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User Authentication
Overview
Jim Fenton
@jimfenton
Context
I’m a consultant to the National Institute of Standards
and Technology
Focusing on revising US Government digital identity
standards
Everything here is my own opinion; I don’t speak for
NIST!
About SP 800-63
NIST Special Publication
800-63, Digital Identity
Guidelines
Intended for federal
government use, but
also widely used
commercially and
internationally
Four-volume Set
Enrollment and

Identity Proofing

SP 800-63A
Authentication and

Lifecycle Management

SP 800-63B
Federation and Assertions

SP 800-63C
We will focus here
Authenticator Assurance
Levels (AALs)
AAL1 AAL2 AAL3
Authentication
Factors
1 2
2 (1 hardware-
based)
Reauthentication Monthly
12 hours /

30 min inactivity
12 hours /

15 min inactivity
Intent Not required Recommended Mandatory
Uses
Low-value
authentication w/no
personal data
General use
Critical
applications
Choose your own AAL
What’s an Authenticator?
A secret used to authenticate
Something containing an authentication secret
Often referred to as a “token” but that word is overused
Factors
There are three authentication factors:
Something you know (memorized secret)
Something you have
Something you are (biometric)
Authenticators may provide 1 or 2 of these
Authenticators
Memorized Secrets
Look-Up Secrets
Out-of-Band Device
Single-Factor OTP
Multi-Factor OTP
Single-Factor Crypto Device
Crypto Software
Multi-Factor Crypto Device
Memorized Secrets
Passwords, Passphrases, PINs: All memorized secrets
Something You Know
Password Guidance
Changes
Any printing Unicode character 😀 (but also Å) + space
Up to at least 64 characters long
No password composition rules (e.g., required digit)
Use dictionary to weed out common choices
No expiration
No hints or “security questions”
Look-Up Secrets
List of one-time passwords for account access
Not memorized so list is “something you have”
Typically too complex
Only used once anyway
Inexpensive solution for account recovery
Out-of-Band Devices
Independent communication channel
Verifies possession and control of specific hardware
Email doesn’t do this: not acceptable
Needs close binding to primary comm channel
Typically typing a secret received over secondary channel on
the primary channel
Make sure attackers can’t get user to approve the wrong thing
Restricted Authenticators
Use of telephone network (SMS, voice
calls)
Doesn’t prove possession strongly
enough
Acceptable for now with restrictions,
may not always be
Notice to user
Available alternatives
Single-Factor OTP
Device or app that generates one-time passcodes
Time-based (synced to verifier) or event-based (button)
Usable anywhere there is a keyboard or keypad
Can be phished (depends on user vigilance)
Uses symmetric crypto (verifier breach reveals secret)
Multi-Factor OTP
Single-factor OTP with addition of an activation factor
Activation factor can be memorized secret or biometric
Single-Factor

Crypto Devices
Hardware device that interfaces directly with user
endpoint
Typically USB, but increasingly NFC, BTLE
Usually requires software drivers on user endpoint
Range from OTP generation to challenge/response to
verifier impersonation resistance
Crypto software
Typically an X.509 client certificate/private key pair
If private key requires activation by a memorized secret,
considered multi-factor
Difficult to enforce rate limits on memorized secret
guessing attacks
Multi-Factor

Crypto Devices
Like single-factor crypto device, but requires activation
by memorized secret or biometric
Examples: PIV and CAC cards, other smart cards
Common Characteristics
Authentication intent
Require physical action by claimant
Protects against malware attacks on hardware
authenticators
Replay resistance
Output of authenticator is only valid for one authentication
Common Characteristics (2)
Verifier impersonation resistance
Output of authenticator is bound to a specific authentication
session, invalid elsewhere
Protects against phishing attacks
Verifier compromise resistance
Breach of data stored by verifier doesn’t allow an attacker to
authenticate
Example: Verifier has only subscribers’ public keys
What About Biometrics?
Some problems
Not based on a secret: fingerprints, etc easy to obtain
Presentation attacks (e.g., gummy bear fingerprint)
Probabilistic match, typically 0.1% false accept rate
Mitigations
Tight binding to specific physical authenticator
Authentication of sensor if separate
Incentives to include liveness detection
Summary
There is no single ideal authenticator - depends on use
case, endpoint type, and user
Passwords have definite limitations, but continue to be
important as “something you know”
Two-factor authentication should be used much more
widely than it is today
Questions?

