This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer the detainee, ISN US9AF-000914DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk threat who was a member of an anti-coalition movement group led by warlord Samoud Khan that was affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He received religious indoctrination at a madrassa led by a known al-Qaeda and Taliban affiliated leader. While the detainee's information may be useful, his credibility is questionable as he has provided inconsistent statements and instructed other detainees to lie. The memorandum recommends transfer for continued detention due to the detainee's affiliations and associations with terrorist groups and personalities.
Detainee Habib Ullah is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He is assessed as a member of an anti-coalition group with ties to al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Detainee admitted to participating in a rocket attack against U.S. forces and was in frequent contact with senior Taliban leader Saifullah Rahman Mansour. He worked for and communicated with known militants, including living at the compound of a wanted al-Qaeda associate. Detainee possesses knowledge of attacks against U.S. forces and militant groups in the region.
(S//NF) Detainee was a senior Taliban official who held multiple high-level positions including Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army. He commanded thousands of Taliban troops and had close ties to al-Qaeda members. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes and would likely rejoin militant groups and target US forces if released. He poses a high security risk and has high intelligence value.
Detainee is assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militias (ACM) member suspected of participating in the 27 March 2003 murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) worker in Afghanistan. He was captured with a satellite phone he was using to contact Mullah Haji Satar, an ACM commander suspected of the ICRC murder. Detainee has provided inconsistent accounts and an uncertain identity. He is assessed to present a high risk threat due to his ties to ACM commanders conducting attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces.
The document is a memorandum recommending the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000934DP. It finds that he poses a high security risk, as he was likely a member of a Taliban militia unit and involved in rocket attacks against U.S. forces. If released, it assesses he would reconnect with extremists and resume hostile activities. The detainee has been inconsistent about his involvement and maintains contact with Taliban members, posing a threat to the U.S. and allies.
This document provides a summary and recommendation for transferring a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was previously assessed as "Retain in DoD" but is now recommended for transfer to the control of another country based on new information. Specifically, the detainee is assessed as a probable Al-Qaeda facilitator and possible anti-coalition militant supporter who aided Al-Qaeda members' escape from Afghanistan and may have ties to Pakistani intelligence services. The document recommends his transfer due to these assessments and potential intelligence value regarding border operations and militant groups.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AG-000175DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on evidence that he was an al-Qaida member who received training at al-Faruq camp and possibly explosives training. He is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US forces as a leader coordinating supplies for al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora, and was possibly selected for training as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. The document recommends his continued detention due to these assessments and his lack of cooperation.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer the detainee, ISN US9AF-000914DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk threat who was a member of an anti-coalition movement group led by warlord Samoud Khan that was affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He received religious indoctrination at a madrassa led by a known al-Qaeda and Taliban affiliated leader. While the detainee's information may be useful, his credibility is questionable as he has provided inconsistent statements and instructed other detainees to lie. The memorandum recommends transfer for continued detention due to the detainee's affiliations and associations with terrorist groups and personalities.
Detainee Habib Ullah is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He is assessed as a member of an anti-coalition group with ties to al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Detainee admitted to participating in a rocket attack against U.S. forces and was in frequent contact with senior Taliban leader Saifullah Rahman Mansour. He worked for and communicated with known militants, including living at the compound of a wanted al-Qaeda associate. Detainee possesses knowledge of attacks against U.S. forces and militant groups in the region.
(S//NF) Detainee was a senior Taliban official who held multiple high-level positions including Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army. He commanded thousands of Taliban troops and had close ties to al-Qaeda members. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes and would likely rejoin militant groups and target US forces if released. He poses a high security risk and has high intelligence value.
Detainee is assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militias (ACM) member suspected of participating in the 27 March 2003 murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) worker in Afghanistan. He was captured with a satellite phone he was using to contact Mullah Haji Satar, an ACM commander suspected of the ICRC murder. Detainee has provided inconsistent accounts and an uncertain identity. He is assessed to present a high risk threat due to his ties to ACM commanders conducting attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces.
