Us9ag 000175dp

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330106
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JTF-GTMO-CDR 6 January 2008
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AG-000175DP (S)
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment
1. (S) Personal Information:
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Hassan Mujamma Rabai
Said
Current/True Name and Aliases: Ghalaab Bashir, Bashir Bu
Jumaa Ghalab, Abu al-Harith Bujamma, Abdul Harith, Abdel
Hamza al-Jazira, al-Harith al-Jazairi, Hassan Bijamina, Bashir
al-Jazairi, Suhayb al-Tunisi
Place of Birth: Oum el-Bouaghi, Algeria (AG)
Date of Birth: 5 February 1976
Citizenship: Algeria
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AG-000175DP
2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.
3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:
(S) Recommendation:a. JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention
Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 14 January 2007.
b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is an assessed al-Qaida member who traveled
to Afghanistan (AF) where he received training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp and
possibly received explosives training. Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities
against US and Coalition forces and was identified as a leader coordinating supplies and

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JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
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for
munitions for the al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora. Detainee was possibly selected for training
as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden (UBL). JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:
A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
A LOW threat from a detention perspective
Of MEDIUM intelligence value
c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s
assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be
annotated by ¡ next to the footnote.)
Upgraded detainee’s risk level to HIGH due to detainee’s logistical duties in Tora
Bora, evidence supporting detainee being chosen for a UBL bodyguard position, and his
overall lack of cooperation since being detained
Added identification of detainee as an emir (leader) in Tora Bora
Added reporting about detainee’s training
Added detainee’s alias Suhayb al-Tunisi
4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events:
The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account.
These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee attended primary and preparatory school, ending in
1992. During his adolescent years, detainee stated that Algeria did not provide a suitable
environment for him to mature in his Islamic faith and that his sister was harassed at school
for wearing traditional Islamic clothing. From 1997 until his departure for Afghanistan,
detainee worked as a clothing merchant in his hometown of Biskara, AG.1
b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee denied hearing encouragement for jihad at
his local mosque, but he heard on television and radio that Afghanistan was a true Islamic
state under Taliban rule. On 19 August 2000, detainee left Algeria for Afghanistan.
Detainee claimed to have stopped in Damascus, Syria (SY), to rectify an overcharge by the
Libyan travel agency who provided his ticket. From the time detainee arrived in Syria until
he departed in 2001, detainee worked at Miramar’s Pizza shop in Damascus.2
During
detainee’s first week in Syria, he attempted to enroll in the Abu Noor Institute, but his
1
IIR 6 034 0567 02
2
IIR 6 034 0567 02, 000175 KB 13-MAY-2002

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application was denied due to his age.3
On 25 June 2001, detainee departed Syria to travel to
Iran (IR). Upon arrival in Zahedan, IR, detainee went to the Pakistani embassy and inquired
about entry into Pakistan (PK). The embassy informed detainee it would take approximately
six months to complete the required paperwork. An individual at a local mosque referred
detainee to the Jama’at Tablighi (JT) office in Zahedan for assistance.4
On 7 July 2001,
associates of the JT office assisted in smuggling detainee into Quetta, PK.5
From Quetta,
detainee traveled to Afghanistan arriving a few days later in Jalalabad via Kandahar and
Kabul.6
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Between July and November 2001, detainee resided
at the Muhammad Khan Mosque in Jalalabad, studying under the tutelage of Imam Abdul
Haq.7
Detainee claims to have dressed as an Afghan during this time, and no one identified
him as an Arab. Detainee stated he never was solicited to join the Taliban to fight against the
Northern Alliance.8
5. (U) Capture Information:
a. (S//NF) Detainee claimed he fled Jalalabad on foot with unknown Arabs and Pakistanis
in mid-November 2001, when the city fell to US and Coalition forces. Detainee traveled
through the mountains and stayed in an unknown location for approximately one month until
16 December 2001. An Afghan guide led detainee and approximately twenty other Arabs to
Pakistan, where Pakistani authorities captured detainee and the group.9
Although his account
is essentially accurate, detainee is assessed to have fled Afghanistan with a group of al-Qaida
and Taliban fighters led by UBL appointed military commander in Tora Bora, Ali
Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-Fakhri aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-
212). The group crossed the Afghani-Pakistani border in the Nangarhar region in mid-
December 2001. Their Pakistani contact convinced them to surrender their weapons and
3
IIR 6 034 0567 02; Analyst Note: The Abu Noor School, or Abu Noor Institute, in Damascus is considered a
common “pass-through” point for terrorists, including some American students who attended the school and adopted
extremist ideology. Reference: ACIC TERRORISM SUMMARY 27-OCT-2004.
4
Analyst Note: JT is designated as a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Counter Terrorism (CT)
Priority 2A Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 2A TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide
financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational
support to Priority 2A terrorist groups.
5
IIR 6 034 0217 04, IIR 6 034 0155 04, IIR 6 034 0144 04
6
000175 KB 13-MAY-2002, IIR 6 034 0567 02
7
IIR 6 034 0216 04, IIR 4 201 2491 04; Analyst Note: Detainee mentioned a student center at the mosque used
exclusively by the Taliban.
8
IIR 6 034 0567 02
9
000175 KB 13-MAY-2002, IIR 6 034 0567 02

