Detainee Habib Ullah is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He is assessed as a member of an anti-coalition group with ties to al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Detainee admitted to participating in a rocket attack against U.S. forces and was in frequent contact with senior Taliban leader Saifullah Rahman Mansour. He worked for and communicated with known militants, including living at the compound of a wanted al-Qaeda associate. Detainee possesses knowledge of attacks against U.S. forces and militant groups in the region.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to release or transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes the detainee's background, capture information, and assessment. The detainee is assessed as a low-level supporter of the Taliban who may have low-level knowledge of anti-coalition militia activities in Afghanistan. Based on available information, it is recommended that he be released or transferred to another country due to low intelligence value and low threat level.
Detainee Mohammed Mussa Yakubi is assessed as a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia in Afghanistan with connections to a global terrorist network. He is believed to have helped engineer IED and mortar attacks against US forces. Detainee was arrested after weapons were found in his compound, including an AK-47, mortar tubes, and ammunition. He is assessed as a HIGH risk and having MEDIUM intelligence value regarding the Gardez cell, planned attacks, and connections to other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. JTF GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be held in DoD custody.
Detainee Hiztullah Nasrat Yar is assessed as a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander with links to al-Qaeda, and participated in meetings to plan attacks on US/Coalition forces. If released, he would be capable of planning, supporting, or facilitating hostile acts. He maintained large weapons caches and supported HIG operations. His brother remains a HIG commander conducting anti-coalition activities. Detainee possesses knowledge of HIG operations and connections that could provide intelligence if exploited.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was identified as an operative for the Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group who specialized in mine laying and explosives. Detainee was believed to have been involved in an assassination plot against Afghan military forces and may have knowledge of future attacks planned by HIG commanders still operating against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. While detainee denied involvement in militant activities, multiple credible sources identified him as an expert mine layer who worked for HIG commander Mullah Nasim. It was recommended that detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to his ties to terrorist groups and suspected threat to the
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000886DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a mid-level, trusted member of the Taliban who served as a courier for senior leaders. He possesses significant connections to high-level Taliban and al-Qaeda figures. The detainee has been uncooperative during interviews and is assessed to pose a high risk threat. It is recommended he be transferred subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AG-000175DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on evidence that he was an al-Qaida member who received training at al-Faruq camp and possibly explosives training. He is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US forces as a leader coordinating supplies for al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora, and was possibly selected for training as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. The document recommends his continued detention due to these assessments and his lack of cooperation.
This document provides a recommendation to continue detaining detainee US9AF-001021DP based on a JTF GTMO assessment. The detainee is assessed to be a high-ranking member of the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) with ties to Al-Qaida and its global terrorism network. He was implicated in a plot to kill Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan by placing bombs at the Presidential Palace and US Embassy. Consistent reporting indicates the detainee remains committed to the HIG and its goals. It is assessed that he poses a high risk and is likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for transferring detainee ISN US9AF-001035DP to another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable former Taliban commander from Afghanistan who is currently in good health. He is assessed as a MEDIUM risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The detainee was captured with documents indicating ties to the Taliban and admitted being a member of an anti-coalition group. He provided information on weapon caches and personalities within the Taliban and Konar province government that expanded US intelligence. Based on this information, JTF-GTMO now recommends the detainee for transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to release or transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes the detainee's background, capture information, and assessment. The detainee is assessed as a low-level supporter of the Taliban who may have low-level knowledge of anti-coalition militia activities in Afghanistan. Based on available information, it is recommended that he be released or transferred to another country due to low intelligence value and low threat level.
Detainee Mohammed Mussa Yakubi is assessed as a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia in Afghanistan with connections to a global terrorist network. He is believed to have helped engineer IED and mortar attacks against US forces. Detainee was arrested after weapons were found in his compound, including an AK-47, mortar tubes, and ammunition. He is assessed as a HIGH risk and having MEDIUM intelligence value regarding the Gardez cell, planned attacks, and connections to other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. JTF GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be held in DoD custody.
Detainee Hiztullah Nasrat Yar is assessed as a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander with links to al-Qaeda, and participated in meetings to plan attacks on US/Coalition forces. If released, he would be capable of planning, supporting, or facilitating hostile acts. He maintained large weapons caches and supported HIG operations. His brother remains a HIG commander conducting anti-coalition activities. Detainee possesses knowledge of HIG operations and connections that could provide intelligence if exploited.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was identified as an operative for the Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group who specialized in mine laying and explosives. Detainee was believed to have been involved in an assassination plot against Afghan military forces and may have knowledge of future attacks planned by HIG commanders still operating against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. While detainee denied involvement in militant activities, multiple credible sources identified him as an expert mine layer who worked for HIG commander Mullah Nasim. It was recommended that detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to his ties to terrorist groups and suspected threat to the
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000886DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a mid-level, trusted member of the Taliban who served as a courier for senior leaders. He possesses significant connections to high-level Taliban and al-Qaeda figures. The detainee has been uncooperative during interviews and is assessed to pose a high risk threat. It is recommended he be transferred subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AG-000175DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on evidence that he was an al-Qaida member who received training at al-Faruq camp and possibly explosives training. He is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US forces as a leader coordinating supplies for al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora, and was possibly selected for training as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. The document recommends his continued detention due to these assessments and his lack of cooperation.
This document provides a recommendation to continue detaining detainee US9AF-001021DP based on a JTF GTMO assessment. The detainee is assessed to be a high-ranking member of the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) with ties to Al-Qaida and its global terrorism network. He was implicated in a plot to kill Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan by placing bombs at the Presidential Palace and US Embassy. Consistent reporting indicates the detainee remains committed to the HIG and its goals. It is assessed that he poses a high risk and is likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for transferring detainee ISN US9AF-001035DP to another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable former Taliban commander from Afghanistan who is currently in good health. He is assessed as a MEDIUM risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The detainee was captured with documents indicating ties to the Taliban and admitted being a member of an anti-coalition group. He provided information on weapon caches and personalities within the Taliban and Konar province government that expanded US intelligence. Based on this information, JTF-GTMO now recommends the detainee for transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000118DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of the Taliban who received weapons training at Taliban facilities and may have been involved in military action against coalition forces, posing a medium risk. He is in good physical health but receives mental health treatment. The assessment recommends transfer and cites the detainee's admissions of traveling with Taliban groups and surrendering to Northern Alliance forces.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000890DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a former Taliban commander who led over 4,000 men and had connections to senior Taliban leaders. He is assessed as a high risk and likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies. The memorandum recommends transfer conditional on the other country agreeing to continued detention and intelligence access.