The document is a memorandum recommending the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000934DP. It finds that he poses a high security risk, as he was likely a member of a Taliban militia unit and involved in rocket attacks against U.S. forces. If released, it assesses he would reconnect with extremists and resume hostile activities. The detainee has been inconsistent about his involvement and maintains contact with Taliban members, posing a threat to the U.S. and allies.
This document provides a summary and recommendation for transferring a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was previously assessed as "Retain in DoD" but is now recommended for transfer to the control of another country based on new information. Specifically, the detainee is assessed as a probable Al-Qaeda facilitator and possible anti-coalition militant supporter who aided Al-Qaeda members' escape from Afghanistan and may have ties to Pakistani intelligence services. The document recommends his transfer due to these assessments and potential intelligence value regarding border operations and militant groups.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AG-000175DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on evidence that he was an al-Qaida member who received training at al-Faruq camp and possibly explosives training. He is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US forces as a leader coordinating supplies for al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora, and was possibly selected for training as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. The document recommends his continued detention due to these assessments and his lack of cooperation.
Detainee was captured in possession of improvised explosive devices and admitted to being part of a four-man cell that planned attacks against US and Coalition forces using IEDs. He was assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militia member with possible ties to al-Qaeda, and may have received explosives training in Pakistan. If released, it is assessed he could reengage in militant activities. While in detention, he has been largely compliant but also verbally harassed guards on occasions. He is considered a medium risk and of low intelligence value.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
This memorandum recommends transferring a detainee, ISN US9AF-000954DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have ties to anti-coalition movement leaders in Afghanistan and resisted capture for over an hour by firing weapons and throwing grenades at U.S. and Afghan forces. He is not known to have directly attacked U.S. or coalition forces, but is assessed to possibly still pose a threat. The detainee provided district-level services under the Taliban and knew key figures such as Saifullah Rahman Mansour, a former Taliban commander with ties to al-Qaeda. It is recommended he be transferred for continued detention due to these associations and his resistance
Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan under the influence of his older brothers, one of whom was a senior al-Qaida member. Detainee received training at al-Qaida camps and guesthouses and worked closely with senior al-Qaida operatives, including having advance knowledge of attack plots. He was captured in 2002 during a raid on an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi with other detainees. The document provides details of detainee's travels, training, associates, and activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000848DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk and a commander in the Taliban who was part of a 40-man unit conducting anti-coalition operations. While the detainee has been compliant in detention, he possesses medium intelligence value due to his role in the 40-man unit and potential knowledge of its operations and security of high-level al-Qaeda and Taliban personnel. The document recommends his transfer for continued detention.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as a high-risk member of al-Qaeda. He is assessed to have been an explosives expert for an IED cell in Khowst subordinate to senior al-Qaeda operative Abu Layth al-Libi. As part of the cell, the detainee directly assisted in planning and implementing attacks against US and Coalition forces. Evidence includes 23 mines found buried at his compound and notebooks with IED assembly instructions. He is reported to have surveyed targets and planted mines to ambush forces, and suggested using a Stinger missile.
Detainee is assessed to be a high risk threat and of high intelligence value. He is a member of an Algerian armed group involved in an al-Qaeda linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Detainee fought in the Bosnian jihad in the 1990s and worked with several charities associated with terrorism. He also served as an instructor at al-Qaeda training camps. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan after 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia before departing. He denies all allegations.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-001012DP, to the control of Afghanistan for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have worked as a facilitator for Al Wafa, transporting Arabs from Iran to the Afghanistan border from 2000-2002. He facilitated travel for Al-Qaida operatives and is linked to the director of Al Wafa activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While not a member of Al-Qaida or the Taliban, he is deemed a medium risk and may pose a threat to US interests due to his ties to terrorist organizations. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay and the Criminal Investigative Task Force agree on the assessment
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000886DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a mid-level, trusted member of the Taliban who served as a courier for senior leaders. He possesses significant connections to high-level Taliban and al-Qaeda figures. The detainee has been uncooperative during interviews and is assessed to pose a high risk threat. It is recommended he be transferred subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
1) The document provides a recommendation to continue detaining a Guantanamo detainee named Sabir Lahmar Manfud due to his involvement with the Armed Islamic Group and ties to terrorist plots and activities in Bosnia.