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User Authentication Overview

  • 2. Context I’m a consultant to the National Institute of Standards and Technology Focusing on revising US Government digital identity standards Everything here is my own opinion; I don’t speak for NIST!
  • 3. About SP 800-63 NIST Special Publication 800-63, Digital Identity Guidelines Intended for federal government use, but also widely used commercially and internationally
  • 4. Four-volume Set Enrollment and
 Identity Proofing
 SP 800-63A Authentication and
 Lifecycle Management
 SP 800-63B Federation and Assertions
 SP 800-63C We will focus here
  • 5. Authenticator Assurance Levels (AALs) AAL1 AAL2 AAL3 Authentication Factors 1 2 2 (1 hardware- based) Reauthentication Monthly 12 hours /
 30 min inactivity 12 hours /
 15 min inactivity Intent Not required Recommended Mandatory Uses Low-value authentication w/no personal data General use Critical applications
  • 7. What’s an Authenticator? A secret used to authenticate Something containing an authentication secret Often referred to as a “token” but that word is overused
  • 8. Factors There are three authentication factors: Something you know (memorized secret) Something you have Something you are (biometric) Authenticators may provide 1 or 2 of these
  • 9. Authenticators Memorized Secrets Look-Up Secrets Out-of-Band Device Single-Factor OTP Multi-Factor OTP Single-Factor Crypto Device Crypto Software Multi-Factor Crypto Device
  • 10. Memorized Secrets Passwords, Passphrases, PINs: All memorized secrets Something You Know
  • 11. Password Guidance Changes Any printing Unicode character 😀 (but also Å) + space Up to at least 64 characters long No password composition rules (e.g., required digit) Use dictionary to weed out common choices No expiration No hints or “security questions”
  • 12. Look-Up Secrets List of one-time passwords for account access Not memorized so list is “something you have” Typically too complex Only used once anyway Inexpensive solution for account recovery
  • 13. Out-of-Band Devices Independent communication channel Verifies possession and control of specific hardware Email doesn’t do this: not acceptable Needs close binding to primary comm channel Typically typing a secret received over secondary channel on the primary channel Make sure attackers can’t get user to approve the wrong thing
  • 14. Restricted Authenticators Use of telephone network (SMS, voice calls) Doesn’t prove possession strongly enough Acceptable for now with restrictions, may not always be Notice to user Available alternatives
  • 15. Single-Factor OTP Device or app that generates one-time passcodes Time-based (synced to verifier) or event-based (button) Usable anywhere there is a keyboard or keypad Can be phished (depends on user vigilance) Uses symmetric crypto (verifier breach reveals secret)
  • 16. Multi-Factor OTP Single-factor OTP with addition of an activation factor Activation factor can be memorized secret or biometric
  • 17. Single-Factor
 Crypto Devices Hardware device that interfaces directly with user endpoint Typically USB, but increasingly NFC, BTLE Usually requires software drivers on user endpoint Range from OTP generation to challenge/response to verifier impersonation resistance
  • 18. Crypto software Typically an X.509 client certificate/private key pair If private key requires activation by a memorized secret, considered multi-factor Difficult to enforce rate limits on memorized secret guessing attacks
  • 19. Multi-Factor
 Crypto Devices Like single-factor crypto device, but requires activation by memorized secret or biometric Examples: PIV and CAC cards, other smart cards
  • 20. Common Characteristics Authentication intent Require physical action by claimant Protects against malware attacks on hardware authenticators Replay resistance Output of authenticator is only valid for one authentication
  • 21. Common Characteristics (2) Verifier impersonation resistance Output of authenticator is bound to a specific authentication session, invalid elsewhere Protects against phishing attacks Verifier compromise resistance Breach of data stored by verifier doesn’t allow an attacker to authenticate Example: Verifier has only subscribers’ public keys
  • 22. What About Biometrics? Some problems Not based on a secret: fingerprints, etc easy to obtain Presentation attacks (e.g., gummy bear fingerprint) Probabilistic match, typically 0.1% false accept rate Mitigations Tight binding to specific physical authenticator Authentication of sensor if separate Incentives to include liveness detection
  • 23. Summary There is no single ideal authenticator - depends on use case, endpoint type, and user Passwords have definite limitations, but continue to be important as “something you know” Two-factor authentication should be used much more widely than it is today