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for
b.
gathered the group in a mosque where Pakistani forces immediately arrested them.10
Detainee was transferred to US custody from Kohat, PK, on 30 December 2001.11
(S) Property Held:
Casio model A159W watch
3,000 Pakistani rupees12
c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 01 May 2002
d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the
following:
Individuals at the Muhammad Khan Mosque in Jalalabad
Egress route of Arabs from Jalalabad through the Tora Bora mountains to the
Pakistani border
6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Detainee has been uncooperative during
interrogation sessions, demonstrating continuing support to extremism and associates who may
still be at large. Detainee has provided conflicting, vague, and false information. Detainee’s
claimed delay in Syria is a probable cover for earlier entry into Afghanistan and his training at
al-Qaida camps. Detainee claimed he had enough money to purchase a return ticket to Algeria
(or to Afghanistan), yet he applied to the Abu Noor Institute. Detainee admitted being smuggled
into Pakistan, yet never explained why he did not enter Afghanistan directly from Iran, especially
given the porous border. Detainee provided no specific information on the other residents at the
Muhammad Khan Mosque during his time there, nor does he provide specific information
concerning his egress from Afghanistan. Detainee has denied receiving any militant training, yet
other JTF-GTMO detainees identified him at al-Faruq. Detainee denied participating in any
combat against US or Coalition forces, yet he has been identified as present in the Tora Bora
region and was captured with a large group fleeing al-Qaida and Taliban fighters. Detainee
admitted lying about his name for a substantial period of his detention and has given conflicting
places of birth.
7. (U) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat
to the US, its interests, and allies.
10
IIR 7 739 3396 02, Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis
11
TD-314/00845-02, DAB Association of Names to 195 Detainees 29-Dec-2006
12
Analyst Note: 3,000 PKR is equivalent to $48.59 US using the conversion date of 15 December 2001.