2) It notes he advocated hostility against US forces, intended to travel to Afghanistan and Iran, and would likely engage in anti-US activities if released.
3) New information since the last review includes reports of his presence at an al-Qaeda guest house in Afghanistan and attempts to meet with al-Qaeda leaders in Iran.
Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AG-000533DP. It summarizes the detainee's personal information, travel history, activities in Afghanistan including possible ties to al-Qaeda, and capture in Tora Bora after being injured attempting to flee US bombing. The assessment determines he poses a high risk and high intelligence value, and recommends his continued detention due to concerns he could reengage in extremism if released.
Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-Qaida who received terrorist training in Afghanistan. He reportedly attended training at al-Qaida affiliated camps, associated with known al-Qaida operatives, and resided in al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee likely participated in action against U.S. and coalition forces. He is assessed as a medium risk and threat, and of medium intelligence value.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
Detainee is a 52-year old Algerian national assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and the North African Extremist Network who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and received small arms training at an al-Qaida camp. He is assessed to be a high risk and threat to the US due to his extremist connections and admitted associations with known terrorists. The document recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention, preferably Algeria, if a satisfactory agreement can be reached. If not, he should remain in DoD custody due to contradictions in his story and suspected deception during interrogations.
Detainee Ahmed Bin Saleh Bel Bachao is assessed as a probable member of al-Qaida who received weapons training in Afghanistan. He traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 after being influenced by extremist lectures at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London. In Afghanistan, he stayed at an Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad known to facilitate foreign fighters, where he received small arms training. He fled to Tora Bora during US attacks and was later captured with a large group of fighters. It is assessed he poses a medium risk and may have participated in hostilities against US forces.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay to another facility. It summarizes the detainee's personal information and assesses him as a probable member of al-Qaeda's support network who likely received improvised explosive device training. The detainee is believed to have traveled from France to Afghanistan via the UK and Pakistan, staying at guesthouses associated with extremist groups. He is assessed to pose a medium risk and high intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AG-000284DP to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and al-Qaeda's global terrorist network. He has been identified as receiving terrorist training, but does not appear to be a senior leader. While sometimes cooperative, he has also been uncooperative and obstinate during interrogations. The Joint Task Force assesses he poses a medium risk but defers to the Criminal Investigative Task Force's assessment that he poses a high risk.
Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaida'sGlobal Jihad SupportNetwork who attendedtraining in Afghanistan andresidedin guesthousesoperatedby al-Qaidamembers.He occupiedpositionsin the Tora Bora Mountainsandparticipatedin hostilities againstUS andcoalition forces. JTF-GTMO previouslyassessedhim asa ContinuedDetentionrisk but now recommendshis TransferOut of DoD Controlbasedon his MEDIUM intelligencevalueandthreatlevel.
Detainee was captured in possession of improvised explosive devices and admitted to being part of a four-man cell that planned attacks against US and Coalition forces using IEDs. He was assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militia member with possible ties to al-Qaeda, and may have received explosives training in Pakistan. If released, it is assessed he could reengage in militant activities. While in detention, he has been largely compliant but also verbally harassed guards on occasions. He is considered a medium risk and of low intelligence value.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
This memorandum recommends transferring a detainee, ISN US9AF-000954DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have ties to anti-coalition movement leaders in Afghanistan and resisted capture for over an hour by firing weapons and throwing grenades at U.S. and Afghan forces. He is not known to have directly attacked U.S. or coalition forces, but is assessed to possibly still pose a threat. The detainee provided district-level services under the Taliban and knew key figures such as Saifullah Rahman Mansour, a former Taliban commander with ties to al-Qaeda. It is recommended he be transferred for continued detention due to these associations and his resistance
Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan under the influence of his older brothers, one of whom was a senior al-Qaida member. Detainee received training at al-Qaida camps and guesthouses and worked closely with senior al-Qaida operatives, including having advance knowledge of attack plots. He was captured in 2002 during a raid on an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi with other detainees. The document provides details of detainee's travels, training, associates, and activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000848DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk and a commander in the Taliban who was part of a 40-man unit conducting anti-coalition operations. While the detainee has been compliant in detention, he possesses medium intelligence value due to his role in the 40-man unit and potential knowledge of its operations and security of high-level al-Qaeda and Taliban personnel. The document recommends his transfer for continued detention.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as a high-risk member of al-Qaeda. He is assessed to have been an explosives expert for an IED cell in Khowst subordinate to senior al-Qaeda operative Abu Layth al-Libi. As part of the cell, the detainee directly assisted in planning and implementing attacks against US and Coalition forces. Evidence includes 23 mines found buried at his compound and notebooks with IED assembly instructions. He is reported to have surveyed targets and planted mines to ambush forces, and suggested using a Stinger missile.
