This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000890DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a former Taliban commander who led over 4,000 men and had connections to senior Taliban leaders. He is assessed as a high risk and likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies. The memorandum recommends transfer conditional on the other country agreeing to continued detention and intelligence access.
Detainee Naswar Khan Sawat Khan is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He was the second-in-command of the Union of Mujahadin (UOM) and subordinate to Malem Jan, the leader of the UOM who was also subordinate to Jalaluddin Haqqani and his Haqqani network. Detainee is assessed as having been a commander for both the UOM and likely the Haqqani network as well. Documents found list detainee as the number two leader of the UOM and as having personnel assigned to him, indicating his direct involvement in the organization. He has been deceptive and refused to discuss his true relationship with the Haqqani
Detainee Habib Ullah is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He is assessed as a member of an anti-coalition group with ties to al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Detainee admitted to participating in a rocket attack against U.S. forces and was in frequent contact with senior Taliban leader Saifullah Rahman Mansour. He worked for and communicated with known militants, including living at the compound of a wanted al-Qaeda associate. Detainee possesses knowledge of attacks against U.S. forces and militant groups in the region.
DetaineeMohammedAmin is recommendedfor transferto the control of anothercountry for continueddetention.He is assessedto be a memberof Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddinwho attendedplanningmeetingswhereattacksagainstUS-ledcoalitionforcesandtheAfghangovernmentwere discussed.Detaineehasassociationswith TalibanandAl-Qaedafiguresandmay haveknowledgeof futureplannedattacksdue to his involvementwith Anti-Coalitionforcesin Afghanistan.While in custody,hehasbeengenerallycompliantbut remainsan enemycombatant.
Detainee Hiztullah Nasrat Yar is assessed as a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander with links to al-Qaeda, and participated in meetings to plan attacks on US/Coalition forces. If released, he would be capable of planning, supporting, or facilitating hostile acts. He maintained large weapons caches and supported HIG operations. His brother remains a HIG commander conducting anti-coalition activities. Detainee possesses knowledge of HIG operations and connections that could provide intelligence if exploited.
Detainee was a senior Taliban official who served as Minister of Interior, Governor of Herat province, and military commander. He was directly associated with al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Following 9/11, detainee represented the Taliban in meetings with Iran seeking support against U.S. forces. He also attended a meeting directed by Osama bin Laden. Detainee was involved in narcotics trafficking and likely used profits to support Taliban interests. The document provides detainee's background and capture information, evaluates his statements, and assesses him as a continued high threat who may have valuable intelligence.
Detainee Abdul Razzaq was incorrectly assessed in a previous report as being the former Taliban Minister of the Interior. He is actually an Afghan national who acted as a facilitator and logistician for Taliban and HIG forces conducting attacks against coalition forces in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He was captured with documents listing Taliban recruits and receipts for supplies. Detainee is assessed to pose a high risk if released, as he is likely to threaten coalition forces in Afghanistan due to his involvement in planning and supporting at least two anti-coalition operations. JTF-GTMO recommends he remain in DoD custody.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AF-000831DP to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who provided support to extremist groups including Al-Qaida. He has ties to other detainees involved in moving Al-Qaida members and conducting attacks. While the detainee claims not to be involved, evidence links him to supporting a bomb-making cell and safe houses used by terrorists. He is assessed to have intelligence value and still poses a medium risk.
The document provides an assessment and recommendation for transferring Guantanamo detainee Zahir Shah, ISN US9AF-00101ODP, to the control of another country with conditions. It summarizes that Zahir Shah is assessed to be the deputy commander of a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) cell in Afghanistan and affiliated with al-Qaeda. He is assessed to pose a medium risk. The document recommends his transfer subject to an acceptable agreement while noting he may have intelligence value on HIG operations, weapons caches, and al-Qaeda affiliations.
Detainee Naswar Khan Sawat Khan is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He was the second-in-command of the Union of Mujahadin (UOM) and subordinate to Malem Jan, the leader of the UOM who was also subordinate to Jalaluddin Haqqani and his Haqqani network. Detainee is assessed as having been a commander for both the UOM and likely the Haqqani network as well. Documents found list detainee as the number two leader of the UOM and as having personnel assigned to him, indicating his direct involvement in the organization. He has been deceptive and refused to discuss his true relationship with the Haqqani
Detainee Habib Ullah is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He is assessed as a member of an anti-coalition group with ties to al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Detainee admitted to participating in a rocket attack against U.S. forces and was in frequent contact with senior Taliban leader Saifullah Rahman Mansour. He worked for and communicated with known militants, including living at the compound of a wanted al-Qaeda associate. Detainee possesses knowledge of attacks against U.S. forces and militant groups in the region.
DetaineeMohammedAmin is recommendedfor transferto the control of anothercountry for continueddetention.He is assessedto be a memberof Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddinwho attendedplanningmeetingswhereattacksagainstUS-ledcoalitionforcesandtheAfghangovernmentwere discussed.Detaineehasassociationswith TalibanandAl-Qaedafiguresandmay haveknowledgeof futureplannedattacksdue to his involvementwith Anti-Coalitionforcesin Afghanistan.While in custody,hehasbeengenerallycompliantbut remainsan enemycombatant.
Detainee Hiztullah Nasrat Yar is assessed as a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander with links to al-Qaeda, and participated in meetings to plan attacks on US/Coalition forces. If released, he would be capable of planning, supporting, or facilitating hostile acts. He maintained large weapons caches and supported HIG operations. His brother remains a HIG commander conducting anti-coalition activities. Detainee possesses knowledge of HIG operations and connections that could provide intelligence if exploited.
Detainee was a senior Taliban official who served as Minister of Interior, Governor of Herat province, and military commander. He was directly associated with al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Following 9/11, detainee represented the Taliban in meetings with Iran seeking support against U.S. forces. He also attended a meeting directed by Osama bin Laden. Detainee was involved in narcotics trafficking and likely used profits to support Taliban interests. The document provides detainee's background and capture information, evaluates his statements, and assesses him as a continued high threat who may have valuable intelligence.
