Detaineeis assessedas a memberof the Taliban and Al-Qaida terrorist network. He served in a 40-man Taliban unit that provided security for Usama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida leaders. The unit also conducted assassinations, kidnappings and bombings against US forces. Detainee admits connections to senior Taliban commanders and fighting against US troops. He poses a high security risk and likely would rejoin insurgent operations if released.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AF-000831DP to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who provided support to extremist groups including Al-Qaida. He has ties to other detainees involved in moving Al-Qaida members and conducting attacks. While the detainee claims not to be involved, evidence links him to supporting a bomb-making cell and safe houses used by terrorists. He is assessed to have intelligence value and still poses a medium risk.
DetaineeMohammedAmin is recommendedfor transferto the control of anothercountry for continueddetention.He is assessedto be a memberof Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddinwho attendedplanningmeetingswhereattacksagainstUS-ledcoalitionforcesandtheAfghangovernmentwere discussed.Detaineehasassociationswith TalibanandAl-Qaedafiguresandmay haveknowledgeof futureplannedattacksdue to his involvementwith Anti-Coalitionforcesin Afghanistan.While in custody,hehasbeengenerallycompliantbut remainsan enemycombatant.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a Guantanamo detainee, ISN: US9AF-001100DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was involved in anti-coalition militia operations and planned an attack on US forces in Afghanistan. He has direct ties to senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. The document assesses the detainee as a medium risk and recommends his transfer based on derogatory information obtained since his previous assessment.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000494, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk and a member of the Taliban who was likely engaged in hostilities against US and Northern Alliance forces. He commanded Taliban troops in Mazar-e-Sharif and participated in a massacre of Shiite Muslims. While the detainee has provided some information, he is assessed to have withheld details about Taliban operations and personnel. The document recommends his transfer for continued detention due to his Taliban membership and role in hostilities.
Detainee Mohammed Sharif is assessedto be Sharif Uddin, the former Taliban Chief of Intelligence for Balkh Province in northern Afghanistan. He initially admitted this identity but later recanted, claiming instead to be a nomadic sheep herder from northern Afghanistan. However, language analysis determined he is actually from southern Afghanistan. As Sharif Uddin, he could provide significant details on the Taliban intelligence network in northern Afghanistan, including command structure, operatives, and intelligence collection methods. He is assessedas medium risk and of medium intelligence value. JTF GTMO recommends his continued detention and transfer to another country.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was identified as an operative for the Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group who specialized in mine laying and explosives. Detainee was believed to have been involved in an assassination plot against Afghan military forces and may have knowledge of future attacks planned by HIG commanders still operating against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. While detainee denied involvement in militant activities, multiple credible sources identified him as an expert mine layer who worked for HIG commander Mullah Nasim. It was recommended that detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to his ties to terrorist groups and suspected threat to the
Operation Zarb-e-Azb was a joint military offensive launched by the Pakistan Armed Forces on June 15, 2014 against militant groups in North Waziristan, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. The operation aimed to counter militancy in the wake of a deadly attack on Karachi's airport for which TTP claimed responsibility. Over 30,000 Pakistani soldiers conducted intelligence-led operations, destroying militant hideouts and infrastructure. The operation received widespread political and public support and helped displace militants, though 82 soldiers were killed and hundreds injured.
The document outlines Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a Pakistani military offensive launched in June 2014 against militant groups in North Waziristan. It provides background on FATA and details peace negotiations between the government and TTP that failed. The operation has received domestic and international support. Over 400 terrorists have been killed and 80% of Miranshah cleared so far. The goal is to eliminate terrorists and resettle IDPs, in order to make Pakistan peaceful and progressive.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AF-000831DP to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who provided support to extremist groups including Al-Qaida. He has ties to other detainees involved in moving Al-Qaida members and conducting attacks. While the detainee claims not to be involved, evidence links him to supporting a bomb-making cell and safe houses used by terrorists. He is assessed to have intelligence value and still poses a medium risk.
DetaineeMohammedAmin is recommendedfor transferto the control of anothercountry for continueddetention.He is assessedto be a memberof Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddinwho attendedplanningmeetingswhereattacksagainstUS-ledcoalitionforcesandtheAfghangovernmentwere discussed.Detaineehasassociationswith TalibanandAl-Qaedafiguresandmay haveknowledgeof futureplannedattacksdue to his involvementwith Anti-Coalitionforcesin Afghanistan.While in custody,hehasbeengenerallycompliantbut remainsan enemycombatant.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a Guantanamo detainee, ISN: US9AF-001100DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was involved in anti-coalition militia operations and planned an attack on US forces in Afghanistan. He has direct ties to senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. The document assesses the detainee as a medium risk and recommends his transfer based on derogatory information obtained since his previous assessment.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000494, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk and a member of the Taliban who was likely engaged in hostilities against US and Northern Alliance forces. He commanded Taliban troops in Mazar-e-Sharif and participated in a massacre of Shiite Muslims. While the detainee has provided some information, he is assessed to have withheld details about Taliban operations and personnel. The document recommends his transfer for continued detention due to his Taliban membership and role in hostilities.
Detainee Mohammed Sharif is assessedto be Sharif Uddin, the former Taliban Chief of Intelligence for Balkh Province in northern Afghanistan. He initially admitted this identity but later recanted, claiming instead to be a nomadic sheep herder from northern Afghanistan. However, language analysis determined he is actually from southern Afghanistan. As Sharif Uddin, he could provide significant details on the Taliban intelligence network in northern Afghanistan, including command structure, operatives, and intelligence collection methods. He is assessedas medium risk and of medium intelligence value. JTF GTMO recommends his continued detention and transfer to another country.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was identified as an operative for the Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group who specialized in mine laying and explosives. Detainee was believed to have been involved in an assassination plot against Afghan military forces and may have knowledge of future attacks planned by HIG commanders still operating against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. While detainee denied involvement in militant activities, multiple credible sources identified him as an expert mine layer who worked for HIG commander Mullah Nasim. It was recommended that detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to his ties to terrorist groups and suspected threat to the
Operation Zarb-e-Azb was a joint military offensive launched by the Pakistan Armed Forces on June 15, 2014 against militant groups in North Waziristan, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. The operation aimed to counter militancy in the wake of a deadly attack on Karachi's airport for which TTP claimed responsibility. Over 30,000 Pakistani soldiers conducted intelligence-led operations, destroying militant hideouts and infrastructure. The operation received widespread political and public support and helped displace militants, though 82 soldiers were killed and hundreds injured.