(S//NF) Detainee was a senior Taliban official who held multiple high-level positions including Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army. He commanded thousands of Taliban troops and had close ties to al-Qaeda members. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes and would likely rejoin militant groups and target US forces if released. He poses a high security risk and has high intelligence value.
The document provides an assessment and recommendation for transferring Guantanamo detainee Zahir Shah, ISN US9AF-00101ODP, to the control of another country with conditions. It summarizes that Zahir Shah is assessed to be the deputy commander of a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) cell in Afghanistan and affiliated with al-Qaeda. He is assessed to pose a medium risk. The document recommends his transfer subject to an acceptable agreement while noting he may have intelligence value on HIG operations, weapons caches, and al-Qaeda affiliations.
Detainee Naswar Khan Sawat Khan is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He was the second-in-command of the Union of Mujahadin (UOM) and subordinate to Malem Jan, the leader of the UOM who was also subordinate to Jalaluddin Haqqani and his Haqqani network. Detainee is assessed as having been a commander for both the UOM and likely the Haqqani network as well. Documents found list detainee as the number two leader of the UOM and as having personnel assigned to him, indicating his direct involvement in the organization. He has been deceptive and refused to discuss his true relationship with the Haqqani
Detainee served as the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence and had direct access to senior Taliban, al-Qaeda, and anti-coalition militia leadership. He coordinated intelligence activities between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and assisted their operatives in evading capture. Detainee is assessed to still pose a threat and have high intelligence value due to his role in the Taliban government and ties to other Islamic militant groups.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000909DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was assessed to be a low-level member of an anti-coalition movement group commanded by his uncle, Samoud Khan, that operated in and around Gardez, Afghanistan. The detainee is assessed to pose a medium risk and may have information on the activities and locations of personnel in his uncle's group, including Saifullah Rahman Mansour, a former senior Taliban commander. The document recommends the detainee be transferred to another country for continued detention.
Detainee was assessed as a low-level Taliban recruit from Afghanistan who was willing to martyr himself. He was recruited in 2002 to fight against US and Northern Alliance forces. While traveling through areas of Afghanistan like Zormat and Shahi-Kot, he likely has information on extremist madrassas and anti-US militants in the region. JTF-GTMO recommends he be transferred to another country for continued detention due to his commitment to jihad and likelihood of returning to terrorism if released.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000845DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes the detainee's background, including his work as a security guard for the Karzai government in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. It assesses the detainee as a medium risk and possibly associated with anti-coalition militia activity. The document recommends his transfer based on information obtained since his previous assessment that designates him as a threat to the US and its allies.
Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaida'sGlobal Jihad SupportNetwork who attendedtraining in Afghanistan andresidedin guesthousesoperatedby al-Qaidamembers.He occupiedpositionsin the Tora Bora Mountainsandparticipatedin hostilities againstUS andcoalition forces. JTF-GTMO previouslyassessedhim asa ContinuedDetentionrisk but now recommendshis TransferOut of DoD Controlbasedon his MEDIUM intelligencevalueandthreatlevel.
1. JTF GTMO recommends detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention.
2. Detainee is assessed as a low-level member of Al-Qaida's terrorist network and a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia who planned insurgent operations against U.S. forces in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
3. Detainee was captured with improvised explosive devices intended to be attached to bicycles and motorcycles near U.S. targets for remote detonation. He poses a medium risk and may threaten U.S. interests and allies.
This document provides a detainee assessment for an individual currently held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It recommends continued detention based on the detainee's history with militant groups and assessed likelihood to reengage in hostilities if released. Specifically:
- The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and likely to pose a threat due to his prior role as an intelligence officer for the Taliban and reported ties to other extremist groups.
- He is a member of an anti-coalition militia group with ties to the Haqqani Network and planned and executed rocket attacks against U.S. forces.
- Since his detention, his brother has engaged in insurgent activities, increasing the risk the deta
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was captured with Taliban leaders and admitted to being a bodyguard for a high-ranking Taliban commander. Detainee received training at a Taliban camp and fought against U.S. forces on the Taliban front lines. While detainee claims to have been a low-level fighter, evidence suggests he was more significant due to being captured alongside senior Taliban leaders.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee Abdullah Turkash, ISN: US9AF-000500DP, to another government for continued detention. Turkash is an elderly Afghan national diagnosed with treatable medical conditions. While he denies knowledge of extremist activities, analysis concludes he may have family connections to al-Qaeda. Despite efforts, no evidence exists to justify his continued detention at Guantanamo Bay. He is assessed as a medium threat risk due to potential connections, but of low intelligence value at this time. Coordination regarding the recommendation was made with related task forces.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
Detainee is assessed to be a high risk threat and of high intelligence value. He is a member of an Algerian armed group involved in an al-Qaeda linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Detainee fought in the Bosnian jihad in the 1990s and worked with several charities associated with terrorism. He also served as an instructor at al-Qaeda training camps. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan after 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia before departing. He denies all allegations.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000832DP. It summarizes that the detainee was a senior Taliban official who served in multiple leadership roles and had strong ties to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other anti-coalition militant groups. The detainee admitted serving in Taliban leadership positions and was involved in attacks against US and Coalition forces. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his past positions and ongoing ties to active militant groups that pose a threat to the US.