Detainee Abdul Razzaq was incorrectly assessed in a previous report as being the former Taliban Minister of the Interior. He is actually an Afghan national who acted as a facilitator and logistician for Taliban and HIG forces conducting attacks against coalition forces in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He was captured with documents listing Taliban recruits and receipts for supplies. Detainee is assessed to pose a high risk if released, as he is likely to threaten coalition forces in Afghanistan due to his involvement in planning and supporting at least two anti-coalition operations. JTF-GTMO recommends he remain in DoD custody.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AF-000831DP to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who provided support to extremist groups including Al-Qaida. He has ties to other detainees involved in moving Al-Qaida members and conducting attacks. While the detainee claims not to be involved, evidence links him to supporting a bomb-making cell and safe houses used by terrorists. He is assessed to have intelligence value and still poses a medium risk.
The document provides an assessment and recommendation for transferring Guantanamo detainee Zahir Shah, ISN US9AF-00101ODP, to the control of another country with conditions. It summarizes that Zahir Shah is assessed to be the deputy commander of a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) cell in Afghanistan and affiliated with al-Qaeda. He is assessed to pose a medium risk. The document recommends his transfer subject to an acceptable agreement while noting he may have intelligence value on HIG operations, weapons caches, and al-Qaeda affiliations.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000118DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of the Taliban who received weapons training at Taliban facilities and may have been involved in military action against coalition forces, posing a medium risk. He is in good physical health but receives mental health treatment. The assessment recommends transfer and cites the detainee's admissions of traveling with Taliban groups and surrendering to Northern Alliance forces.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative with ties to senior leaders. He has admitted to affiliations with terrorist groups including GIA and HIG. Detainee trained at militant camps, fought Soviets in Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban Foreign and Intelligence Ministries. He was captured in Pakistan and transferred to Guantanamo for suspected involvement in terrorist plots and attacks. Detainee has omitted details of his activities prior to capture, making his threat level and intelligence value difficult to assess fully.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda operative and leader of an improvised explosive devices (IED) cell in Khowst, Afghanistan. He worked directly for senior al-Qaeda member Ali Ammar Ashur al-Raqiai, planning IED attacks against US and Coalition forces. Multiple sources reported that detainee's cell received instructions from al-Raqiai to make IEDs for attacks against US forces. Detainee recruited others to his al-Qaeda cell and provided explosives training. He is assessed to be a continued threat and is recommended for continued detention.
Detainee Mohammed Mussa Yakubi is assessed as a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia in Afghanistan with connections to a global terrorist network. He is believed to have helped engineer IED and mortar attacks against US forces. Detainee was arrested after weapons were found in his compound, including an AK-47, mortar tubes, and ammunition. He is assessed as a HIGH risk and having MEDIUM intelligence value regarding the Gardez cell, planned attacks, and connections to other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. JTF GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be held in DoD custody.
This document provides a detainee assessment for an individual currently held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It recommends continued detention based on the detainee's history with militant groups and assessed likelihood to reengage in hostilities if released. Specifically:
- The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and likely to pose a threat due to his prior role as an intelligence officer for the Taliban and reported ties to other extremist groups.
- He is a member of an anti-coalition militia group with ties to the Haqqani Network and planned and executed rocket attacks against U.S. forces.
- Since his detention, his brother has engaged in insurgent activities, increasing the risk the deta
Detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and weapons smuggler associated with senior Taliban officials. He was captured in 2003 with documents and materials indicating ties to the Taliban and extremist networks. Detainee worked closely with the Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister and other senior figures. He denies the full extent of his Taliban activities and affiliations. JTF-GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be detained due to his high-level Taliban connections and potential threat.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a threat. He is assessed as a member of an Algerian extremist group involved in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Bosnia. Detainee served as the Bosnia contact for a senior al-Qaeda facilitator and received advanced training in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He is linked to al-Qaeda's support network and coordinated travel for extremists to Afghanistan. Detainee denies his extremist activities and identities despite corroborating intelligence reporting.
This memorandum recommends retaining a detainee, ISN US9AF-001043DP, under Department of Defense control at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who possesses intelligence on terrorist operations and personnel. He was formerly the Taliban Minister of Commerce and deputy to a senior Taliban commander. New information indicates he was involved in the killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross employee in 2003. The detainee poses a high risk and should continue to be detained.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (or Gulf war II) that took place in Iraq. In term of summary in strategies planning. The script is with PowerPoint version (in Thai language)
This memorandum provides an assessment of security operations in Afghanistan based on briefings and field observations by the author. It finds that the Taliban believe they are winning and gaining strength and popular support. ISAF forces are reinforcing but casualties are rising significantly. The Afghan National Army is developing capabilities but the Afghan National Police remains poorly equipped, corrupt, and untrained. Building competent Afghan security forces able to maintain stability without foreign assistance will be a long term effort requiring continued resources and commitment.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000560DP. It summarizes that the detainee has been compliant in detention but is assessed to be a high risk if released due to his prior role as a primary financial manager for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He facilitated large money transfers and the procurement of weapons for terrorist attacks. The detainee is reported to have strong ties to the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, and Jamaat Tablighi and to have been involved in narcotics trafficking. The document recommends the detainee remain in DoD custody due to concerns he could reengage in extremist support activities if released.
Pakistan gained independence in 1947 as a sovereign state, with Muhammad Ali Jinnah elected as the first President of Pakistan's Constituent Assembly. In 1949, the Assembly adopted the Objective Resolution to provide guidance for a future constitution based on Islamic ideology. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in 1951. Subsequent decades saw military coups, the formation of new political parties like the Pakistan Peoples Party, a war leading to the independence of Bangladesh, and changes to Pakistan's constitution in 1973. General elections were scheduled for May 2013 after the completion of the previous National Assembly's term.