The document outlines Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a Pakistani military offensive launched in June 2014 against militant groups in North Waziristan. It provides background on FATA and details peace negotiations between the government and TTP that failed. The operation has received domestic and international support. Over 400 terrorists have been killed and 80% of Miranshah cleared so far. The goal is to eliminate terrorists and resettle IDPs, in order to make Pakistan peaceful and progressive.
Operation Zarb-e-Azb was a large-scale military operation launched by the Pakistani military in June 2014 against various militant groups, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan. The operation involved around 30,000 ground troops as well as air support and artillery to encircle and attack militant bases. It resulted in over 2,700 terrorist casualties and the destruction of hundreds of hideouts and tons of explosives. The operation was widely supported domestically and internationally and significantly improved Pakistan's security situation and global image.
Operation Zarb-e-Azb was a large-scale military operation launched by the Pakistani military in June 2014 against militant groups in North Waziristan. The operation aimed to eliminate terrorists including the TTP, al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani network. Over 30,000 soldiers were deployed and over 2,700 terrorists were killed. Key outcomes included terrorist attacks in retaliation, such as the Peshawar school massacre in December 2014, and intensified counter-terrorism efforts by Pakistan resulting in many terrorist leaders and operatives being killed. The long-term goal of the operation is to clear Pakistan of terrorism and ensure national security and stability.
Zarb-e-Azb was a joint military operation launched by the Pakistani government in June 2014 in response to the TTP's attack on Karachi airport. Over 30,000 Pakistani soldiers were deployed to target militant groups like the TTP, Haqqani Network, and al-Qaeda operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. While the operation was supported by most political parties and civilians, the TTP responded with several retaliatory attacks including the deadly Peshawar school attack in December 2014 that killed 145 people. The Pakistani military and police intensified counterterrorism efforts, conducting raids that killed many TTP commanders and militants.
North Waziristan Agency has 10 tehsils with a population of around 0.4 million people. It has historically been a stronghold for terrorist groups like the TTP and foreign fighters. Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched in June 2014 to eliminate these terrorist havens and restore government control by clearing the area in stages, with the army, air force, frontier corps, and intelligence agencies participating. So far the operation has killed 570 terrorists and destroyed 98 hideouts while suffering 34 army deaths and 18 injuries. The army is assisting with relief efforts for over 1 million civilians displaced by the operation.
Reza Zarrab, an Iranian-Turkish businessman, was arrested in Miami in March 2016 and charged with evading US sanctions on Iran. He had risen to fame and fortune in Turkey through gold trading with Iran. However, the lifting of sanctions led Iran and Turkey to see Zarrab as disposable. It's believed Zarrab cooperated with US prosecutors to avoid the same fate as his partner, who was sentenced to death in Iran. The complex case involving corruption in Turkey and Iran is now moving forward in a US federal court.
Hillary blumenthal drumheller original documents hrc memo more_magariaf_priva...AnonDownload
1. Libyan President Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf told advisors that the death of the U.S. Ambassador at the hands of Islamist militia represents a threat to Libya's new government and its ability to protect non-Islamic allies. Security officials believe the attack was carried out by the Ansar al Sharia brigade, former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, some loyal to General Abdelhakim Belhaj.
2. The attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi was inspired by protests against an anti-Islam film, but was a planned assault by approximately 21 Ansar al Sharia fighters who infiltrated the protest and opened fire with rocket prop
BARACK OBAMA - Secret Visit To Afghanistan 05/01/12VogelDenise
President Obama made a surprise overnight visit to Afghanistan to mark the one-year anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death. He thanked U.S. troops and signed an agreement with Afghan President Karzai establishing a long-term strategic partnership between the U.S. and Afghanistan beyond 2014. Obama also addressed troops, saying the war came to America on 9/11 and though the battle is not over, they have made progress in decimating al Qaeda and bringing bin Laden to justice.
Hillary blumenthal drumheller original documents hrc memo latest_french_intel...AnonDownload
1. According to confidential sources, the Algerian government was surprised by the hostage crisis carried out by Mokhtar Belmokhtar's group at an Algerian gas plant. The Algerian security forces saw the attack as a resumption of the country's civil war and were determined to destroy Belmokhtar's group with extreme force, prioritizing security over the lives of the hostages.
2. Belmokhtar carried out the attack at the request of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to support Malian rebels facing a French military intervention. Belmokhtar has a long history with AQIM and owes them support.
3. The hostage crisis
The document discusses the geopolitical importance of oil reserves in the Caspian Sea region and the role this played in US and other countries' foreign policy decisions. It suggests that the US invasion of Afghanistan and support for certain regimes in the region were motivated partly by desires to secure oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian to international markets. However, US officials publicly denied that oil was a factor and emphasized other stated rationales like national security and counterterrorism. The control of Caspian energy resources was an area of competition and strategic interest for major powers like the US, Russia, and China.
This document discusses cover stories used by Al-Qaeda operatives detained at Guantanamo Bay to justify their travel to Afghanistan. Many claim they went to teach the Koran or provide humanitarian aid, but these have been disproven through interrogations and evidence showing the detainees' actual involvement with Al-Qaeda. Common cover stories included teaching religion, working for an NGO called Al Wafa that had Al-Qaeda ties, and claiming to help poor Afghans, but these have been exposed as false through corroborated confessions and identification of detainees as bodyguards of Osama bin Laden.
This document provides a recommendation to release or transfer a Guantanamo detainee. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed to pose a low risk and is unlikely to threaten the US or its allies. While initially suspected of money laundering, further review found no evidence to support this claim. The detainee's statements that he and his family are honest businessmen with no Taliban or Al Qaeda connections are considered truthful. It is recommended the detainee be released or transferred to another country.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a threat. He is assessed as a member of an Algerian extremist group involved in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Bosnia. Detainee served as the Bosnia contact for a senior al-Qaeda facilitator and received advanced training in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He is linked to al-Qaeda's support network and coordinated travel for extremists to Afghanistan. Detainee denies his extremist activities and identities despite corroborating intelligence reporting.
Detainee is an admitted Taliban recruiter and commander of Military Base 4 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He has an extensive operational association with Usama Bin Laden and al-Qaida dating back to 1990. Detainee provided assistance to Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri during their escape from U.S. and Coalition forces in December 2001. He also provided security for al-Qaida personnel in Tora Bora in 1999-2000 and protection to Bin Laden in 1996. Detainee worked closely with al-Qaida and possibly participated in narcotics smuggling. JTF-GTMO assesses the detainee to be a high risk and of high intelligence value.