Detainee was captured in possession of improvised explosive devices and admitted to being part of a four-man cell that planned attacks against US and Coalition forces using IEDs. He was assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militia member with possible ties to al-Qaeda, and may have received explosives training in Pakistan. If released, it is assessed he could reengage in militant activities. While in detention, he has been largely compliant but also verbally harassed guards on occasions. He is considered a medium risk and of low intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends retaining a detainee, ISN US9AF-001043DP, under Department of Defense control at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who possesses intelligence on terrorist operations and personnel. He was formerly the Taliban Minister of Commerce and deputy to a senior Taliban commander. New information indicates he was involved in the killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross employee in 2003. The detainee poses a high risk and should continue to be detained.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000118DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of the Taliban who received weapons training at Taliban facilities and may have been involved in military action against coalition forces, posing a medium risk. He is in good physical health but receives mental health treatment. The assessment recommends transfer and cites the detainee's admissions of traveling with Taliban groups and surrendering to Northern Alliance forces.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000890DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a former Taliban commander who led over 4,000 men and had connections to senior Taliban leaders. He is assessed as a high risk and likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies. The memorandum recommends transfer conditional on the other country agreeing to continued detention and intelligence access.
(S//NF) Detainee was a senior Taliban official who held multiple high-level positions including Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army. He commanded thousands of Taliban troops and had close ties to al-Qaeda members. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes and would likely rejoin militant groups and target US forces if released. He poses a high security risk and has high intelligence value.
The document provides an assessment and recommendation for transferring Guantanamo detainee Zahir Shah, ISN US9AF-00101ODP, to the control of another country with conditions. It summarizes that Zahir Shah is assessed to be the deputy commander of a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) cell in Afghanistan and affiliated with al-Qaeda. He is assessed to pose a medium risk. The document recommends his transfer subject to an acceptable agreement while noting he may have intelligence value on HIG operations, weapons caches, and al-Qaeda affiliations.
Detainee Naswar Khan Sawat Khan is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He was the second-in-command of the Union of Mujahadin (UOM) and subordinate to Malem Jan, the leader of the UOM who was also subordinate to Jalaluddin Haqqani and his Haqqani network. Detainee is assessed as having been a commander for both the UOM and likely the Haqqani network as well. Documents found list detainee as the number two leader of the UOM and as having personnel assigned to him, indicating his direct involvement in the organization. He has been deceptive and refused to discuss his true relationship with the Haqqani
Detainee served as the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence and had direct access to senior Taliban, al-Qaeda, and anti-coalition militia leadership. He coordinated intelligence activities between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and assisted their operatives in evading capture. Detainee is assessed to still pose a threat and have high intelligence value due to his role in the Taliban government and ties to other Islamic militant groups.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000909DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was assessed to be a low-level member of an anti-coalition movement group commanded by his uncle, Samoud Khan, that operated in and around Gardez, Afghanistan. The detainee is assessed to pose a medium risk and may have information on the activities and locations of personnel in his uncle's group, including Saifullah Rahman Mansour, a former senior Taliban commander. The document recommends the detainee be transferred to another country for continued detention.
Detainee was assessed as a low-level Taliban recruit from Afghanistan who was willing to martyr himself. He was recruited in 2002 to fight against US and Northern Alliance forces. While traveling through areas of Afghanistan like Zormat and Shahi-Kot, he likely has information on extremist madrassas and anti-US militants in the region. JTF-GTMO recommends he be transferred to another country for continued detention due to his commitment to jihad and likelihood of returning to terrorism if released.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000845DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes the detainee's background, including his work as a security guard for the Karzai government in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. It assesses the detainee as a medium risk and possibly associated with anti-coalition militia activity. The document recommends his transfer based on information obtained since his previous assessment that designates him as a threat to the US and its allies.
Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaida'sGlobal Jihad SupportNetwork who attendedtraining in Afghanistan andresidedin guesthousesoperatedby al-Qaidamembers.He occupiedpositionsin the Tora Bora Mountainsandparticipatedin hostilities againstUS andcoalition forces. JTF-GTMO previouslyassessedhim asa ContinuedDetentionrisk but now recommendshis TransferOut of DoD Controlbasedon his MEDIUM intelligencevalueandthreatlevel.
1. JTF GTMO recommends detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention.
2. Detainee is assessed as a low-level member of Al-Qaida's terrorist network and a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia who planned insurgent operations against U.S. forces in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
3. Detainee was captured with improvised explosive devices intended to be attached to bicycles and motorcycles near U.S. targets for remote detonation. He poses a medium risk and may threaten U.S. interests and allies.
This document provides a detainee assessment for an individual currently held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It recommends continued detention based on the detainee's history with militant groups and assessed likelihood to reengage in hostilities if released. Specifically:
- The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and likely to pose a threat due to his prior role as an intelligence officer for the Taliban and reported ties to other extremist groups.
- He is a member of an anti-coalition militia group with ties to the Haqqani Network and planned and executed rocket attacks against U.S. forces.
- Since his detention, his brother has engaged in insurgent activities, increasing the risk the deta
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was captured with Taliban leaders and admitted to being a bodyguard for a high-ranking Taliban commander. Detainee received training at a Taliban camp and fought against U.S. forces on the Taliban front lines. While detainee claims to have been a low-level fighter, evidence suggests he was more significant due to being captured alongside senior Taliban leaders.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee Abdullah Turkash, ISN: US9AF-000500DP, to another government for continued detention. Turkash is an elderly Afghan national diagnosed with treatable medical conditions. While he denies knowledge of extremist activities, analysis concludes he may have family connections to al-Qaeda. Despite efforts, no evidence exists to justify his continued detention at Guantanamo Bay. He is assessed as a medium threat risk due to potential connections, but of low intelligence value at this time. Coordination regarding the recommendation was made with related task forces.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
Detainee is assessed to be a high risk threat and of high intelligence value. He is a member of an Algerian armed group involved in an al-Qaeda linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Detainee fought in the Bosnian jihad in the 1990s and worked with several charities associated with terrorism. He also served as an instructor at al-Qaeda training camps. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan after 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia before departing. He denies all allegations.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000832DP. It summarizes that the detainee was a senior Taliban official who served in multiple leadership roles and had strong ties to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other anti-coalition militant groups. The detainee admitted serving in Taliban leadership positions and was involved in attacks against US and Coalition forces. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his past positions and ongoing ties to active militant groups that pose a threat to the US.