Political and constitutional phases of pakisatan 1988-OnwardMalikzain21
This document provides an overview of the political and constitutional phases of Pakistan from 1988 to 2014. It discusses the tenures of multiple prime ministers including Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and Yousaf Raza Gillani. It also covers constitutional amendments, presidential elections, and the transition to civilian rule under Pervez Musharraf. Key events included the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's government in 1990, nuclear tests in 1998, and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention due to his involvement in a terrorist plot. He was arrested in 2001 as part of an Algerian cell in Bosnia suspected of planning to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee has an extensive history with extremist groups in Algeria, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. He worked with several Islamic non-governmental organizations of concern. While cooperative, he likely withholds full details about personal ties to extremists.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer Mohi Bullar, an Afghan national held at Guantanamo Bay, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes Bullar's background, capture, and reasons for continued detention. He is assessed as an active supporter of anti-coalition militia who engaged US and Afghan forces in a firefight, admitting to firing his weapon. While compliant in detention, he is considered a medium risk and may pose a threat. The document recommends his transfer for continued intelligence exploitation regarding militant activity in his home province of Oruzgan, Afghanistan.
This document provides a summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is believed to have worked for a known member of the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group and traveled between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for over a decade. Concerns were raised about inconsistencies in his story and links to anti-coalition militant groups. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining him in the Department of Defense's control due to these associations and assessed intelligence value.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000899DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on his admitted membership in Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, ties to anti-coalition militias, possible ties to al-Qaeda and Iranian extremists, and participation in attacks against US and coalition forces. Materials found in his possession at capture included an al-Qaeda training manual. The detainee is uncooperative and continues to support anti-US elements, so continued detention is advised for risk of reengagement if released.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000956DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes the detainee's background, including that he was a Taliban recruiter and commander in the 856th Brigade of the Afghan Military Forces. He received an order to attack US forces if they returned to the area. The document assesses the detainee as a medium risk and medium intelligence value, and recommends his transfer for continued detention based on his past militant activities and potential to provide information on other militants and weapon caches.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AG-000284DP to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and al-Qaeda's global terrorist network. He has been identified as receiving terrorist training, but does not appear to be a senior leader. While sometimes cooperative, he has also been uncooperative and obstinate during interrogations. The Joint Task Force assesses he poses a medium risk but defers to the Criminal Investigative Task Force's assessment that he poses a high risk.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000118DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of the Taliban who received weapons training at Taliban facilities and may have been involved in military action against coalition forces, posing a medium risk. He is in good physical health but receives mental health treatment. The assessment recommends transfer and cites the detainee's admissions of traveling with Taliban groups and surrendering to Northern Alliance forces.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative with ties to senior leaders. He has admitted to affiliations with terrorist groups including GIA and HIG. Detainee trained at militant camps, fought Soviets in Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban Foreign and Intelligence Ministries. He was captured in Pakistan and transferred to Guantanamo for suspected involvement in terrorist plots and attacks. Detainee has omitted details of his activities prior to capture, making his threat level and intelligence value difficult to assess fully.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda operative and leader of an improvised explosive devices (IED) cell in Khowst, Afghanistan. He worked directly for senior al-Qaeda member Ali Ammar Ashur al-Raqiai, planning IED attacks against US and Coalition forces. Multiple sources reported that detainee's cell received instructions from al-Raqiai to make IEDs for attacks against US forces. Detainee recruited others to his al-Qaeda cell and provided explosives training. He is assessed to be a continued threat and is recommended for continued detention.
Detainee Mohammed Mussa Yakubi is assessed as a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia in Afghanistan with connections to a global terrorist network. He is believed to have helped engineer IED and mortar attacks against US forces. Detainee was arrested after weapons were found in his compound, including an AK-47, mortar tubes, and ammunition. He is assessed as a HIGH risk and having MEDIUM intelligence value regarding the Gardez cell, planned attacks, and connections to other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. JTF GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be held in DoD custody.
This document provides a detainee assessment for an individual currently held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It recommends continued detention based on the detainee's history with militant groups and assessed likelihood to reengage in hostilities if released. Specifically:
- The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and likely to pose a threat due to his prior role as an intelligence officer for the Taliban and reported ties to other extremist groups.
- He is a member of an anti-coalition militia group with ties to the Haqqani Network and planned and executed rocket attacks against U.S. forces.
- Since his detention, his brother has engaged in insurgent activities, increasing the risk the deta
Detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and weapons smuggler associated with senior Taliban officials. He was captured in 2003 with documents and materials indicating ties to the Taliban and extremist networks. Detainee worked closely with the Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister and other senior figures. He denies the full extent of his Taliban activities and affiliations. JTF-GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be detained due to his high-level Taliban connections and potential threat.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a threat. He is assessed as a member of an Algerian extremist group involved in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Bosnia. Detainee served as the Bosnia contact for a senior al-Qaeda facilitator and received advanced training in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He is linked to al-Qaeda's support network and coordinated travel for extremists to Afghanistan. Detainee denies his extremist activities and identities despite corroborating intelligence reporting.
This memorandum recommends retaining a detainee, ISN US9AF-001043DP, under Department of Defense control at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who possesses intelligence on terrorist operations and personnel. He was formerly the Taliban Minister of Commerce and deputy to a senior Taliban commander. New information indicates he was involved in the killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross employee in 2003. The detainee poses a high risk and should continue to be detained.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (or Gulf war II) that took place in Iraq. In term of summary in strategies planning. The script is with PowerPoint version (in Thai language)
This memorandum provides an assessment of security operations in Afghanistan based on briefings and field observations by the author. It finds that the Taliban believe they are winning and gaining strength and popular support. ISAF forces are reinforcing but casualties are rising significantly. The Afghan National Army is developing capabilities but the Afghan National Police remains poorly equipped, corrupt, and untrained. Building competent Afghan security forces able to maintain stability without foreign assistance will be a long term effort requiring continued resources and commitment.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000560DP. It summarizes that the detainee has been compliant in detention but is assessed to be a high risk if released due to his prior role as a primary financial manager for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He facilitated large money transfers and the procurement of weapons for terrorist attacks. The detainee is reported to have strong ties to the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, and Jamaat Tablighi and to have been involved in narcotics trafficking. The document recommends the detainee remain in DoD custody due to concerns he could reengage in extremist support activities if released.
