packets and compromise networks. While it provides some protection, WEP is insecure and better alternatives like WPA or IPsec should be used to securely encrypt wireless traffic.

1. WEP
PRESENTED BY
SUDEEP KULKARNI (W5097046)
SWAPNIL KULKARNI (W5097047)
SNEHAL LOKARE (W5097048)
ABHISHEK MULAY (W5097056)

2. INTRODUCTION
 Wireless network connectivity is becoming very important
part of computing environments
 One of the most popular wireless network standard is
802.11 i.e. WLAN. In this standard data is transmitted over
radio waves
 Wireless networks rely on Open Medium
 With an open network medium, unprotected traffic can
be seen by anybody
 Guarding against such attacks constitutes the domain of
Cryptography

3. What is WEP?
 WEP is “Wired Equivalent Privacy” or “Wireless
Encryption Protocol”
 It is the original wireless security protocol for the
802.11 standard.
 It uses the RC4 stream cipher, using a 64-bit key
consisting of:
 A 24-bit master key
 A 40-bit initialization vector (IV)
 It also employs a CRC integrity checksum

4. WEP Cryptographic Operations
 Three major objectives of communication security
 Confidentiality
 Integrity
 Authentication
 WEP provides operations that attempt to meet these
criteria
 Frame body encryption supports confidentiality.
 An integrity check sequence protects data in
transit and allows receivers to validate that the
received data was not altered in transit.

5. WEP Data Processing
 Confidentiality and integrity are handled
simultaneously.
 Before encryption, the frame is run through an
integrity check algorithm, generating a hash
called an integrity check value (ICV)
 The ICV protects the contents against tampering by
ensuring that the frame has not changed in transit.
 The frame and the ICV are both encrypted, so
the ICV is not available to casual attackers

7. WEP Data Processing
 As input, WEP requires Three Items viz.
 Payload
 Key
 Initialization Vector (IV)
 After processing, WEP has a single output.
 Encrypted Frame

8. WEP Keys
 Mapped Keys/Station Keys
 For Unicast traffic.
 Default Keys
 WEP keys have an associated number. Up to four
keys may be defined in an 802.11 station.
 Each station receives two keys from the access point
 A mapping key (0)
 A default Key (1)

9. WEP key numbering and Storage
 To efficiently encrypt frames, many 802.11 chipsets
include a data structure known as Key Cache.
 Most chipsets include four key slots.
 Two types of Key Distribution:
 Static/Manual
 Dynamic
 Static WEP uses one key slot whilw dynamic WEP
uses two.

10. WEP Encapsulation
 When WEP is in use, the frame body expands by
8 bytes.
 4 bytes for IV Header
 Remaining 4 for ICV Trailer

11. Design flaws of the WEP System
 Key management
 Manual key management is a minefield of problems
 Static WEP offers a shared secret of only 40 bits.
 Key Reuse
 Stream ciphers are vulnerable to analysis when the key
stream is reused.
 IV reuse:
 WEP's IV size is 24 bits.
 WEP uses the same IV for different data packets.
 An attacker can decrypt packets that were encrypted with
the same IV.
 Inappropriate Integrity check:
 MD5 or SHA-1 algorithms are more suitable for
cryptographic hash than CRC-32.

12. Attacks on WEP
 FMS Attack
 Fluhrer, Martin and Shamir published the first key recovery
attack onWEP.
 If the first 2 bytes of enough key stream are known -> The RC4
key is discovered
 The first 8 bytes of WEP packet is a known SNAP-SAP header
 AirSnort implements this attack
 Recovers key after 20,000 packets = 11 seconds

13. Attacks on WEP
 IP redirection:
 Change the destination of an encrypted packet to a machine
controlled by the attacker on the wired network.
 Send modified frame to AP that will decrypt it and send to
attacker machine
 Derive keystream from this ciphertext, plaintext pair
 Attacker can reuse keysteam to send/receive WLAN traffic

14. Attacks on WEP
 Bit Flipping

15. Solutions to improve security of WEP
 Multiple Security measures along with WEP.
 Using VPN.
 Using Efficient key management techniques as an
additional measure.
 Using alternative encryption techniques like IPsec instead
of WEP.

16. Conclusions
 WEP does little to secure the WLAN’s from
attackers.
 Better to use WEP rather than not using any
encryption.
 New standards and specifications which will
replace WEP can be expected to provide sufficient
security for wireless LAN’s.

17. THANK YOU