Detainee was captured in possession of improvised explosive devices and admitted to being part of a four-man cell that planned attacks against US and Coalition forces using IEDs. He was assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militia member with possible ties to al-Qaeda, and may have received explosives training in Pakistan. If released, it is assessed he could reengage in militant activities. While in detention, he has been largely compliant but also verbally harassed guards on occasions. He is considered a medium risk and of low intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends retaining a detainee, ISN US9AF-001043DP, under Department of Defense control at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who possesses intelligence on terrorist operations and personnel. He was formerly the Taliban Minister of Commerce and deputy to a senior Taliban commander. New information indicates he was involved in the killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross employee in 2003. The detainee poses a high risk and should continue to be detained.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
The document is a memorandum recommending the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000934DP. It finds that he poses a high security risk, as he was likely a member of a Taliban militia unit and involved in rocket attacks against U.S. forces. If released, it assesses he would reconnect with extremists and resume hostile activities. The detainee has been inconsistent about his involvement and maintains contact with Taliban members, posing a threat to the U.S. and allies.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-001012DP, to the control of Afghanistan for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have worked as a facilitator for Al Wafa, transporting Arabs from Iran to the Afghanistan border from 2000-2002. He facilitated travel for Al-Qaida operatives and is linked to the director of Al Wafa activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While not a member of Al-Qaida or the Taliban, he is deemed a medium risk and may pose a threat to US interests due to his ties to terrorist organizations. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay and the Criminal Investigative Task Force agree on the assessment
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer the detainee, ISN US9AF-000914DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk threat who was a member of an anti-coalition movement group led by warlord Samoud Khan that was affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He received religious indoctrination at a madrassa led by a known al-Qaeda and Taliban affiliated leader. While the detainee's information may be useful, his credibility is questionable as he has provided inconsistent statements and instructed other detainees to lie. The memorandum recommends transfer for continued detention due to the detainee's affiliations and associations with terrorist groups and personalities.
This document provides a summary and recommendation for transferring a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was previously assessed as "Retain in DoD" but is now recommended for transfer to the control of another country based on new information. Specifically, the detainee is assessed as a probable Al-Qaeda facilitator and possible anti-coalition militant supporter who aided Al-Qaeda members' escape from Afghanistan and may have ties to Pakistani intelligence services. The document recommends his transfer due to these assessments and potential intelligence value regarding border operations and militant groups.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as a high-risk member of al-Qaeda. He is assessed to have been an explosives expert for an IED cell in Khowst subordinate to senior al-Qaeda operative Abu Layth al-Libi. As part of the cell, the detainee directly assisted in planning and implementing attacks against US and Coalition forces. Evidence includes 23 mines found buried at his compound and notebooks with IED assembly instructions. He is reported to have surveyed targets and planted mines to ambush forces, and suggested using a Stinger missile.
Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan under the influence of his older brothers, one of whom was a senior al-Qaida member. Detainee received training at al-Qaida camps and guesthouses and worked closely with senior al-Qaida operatives, including having advance knowledge of attack plots. He was captured in 2002 during a raid on an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi with other detainees. The document provides details of detainee's travels, training, associates, and activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Detainee is assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militias (ACM) member suspected of participating in the 27 March 2003 murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) worker in Afghanistan. He was captured with a satellite phone he was using to contact Mullah Haji Satar, an ACM commander suspected of the ICRC murder. Detainee has provided inconsistent accounts and an uncertain identity. He is assessed to present a high risk threat due to his ties to ACM commanders conducting attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces.
This memorandum recommends transferring a detainee, ISN US9AF-000954DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have ties to anti-coalition movement leaders in Afghanistan and resisted capture for over an hour by firing weapons and throwing grenades at U.S. and Afghan forces. He is not known to have directly attacked U.S. or coalition forces, but is assessed to possibly still pose a threat. The detainee provided district-level services under the Taliban and knew key figures such as Saifullah Rahman Mansour, a former Taliban commander with ties to al-Qaeda. It is recommended he be transferred for continued detention due to these associations and his resistance
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000848DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk and a commander in the Taliban who was part of a 40-man unit conducting anti-coalition operations. While the detainee has been compliant in detention, he possesses medium intelligence value due to his role in the 40-man unit and potential knowledge of its operations and security of high-level al-Qaeda and Taliban personnel. The document recommends his transfer for continued detention.
1) The document provides a recommendation to continue detaining a Guantanamo detainee named Sabir Lahmar Manfud due to his involvement with the Armed Islamic Group and ties to terrorist plots and activities in Bosnia.
2) It notes he advocated hostility against US forces, intended to travel to Afghanistan and Iran, and would likely engage in anti-US activities if released.
3) New information since the last review includes reports of his presence at an al-Qaeda guest house in Afghanistan and attempts to meet with al-Qaeda leaders in Iran.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AF-000831DP to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who provided support to extremist groups including Al-Qaida. He has ties to other detainees involved in moving Al-Qaida members and conducting attacks. While the detainee claims not to be involved, evidence links him to supporting a bomb-making cell and safe houses used by terrorists. He is assessed to have intelligence value and still poses a medium risk.
Detainee ISN US9AF-001037DP is assessed to be a high-ranking commander in the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group. He was captured along with another high-ranking HIG commander, ISN 1036, during a raid on a HIG safe house. Detainee and ISN 1036 have provided conflicting statements about their roles in HIG and how long they have known each other. Detainee is assessed to pose a high risk as he likely would threaten U.S. interests. JTF GTMO assesses the detainee to be of high intelligence value and recommends he continue to be detained in DoD custody.
Detainee Akhtiar Mohammad is assessed to be a high-level commander in the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group who has extensive knowledge of anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan. He is assessed to pose a high risk if released. Detainee was captured in 2003 at a suspected HIG compound during a raid. He has been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2004 and continues to be assessed as an enemy combatant with high intelligence value due to his connections and knowledge of HIG activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation on detainee ISN US9AF-000457DP. It recommends the detainee be released or transferred to another country's control based on the following: the detainee is assessed to pose a low threat; he is unlikely to be a member of al-Qaeda or Taliban; careful review found no new derogatory information; and other detainees captured with him provided no damaging information. The detainee may have general knowledge about air strikes in his village and Jalaluddin Haqqani's activities, but is assessed to have low intelligence value.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed as a senior-level Taliban member who organized networks and disrupted coalition operations. He facilitated operations that likely resulted in US casualties. The detainee poses a high risk and can provide intelligence on extremist activities, drug trafficking, and Taliban networks. The Joint Task Force recommends continued detention.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a Guantanamo detainee, ISN: US9AF-001100DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was involved in anti-coalition militia operations and planned an attack on US forces in Afghanistan. He has direct ties to senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. The document assesses the detainee as a medium risk and recommends his transfer based on derogatory information obtained since his previous assessment.