Pakistan gained independence in 1947 as a sovereign state, with Muhammad Ali Jinnah elected as the first President of Pakistan's Constituent Assembly. In 1949, the Assembly adopted the Objective Resolution to provide guidance for a future constitution based on Islamic ideology. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in 1951. Subsequent decades saw military coups, the formation of new political parties like the Pakistan Peoples Party, a war leading to the independence of Bangladesh, and changes to Pakistan's constitution in 1973. General elections were scheduled for May 2013 after the completion of the previous National Assembly's term.
Political and constitutional phases of pakisatan 1988-OnwardMalikzain21
This document provides an overview of the political and constitutional phases of Pakistan from 1988 to 2014. It discusses the tenures of multiple prime ministers including Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and Yousaf Raza Gillani. It also covers constitutional amendments, presidential elections, and the transition to civilian rule under Pervez Musharraf. Key events included the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's government in 1990, nuclear tests in 1998, and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention due to his involvement in a terrorist plot. He was arrested in 2001 as part of an Algerian cell in Bosnia suspected of planning to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee has an extensive history with extremist groups in Algeria, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. He worked with several Islamic non-governmental organizations of concern. While cooperative, he likely withholds full details about personal ties to extremists.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer Mohi Bullar, an Afghan national held at Guantanamo Bay, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes Bullar's background, capture, and reasons for continued detention. He is assessed as an active supporter of anti-coalition militia who engaged US and Afghan forces in a firefight, admitting to firing his weapon. While compliant in detention, he is considered a medium risk and may pose a threat. The document recommends his transfer for continued intelligence exploitation regarding militant activity in his home province of Oruzgan, Afghanistan.
This document provides a summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is believed to have worked for a known member of the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group and traveled between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for over a decade. Concerns were raised about inconsistencies in his story and links to anti-coalition militant groups. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining him in the Department of Defense's control due to these associations and assessed intelligence value.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000899DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on his admitted membership in Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, ties to anti-coalition militias, possible ties to al-Qaeda and Iranian extremists, and participation in attacks against US and coalition forces. Materials found in his possession at capture included an al-Qaeda training manual. The detainee is uncooperative and continues to support anti-US elements, so continued detention is advised for risk of reengagement if released.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000956DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes the detainee's background, including that he was a Taliban recruiter and commander in the 856th Brigade of the Afghan Military Forces. He received an order to attack US forces if they returned to the area. The document assesses the detainee as a medium risk and medium intelligence value, and recommends his transfer for continued detention based on his past militant activities and potential to provide information on other militants and weapon caches.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AG-000284DP to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and al-Qaeda's global terrorist network. He has been identified as receiving terrorist training, but does not appear to be a senior leader. While sometimes cooperative, he has also been uncooperative and obstinate during interrogations. The Joint Task Force assesses he poses a medium risk but defers to the Criminal Investigative Task Force's assessment that he poses a high risk.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000948DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable arms smuggler with ties to the Taliban. He has changed his story during interrogations and provided information about Taliban members, activities, and weapons caches. The memorandum recommends he be transferred with conditions due to still being assessed as a medium risk and having intelligence value regarding weapons smuggling and the Taliban.
Detainee Akhtiar Mohammad is assessed to be a high-level commander in the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group who has extensive knowledge of anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan. He is assessed to pose a high risk if released. Detainee was captured in 2003 at a suspected HIG compound during a raid. He has been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2004 and continues to be assessed as an enemy combatant with high intelligence value due to his connections and knowledge of HIG activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Detaineeis assessedas a mid-to-high level memberof the Taliban with ties to high-level membersof the Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and Al-Qaida's terrorist network. He served in a 40-man unit that provided security for Usama Bin Laden and helped plan insurgent operations against U.S. forces. Detainee has admitted to assisting in the escapeof a mujahideen general with alleged support from Iran. It is assessedhe poses a high risk and may be able to provide information on past and future plans against the U.S. and its allies.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN:US9AF-001019DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is an Afghan national who fought with the mujahideen and Taliban. He is assessed to have been a corrupt government official in Zabol province who associated with known terrorists like Hamidullah. While somewhat cooperative, he has been evasive about his full role. He poses a medium security risk and may have intelligence value. The Joint Task Force recommends his transfer for continued detention based on these assessments.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-001009DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee is a retired HIG commander whose sons were involved in attacks against US personnel in Afghanistan. While retired, the detainee still had influence among HIG leadership through his sons. It is assessed that he poses a medium risk and could plan, support or facilitate acts of terrorism if released. Due to his medical conditions, transfer to another country is recommended for continued detention.
This document provides a recommendation to continue detaining detainee ISN: US9AF-001001DP based on a JTF GTMO assessment. The detainee is assessed as a senior Anti-Coalition Militant facilitator with ties to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who provided logistical and operational support against US and Afghan forces. He abused government positions to support militant activities. The recommendation is to continue detaining him under DoD control due to the high risk he poses as likely to threaten the US and allies.
Detaineeis assessedas a memberof the Taliban and Al-Qaida terrorist network. He served in a 40-man Taliban unit that provided security for Usama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida leaders. The unit also conducted assassinations, kidnappings and bombings against US forces. Detainee admits connections to senior Taliban commanders and fighting against US troops. He poses a high security risk and likely would rejoin insurgent operations if released.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000886DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a mid-level, trusted member of the Taliban who served as a courier for senior leaders. He possesses significant connections to high-level Taliban and al-Qaeda figures. The detainee has been uncooperative during interviews and is assessed to pose a high risk threat. It is recommended he be transferred subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000494, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk and a member of the Taliban who was likely engaged in hostilities against US and Northern Alliance forces. He commanded Taliban troops in Mazar-e-Sharif and participated in a massacre of Shiite Muslims. While the detainee has provided some information, he is assessed to have withheld details about Taliban operations and personnel. The document recommends his transfer for continued detention due to his Taliban membership and role in hostilities.