Detainee is an Algerian national assessed to be a member of an al-Qaeda linked GIA cell in Bosnia. He is suspected of participating in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan for jihad following 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia beforehand. While in Bosnia, he threatened to attack international forces and was associated with al-Qaeda linked extremists. Detainee is also reported to have fought in Bosnia and Afghanistan as the chief martial arts instructor for an Islamic militant group. He was employed by several NGOs with ties to terrorism over seven years.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was captured with Taliban leaders and admitted to being a bodyguard for a high-ranking Taliban commander. Detainee received training at a Taliban camp and fought against U.S. forces on the Taliban front lines. While detainee claims to have been a low-level fighter, evidence suggests he was more significant due to being captured alongside senior Taliban leaders.
Surajadin Abib (ISN: US9AF-000458DP) is recommended for transfer to another country with conditions based on his close ties to Jalaluddin Haqqani, the former Taliban Minister of Borders. Haqqani oversees anti-coalition militia operations in the Khowst area. It is believed Haqqani was attending a meeting at the detainee's compound when it was bombed in November 2001. The detainee denies knowledge of Haqqani or Taliban in the area despite evidence to the contrary. He poses a medium risk and may have information on Haqqani and ongoing militant activities.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000941DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. Key details include:
- The detainee is assessed to be associated with al-Qaeda and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin due to his close ties with known al-Qaeda facilitators Abu Nasim al-Tunisi and Abu Sulayman al-Jazairi.
- He was captured in Pakistan during a raid on three suspected al-Qaeda safehouses linked to al-Jazairi and al-Tunisi.
- It is assessed that the detainee poses a medium risk and may
Operation Zarb-e-Azb was a large-scale military operation launched by the Pakistani military in June 2014 against various militant groups, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan. The operation involved around 30,000 ground troops as well as air support and artillery to encircle and attack militant bases. It resulted in over 2,700 terrorist casualties and the destruction of hundreds of hideouts and tons of explosives. The operation was widely supported domestically and internationally and significantly improved Pakistan's security situation and global image.
Operation Zarb-e-Azb was a large-scale military operation launched by the Pakistani military in June 2014 against militant groups in North Waziristan. The operation aimed to eliminate terrorists including the TTP, al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani network. Over 30,000 soldiers were deployed and over 2,700 terrorists were killed. Key outcomes included terrorist attacks in retaliation, such as the Peshawar school massacre in December 2014, and intensified counter-terrorism efforts by Pakistan resulting in many terrorist leaders and operatives being killed. The long-term goal of the operation is to clear Pakistan of terrorism and ensure national security and stability.
Zarb-e-Azb was a joint military operation launched by the Pakistani government in June 2014 in response to the TTP's attack on Karachi airport. Over 30,000 Pakistani soldiers were deployed to target militant groups like the TTP, Haqqani Network, and al-Qaeda operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. While the operation was supported by most political parties and civilians, the TTP responded with several retaliatory attacks including the deadly Peshawar school attack in December 2014 that killed 145 people. The Pakistani military and police intensified counterterrorism efforts, conducting raids that killed many TTP commanders and militants.
North Waziristan Agency has 10 tehsils with a population of around 0.4 million people. It has historically been a stronghold for terrorist groups like the TTP and foreign fighters. Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched in June 2014 to eliminate these terrorist havens and restore government control by clearing the area in stages, with the army, air force, frontier corps, and intelligence agencies participating. So far the operation has killed 570 terrorists and destroyed 98 hideouts while suffering 34 army deaths and 18 injuries. The army is assisting with relief efforts for over 1 million civilians displaced by the operation.
Reza Zarrab, an Iranian-Turkish businessman, was arrested in Miami in March 2016 and charged with evading US sanctions on Iran. He had risen to fame and fortune in Turkey through gold trading with Iran. However, the lifting of sanctions led Iran and Turkey to see Zarrab as disposable. It's believed Zarrab cooperated with US prosecutors to avoid the same fate as his partner, who was sentenced to death in Iran. The complex case involving corruption in Turkey and Iran is now moving forward in a US federal court.
Hillary blumenthal drumheller original documents hrc memo more_magariaf_priva...AnonDownload
1. Libyan President Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf told advisors that the death of the U.S. Ambassador at the hands of Islamist militia represents a threat to Libya's new government and its ability to protect non-Islamic allies. Security officials believe the attack was carried out by the Ansar al Sharia brigade, former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, some loyal to General Abdelhakim Belhaj.
2. The attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi was inspired by protests against an anti-Islam film, but was a planned assault by approximately 21 Ansar al Sharia fighters who infiltrated the protest and opened fire with rocket prop
BARACK OBAMA - Secret Visit To Afghanistan 05/01/12VogelDenise
President Obama made a surprise overnight visit to Afghanistan to mark the one-year anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death. He thanked U.S. troops and signed an agreement with Afghan President Karzai establishing a long-term strategic partnership between the U.S. and Afghanistan beyond 2014. Obama also addressed troops, saying the war came to America on 9/11 and though the battle is not over, they have made progress in decimating al Qaeda and bringing bin Laden to justice.
Hillary blumenthal drumheller original documents hrc memo latest_french_intel...AnonDownload
1. According to confidential sources, the Algerian government was surprised by the hostage crisis carried out by Mokhtar Belmokhtar's group at an Algerian gas plant. The Algerian security forces saw the attack as a resumption of the country's civil war and were determined to destroy Belmokhtar's group with extreme force, prioritizing security over the lives of the hostages.
2. Belmokhtar carried out the attack at the request of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to support Malian rebels facing a French military intervention. Belmokhtar has a long history with AQIM and owes them support.
3. The hostage crisis
The document discusses the geopolitical importance of oil reserves in the Caspian Sea region and the role this played in US and other countries' foreign policy decisions. It suggests that the US invasion of Afghanistan and support for certain regimes in the region were motivated partly by desires to secure oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian to international markets. However, US officials publicly denied that oil was a factor and emphasized other stated rationales like national security and counterterrorism. The control of Caspian energy resources was an area of competition and strategic interest for major powers like the US, Russia, and China.
This document discusses cover stories used by Al-Qaeda operatives detained at Guantanamo Bay to justify their travel to Afghanistan. Many claim they went to teach the Koran or provide humanitarian aid, but these have been disproven through interrogations and evidence showing the detainees' actual involvement with Al-Qaeda. Common cover stories included teaching religion, working for an NGO called Al Wafa that had Al-Qaeda ties, and claiming to help poor Afghans, but these have been exposed as false through corroborated confessions and identification of detainees as bodyguards of Osama bin Laden.