Surajadin Abib (ISN: US9AF-000458DP) is recommended for transfer to another country with conditions based on his close ties to Jalaluddin Haqqani, the former Taliban Minister of Borders. Haqqani oversees anti-coalition militia operations in the Khowst area. It is believed Haqqani was attending a meeting at the detainee's compound when it was bombed in November 2001. The detainee denies knowledge of Haqqani or Taliban in the area despite evidence to the contrary. He poses a medium risk and may have information on Haqqani and ongoing militant activities.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000494, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk and a member of the Taliban who was likely engaged in hostilities against US and Northern Alliance forces. He commanded Taliban troops in Mazar-e-Sharif and participated in a massacre of Shiite Muslims. While the detainee has provided some information, he is assessed to have withheld details about Taliban operations and personnel. The document recommends his transfer for continued detention due to his Taliban membership and role in hostilities.
A memorandum from the Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining a detainee under Department of Defense control. The detainee, captured in Mexico attempting to enter the US, has provided inconsistent stories about his travel and background. He is considered of high intelligence value due to his potential knowledge of smuggling routes and operations. While generally compliant in detention, he has failed polygraph tests regarding combat training and intentions in the US. The task force assesses he poses a medium security risk.
Detainee Mohammed Shah is assessed as a probable member of al Qaeda who has ties to terrorist political parties in Iran. He is assessed to be a medium risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The document recommends transferring the detainee to another country with conditions, subject to an acceptable transfer agreement. It provides details of the detainee's background, including fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, working as a doctor in Iran, and traveling between Afghanistan and Iran with large sums of money to support terrorist activities. The detainee is considered of medium intelligence value and may be able to provide information on Taliban commanders, couriers, and training camps in Iran with links to terrorist groups.
Detainee is a 52-year old Algerian national assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and the North African Extremist Network who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and received small arms training at an al-Qaida camp. He is assessed to be a high risk and threat to the US due to his extremist connections and admitted associations with known terrorists. The document recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention, preferably Algeria, if a satisfactory agreement can be reached. If not, he should remain in DoD custody due to contradictions in his story and suspected deception during interrogations.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000955DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have connections to anti-coalition activities in Afghanistan and may have been involved in rocket attacks against US forces. He was found deceptive during a polygraph about his participation. The detainee has also been tentatively identified as the chief of investigations for the Taliban in Zormat province. It is recommended he be transferred for continued detention due to posing a medium risk of engaging in future anti-coalition activities if released.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000941DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. Key details include:
- The detainee is assessed to be associated with al-Qaeda and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin due to his close ties with known al-Qaeda facilitators Abu Nasim al-Tunisi and Abu Sulayman al-Jazairi.
- He was captured in Pakistan during a raid on three suspected al-Qaeda safehouses linked to al-Jazairi and al-Tunisi.
- It is assessed that the detainee poses a medium risk and may
Haji Sahib Rohullah Wakil is assessedto pose a high risk threat. He is a 45-year-old Afghan citizen and important politician from Konar Province who provided operational support to al-Qaida. Detainee assisted Arabs associated with al-Qaida to infiltrate and exfiltrate from Afghanistan and Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban regime. He also worked with anti-Afghan government factions and Pakistani intelligence to destabilize the interim Afghan administration. Detainee remains a threat due to his past involvement with al-Qaida, support for insurgent groups, and efforts to undermine the Afghan government.
This document provides an intelligence assessment and transfer recommendation for a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was a high-ranking member of the Taliban who held multiple positions, including as the head of the Sherbergan Oil Exploration Plant. While he has been deceptive during interrogations, he may possess key information on Taliban intelligence structures and operations. As such, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to posing a medium risk.
The document provides a 3-part summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay:
1) It recommends the detainee for release or transfer to another country due to having only nominal affiliations with anti-coalition militants based on tribal relationships. The detainee is assessed to be a low risk.
2) It details the detainee's background, including being captured with two others in Afghanistan and having loose connections to two tribal leaders involved in anti-coalition activities.
3) It assesses the detainee as having low intelligence value, though provides some potential areas of exploitation, and recommends he remain classified as an enemy combatant.
Detaineeis recommendedfor transferout of DoD control basedon being an admittedTaliban memberwho spentfour yearsin the Taliban intelligenceservice.He hasfamilial ties to activeanti-coalitionmilitia membersandwould likely rejoin suchgroupsif released.The detaineeis assessedas a mediumrisk andthreatbasedon thesefactors. He hasbeencompliantin detentionbut his brother-in-lawandassociatesremainactiveinsurgentsin Afghanistan.
Detaineeis assessedas a memberof the Taliban and Al-Qaida terrorist network. He served in a 40-man Taliban unit that provided security for Usama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida leaders. The unit also conducted assassinations, kidnappings and bombings against US forces. Detainee admits connections to senior Taliban commanders and fighting against US troops. He poses a high security risk and likely would rejoin insurgent operations if released.
Detainee is an Afghan national captured in 2002 for suspected involvement with al-Qaida. He worked closely with al-Qaida commander IZ-10026 for approximately 5 years, serving as his assistant, facilitator, translator, and distributing funds on his behalf. Detainee admitted participating in hostilities against US forces and operating al-Qaida guesthouses. He is assessed to still pose a threat and would likely reengage in extremist activities if released. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000562DP, to another country for continued detention. Key details include:
- The detainee is a 25-year-old Afghan national who was captured in 2002 and may have worked briefly as a clerk for an individual linked to the Taliban.
- He has been diagnosed with a dissociative disorder and poses a medium risk, though he claims to have no terrorist affiliations or training.
- The assessment recommends transferring the detainee to his country of citizenship for further psychiatric care due to his deteriorating mental state.
Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AG-000533DP. It summarizes the detainee's personal information, travel history, activities in Afghanistan including possible ties to al-Qaeda, and capture in Tora Bora after being injured attempting to flee US bombing. The assessment determines he poses a high risk and high intelligence value, and recommends his continued detention due to concerns he could reengage in extremism if released.
Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-Qaida who received terrorist training in Afghanistan. He reportedly attended training at al-Qaida affiliated camps, associated with known al-Qaida operatives, and resided in al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee likely participated in action against U.S. and coalition forces. He is assessed as a medium risk and threat, and of medium intelligence value.
Detainee Ahmed Bin Saleh Bel Bachao is assessed as a probable member of al-Qaida who received weapons training in Afghanistan. He traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 after being influenced by extremist lectures at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London. In Afghanistan, he stayed at an Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad known to facilitate foreign fighters, where he received small arms training. He fled to Tora Bora during US attacks and was later captured with a large group of fighters. It is assessed he poses a medium risk and may have participated in hostilities against US forces.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay to another facility. It summarizes the detainee's personal information and assesses him as a probable member of al-Qaeda's support network who likely received improvised explosive device training. The detainee is believed to have traveled from France to Afghanistan via the UK and Pakistan, staying at guesthouses associated with extremist groups. He is assessed to pose a medium risk and high intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AG-000284DP to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and al-Qaeda's global terrorist network. He has been identified as receiving terrorist training, but does not appear to be a senior leader. While sometimes cooperative, he has also been uncooperative and obstinate during interrogations. The Joint Task Force assesses he poses a medium risk but defers to the Criminal Investigative Task Force's assessment that he poses a high risk.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for detainee ISN US9AG-000070DP held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is a 24-year old Algerian man with a history of significant head trauma resulting in blindness in one eye and brain injuries causing difficulties with speech, understanding, and controlling behaviors. Due to his medical condition, he requires long-term custodial care. While previously assessed as medium intelligence value, he now poses a low risk. The Joint Task Force recommends releasing or transferring the detainee to another country for continued detention based on his health status and low risk level.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
This document provides a summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is believed to have worked for a known member of the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group and traveled between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for over a decade. Concerns were raised about inconsistencies in his story and links to anti-coalition militant groups. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining him in the Department of Defense's control due to these associations and assessed intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends releasing or transferring a Guantanamo detainee. The detainee was likely falsely accused of participating in an ambush by Afghan forces seeking to cover up their own involvement. Records indicate the detainee poses a low risk and likely has no valuable intelligence. While the Criminal Investigation Task Force assesses the detainee as medium risk, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo recommends release or transfer based on the fraudulent circumstances of his capture.
Detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and weapons smuggler associated with senior Taliban officials. He was captured in 2003 with documents and materials indicating ties to the Taliban and extremist networks. Detainee worked closely with the Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister and other senior figures. He denies the full extent of his Taliban activities and affiliations. JTF-GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be detained due to his high-level Taliban connections and potential threat.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-001075DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be of medium intelligence value and a medium threat risk. He was captured in Afghanistan in possession of weapons and has ties to anti-coalition militant groups in the Gardez region. While the detainee denies involvement, he has knowledge about a bombing in Gardez. The task force recommends his transfer to allow another country to take over his continued detention.
DetaineeMohammedAmin is recommendedfor transferto the control of anothercountry for continueddetention.He is assessedto be a memberof Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddinwho attendedplanningmeetingswhereattacksagainstUS-ledcoalitionforcesandtheAfghangovernmentwere discussed.Detaineehasassociationswith TalibanandAl-Qaedafiguresandmay haveknowledgeof futureplannedattacksdue to his involvementwith Anti-Coalitionforcesin Afghanistan.While in custody,hehasbeengenerallycompliantbut remainsan enemycombatant.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo Bay detainee, ISN US9AF-001045DP, in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee (1) is assessed to be a key member of anti-coalition militant groups who has participated in weapons trafficking, explosives training, and attacks against US and coalition forces; (2) has admitted ties to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations; and (3) poses a high risk and is likely to provide intelligence on terrorist networks, operations, and leaders if retained in DoD control.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN:US9AF-001019DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is an Afghan national who fought with the mujahideen and Taliban. He is assessed to have been a corrupt government official in Zabol province who associated with known terrorists like Hamidullah. While somewhat cooperative, he has been evasive about his full role. He poses a medium security risk and may have intelligence value. The Joint Task Force recommends his transfer for continued detention based on these assessments.
1. SE C R E T //NOFORN I / 20300513
DEPARTMENTOF DEF'ENSE
JOINT TASK FORCEGUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360
JTFGTMO-CG 13May2005
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander,United StatesSouthernCommand,3511NW 9lstAvenue,
Miami,FL33172.
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Transferto the Control of Another Country for
ContinuedDetention(TRCD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-000907DP(S)
JTFGTMODetaineeAssessment
1. (FOUO)PersonalInformation:
HabibUllah
Habib Rahman.Man Goot.
o Placeof Birth: Mansehra.Pakistan(PK)
o Dateof Birth: 1982
o Citizenship: Afghanistan(AF)
o InternmentSerialNumber (ISN): US9AF-000907DP
2. (FOUO)Health: Detaineeis in goodhealth,isnotonanychronicmedications,andhasno
knowndrugallergies.Hehaslatenttuberculosisandrefusesmedication.Detaineehasachronic
skinconditionthatdoesnotposeahealthrisk. Hewasevaluatedby behavioralhealthandhas
nopsychiatricconditions.Hehasnotravelrestrictions.
3. (S/NF) JTF GTMOAssessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTFGTMOrecommendsdetaineebeTransferredto the
Controlof AnotherCountryfor ContinuedDetention(TRCD).
b. (S//NF)Summary: JTFGTMOpreviouslyassesseddetaineeto beRetainedin DoD
(DoD)on20November2003.Baseduponinformationobtainedsincedetainee'sprevious
assessment,it is nowrecommendedhebeTransferredto theControlof AnotherCountryfor
ContinuedDetention(TRCD).