(S//NF) Detainee was a senior Taliban official who held multiple high-level positions including Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army. He commanded thousands of Taliban troops and had close ties to al-Qaeda members. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes and would likely rejoin militant groups and target US forces if released. He poses a high security risk and has high intelligence value.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was captured with Taliban leaders and admitted to being a bodyguard for a high-ranking Taliban commander. Detainee received training at a Taliban camp and fought against U.S. forces on the Taliban front lines. While detainee claims to have been a low-level fighter, evidence suggests he was more significant due to being captured alongside senior Taliban leaders.
Detainee served as the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence and had direct access to senior Taliban, al-Qaeda, and anti-coalition militia leadership. He coordinated intelligence activities between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and assisted their operatives in evading capture. Detainee is assessed to still pose a threat and have high intelligence value due to his role in the Taliban government and ties to other Islamic militant groups.
Detainee was assessed as a low-level Taliban recruit from Afghanistan who was willing to martyr himself. He was recruited in 2002 to fight against US and Northern Alliance forces. While traveling through areas of Afghanistan like Zormat and Shahi-Kot, he likely has information on extremist madrassas and anti-US militants in the region. JTF-GTMO recommends he be transferred to another country for continued detention due to his commitment to jihad and likelihood of returning to terrorism if released.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000909DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was assessed to be a low-level member of an anti-coalition movement group commanded by his uncle, Samoud Khan, that operated in and around Gardez, Afghanistan. The detainee is assessed to pose a medium risk and may have information on the activities and locations of personnel in his uncle's group, including Saifullah Rahman Mansour, a former senior Taliban commander. The document recommends the detainee be transferred to another country for continued detention.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for transferring detainee ISN US9AF-001035DP to another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable former Taliban commander from Afghanistan who is currently in good health. He is assessed as a MEDIUM risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The detainee was captured with documents indicating ties to the Taliban and admitted being a member of an anti-coalition group. He provided information on weapon caches and personalities within the Taliban and Konar province government that expanded US intelligence. Based on this information, JTF-GTMO now recommends the detainee for transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000955DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have connections to anti-coalition activities in Afghanistan and may have been involved in rocket attacks against US forces. He was found deceptive during a polygraph about his participation. The detainee has also been tentatively identified as the chief of investigations for the Taliban in Zormat province. It is recommended he be transferred for continued detention due to posing a medium risk of engaging in future anti-coalition activities if released.
Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaida'sGlobal Jihad SupportNetwork who attendedtraining in Afghanistan andresidedin guesthousesoperatedby al-Qaidamembers.He occupiedpositionsin the Tora Bora Mountainsandparticipatedin hostilities againstUS andcoalition forces. JTF-GTMO previouslyassessedhim asa ContinuedDetentionrisk but now recommendshis TransferOut of DoD Controlbasedon his MEDIUM intelligencevalueandthreatlevel.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer the detainee, ISN US9AF-000914DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk threat who was a member of an anti-coalition movement group led by warlord Samoud Khan that was affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He received religious indoctrination at a madrassa led by a known al-Qaeda and Taliban affiliated leader. While the detainee's information may be useful, his credibility is questionable as he has provided inconsistent statements and instructed other detainees to lie. The memorandum recommends transfer for continued detention due to the detainee's affiliations and associations with terrorist groups and personalities.
The document provides a 3-part summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay:
1) It recommends the detainee for release or transfer to another country due to having only nominal affiliations with anti-coalition militants based on tribal relationships. The detainee is assessed to be a low risk.
2) It details the detainee's background, including being captured with two others in Afghanistan and having loose connections to two tribal leaders involved in anti-coalition activities.
3) It assesses the detainee as having low intelligence value, though provides some potential areas of exploitation, and recommends he remain classified as an enemy combatant.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed as a senior-level Taliban member who organized networks and disrupted coalition operations. He facilitated operations that likely resulted in US casualties. The detainee poses a high risk and can provide intelligence on extremist activities, drug trafficking, and Taliban networks. The Joint Task Force recommends continued detention.
Detainee is an admitted Taliban recruiter and commander of Military Base 4 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He has an extensive operational association with Usama Bin Laden and al-Qaida dating back to 1990. Detainee provided assistance to Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri during their escape from U.S. and Coalition forces in December 2001. He also provided security for al-Qaida personnel in Tora Bora in 1999-2000 and protection to Bin Laden in 1996. Detainee worked closely with al-Qaida and possibly participated in narcotics smuggling. JTF-GTMO assesses the detainee to be a high risk and of high intelligence value.
This document provides a summary and recommendation for transferring a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was previously assessed as "Retain in DoD" but is now recommended for transfer to the control of another country based on new information. Specifically, the detainee is assessed as a probable Al-Qaeda facilitator and possible anti-coalition militant supporter who aided Al-Qaeda members' escape from Afghanistan and may have ties to Pakistani intelligence services. The document recommends his transfer due to these assessments and potential intelligence value regarding border operations and militant groups.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000832DP. It summarizes that the detainee was a senior Taliban official who served in multiple leadership roles and had strong ties to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other anti-coalition militant groups. The detainee admitted serving in Taliban leadership positions and was involved in attacks against US and Coalition forces. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his past positions and ongoing ties to active militant groups that pose a threat to the US.