This document provides a recommendation to release or transfer a Guantanamo detainee. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed to pose a low risk and is unlikely to threaten the US or its allies. While initially suspected of money laundering, further review found no evidence to support this claim. The detainee's statements that he and his family are honest businessmen with no Taliban or Al Qaeda connections are considered truthful. It is recommended the detainee be released or transferred to another country.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a threat. He is assessed as a member of an Algerian extremist group involved in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Bosnia. Detainee served as the Bosnia contact for a senior al-Qaeda facilitator and received advanced training in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He is linked to al-Qaeda's support network and coordinated travel for extremists to Afghanistan. Detainee denies his extremist activities and identities despite corroborating intelligence reporting.
Detainee is an admitted Taliban recruiter and commander of Military Base 4 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He has an extensive operational association with Usama Bin Laden and al-Qaida dating back to 1990. Detainee provided assistance to Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri during their escape from U.S. and Coalition forces in December 2001. He also provided security for al-Qaida personnel in Tora Bora in 1999-2000 and protection to Bin Laden in 1996. Detainee worked closely with al-Qaida and possibly participated in narcotics smuggling. JTF-GTMO assesses the detainee to be a high risk and of high intelligence value.
Detainee is an Algerian national assessed to be a member of an al-Qaeda linked GIA cell in Bosnia. He is suspected of participating in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan for jihad following 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia beforehand. While in Bosnia, he threatened to attack international forces and was associated with al-Qaeda linked extremists. Detainee is also reported to have fought in Bosnia and Afghanistan as the chief martial arts instructor for an Islamic militant group. He was employed by several NGOs with ties to terrorism over seven years.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was captured with Taliban leaders and admitted to being a bodyguard for a high-ranking Taliban commander. Detainee received training at a Taliban camp and fought against U.S. forces on the Taliban front lines. While detainee claims to have been a low-level fighter, evidence suggests he was more significant due to being captured alongside senior Taliban leaders.
Surajadin Abib (ISN: US9AF-000458DP) is recommended for transfer to another country with conditions based on his close ties to Jalaluddin Haqqani, the former Taliban Minister of Borders. Haqqani oversees anti-coalition militia operations in the Khowst area. It is believed Haqqani was attending a meeting at the detainee's compound when it was bombed in November 2001. The detainee denies knowledge of Haqqani or Taliban in the area despite evidence to the contrary. He poses a medium risk and may have information on Haqqani and ongoing militant activities.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000941DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. Key details include:
- The detainee is assessed to be associated with al-Qaeda and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin due to his close ties with known al-Qaeda facilitators Abu Nasim al-Tunisi and Abu Sulayman al-Jazairi.
- He was captured in Pakistan during a raid on three suspected al-Qaeda safehouses linked to al-Jazairi and al-Tunisi.
- It is assessed that the detainee poses a medium risk and may
This document provides an intelligence assessment and transfer recommendation for a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was a high-ranking member of the Taliban who held multiple positions, including as the head of the Sherbergan Oil Exploration Plant. While he has been deceptive during interrogations, he may possess key information on Taliban intelligence structures and operations. As such, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to posing a medium risk.
1. JTF GTMO recommends detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention.
2. Detainee is assessed as a low-level member of Al-Qaida's terrorist network and a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia who planned insurgent operations against U.S. forces in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
3. Detainee was captured with improvised explosive devices intended to be attached to bicycles and motorcycles near U.S. targets for remote detonation. He poses a medium risk and may threaten U.S. interests and allies.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000560DP. It summarizes that the detainee has been compliant in detention but is assessed to be a high risk if released due to his prior role as a primary financial manager for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He facilitated large money transfers and the procurement of weapons for terrorist attacks. The detainee is reported to have strong ties to the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, and Jamaat Tablighi and to have been involved in narcotics trafficking. The document recommends the detainee remain in DoD custody due to concerns he could reengage in extremist support activities if released.
- Detainee was a senior al-Qaeda facilitator who swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and personally recruited his bodyguards. He has ties to many high-level al-Qaeda members and operatives involved in the 9/11 attacks.
- After the fall of the Taliban, detainee provided assistance to hundreds of foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan. He was responsible for moving money and fighters into Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban.
- Detainee traveled to Bosnia in the 1990s for jihad and spent a year fighting before returning to Yemen. He is associated with the planner of the 9/11 attacks and 11 of the hijackers.
The document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo detainee under Department of Defense control. It summarizes the detainee's background, including admitting to being a member of a 40-person Taliban unit that conducted attacks on U.S. and coalition forces. It also notes the detainee participated in a rocket attack on Kandahar Airfield and conducted surveillance of U.S. forces. The joint task force assesses the detainee poses a high risk and is likely to threaten the U.S. and its allies if released. They recommend retaining the detainee under DoD control.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000886DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a mid-level, trusted member of the Taliban who served as a courier for senior leaders. He possesses significant connections to high-level Taliban and al-Qaeda figures. The detainee has been uncooperative during interviews and is assessed to pose a high risk threat. It is recommended he be transferred subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
Detainee Mohammed Shah is assessed as a probable member of al Qaeda who has ties to terrorist political parties in Iran. He is assessed to be a medium risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The document recommends transferring the detainee to another country with conditions, subject to an acceptable transfer agreement. It provides details of the detainee's background, including fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, working as a doctor in Iran, and traveling between Afghanistan and Iran with large sums of money to support terrorist activities. The detainee is considered of medium intelligence value and may be able to provide information on Taliban commanders, couriers, and training camps in Iran with links to terrorist groups.
Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaida'sGlobal Jihad SupportNetwork who attendedtraining in Afghanistan andresidedin guesthousesoperatedby al-Qaidamembers.He occupiedpositionsin the Tora Bora Mountainsandparticipatedin hostilities againstUS andcoalition forces. JTF-GTMO previouslyassessedhim asa ContinuedDetentionrisk but now recommendshis TransferOut of DoD Controlbasedon his MEDIUM intelligencevalueandthreatlevel.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000890DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a former Taliban commander who led over 4,000 men and had connections to senior Taliban leaders. He is assessed as a high risk and likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies. The memorandum recommends transfer conditional on the other country agreeing to continued detention and intelligence access.