CLASSIFIEDBY: MULTIPLESOURCES
REASON:E.O.12958SECTION1.5(C)
DECLASSIFYON:20300513
o JDIMSAIDRC ReferenceName:
o AliasesandCurrent/TrueName:
ManGowt. Mangowt Habibullah
SE C R E T // NOFORN/ I 2O3OO5I3
2. S E C R E T //NOFORN / I 2O3OO5I3
JTF GTMO.CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Transferto the Control of Another Country for
ContinuedDetention(TRCD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-000907DP(S)
Detaineeis assessedasa memberof an Anti-Coalition Movement (ACM) with strongtiesto
Al-Qaida affiliated Taliban leadership. Detaineeis assessedasan integral part of the
SamoudKhan,US9AF-0001850DPQSN 1850),ACM groupoperatingin andaround
Gardez,AF. Detaineehasadmittedto participating in a rocket attackagainstUnited States
andcoalition forces. Detaineewas in frequentcommunicationswith seniorTaliban leader,
Saifullah RahmanMansour. Furthermore,it is assessedthat the detaineepossessesfamilial
ties to extremisVmilitantIslam andis the sonof a former Taliban Minister of Islamic Virtue.
If released,detaineeis likely to continuehis ACM activities. It is assessedthis detaineeis a
MEDIUM risk, ashe may posea threatto the US, its interestsandallies.
4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unlessotherwisenoted,thefollowing
paragraphsarebasedsolely on the detainee'sstatements.
a. (S) Prior History: Detaineeneverattendedschool. He hasworkedfrom a very young
ageto eammoney for his family. During the Taliban rule, detaineelived andworked in
Kashmir, PK, asa generallaborerfor approximatelyoneyear.
b. (S) Recruitment and Travel: Detaineewashiredasa cookandguardfor Samoud
Khan's compound.(Analystnote: SamoudKhan,ISN 1850,is a well known warlordin
Afghanistanwho haslinks to bothAl-Qaidaandthe Taliban.) ISN 1850originally cameto
detainee'shomeandhired detaineeto helpprovideprotectionagainsthis enemies.ISN 1850
wasa friend of detainee'sfather,Haji ZaherKhan. Detaineeknew ISN 1850wasin
Kashmir, PK, during the Taliban era. ISN 1850retumedto Afghanistanwhen the Americans
invaded.
c. (S) Training and Activities: Detainee'sdutiesfor ISN 1850includedcookingand
security. ISN 1850washiredby the localcommunityto decidethepunishmentof criminals
within the district. Detaineeobtainedan identification card,which he wore aroundhis neck,
to showhe hada positive relationshipwith the Americansin his district. Detaineelived at
ISN 1850'scompoundwith 19othermen. Eachpersonwasprovidedwith a Kalashnikov
rifle. Therewere alsotwo RPG-7 rocketsin the compound. While detaineeworked for ISN
1850,everyoneat the compound,including detainee,wore greenbattle dressuniforms
similar to the onesworn by US soldiers. Afghan GeneralAtik, who wasworking for the US,
providedtheseuniformsfor ISN 1850'smen.Detaineeadmittedto participatingin rocket
attackswith ISN 1850'sgroupagainstcoalitionforces. Theseattackswereagainstthe
coalitionbaseat Gardez,AF.
d. (S) Capture Information: Detaineewascapturedon 11December2002duringa US
SpecialForcesraid of ISN 1850'scompound.AsadUllah, US9AF-000912(ISN 912),Naqib
1
L
SE C R E T // NOFORNI I 2O3OO5I3
3. SE C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3OO5I3
JTFGTMO-CG
SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationto Transferto theControlof AnotherCountryfor
ContinuedDetention(TRCD)for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN:US9AF-000907DP(S)
Ullah,US9AF-000913(ISN913),ShardarKhan,US9AF-000914(ISN914),and
MohammedIsmailUS9AF-000930(ISN930)werealsocapturedwith detainee.ISN 1850
wasatthecompound,butwaswamedof theattackandescapedby motorcycle.At thetime
of capturethedetaineepossessedan AK-47,anotebook,and2pornographicplayingcards.
DetaineewasheldatBagramdetentionfacility. ISN's912,9I3,930wereall classified
JuvenileEnemyCombatants(JEC)andsubsequentlyreleasedto Afghanistan.(Analyst
Note:CoalitionforceshavesincerecapturedISN-930duringafirefightin Afghanistan.)
e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 6 February2003
f. (S//NF)Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: Toprovideinformationonthe
following:
o Terrorismoperations
. Keypersonnelbiographies
o Sociologicalfactorsandbiographies
o Hostileinstallationsin Afghanistan
5. (S//NF)DetaineeThreat:
a. (S) Assessment: It is determinedthisdetaineeposesaMEDIUM risk,ashemaypose
athreattotheUS,itsinterestsandallies.
b. (S//NF)Reasonsfor Gontinued Detention:
. (S/AIF)Detaineehasadmittedto participatingin arocketattackconductedby ISN
1850'sgroupagainstUSforceslocatedatFirebaseSalamoin theGardez-Zormatarea.
(Analystnote: Detaineehassincerecantedhisadmissionto participatingin therocket
attackandprovidedthreedifferentaccountsof thisevent;eachdistancinghimselffurther
fromincriminatingactivity.)
o (S/AIF)Detaineehasadmittedto workingfor ISN 1850,anAl-Qaida/Taliban
affiliatedACM leader,andis reportedto possessdirecttiesto formerTalibancommander
andACM leaderSaifullahRahmanMansour.
o (S/A{F)ISN 1850hasplannedandcarriedoutnumerousillegalacts,including:
robberies,kidnappings,murders,andstealingcarsfromtheAfghanpeople.ISN 1850
is anassociateof SaifullahRahmanMansour.(Analystnote:Mansouris theformer
Taliban8ftDivisionCommander.Heis aknownACM leaderlistedonCENTCOM's
TierIII personalitiesandiswantedby AfghanandcoalitionForces.)Theleadersof
Al-Qaida,Hezbi-e-IslamiGulbuddin(HIG)andTaliban;UsamaBin Laden(UBL),
3
SE C RE T // NOFORNI I 2O3OO5I3
4. SE C RE T //NOFORN I I 2O3OO5I3
JTFGTMO-CG
SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationto Transferto theControlof AnotherCountryfor
ContinuedDetention(TRCD)for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN:US9AF-000907DP(S)
Gulbuddin HekmatyarandMullah Omar,respectivelygaveMansour,Malawi Kabir
andJalaluddinHaqqanithe responsibilityto attackcoalition forcesin the Khost,
Paktia,andGhazniProvincesof Afghanistan.
o (S) ISN 1850wasin Kashmir,PK, duringthe Talibanadministrationof
Afghanistan. ISN 1850returnedto Afghanistanafterthe fall of the Taliban.