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b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-
Qaida. Detainee’s name was found on al-Qaida affiliated documents and he is assessed to
have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee was identified as a
leader associated with the supply and logistics in Tora Bora. Detainee received militant
training at the al-Faruq Camp and he was identified as being selected to serve as a UBL
bodyguard. Detainee also possibly received explosives training.
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida. Detainee’s name was
found on al-Qaida affiliated documents indicating he was a fighter assessed to have
participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces, and stayed at al-Qaida
guesthouses.
(S//NF) Detainee was one of 84 reported fighters that were captured by Pakistani
forces after they crossed the border from Afghanistan to Pakistan.13
(Analyst Note:
This is assessed to be the group led out of Tora Bora by senior al-Qaida commander
LY-212, who was captured with the group.)14
(S//NF) Detainee’s name, Ghalib Bashir (variant: Ghalaab) and his alias, al-
Harith al-Jazairi, were on a list of captured mujahideen recovered from a hard drive
associated with senior al-Qaida operative Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM),
aka (Mukhtar), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024).15
(Analyst Note: The
mujahideen were those captured with LY-212 after fleeing the hostilities in Tora
Bora.)
(S//NF) A variant of detainee’s alias, Bashir al-Jazairi, was included on a list of
emirs (leaders) in Tora Bora.16
(S//NF) Detainee’s assessed participation in hostilities is supported by reporting
from other JTF-GTMO detainees who identified detainee at the Tora Bora supply
center.
¡ (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM-00252DP
(YM-252), stated detainee went by the name Abdel Hamza al-Jazira in Tora Bora
where detainee managed the weapons inventory.17
YM-252 saw detainee
multiple times in Tora Bora following the 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee
checked on YM-252’s fighting group to make sure they had enough supplies.
Abdullah al-Kuwaiti, (an alias for Fuad Mahmud Hasan al-Rabia, ISN US9KU-
000551DP (KU-551)) served as detainee’s leader and head of the supply center in
Tora Bora.18
13
IIR 7 739 3396 02
14
TD-314/52609-05, TD-314/14605-04
15
TD-314/13174-03
16
¢IIR 6 034 0281 07
17
IIR 6 034 0013 04
18
IIR 6 034 0700 03, IIR 6 034 0705 03, 000551 SIR 02-MAR-2005

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(S//NF) KU-551 identified detainee at Tora Bora working with al-Qaida
operative Mahr Rafat al-Quwari, ISN US9WE-000519DP (WE-519), in UBL’s
Tora Bora cave complex re-supplying the fighters. KU-551 identified detainee as
Suhayb al-Tunisi and noted al-Qaida commander Abd al-Qadus assigned detainee
to the supply center.19
(S//NF) Detainee’s name and alias were found on a list of al-Qaida members and
the contents of their trust accounts. Detainee’s trust account contained a passport and
unidentified documents. This list was found on computer media recovered during
raids against al-Qaida-associated safe houses in Rawalpindi, PK, on 1 March 2003
and Karachi, PK, on 11 September 2003.20
(S//NF) Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual’s residence
within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose
of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust
accounts, also referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were simply
storage compartments, such as envelopes or folders, which guesthouse
administrators used to secure the individual’s personal valuables, such as
passports and plane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until
completion of training or other activity.
¡ (S//NF) Detainee received militant training at al-Faruq Training Camp and was
reportedly selected to be a future UBL bodyguard.
(S//NF) Richard Dean Belmar, ISN US9UK-000817DP (UK-817, transferred),
photo-identified detainee as having trained at al-Faruq.21
(S//NF) YM-252 stated he and detainee attended militant training together at al-
Faruq; detainee was one class ahead of YM-252.22
(Analyst Note: YM-252’s
identification of detainee at al-Faruq conflicts with detainee’s claimed arrival.
Detainee stated he arrived in Afghanistan in the summer of 2001, while YM-252
places them at al-Faruq in spring 2001. YM-252’s reporting is more credible than
detainee’s reporting. Detainee’s cover story claiming an extended stay in Syria en
route Afghanistan is probably to hide his al-Faruq training.)23
(S//NF) YM-252 also reported detainee was among a group of 50 selected to
become a bodyguard for UBL.24
(Analyst Note: YM-252 does not state detainee
served as a bodyguard.)
¡ (S//NF) Detainee possibly received explosives training.
19
¢IIR 6 034 0096 04, 000551 SIR 02-MAR-2005, 000551 MFR 25-Jun-200320
TD-314/47683-03, TD-314/40693-
02
21
000817 SIR 31-OCT-2002
22
IIR 6 034 0705 03
23
IIR 6 034 0705 03, IIR 6 034 0217 04
24
IIR 6 034 0705 03