Detainee Naswar Khan Sawat Khan is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He was the second-in-command of the Union of Mujahadin (UOM) and subordinate to Malem Jan, the leader of the UOM who was also subordinate to Jalaluddin Haqqani and his Haqqani network. Detainee is assessed as having been a commander for both the UOM and likely the Haqqani network as well. Documents found list detainee as the number two leader of the UOM and as having personnel assigned to him, indicating his direct involvement in the organization. He has been deceptive and refused to discuss his true relationship with the Haqqani
Haji Sahib Rohullah Wakil is assessedto pose a high risk threat. He is a 45-year-old Afghan citizen and important politician from Konar Province who provided operational support to al-Qaida. Detainee assisted Arabs associated with al-Qaida to infiltrate and exfiltrate from Afghanistan and Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban regime. He also worked with anti-Afghan government factions and Pakistani intelligence to destabilize the interim Afghan administration. Detainee remains a threat due to his past involvement with al-Qaida, support for insurgent groups, and efforts to undermine the Afghan government.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer the detainee, ISN US9AF-000914DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk threat who was a member of an anti-coalition movement group led by warlord Samoud Khan that was affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He received religious indoctrination at a madrassa led by a known al-Qaeda and Taliban affiliated leader. While the detainee's information may be useful, his credibility is questionable as he has provided inconsistent statements and instructed other detainees to lie. The memorandum recommends transfer for continued detention due to the detainee's affiliations and associations with terrorist groups and personalities.
Detainee Akhtiar Mohammad is assessed to be a high-level commander in the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group who has extensive knowledge of anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan. He is assessed to pose a high risk if released. Detainee was captured in 2003 at a suspected HIG compound during a raid. He has been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2004 and continues to be assessed as an enemy combatant with high intelligence value due to his connections and knowledge of HIG activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000955DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have connections to anti-coalition activities in Afghanistan and may have been involved in rocket attacks against US forces. He was found deceptive during a polygraph about his participation. The detainee has also been tentatively identified as the chief of investigations for the Taliban in Zormat province. It is recommended he be transferred for continued detention due to posing a medium risk of engaging in future anti-coalition activities if released.
Detaineeis assessedas a mid-to-high level memberof the Taliban with ties to high-level membersof the Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and Al-Qaida's terrorist network. He served in a 40-man unit that provided security for Usama Bin Laden and helped plan insurgent operations against U.S. forces. Detainee has admitted to assisting in the escapeof a mujahideen general with alleged support from Iran. It is assessedhe poses a high risk and may be able to provide information on past and future plans against the U.S. and its allies.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative with ties to senior leaders. He has admitted to affiliations with terrorist groups including GIA and HIG. Detainee trained at militant camps, fought Soviets in Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban Foreign and Intelligence Ministries. He was captured in Pakistan and transferred to Guantanamo for suspected involvement in terrorist plots and attacks. Detainee has omitted details of his activities prior to capture, making his threat level and intelligence value difficult to assess fully.
The document is a memorandum recommending the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000934DP. It finds that he poses a high security risk, as he was likely a member of a Taliban militia unit and involved in rocket attacks against U.S. forces. If released, it assesses he would reconnect with extremists and resume hostile activities. The detainee has been inconsistent about his involvement and maintains contact with Taliban members, posing a threat to the U.S. and allies.
Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed as a senior-level Taliban member who organized networks and disrupted coalition operations. He facilitated operations that likely resulted in US casualties. The detainee poses a high risk and can provide intelligence on extremist activities, drug trafficking, and Taliban networks. The Joint Task Force recommends continued detention.
Detainee was a senior Taliban official who served as Minister of Interior, Governor of Herat province, and military commander. He was directly associated with al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Following 9/11, detainee represented the Taliban in meetings with Iran seeking support against U.S. forces. He also attended a meeting directed by Osama bin Laden. Detainee was involved in narcotics trafficking and likely used profits to support Taliban interests. The document provides detainee's background and capture information, evaluates his statements, and assesses him as a continued high threat who may have valuable intelligence.
Detainee is a 52-year old Algerian national assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and the North African Extremist Network who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and received small arms training at an al-Qaida camp. He is assessed to be a high risk and threat to the US due to his extremist connections and admitted associations with known terrorists. The document recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention, preferably Algeria, if a satisfactory agreement can be reached. If not, he should remain in DoD custody due to contradictions in his story and suspected deception during interrogations.
This document provides a summary and recommendation for transferring a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was previously assessed as "Retain in DoD" but is now recommended for transfer to the control of another country based on new information. Specifically, the detainee is assessed as a probable Al-Qaeda facilitator and possible anti-coalition militant supporter who aided Al-Qaeda members' escape from Afghanistan and may have ties to Pakistani intelligence services. The document recommends his transfer due to these assessments and potential intelligence value regarding border operations and militant groups.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000900DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who willingly participated in training and then traveled with a group to Kabul to carry out attacks against US forces. He was captured in the grenade attack on US Special Forces on December 17, 2002 in Kabul. While the detainee is assessed as a high risk and threat to the US, its interests, and allies, he has been compliant in detention and is assessed to be of low intelligence value.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
Detainee Habib Ullah is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He is assessed as a member of an anti-coalition group with ties to al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Detainee admitted to participating in a rocket attack against U.S. forces and was in frequent contact with senior Taliban leader Saifullah Rahman Mansour. He worked for and communicated with known militants, including living at the compound of a wanted al-Qaeda associate. Detainee possesses knowledge of attacks against U.S. forces and militant groups in the region.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AG-000533DP. It summarizes the detainee's personal information, travel history, activities in Afghanistan including possible ties to al-Qaeda, and capture in Tora Bora after being injured attempting to flee US bombing. The assessment determines he poses a high risk and high intelligence value, and recommends his continued detention due to concerns he could reengage in extremism if released.
Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-Qaida who received terrorist training in Afghanistan. He reportedly attended training at al-Qaida affiliated camps, associated with known al-Qaida operatives, and resided in al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee likely participated in action against U.S. and coalition forces. He is assessed as a medium risk and threat, and of medium intelligence value.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
Detainee Ahmed Bin Saleh Bel Bachao is assessed as a probable member of al-Qaida who received weapons training in Afghanistan. He traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 after being influenced by extremist lectures at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London. In Afghanistan, he stayed at an Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad known to facilitate foreign fighters, where he received small arms training. He fled to Tora Bora during US attacks and was later captured with a large group of fighters. It is assessed he poses a medium risk and may have participated in hostilities against US forces.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay to another facility. It summarizes the detainee's personal information and assesses him as a probable member of al-Qaeda's support network who likely received improvised explosive device training. The detainee is believed to have traveled from France to Afghanistan via the UK and Pakistan, staying at guesthouses associated with extremist groups. He is assessed to pose a medium risk and high intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AG-000284DP to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and al-Qaeda's global terrorist network. He has been identified as receiving terrorist training, but does not appear to be a senior leader. While sometimes cooperative, he has also been uncooperative and obstinate during interrogations. The Joint Task Force assesses he poses a medium risk but defers to the Criminal Investigative Task Force's assessment that he poses a high risk.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AG-000175DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on evidence that he was an al-Qaida member who received training at al-Faruq camp and possibly explosives training. He is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US forces as a leader coordinating supplies for al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora, and was possibly selected for training as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. The document recommends his continued detention due to these assessments and his lack of cooperation.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for detainee ISN US9AG-000070DP held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is a 24-year old Algerian man with a history of significant head trauma resulting in blindness in one eye and brain injuries causing difficulties with speech, understanding, and controlling behaviors. Due to his medical condition, he requires long-term custodial care. While previously assessed as medium intelligence value, he now poses a low risk. The Joint Task Force recommends releasing or transferring the detainee to another country for continued detention based on his health status and low risk level.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
Detainee Mohammed Mussa Yakubi is assessed as a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia in Afghanistan with connections to a global terrorist network. He is believed to have helped engineer IED and mortar attacks against US forces. Detainee was arrested after weapons were found in his compound, including an AK-47, mortar tubes, and ammunition. He is assessed as a HIGH risk and having MEDIUM intelligence value regarding the Gardez cell, planned attacks, and connections to other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. JTF GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be held in DoD custody.