Detainee Mohammed Shah is assessed as a probable member of al Qaeda who has ties to terrorist political parties in Iran. He is assessed to be a medium risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The document recommends transferring the detainee to another country with conditions, subject to an acceptable transfer agreement. It provides details of the detainee's background, including fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, working as a doctor in Iran, and traveling between Afghanistan and Iran with large sums of money to support terrorist activities. The detainee is considered of medium intelligence value and may be able to provide information on Taliban commanders, couriers, and training camps in Iran with links to terrorist groups.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as a high-risk member of al-Qaeda. He is assessed to have been an explosives expert for an IED cell in Khowst subordinate to senior al-Qaeda operative Abu Layth al-Libi. As part of the cell, the detainee directly assisted in planning and implementing attacks against US and Coalition forces. Evidence includes 23 mines found buried at his compound and notebooks with IED assembly instructions. He is reported to have surveyed targets and planted mines to ambush forces, and suggested using a Stinger missile.
Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AG-000533DP. It summarizes the detainee's personal information, travel history, activities in Afghanistan including possible ties to al-Qaeda, and capture in Tora Bora after being injured attempting to flee US bombing. The assessment determines he poses a high risk and high intelligence value, and recommends his continued detention due to concerns he could reengage in extremism if released.
Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-Qaida who received terrorist training in Afghanistan. He reportedly attended training at al-Qaida affiliated camps, associated with known al-Qaida operatives, and resided in al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee likely participated in action against U.S. and coalition forces. He is assessed as a medium risk and threat, and of medium intelligence value.
Detainee is a 52-year old Algerian national assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and the North African Extremist Network who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and received small arms training at an al-Qaida camp. He is assessed to be a high risk and threat to the US due to his extremist connections and admitted associations with known terrorists. The document recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention, preferably Algeria, if a satisfactory agreement can be reached. If not, he should remain in DoD custody due to contradictions in his story and suspected deception during interrogations.
Detainee Ahmed Bin Saleh Bel Bachao is assessed as a probable member of al-Qaida who received weapons training in Afghanistan. He traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 after being influenced by extremist lectures at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London. In Afghanistan, he stayed at an Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad known to facilitate foreign fighters, where he received small arms training. He fled to Tora Bora during US attacks and was later captured with a large group of fighters. It is assessed he poses a medium risk and may have participated in hostilities against US forces.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay to another facility. It summarizes the detainee's personal information and assesses him as a probable member of al-Qaeda's support network who likely received improvised explosive device training. The detainee is believed to have traveled from France to Afghanistan via the UK and Pakistan, staying at guesthouses associated with extremist groups. He is assessed to pose a medium risk and high intelligence value.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AG-000175DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on evidence that he was an al-Qaida member who received training at al-Faruq camp and possibly explosives training. He is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US forces as a leader coordinating supplies for al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora, and was possibly selected for training as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. The document recommends his continued detention due to these assessments and his lack of cooperation.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for detainee ISN US9AG-000070DP held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is a 24-year old Algerian man with a history of significant head trauma resulting in blindness in one eye and brain injuries causing difficulties with speech, understanding, and controlling behaviors. Due to his medical condition, he requires long-term custodial care. While previously assessed as medium intelligence value, he now poses a low risk. The Joint Task Force recommends releasing or transferring the detainee to another country for continued detention based on his health status and low risk level.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
This memorandum recommends releasing or transferring a Guantanamo detainee. The detainee was likely falsely accused of participating in an ambush by Afghan forces seeking to cover up their own involvement. Records indicate the detainee poses a low risk and likely has no valuable intelligence. While the Criminal Investigation Task Force assesses the detainee as medium risk, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo recommends release or transfer based on the fraudulent circumstances of his capture.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a Guantanamo detainee, ISN: US9AF-001100DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was involved in anti-coalition militia operations and planned an attack on US forces in Afghanistan. He has direct ties to senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. The document assesses the detainee as a medium risk and recommends his transfer based on derogatory information obtained since his previous assessment.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-001075DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be of medium intelligence value and a medium threat risk. He was captured in Afghanistan in possession of weapons and has ties to anti-coalition militant groups in the Gardez region. While the detainee denies involvement, he has knowledge about a bombing in Gardez. The task force recommends his transfer to allow another country to take over his continued detention.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo Bay detainee, ISN US9AF-001045DP, in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee (1) is assessed to be a key member of anti-coalition militant groups who has participated in weapons trafficking, explosives training, and attacks against US and coalition forces; (2) has admitted ties to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations; and (3) poses a high risk and is likely to provide intelligence on terrorist networks, operations, and leaders if retained in DoD control.
Detainee ISN US9AF-001037DP is assessed to be a high-ranking commander in the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group. He was captured along with another high-ranking HIG commander, ISN 1036, during a raid on a HIG safe house. Detainee and ISN 1036 have provided conflicting statements about their roles in HIG and how long they have known each other. Detainee is assessed to pose a high risk as he likely would threaten U.S. interests. JTF GTMO assesses the detainee to be of high intelligence value and recommends he continue to be detained in DoD custody.
Detainee is assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militias (ACM) member suspected of participating in the 27 March 2003 murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) worker in Afghanistan. He was captured with a satellite phone he was using to contact Mullah Haji Satar, an ACM commander suspected of the ICRC murder. Detainee has provided inconsistent accounts and an uncertain identity. He is assessed to present a high risk threat due to his ties to ACM commanders conducting attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces.
This document provides a recommendation to continue detaining detainee US9AF-001021DP based on a JTF GTMO assessment. The detainee is assessed to be a high-ranking member of the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) with ties to Al-Qaida and its global terrorism network. He was implicated in a plot to kill Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan by placing bombs at the Presidential Palace and US Embassy. Consistent reporting indicates the detainee remains committed to the HIG and its goals. It is assessed that he poses a high risk and is likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies.
A memorandum from the Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining a detainee under Department of Defense control. The detainee, captured in Mexico attempting to enter the US, has provided inconsistent stories about his travel and background. He is considered of high intelligence value due to his potential knowledge of smuggling routes and operations. While generally compliant in detention, he has failed polygraph tests regarding combat training and intentions in the US. The task force assesses he poses a medium security risk.