Detaineewasin Kashmir,PK, atthe sametime asISN 1850. It is suspectedthatthe
detaineewasassociatedwith ISN 1850while in Kashmir,PK. Theirtime in Kashmir,
PK, is suspectedto be in supportof Islamic extremistactivities in the Kashmir
conflict (Jihad).(Analyst Note: An affiliation to the Kashmirjihad identifies that the
detaineepossessesa rootedcommitmentto militant Islamandjihad. This would also
presentthe potential for the detaineeto possessties to PakistaniIslamic
Extremist/Militant groupsoperatingbetweenthe Afghan andPakistanjihads.)
o (S/AfD ISN 914,who wascapturedwith detainee,corroboratesdetainee'stiesto
ISN 1850andidentifiesthe detainee'sdirectties SaifullahRahmanMansour. ISN
914reportedthat:
. (S/AIF) Detaineewas in radio contactwith ISN 1850and Saifullah Rahman
Mansourwhile they were conductingattackson US forceslocatedat the Gardez,
AF, firebase.
. (S/AIF) Mansourcalled detaineeaboutevery five or six dayswanting detainee
to checkon his (Mansour's)family. During oneconversation,Mansourasked
detaineeif he wantedto attackthe Gardezfirebaseandthat he would supplythe
weaponsif detaineedid.
. (S/AIF) ISN 1850traineddetaineeon theproperuseof the smallhand-held
radios. (Analystnote:Probablythe ICOM 168radio,which is in widespreaduse
by ACM groups.)
. (S/A{F)ISN 1850instructeddetaineehow to contactMansour'scavecomplex
in the mountainsnearShai-I-Khot, AF. Detaineedelivereda letter to Mansour
from ISN 1850informinghim aboutcommunicationsproblems.
. (S/AIF) Detaineedeliveredlettersto Mansour'scompoundaboutthreeor four
times. Mansoursentfive lettersto ISN 1850via detainee.
. (S/AIF) In November2002,ISN 1850'sgroupwasgoingto movetheirbase
of operationsfrom Gardez,AF, to the Shai-I-Khot, AF, mountainrangeandjoin
with Mansour's groupto continueoperationsagainstUS andcoalition forces.
. (S/AIF)Right beforetheywerecaptured,detaineetold ISNs 912191319141930
that it was importantto all havethe samestory andnot revealany secret
information aboutMansour. Detaineeinstructedthe othersto tell the Americans
that they all worked for Dr. FaisalUllah.
o (S/A{F)ISN 912hasidentifieddetaineeasISN 914's cousin. ISN 914is alsoa
memberof the Samoudgroupandwas capturedwith the detainee. ISN 912 hasalso
identified detainee'sfatherasa Minister of "Islamic Virtue" during the war againstthe
+
SE C R E T / / NOFORN/ / 20300513
5. S E C RE T // NOFORN I / 2O3OO5I3
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Transferto the Control of Another Country for
ContinuedDetention(TRCD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-000907DP(S)
Russians.He went from village to village to enforceTaliban law. (Analyst note: This
probablymeansdetainee'sfatherhelda leadershippositionin his village andalsowith
the Taliban. Additionally, it is likely that familial ties of this extentwould breeda strong
commitmentto extremisVmilitantIslam in the detainee.)
o (S/A{F)FaisalSahaAl Naser,US9AF-000437DP(ISN 437),identifieddetaineeasa
facilitator. ISN 437 met detaineein Quetta,PK. Detaineewas looking for peoplewho
wantedto fight thejihad in Afghanistan.(Analyst note: Presumably,detaineehelpedISN
437withtravel arrangementsfor his trip to the Al-Qaida-operatedAl Farouqtraining
campin Kandahar,AF.)
c. (S/NF) Detainee's Gonduct: Detainee'sbehavioris assessedasmostlycompliant.
Detaineeassaultedthe guardsthreetimes, including spitting on the commandingofficer. The
othertwo assaultswere againstthe guardsandinvolved detaineethrowing Meals Readyto
Eat (MRE) wrappersat the guards. Detaineehadtwo failuresto comply with ordersgiven by
guards.
6. (S/NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO hasdeterminedthis detaineeis of MEDIUM
intelligencevalue.
. (S) Detaineehasparticipatedin, andhasknowledgeof, attacksagainstUS and
coalitionforces. Detaineeis reportedlya relativeof ISN 1850who hasattackedcoalition
forcesmultiple times. Detaineeworked for andcommunicationwith Saifullah Mansour
who wasthe overall leaderagainstthe coalition in the Paktiaprovince region of
Afghanistan.Due to detainee'splacementandaccessandhis familial ties,detaineeis
assessedto havesignificantdetailsof Mansour'sforcecompositionanddispositionin the
Paktiaprovince. Detaineehadplacementandaccessto high level terroristsandmay have
knowledgeof safehouses,encampments,andhow to contactACM personalities.
b. (S/NF)Areasof PotentialExploitation:
o Saifullah RahmanMansour
o Cavecomplex
. Family andhideoutlocations
o PersonalitiesandACM leadersassociatedwith Mansour
o ACM groupsandactivities underthe control of Mansour
o Tactics,TechniquesandProceduresusedby ACM groups
o SamoudKhan (ISN 1850)groupoperations
)
SE C R E T //NOFORN I / 2O3OO5I3
6. SE C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3OO5I3
JTFGTMO-CG
SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationto Transferto theControlof AnotherCountryfor
ContinuedDetention(TRCD)for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN:US9AF-000907DP(S)
o ISN 1850recruitingmethods
o IslamicMilitant Groupsin Pakistan
7. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon5November2004,
andheremainsanenemycombatant.
Xab 4'q
q/AY w.HooD
BrigadierGeneral,USA
Commanding
6
S E C R E T //NOFORN / / 2O3OO5I3