This document provides a summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is believed to have worked for a known member of the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group and traveled between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for over a decade. Concerns were raised about inconsistencies in his story and links to anti-coalition militant groups. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining him in the Department of Defense's control due to these associations and assessed intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends releasing or transferring a Guantanamo detainee. The detainee was likely falsely accused of participating in an ambush by Afghan forces seeking to cover up their own involvement. Records indicate the detainee poses a low risk and likely has no valuable intelligence. While the Criminal Investigation Task Force assesses the detainee as medium risk, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo recommends release or transfer based on the fraudulent circumstances of his capture.
Detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and weapons smuggler associated with senior Taliban officials. He was captured in 2003 with documents and materials indicating ties to the Taliban and extremist networks. Detainee worked closely with the Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister and other senior figures. He denies the full extent of his Taliban activities and affiliations. JTF-GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be detained due to his high-level Taliban connections and potential threat.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-001075DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be of medium intelligence value and a medium threat risk. He was captured in Afghanistan in possession of weapons and has ties to anti-coalition militant groups in the Gardez region. While the detainee denies involvement, he has knowledge about a bombing in Gardez. The task force recommends his transfer to allow another country to take over his continued detention.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo Bay detainee, ISN US9AF-001045DP, in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee (1) is assessed to be a key member of anti-coalition militant groups who has participated in weapons trafficking, explosives training, and attacks against US and coalition forces; (2) has admitted ties to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations; and (3) poses a high risk and is likely to provide intelligence on terrorist networks, operations, and leaders if retained in DoD control.
This memorandum recommends retaining a detainee, ISN US9AF-001043DP, under Department of Defense control at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who possesses intelligence on terrorist operations and personnel. He was formerly the Taliban Minister of Commerce and deputy to a senior Taliban commander. New information indicates he was involved in the killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross employee in 2003. The detainee poses a high risk and should continue to be detained.
Detainee ISN US9AF-001037DP is assessed to be a high-ranking commander in the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group. He was captured along with another high-ranking HIG commander, ISN 1036, during a raid on a HIG safe house. Detainee and ISN 1036 have provided conflicting statements about their roles in HIG and how long they have known each other. Detainee is assessed to pose a high risk as he likely would threaten U.S. interests. JTF GTMO assesses the detainee to be of high intelligence value and recommends he continue to be detained in DoD custody.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for transferring detainee ISN US9AF-001035DP to another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable former Taliban commander from Afghanistan who is currently in good health. He is assessed as a MEDIUM risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The detainee was captured with documents indicating ties to the Taliban and admitted being a member of an anti-coalition group. He provided information on weapon caches and personalities within the Taliban and Konar province government that expanded US intelligence. Based on this information, JTF-GTMO now recommends the detainee for transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
Detainee is assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militias (ACM) member suspected of participating in the 27 March 2003 murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) worker in Afghanistan. He was captured with a satellite phone he was using to contact Mullah Haji Satar, an ACM commander suspected of the ICRC murder. Detainee has provided inconsistent accounts and an uncertain identity. He is assessed to present a high risk threat due to his ties to ACM commanders conducting attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces.
This document provides a recommendation to continue detaining detainee US9AF-001021DP based on a JTF GTMO assessment. The detainee is assessed to be a high-ranking member of the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) with ties to Al-Qaida and its global terrorism network. He was implicated in a plot to kill Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan by placing bombs at the Presidential Palace and US Embassy. Consistent reporting indicates the detainee remains committed to the HIG and its goals. It is assessed that he poses a high risk and is likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies.
1. SE C R E T // NOFORNI I 20300422
DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360
JTF GTMO-CG 22 Apil2005
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander.United StatesSouthernCommand,3511NW 9lstAvenue,
Miami,FL33172.
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo
Detainee,ISN: US9AF-000888DP(S)
JTFGTMODetaineeAssessment
1. (FOUO)PersonalInformation:
o JDIMSA{DRC ReferenceName: Esmatullah
o AliasesandCurrent/TrueName: IsmatUllah andWaladi
RahmattullahImatullah
o Placeof Birth: Daykundi"Afghanistan(AF)
o Date of Birth: I January1977
o Citizenship: Afghanistan
o IntemmentSerialNumber(ISN): US9AF-000888DP
2. (FOUO) Health: Detaineeis in goodhealth,is not on chronicmedications,andhasno
known drug allergies. He hasa chronic complaint of itchy eyes,probably relatedto allergies.
He hasno travel restrictions.
3. (S//NF)JTF GTMOAssessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTFGTMOrecommendsdetaineebeRetainedin DoD
Control(DoD).
b. (S//NF)Summary: JTFGTMOpreviouslyassesseddetaineeRetainin DoD(DoD)on
20November2003
Forthisupdaterecommendation,detaineeis assessedasamemberof TalibanandAl-Qaida's
terroristnetwork.MohammedHashim,US9AF-000850DP(ISN850),identifieddetaineeas
amemberof a40-manunitorganizedinNovemberof 2001to completevariousmissions.
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON:E.O.12958SECTION1.5(C)
DECLASSIFYON: 20300422
SE C R E T // NOFORN/ I 20300422
2. s E c R E T // NOFORN I I 20300422
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo
Detainee,ISN: US9AF-000888DP(S)
Oneof their primary missionswasto provide securityfor UsamaBin Laden(UBL) andhis
family for safepassagethroughAfghanistan. Othermissionstaskedto the 40-manunit
involved assassinations,kidnappings,andbombingsagainstUS forces,its allies,and
representativesof Afghanistanconsideredenemiesof the Taliban. Detaineealsowaspart of
an effort by well-known Taliban commandersto recruit former Taliban commandersinto
joining their Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) efforts againstthe legitimategovemmentof
Afghanistan. Detaineeadmitsto connectionswith upper-levelTaliban members. His role
andknowledgeregardinghow securitywasprovided for UBL's movementsrequiresfurther
exploitation. Detaineeappearsto havespecializedtraining,andmostlikely, if released
would join currentACM operationsagainstUS andcoalition personnelandobjectivesin
Afghanistan. It is assessedthis detaineeis a HIGH risk, ashe is likely to posea threatto the
US, its interestsandallies.