1. s E c R E T / / NOFORN/ / 20301001
DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCEGUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360
JTFGTMO-CG 0l October2005
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander,United StatesSouthernCommand,3511NW 9lstAvenue,
Miami,FL33172.
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationfor Transferto the Control of Another Country for
ContinuedDetention(TRCD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN:US9AF-000890DP(S)
JTFGTMODetaineeAssessment
1. (S//NF)PersonalInformation:
o JDIMSA{DRC ReferenceName: RahmatullahSanearyar
o AliasesandCurrent/TrueName: Habibullah
o Placeof Binh: Ow Paran.Afehanistan(AF)
o Dateof Birth: 1 January1968
o Citizenship: Afghanistan
o InternmentSerialNumber(ISN): US9AF-000890DP
2. (FOUO)Health: Detaineeis in goodhealth.Hehasnoknownmedicalconditionsor drug
allergies.
3. (S//NF)JTF GTMOAssessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTFGTMOrecommendsthisdetaineefor Transferto the
Controlof AnotherCountryfor ContinuedDetention(TRCD).
b. (S/NF) Summary: JTFGTMOpreviouslyassesseddetaineeasRetainin DoDcontrol
(DoD)on29November2004.Baseduponinformationobtainedsincedetainee'sprevious
assessment,it isnowrecommendedhebeTransferredto theControlof AnotherCountryfor
ContinuedDetention(TRCD)if a satisfactoryagreementcanbereachedthatensures
continueddetentionandallowsaccessto detaineeand/oraccessto exploitedintelligence.
If asatisfactoryagreementcannotbereachedfor hiscontinueddetention,heshouldbe
retainedunderDoD control.
CLASSIFIEDBY: MULTIPLESOURCES
REASON:E.O.12958SECTION1.5(C)
DECLASSIFYON: 20301001
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2. S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3OIOOI
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationfor Transferto the Control of Another Country for
ContinuedDetention(TRCD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-000890DP(S)
Detaineeis assessedasa formerTalibancommander.Detaineeled over4000menagainst
variousenemies,includingthe Soviets,NorthernAlliance andHezb-e-Islami.His previous
activitiesreflecta commitmentto extremeIslamistideology. Detainee'sTalibanconnections
includethe inner circle of Taliban SupremeleaderMullah MohammedOmar. Detainee
probablybelongedto the anti-coalitionmovementprior to his capture,despitehis denialsto
the contrary. Mullah Omar reportedlystayedat the detainee'scompoundfollowing
detainee'sarrest.Due to his long alliancewith seniorleadersof the Taliban,leadershiprole
in oppositiongroups(e.g.HIG, a majormilitant factionandlong-establishedtiesto Al-
Qaida),andlong historyasa fighter,it is assessedthis detaineeis a HIGH risk, ashe is likely
to poseathreatto the US, its interestsandallies.
4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unlessotherwisenoted,thefollowing
paragraphsarebasedsolelyon thedetainee'sstatements.
a. (S/NF) Prior History: Detaineewasborn in the village of Ow Paran,Oruzgan
Province,AF. Detaineewas a farmer until he fought in the Sovietjihad aroundKabul.
Detaineereceivedover 18woundsduringthatconflict andcommandedasmanyas4000
tloops.
b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detaineewentto Kabul four monthsafterthe
Talibanseizedpowerin 1997,andwasa Talibancommanderwith 500troopsunderhis
command. Detaineecommandedthis unit until the fall of the Taliban.
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detaineemet Supremeleaderof the Taliban,
Mullah MohammedOmar, in 1997, afterthe assassinationof Taliban leaderMullah Mesher.
Detaineereportedto Mullah Abdul Qayoom,who in turn reportedto the Taliban Defense
MinisterMullah Obaidullah. Detaineeclaimedhe did not fight againstUS forces.
d. (S//NF) Capture Information: Around 27 November2002,NasrullahUS9AF-
00886DP(ISN 886)andUllah Ismat,US9AF-00888DP(ISN 888)werecapturedby the
Governorof Oruzganprovince, JanMohammed,andhis securitypatrol, after delivering
lettersto detainee.ISNs 886and888weregiven 10,000PKrupeesto deliverlettersfrom
seniorTaliban official, Mullah Obaidullah,who was in Quetta,Pakistan(PK). The next day
JanMohammedcaptureddetaineeat his compound. Detaineewasturnedover to US forces
shortly afterwards.
e. (S)Transferredto JTFGTMO:23March2003
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3. s E c R E T //NOFORN | | 20301001
JTFGTMO-CG
SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationfor Transferto theControlof AnotherCountryfor
ContinuedDetention(TRCD)for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN:US9AF-000890DP(S)
f. (S//NF)Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: Toprovideinformationonthe
followins:
o Talibangroundforcesfor thepast6 years.
o Routeof ingress
o Routeof egress
5. (S//NF)DetaineeThreat:
a. (S)Assessment:It isassessedthedetaineeposesaHIGHrisk,asheislikelytoposea
threatto theUS, its interestsandallies.
b. (S/NF)Reasonsfor GontinuedDetention:
. (S/A{F) Detaineewas a well-known Taliban commanderwho led a largenumberof
soldiersagainsttheNorthernAlliance. Detaineeled a localterroristcell andinteracted
with at leastthreeof the most seniorTaliban commanders,all of whom continueanti-
coalitionattacksandarelistedon US CentralCommand's"most wanted"blacklist.
Detaineeassociatedwith an Al-Qaida affiliated groupplanningto assassinateHamid
Karzai, the currentPresidentof Afghanistan.
o (S/AJF)Detaineewasa senior-levelTalibanmember,led effortsto localize
Taliban control, andinitiated numerousrelationshipswith Taliban andAl-Qaida
associatedgroupsandpersonnel.