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(S//NF) Detainee was captured with a Casio model A159W watch.
(U//FOUO) The possession of a Casio F-91W model watch (or the silver-
color version of this model, the A159W), is an indicator of al-Qaida training in
the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). A JTF-GTMO detainee
identified the Casio watch as “the sign of al-Qaida, [which] uses the watch to
make bombs.” The Casio was known to be given to the students at al-Qaida
bomb-making training courses in Afghanistan, at which the students received
instruction in the preparation of timing devices using the watch. Approximately
one-third of the JTF-GTMO detainees that were captured with these models of
watches have known connections to explosives, either having attended explosives
training, having association with a facility where IEDs were made or where
explosives training was given, or having association with a person identified as an
explosives expert.25
(S//NF) A variant of detainee’s alias (Abu Hamza al-Jazairi) was found on a
letter addressed to al-Qaida explosives trainer Midhat Mursi al-Sayyid Umar, aka
(Abu Khabab al-Masri). The letter stated the individual would arrive 6 May 2001 to
attend training.26
(Analyst Note: Detainee’s assessed timeline allowed him ample
time to complete basic training in preparation for the start of the explosives training.
However, the Abu Hamza al-Jazairi found in this letter may be Djamel Beghal, who
shares the alias with detainee and detainee’s possible explosives training requires
further investigation. Beghal, also an Algerian, was an extremist tied to the US
Embassy Plot in Paris.)
(S//NF) As previously noted, detainee was identified as Suhayb al-Tunisi.
Muhammad Murdi Issa al-Zahrani, ISN US9SA-000713DP (SA-713), reported
his associate Suhayb al-Tunisi had attended the Khabbab Training Camp.
Khabbab is a variant for Abu Khabab and detainee may be the Suhayb reported by
SA-713. This association requires further investigation.27
c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a LOW threat from a detention
perspective. Detainee’s overall behavior has been mostly compliant and semi-hostile to the
guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 61 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in
DIMS with the most recent occurring on 6 December 2007, when he talked while being
shackled. Detainee has 3 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent
occurring on 23 May 2003, when he threw water and bodily fluids, and spit on a guard.
Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include participating in mass
disturbances, failure to follow instructions and camp rules, damage to government property,
25
For additional details see 000002 MFR 24-APR-2002, Casio Watch Electronic Analysis Report 19-Aug-2004,
Casio Watches and Relationship to Detainees 20-Apr-2006
26
¡AFGP-2002-006295
27
¡TD-314/37816-02

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for
assault, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2006, detainee had a
total of nine Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and six in 2007.
8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee’s
most recent interrogation session occurred on 23 February 2007.
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee resided in Damascus for ten months and
utilized the JT office in Zahedan to be smuggled into Pakistan. Detainee’s account places
him at the Muhammad Khan Mosque in Jalalabad for over three months in mid-2001.
Detainee has been identified by JTF-GTMO detainees as having attended the al-Faruq
Training Camp. Detainee may have served as a tactical logistician in direct support of al-
Qaida’s combat operations in Tora Bora.
c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has intentionally omitted or provided vague
details in his account to support a weak cover story. Detainee’s affiliation to al-Qaida is
evident as seen in recovered documents and testimony by other detainees placing detainee at
Tora Bora and al-Faruq. Further exploitation of detainee’s probable relationship with KU-
551 and WE-519 may provide further insight into his role and responsibilities at Tora Bora.
There are intelligence gaps in detainee’s activities and contacts in Syria, Iran, and
Afghanistan. If YM-252’s allegation that detainee was selected to be a UBL bodyguard can
be supported by separate reporting, detainee’s intelligence value would increase.
d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:
Al-Qaida supply procedures and support to front line troops
LY-212 and al-Qaida leadership in Tora Bora
JT facilitation of fighters from Zahedan
Al-Qaida training including explosives
Al-Qaida safe houses
Extremist and al-Qaida recruiting tactics in Algeria
Individuals at the Muhammad Khan Mosque
Mujahideen ingress routes into Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Syria
Extremist routes of egress into Pakistan from Tora Bora.

S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20330106
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN US9AG-000175DP(S)
9. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantptatuswasreassessedon 1 October2004,and
he remainsan enemycombatant. ,lfZ
%,,t4Z1#<MARKH.BUZBY /
L-)
RearAdmiral, US Navy
Commanding
'
Definitions for intelligencetermsusedin the assessmentcanbe found in the Joint Military Intelligence College
October2001 guideIntelligence Warning Terminology.
9
S E C R E T // NOFORN / I 20330106

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