4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unlessotherwisenoted,the following
paragraphsarebasedsolelyon thedetainee'sstatements.
a. (S) Prior History: Detainee'sfamily movedfrom Afghanistanto Quetta,Pakistan
(PK), in 1983to escapethe warring environmentin Afghanistanafter the Russianinvasion.
Detaineeattendedoneyearof schoolin Quetta,PK, in 1985. In 1990,detaineewent to
Chaman,PK, to learnhow to be a tailor. Detaineelived with his cousins,andstayedfor a
periodof 2-3 years(1992or 1993),thenreturnedto Quetta,PK. In October1998,detainee
moved from Quettato Khandahar,AF. Detaineegot married in November 1998in
Khandahar,andmoved into a housein district five. (Analyst Note: This areais where
peopleworking for the Taliban governmentlived.)
b. (S) Recruitment and Travel: Sometimeduring2000,detaineevolunteeredto become
a Taliban member. Oneof the individuals that assistedhim in joining the Talibanwas Gul
Mohammad(possiblyGul Mohammad,former Taliban leader,in possessionof a large
amountof weaponscaches)from Deh Rawod,OruzganProvince,AF.
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detaineewasforcedto work with the Talibanfor
threemonthsat a time. He was calledup four times for a total of approximatelyoneyear. In
alternatereporting,he claims he was assignedto work for the Taliban on threedifferent
occasions.His first assignmentlastedfour months. During this period, detaineeservedasa
guardfor the Taliban inMazar province. His duty consistedof guardinga particular areaand
reporting any suspiciousactivity to his supervisor,Akhundzada. Akhundzada'ssupervisor
wasAbdul Razak(assessedto be referring to now deceasedAbdul RazzaqNafiz, former
seniorTaliban commanderof MazarE-Sharifl. After this period, detaineewent hometo
Khandahar. The secondperiod of Taliban duty lastedthreemonths,while the third period
lastedtwo months. Detaineeperformedthe samedutieseachtime he served. Detainee's
commander,Akhundzada,in commandof a 40-manteam,controlledhis fate. (Analyst Note:
2
SE C RE T / / NOFORN/ / 20300422
3. S E C R E T // NOFORN / I 20300422
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo
Detainee;ISN: US9AF-000888DP(S)
It is assessedthis is the same40-manteamto which ISN 850hasreferred.)Oncehe had
finishedhis one-yearstint (aroundOctoberof 2001),detaineeandhis wife movedto Deh
Rawod,to get away from the US bombing in Khandahar. ln December2001,detainee
movedback to Khandahar. He andhis wife lived with his father-in-law. From January2002
until July 2002,detaineeworked to fix up the househe hadreceivedasan inheritancein
Tarin Kowt, AF. His goal wasto fix it up andthensell it. Sometimein August of 2002,
detaineeandhis family movedto Quetta,PK, to live with two sisters. Lr the latterpart of
2002,Abdul Razakaskeddetaineeto deliver a letter to RahmatullahSangayar,US9AF-
000890DP(ISN 890),a formerTalibancommanderwho residedin OruzganProvince.
Detaineewas alsoto find JananAgha (assessedto be referring to the former Taliban
Governorof Nimruz Province,AF, andaNative of OruzganProvince)andMullah Abdul
Ghafoor (assessedto be referring to the Haji Mullah Abdul Ghafoor a former Taliban Front-
Line Commander)andtell themboth to go to Pakistan. After delivering the letter to ISN
890,detaineewent to Tarin Kowt to searchfor the othertwo men,but was unsuccessful.
d. (S) Gapture Information: JanMohammed,the Govemorof OruzganProvince,and
HostNation GIN) officials captureddetaineeon27 November2002,while travelingon a
road from Oruzgan,AF, to Tarin Kowt. Detaineewas armedwith an AK-47, which was
usedfor protection againstthieves. Detaineewasbroughtin andturnedover to US Forces.
No further captureinformation is available.
e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 7 February2003
f. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provideinformationon the
following:
o Severalmid-levelTalibanmilitary personalities
o FormerTaliban military sites
5. (S//NF)DetaineeThreat:
a. (S)Assessment:It isassessedthedetaineeposesaHIGHrisk,asheislikelytoposea
threatto the US, its interestsandallies.
b. (S/NF)Reasonsfor ContinuedDetention:
. (S) It is assesseddetaineeis a memberof theTalibanandAl-Qaida'sterrorist
network. He worked in a Taliban specialunit that supportedandprovided securityto
high-level Al-Qaida membersandplannedandcarriedout ACM operations.
o (S) ISN 850identifieddetaineeasbeinga Talibansub-commanderfor a 40-man
unit that provided securityfor high-level Al-Qaida personalities,to includeUBL and
3
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4. SE C R E T // NOFORNI I 20300422
JTFGTMO-CG
SIIBJECT:UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control(DoD)for Guantanamo
Detainee,ISN:US9AF-000888DP(S)
Dr. Ayman al-Zawahii. This unit alsoconductedACM operations. (Analyst note:
ISN 850 admitsto being a spy for the 40-manunit. He waspart of this unit before
being capturedwhile conductingreconnaissanceagainstMullah Omar's home. At
thetime it housedUS andCoalitionforces,andwasbeingusedasa Coalition
headquarters).ISN 850alsoallegeddetaineedid the following:
. (S) Fought at Tora Bora andescapedto Peshawar,PK. This corroborates
detainee'sadmissionthat he was stationedat the Front Line andfighting against
theNorthern Alliance.
. (S) Detainee,ISN 890andMullah Ghafar(possiblememberof theHezb-e-
Islami (HIG) areresponsiblefor planting mines from Khandaharto Spin Boldak
during Novemberof 2002).
. (S) ISN 850maintainsdetaineewasbackedby Al-Qaida andfoughtUS
troops. Iamanzawaherisupportedthe 40-mansquad(assessedto meanDr.
Ayman AlZawahii, LlElL'schief aid andadvisor). (Analystnote: It is probable
thatZawahiri supportedthe establishmentof this unit to provide supportfor UBL
andhis entouragewhile in Afghanistan.)
