Surajadin Abib (ISN: US9AF-000458DP) is recommended for transfer to another country with conditions based on his close ties to Jalaluddin Haqqani, the former Taliban Minister of Borders. Haqqani oversees anti-coalition militia operations in the Khowst area. It is believed Haqqani was attending a meeting at the detainee's compound when it was bombed in November 2001. The detainee denies knowledge of Haqqani or Taliban in the area despite evidence to the contrary. He poses a medium risk and may have information on Haqqani and ongoing militant activities.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was captured with Taliban leaders and admitted to being a bodyguard for a high-ranking Taliban commander. Detainee received training at a Taliban camp and fought against U.S. forces on the Taliban front lines. While detainee claims to have been a low-level fighter, evidence suggests he was more significant due to being captured alongside senior Taliban leaders.
Detaineeis assessedas a memberof the Taliban and Al-Qaida terrorist network. He served in a 40-man Taliban unit that provided security for Usama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida leaders. The unit also conducted assassinations, kidnappings and bombings against US forces. Detainee admits connections to senior Taliban commanders and fighting against US troops. He poses a high security risk and likely would rejoin insurgent operations if released.
Detainee is an admitted Taliban recruiter and commander of Military Base 4 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He has an extensive operational association with Usama Bin Laden and al-Qaida dating back to 1990. Detainee provided assistance to Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri during their escape from U.S. and Coalition forces in December 2001. He also provided security for al-Qaida personnel in Tora Bora in 1999-2000 and protection to Bin Laden in 1996. Detainee worked closely with al-Qaida and possibly participated in narcotics smuggling. JTF-GTMO assesses the detainee to be a high risk and of high intelligence value.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000560DP. It summarizes that the detainee has been compliant in detention but is assessed to be a high risk if released due to his prior role as a primary financial manager for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He facilitated large money transfers and the procurement of weapons for terrorist attacks. The detainee is reported to have strong ties to the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, and Jamaat Tablighi and to have been involved in narcotics trafficking. The document recommends the detainee remain in DoD custody due to concerns he could reengage in extremist support activities if released.
1. JTF GTMO recommends detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention.
2. Detainee is assessed as a low-level member of Al-Qaida's terrorist network and a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia who planned insurgent operations against U.S. forces in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
3. Detainee was captured with improvised explosive devices intended to be attached to bicycles and motorcycles near U.S. targets for remote detonation. He poses a medium risk and may threaten U.S. interests and allies.
The document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo detainee under Department of Defense control. It summarizes the detainee's background, including admitting to being a member of a 40-person Taliban unit that conducted attacks on U.S. and coalition forces. It also notes the detainee participated in a rocket attack on Kandahar Airfield and conducted surveillance of U.S. forces. The joint task force assesses the detainee poses a high risk and is likely to threaten the U.S. and its allies if released. They recommend retaining the detainee under DoD control.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was captured with Taliban leaders and admitted to being a bodyguard for a high-ranking Taliban commander. Detainee received training at a Taliban camp and fought against U.S. forces on the Taliban front lines. While detainee claims to have been a low-level fighter, evidence suggests he was more significant due to being captured alongside senior Taliban leaders.
Detaineeis assessedas a memberof the Taliban and Al-Qaida terrorist network. He served in a 40-man Taliban unit that provided security for Usama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida leaders. The unit also conducted assassinations, kidnappings and bombings against US forces. Detainee admits connections to senior Taliban commanders and fighting against US troops. He poses a high security risk and likely would rejoin insurgent operations if released.
Detainee is an admitted Taliban recruiter and commander of Military Base 4 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He has an extensive operational association with Usama Bin Laden and al-Qaida dating back to 1990. Detainee provided assistance to Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri during their escape from U.S. and Coalition forces in December 2001. He also provided security for al-Qaida personnel in Tora Bora in 1999-2000 and protection to Bin Laden in 1996. Detainee worked closely with al-Qaida and possibly participated in narcotics smuggling. JTF-GTMO assesses the detainee to be a high risk and of high intelligence value.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000560DP. It summarizes that the detainee has been compliant in detention but is assessed to be a high risk if released due to his prior role as a primary financial manager for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He facilitated large money transfers and the procurement of weapons for terrorist attacks. The detainee is reported to have strong ties to the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, and Jamaat Tablighi and to have been involved in narcotics trafficking. The document recommends the detainee remain in DoD custody due to concerns he could reengage in extremist support activities if released.
1. JTF GTMO recommends detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention.
2. Detainee is assessed as a low-level member of Al-Qaida's terrorist network and a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia who planned insurgent operations against U.S. forces in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
3. Detainee was captured with improvised explosive devices intended to be attached to bicycles and motorcycles near U.S. targets for remote detonation. He poses a medium risk and may threaten U.S. interests and allies.