Detainee is assessed to be a high risk threat and of high intelligence value. He is a member of an Algerian armed group involved in an al-Qaeda linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Detainee fought in the Bosnian jihad in the 1990s and worked with several charities associated with terrorism. He also served as an instructor at al-Qaeda training camps. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan after 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia before departing. He denies all allegations.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-001012DP, to the control of Afghanistan for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have worked as a facilitator for Al Wafa, transporting Arabs from Iran to the Afghanistan border from 2000-2002. He facilitated travel for Al-Qaida operatives and is linked to the director of Al Wafa activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While not a member of Al-Qaida or the Taliban, he is deemed a medium risk and may pose a threat to US interests due to his ties to terrorist organizations. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay and the Criminal Investigative Task Force agree on the assessment
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000886DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a mid-level, trusted member of the Taliban who served as a courier for senior leaders. He possesses significant connections to high-level Taliban and al-Qaeda figures. The detainee has been uncooperative during interviews and is assessed to pose a high risk threat. It is recommended he be transferred subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
1) The document provides a recommendation to continue detaining a Guantanamo detainee named Sabir Lahmar Manfud due to his involvement with the Armed Islamic Group and ties to terrorist plots and activities in Bosnia.
2) It notes he advocated hostility against US forces, intended to travel to Afghanistan and Iran, and would likely engage in anti-US activities if released.
3) New information since the last review includes reports of his presence at an al-Qaeda guest house in Afghanistan and attempts to meet with al-Qaeda leaders in Iran.
Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AG-000533DP. It summarizes the detainee's personal information, travel history, activities in Afghanistan including possible ties to al-Qaeda, and capture in Tora Bora after being injured attempting to flee US bombing. The assessment determines he poses a high risk and high intelligence value, and recommends his continued detention due to concerns he could reengage in extremism if released.
Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-Qaida who received terrorist training in Afghanistan. He reportedly attended training at al-Qaida affiliated camps, associated with known al-Qaida operatives, and resided in al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee likely participated in action against U.S. and coalition forces. He is assessed as a medium risk and threat, and of medium intelligence value.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
Detainee is a 52-year old Algerian national assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and the North African Extremist Network who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and received small arms training at an al-Qaida camp. He is assessed to be a high risk and threat to the US due to his extremist connections and admitted associations with known terrorists. The document recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention, preferably Algeria, if a satisfactory agreement can be reached. If not, he should remain in DoD custody due to contradictions in his story and suspected deception during interrogations.
Detainee Ahmed Bin Saleh Bel Bachao is assessed as a probable member of al-Qaida who received weapons training in Afghanistan. He traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 after being influenced by extremist lectures at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London. In Afghanistan, he stayed at an Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad known to facilitate foreign fighters, where he received small arms training. He fled to Tora Bora during US attacks and was later captured with a large group of fighters. It is assessed he poses a medium risk and may have participated in hostilities against US forces.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay to another facility. It summarizes the detainee's personal information and assesses him as a probable member of al-Qaeda's support network who likely received improvised explosive device training. The detainee is believed to have traveled from France to Afghanistan via the UK and Pakistan, staying at guesthouses associated with extremist groups. He is assessed to pose a medium risk and high intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AG-000284DP to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and al-Qaeda's global terrorist network. He has been identified as receiving terrorist training, but does not appear to be a senior leader. While sometimes cooperative, he has also been uncooperative and obstinate during interrogations. The Joint Task Force assesses he poses a medium risk but defers to the Criminal Investigative Task Force's assessment that he poses a high risk.
Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaida'sGlobal Jihad SupportNetwork who attendedtraining in Afghanistan andresidedin guesthousesoperatedby al-Qaidamembers.He occupiedpositionsin the Tora Bora Mountainsandparticipatedin hostilities againstUS andcoalition forces. JTF-GTMO previouslyassessedhim asa ContinuedDetentionrisk but now recommendshis TransferOut of DoD Controlbasedon his MEDIUM intelligencevalueandthreatlevel.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for detainee ISN US9AG-000070DP held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is a 24-year old Algerian man with a history of significant head trauma resulting in blindness in one eye and brain injuries causing difficulties with speech, understanding, and controlling behaviors. Due to his medical condition, he requires long-term custodial care. While previously assessed as medium intelligence value, he now poses a low risk. The Joint Task Force recommends releasing or transferring the detainee to another country for continued detention based on his health status and low risk level.
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Detainee Mohammed Mussa Yakubi is assessed as a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia in Afghanistan with connections to a global terrorist network. He is believed to have helped engineer IED and mortar attacks against US forces. Detainee was arrested after weapons were found in his compound, including an AK-47, mortar tubes, and ammunition. He is assessed as a HIGH risk and having MEDIUM intelligence value regarding the Gardez cell, planned attacks, and connections to other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. JTF GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be held in DoD custody.
This document provides a summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is believed to have worked for a known member of the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group and traveled between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for over a decade. Concerns were raised about inconsistencies in his story and links to anti-coalition militant groups. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining him in the Department of Defense's control due to these associations and assessed intelligence value.
Detainee Mohammed Shah is assessed as a probable member of al Qaeda who has ties to terrorist political parties in Iran. He is assessed to be a medium risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The document recommends transferring the detainee to another country with conditions, subject to an acceptable transfer agreement. It provides details of the detainee's background, including fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, working as a doctor in Iran, and traveling between Afghanistan and Iran with large sums of money to support terrorist activities. The detainee is considered of medium intelligence value and may be able to provide information on Taliban commanders, couriers, and training camps in Iran with links to terrorist groups.
This memorandum recommends releasing or transferring a Guantanamo detainee. The detainee was likely falsely accused of participating in an ambush by Afghan forces seeking to cover up their own involvement. Records indicate the detainee poses a low risk and likely has no valuable intelligence. While the Criminal Investigation Task Force assesses the detainee as medium risk, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo recommends release or transfer based on the fraudulent circumstances of his capture.
Detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and weapons smuggler associated with senior Taliban officials. He was captured in 2003 with documents and materials indicating ties to the Taliban and extremist networks. Detainee worked closely with the Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister and other senior figures. He denies the full extent of his Taliban activities and affiliations. JTF-GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be detained due to his high-level Taliban connections and potential threat.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a Guantanamo detainee, ISN: US9AF-001100DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was involved in anti-coalition militia operations and planned an attack on US forces in Afghanistan. He has direct ties to senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. The document assesses the detainee as a medium risk and recommends his transfer based on derogatory information obtained since his previous assessment.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-001075DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be of medium intelligence value and a medium threat risk. He was captured in Afghanistan in possession of weapons and has ties to anti-coalition militant groups in the Gardez region. While the detainee denies involvement, he has knowledge about a bombing in Gardez. The task force recommends his transfer to allow another country to take over his continued detention.
DetaineeMohammedAmin is recommendedfor transferto the control of anothercountry for continueddetention.He is assessedto be a memberof Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddinwho attendedplanningmeetingswhereattacksagainstUS-ledcoalitionforcesandtheAfghangovernmentwere discussed.Detaineehasassociationswith TalibanandAl-Qaedafiguresandmay haveknowledgeof futureplannedattacksdue to his involvementwith Anti-Coalitionforcesin Afghanistan.While in custody,hehasbeengenerallycompliantbut remainsan enemycombatant.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo Bay detainee, ISN US9AF-001045DP, in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee (1) is assessed to be a key member of anti-coalition militant groups who has participated in weapons trafficking, explosives training, and attacks against US and coalition forces; (2) has admitted ties to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations; and (3) poses a high risk and is likely to provide intelligence on terrorist networks, operations, and leaders if retained in DoD control.