. (S) Detaineeknowshow to userockets,heavymachineguns,andAK-47s.
. (S) Detaineehasbeena memberof theunit sinceits creationin Novemberof
200t.
o (S) Detaineeclaims after Ahmad ShahMasoudof the Northern Alliance was
killed by Arab suicidebombers,Razzaqdecidedhe did not want to fight anymore.
Detaineeclaims the 40-manteamhe was a part of stoppedfighting andwent hometo
Khandahar.
o (S) Detaineewas capturedin the latter part of Novemberof 2002with known
TalibanmembersISN 890andNasrullah,US9AF-000886DP(ISN 886). The capture
occurredafter detaineehaddelivereda letter from former Taliban Minister of
Defense,Mullah Obaidullah. Obaidullahwho was known to be involved in several
anti-governmentactivities.(Analyst Note: The letter containedinformation regarding
a meetingto takeplacewith Obaidullah.)
. (S) HN officials believethe meetingwas for coordinatingan operationagainst
US forcesandthe Afghan govemmentduring EID (End of Ramadancelebration).
. (S) At approximately2818302Nov02,GovemorJanMohammedinformed
Fire BaseTK (FBTK) thathehadapprehendedsevenTaliban;detainee,ISN 886,
ISN 890,Mullah SharafUddine, Mullah Habib Ullah, Mullah Ghafar,and
Mullah Rahim Ullah. Janidentified them asfollows:
a Detainee.who worked for Mullah Abdul Bari andwas friendswith Mullah
Razak.
I ISN 890,commanderfor Taliban national guardin Kabul, anda senior
Taliban commanderfighting againsttheNorthem Alliance andUSSF.
a Mullah SharafUddine, commanderfor Mullah Qahir of Murabad.
+
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5. s E c R E T // NOFORNI I 20300422
JTFGTMO-CG
SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control(DoD)for Guantanamo
Detainee,ISN:US9AI-000888DP(S)
a Mullah Habib Ullah, Taliban securitychief of Mazar-E-Sharifand
brother-in-law to Mullah Omar.
I Mullah Ghafar,intelligencechief for Mullah Rabani.
a Mullah Rahim Ullah, Chief of TarnakFarmsTraining Campin
Khandahar.
. (S) Accordingto ISN 850,detaineewascapturedwith ISN 886,Habibullah,
andSharafuddinwhile riding in a stationwagon given him by the Taliban.
o ISN 850 statedthat commandersrecruitedtheir own men. Detaineehadrecruited
Sharafuddin,who joined the unit primarily to fight againstUS forces. Sharafuddin
alsomadeplanswith detaineeto kidnap the OruzganProvinceGovernor'ssonin
exchangefor releasingprisonersin Khandahar. The two alsotalked aboutkilling the
governorby bombinghis office. (AnalystNote: It canbe inferreddetaineealso
recruitedthe other four membersof his group.)
o Detaineehasadmittedaffiliations with a numberof high-level Taliban, Hizb-e-
Islami (HIG), andAl-Qaida memberssuchasUBL, andAbdul Razak,US9AF-
000942DP(ISN 942). ISN 850statedthatMullah Abdul RazakwastheTaliban
Supremecommanderfor theprovince of Helmand.
o (S/AIF)As a resultof a raid on a housesearchof AhamadDullah'sresidencein
district four, Khandahar,AF, andsubsequentsearchof his neighbor's(Essa
Mohammed's)house,detainee'snamewasfoundon a Hezb-I-Islami(HIG)
identificationcard.
o (U) Detainee'sadmissionasa Talibanmember. Accordingto opensourcing,a
Time-Life interviewon September24,2002, in Oruzganprovince,Esmatullah
(assessedto be detainee)madethecomment:"..we areTalibanandtheywant to arrest
us." In the article,hewould not give his name,but did admitto beinga Taliban
Commander. Otherindividuals identified thepersonin the interview asbeing
EsmatullahAkhond (Akhond is a title of honor).
. (S) Detaineehasa habit of changinghis statementeverytime he is interviewedeven
on suchinconsequentialactsasmoving to Pakistanor asconsequentialasto who his
commanderwas.
o (S) In a 12 June2003debriefinghe states,"He waspartof a 40-manteamunder
the control of CommanderAkhundZada."
o (S) In a 3 July 2003 debriefinghe states,"The letter was given to detaineein
Pakistanby his former Taliban commander,Abdul Razzaq."
o (S) In a 14April 2004debriefinghe states,"...Abdul Razzaqwashis commander
while he servedin the Taliban.
o (S) In a 12May 2004debriefinghe states,"Thepersonwho controlledhis fate
was Akhundzadawho was detainee'scommander."
. (S) Detaineeadmitshe was stationedat the Front Line andfighting againstthe
Northem Alliance.
SE C R E T // NOFORNI I 20300422
6. SE C R E T / / NOFORNI I 20300422
JTFGTMO-CG
SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control(DoD)for Guantanamo
Detainee,ISN:US9AF-000888DP(S)
. (S)Matula,Securitychieffor TarinKowt, AF,personallyidentifieddetaineeas
havingdistributedweaponsto otherTalibanin preparationfor theNorthernAlliance
offensive.
c. (S//NF)Detainee's Gonduct: Thisdetaineehasapasthistoryof aggressivebehavior.
Hehasdisplayedextremeemotionandshownsignsof aggression.Detaineehasassaulted
theguardsonnumerousoccasions.Hefailsto complywith theguardforce'sinstructions.
6. (S/NF) DetaineeIntelligenceValueAssessment:
a. (S) Assessment: JTFGTMOhasdeterminedthatthisdetaineeis of MEDIUM
intelligencevalue.
o (S/A{F)Detaineehasadmittedhebelongedto a40-manunit. It is assesseddetainee's
40-manunitandtheonethatISN 850talksaboutarethesame.Detaineehasanumberof
discrepanciesin histimelinethatneedtobeclarified.Detaineehasbeenlinkedto a
numberof high-levelTaliban,Al-Qaida,andHIGpersonalities.Duetothenumberof
individualswhogoby thesamename,weneedto crosscheckwhichactualindividuals
areconnectedwith detainee.Forinstance,atleasttwo Talibancommandersgoingby the
nameAbdulRazakin Afghanistanaredeceased.Detaineemayhaveknownor dealtwith
bothof them,aswell astheirassociates.
b. (S/NF) Areas of PotentialExploitation:
o 40-manunit
o Missions
o Logistics
o Locations
o Breakdown
o Personalitiesdetaineeis connectedto:
7. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon 15October2004,
andheremainsanenemvcombatant.
LAY W. HOOD
Brigadier General,USA
Commanding
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