. (S/A{F) Detaineecommandedthe Taliban Guard's BadamBagh andTagab
Divisionsduringmilitary campaignsagainsttheNorthemAlliance. Detainee's
front-linedivision,consistingof nearly4000men,controlledthemountainous
borderregionwith Pakistanjust northeastof Kabul, AF.
. (SiND In November 2002,an Afghan official identified detaineeasthe new
directorof the Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddin(HIG) Gulbuddincell locatedin
Kandahar,AF, a tier I terrorist target. (Analyst Note: Tier 1targetsaredefinedas
terrorist groups,especiallythosewith statesupport,that havedemonstratedthe
intentionandthe capabilityto attackUS personsor interests.)Detainee'sHIG
command,thoughshort-lived(detainee'scapturedatewas28 Nov 02), involved
plannedoperationsagainstUS interests,including kidnappinga suspectedfemale
CIA operativeandplannedexplosiveoperationsagainstUS andcoalition
vehicles. (Analyst Note: Although detaineenormally associatedwith Taliban
ratherthanthe HIG, reporting indicatedan alliancebetweenTaliban andHIG
soonafter9-11retaliatoryattacksbegan.)
. (S/A{F)MohammedHashimUS9AF-000850DP(ISN 850),identified
detaineeasa memberof an "Al
Qaida-supported40-manTaliban squad"led by
)
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4. s E c R E T //NOFORN | | 20301001
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationfor Transferto the Control of Another Country for
ContinuedDetention(TRCD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-000890DP(S)
Abdul Rais Wahid. The groupwasresponsiblefor supportinghostile actions
againstUS andAfghan interests. ISN 850 indicatedthat detaineefocusedagainst
US softtargets(personnelandlightly armoredvehicles),utilizing AK-47s asthe
primary weapon. Plannedactionsincludedassassinationsof Afghan government
. officials, including currentAfghan PresidentY:harzai.
o (S) On 28 November2002,Afghanprovincialforcescapturedsix Taliban
membersfor distributing night letters(propaganda)supportingTaliban objectives.
Capturedpersonnelincludeddetainee,Mullah Habibullah(possibleMullah Omar's
brother-in-law),ISN 866,ISN 868,Mullah Sharafudin(NFI), andMullah Ghafer
(NFr).
. (S/AIF) ISN 850revealedthat senior-level-Talibanofhcials (who werein
hiding) directedISN 888to deliverfour'letters' to detainee.Mullah Odaidullah
(formerTalibanMinister of DefenseandCENTCOM's #17 Blacklistmember),
Mullah Dadullah (former Taliban Commanderof the Kabul Corps,Northern
Afghanistantop memberof the War Council,andCENTCOM's #16 Blacklist
member),andMullah Berader(suspectedMullah Omar'ssuccessorand
CENTCOM's #13 Blacklistmember)eachsenta letterto detainee.A Fourth
letterwas a personnelinvitation from Odaidullahto visit him in Quetta,Pakistan
(PK). (AnalystNote: Positionof letteroriginatorsindicateslevelof respectand
importancedetaineehadin seniorTalibancircles).
. (S/n{F) ISN 888informedISN 850thathe readthethree'important' letters
anddestroyedthembeforedeliveringthemto detainee.ISN 888did not elaborate
on why he destroyedthe letters. (AnalystNote: ISN 888informedISN 850he
couldreadwell anddid not needanybodyto readlettersto him. The reasonfor
destroyinglettersis unknown.)
o (S/AIF) In late August 2005,high-rankingAfghan officials statedthat detainee,
ISN 886,andISN 888shouldremainin long-termcustody.
o (S/AIF) US officials identified detaineeasa former Taliban securitychief and
allegedlyassociatedwith tenorist groups/personnel.Theseofficials recommended
placing detaineeon severalUS federalagencieswatch lists for possiblethreatto US
andintemational civiI transportationcarriers.
o (S/A{F)Detaineediscussedhis relationshipwith Mullah DadullahandHajji
Mullah Fazil (senior-Talibancommander)in a pro-Talibanpersonallypennedpoem.
o (S/A{F) In November 2003,Mullah MohammedOmar, former Taliban supreme
commander,reportedly stayedat detainee'scompoundbecausehe felt it would not be
of interestto US forces.
c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detaineeis assessedasa LOW threatfrom a detention
perspective.Detainee'soverallbehaviorhasbeencompliantandnon-hostileto the guard
force and staff.
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5. SE C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3OIOOI
JTFGTMO-CG
SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationfor Transferto theControlof AnotherCountryfor
ContinuedDetention(TRCD)for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN:US9AF-000890DP(S)
6. (S//NF)DetaineeIntelligenceValue Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: JTFGTMOdeterminedthisdetaineeis of MEDIUM intelligence
value.
. (S/A{F)Additional informationis requiredon detainee'sactionsin the Taliban
leadership.Reportingis limited on the"Al
Qaida-supported40-manTalibansquad".
Detaineehasplacementandaccessto high-levelTalibanfield commandersincluding
Mullah MohammadOmar. DetaineecommandedArab soldiersduring campaigns
againsttheNorthernAlliance andprobablyhaslinks to HIG andAl-Qaida. Detaineehas
knowledgeof weaponscaches,Taliban routesof attack,andtacticsusedduring attacks
on coalition forces. Detaineemay know routesand safehousesMullah Omar usesto hide
from coalitionforces.
b. (S//NF)Areasof PotentialExploitation:
o Talibanpersonalities,includingMullah Berader,Mullah Obaidullah,Mullah
Dadullah,Mullah MohamedOmar,Nasrullah(US9AF-000886DP),Esmatullah(US9AF-
000888DP),andMatteUllah.
. Al-Qaidapersonalitiesandweaponscaches.
r Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddin(HIG)
7. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon 18June2004,and
he remainsan enemycombatant.
Z^/L./h/ /AY W.HOOD
Vruaio, General,USA
Commandins
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