The document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo detainee under Department of Defense control. It summarizes the detainee's background, including admitting to being a member of a 40-person Taliban unit that conducted attacks on U.S. and coalition forces. It also notes the detainee participated in a rocket attack on Kandahar Airfield and conducted surveillance of U.S. forces. The joint task force assesses the detainee poses a high risk and is likely to threaten the U.S. and its allies if released. They recommend retaining the detainee under DoD control.
- Detainee was a senior al-Qaeda facilitator who swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and personally recruited his bodyguards. He has ties to many high-level al-Qaeda members and operatives involved in the 9/11 attacks.
- After the fall of the Taliban, detainee provided assistance to hundreds of foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan. He was responsible for moving money and fighters into Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban.
- Detainee traveled to Bosnia in the 1990s for jihad and spent a year fighting before returning to Yemen. He is associated with the planner of the 9/11 attacks and 11 of the hijackers.
This document discusses cover stories used by Al-Qaeda operatives detained at Guantanamo Bay to justify their travel to Afghanistan. Many claim they went to teach the Koran or provide humanitarian aid, but these have been disproven through interrogations and evidence showing the detainees' actual involvement with Al-Qaeda. Common cover stories included teaching religion, working for an NGO called Al Wafa that had Al-Qaeda ties, and claiming to help poor Afghans, but these have been exposed as false through corroborated confessions and identification of detainees as bodyguards of Osama bin Laden.
This document provides a recommendation to release or transfer a Guantanamo detainee. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed to pose a low risk and is unlikely to threaten the US or its allies. While initially suspected of money laundering, further review found no evidence to support this claim. The detainee's statements that he and his family are honest businessmen with no Taliban or Al Qaeda connections are considered truthful. It is recommended the detainee be released or transferred to another country.
This document provides an intelligence assessment and transfer recommendation for a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was a high-ranking member of the Taliban who held multiple positions, including as the head of the Sherbergan Oil Exploration Plant. While he has been deceptive during interrogations, he may possess key information on Taliban intelligence structures and operations. As such, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to posing a medium risk.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a threat. He is assessed as a member of an Algerian extremist group involved in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Bosnia. Detainee served as the Bosnia contact for a senior al-Qaeda facilitator and received advanced training in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He is linked to al-Qaeda's support network and coordinated travel for extremists to Afghanistan. Detainee denies his extremist activities and identities despite corroborating intelligence reporting.
Detainee is an Algerian national assessed to be a member of an al-Qaeda linked GIA cell in Bosnia. He is suspected of participating in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan for jihad following 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia beforehand. While in Bosnia, he threatened to attack international forces and was associated with al-Qaeda linked extremists. Detainee is also reported to have fought in Bosnia and Afghanistan as the chief martial arts instructor for an Islamic militant group. He was employed by several NGOs with ties to terrorism over seven years.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000941DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. Key details include:
- The detainee is assessed to be associated with al-Qaeda and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin due to his close ties with known al-Qaeda facilitators Abu Nasim al-Tunisi and Abu Sulayman al-Jazairi.
- He was captured in Pakistan during a raid on three suspected al-Qaeda safehouses linked to al-Jazairi and al-Tunisi.
- It is assessed that the detainee poses a medium risk and may
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was identified as an operative for the Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group who specialized in mine laying and explosives. Detainee was believed to have been involved in an assassination plot against Afghan military forces and may have knowledge of future attacks planned by HIG commanders still operating against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. While detainee denied involvement in militant activities, multiple credible sources identified him as an expert mine layer who worked for HIG commander Mullah Nasim. It was recommended that detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to his ties to terrorist groups and suspected threat to the
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AF-000831DP to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who provided support to extremist groups including Al-Qaida. He has ties to other detainees involved in moving Al-Qaida members and conducting attacks. While the detainee claims not to be involved, evidence links him to supporting a bomb-making cell and safe houses used by terrorists. He is assessed to have intelligence value and still poses a medium risk.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for transferring detainee ISN US9AF-001035DP to another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable former Taliban commander from Afghanistan who is currently in good health. He is assessed as a MEDIUM risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The detainee was captured with documents indicating ties to the Taliban and admitted being a member of an anti-coalition group. He provided information on weapon caches and personalities within the Taliban and Konar province government that expanded US intelligence. Based on this information, JTF-GTMO now recommends the detainee for transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
The document provides a 3-part summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay:
1) It recommends the detainee for release or transfer to another country due to having only nominal affiliations with anti-coalition militants based on tribal relationships. The detainee is assessed to be a low risk.
2) It details the detainee's background, including being captured with two others in Afghanistan and having loose connections to two tribal leaders involved in anti-coalition activities.
3) It assesses the detainee as having low intelligence value, though provides some potential areas of exploitation, and recommends he remain classified as an enemy combatant.
This document provides a summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is believed to have worked for a known member of the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group and traveled between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for over a decade. Concerns were raised about inconsistencies in his story and links to anti-coalition militant groups. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining him in the Department of Defense's control due to these associations and assessed intelligence value.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000118DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of the Taliban who received weapons training at Taliban facilities and may have been involved in military action against coalition forces, posing a medium risk. He is in good physical health but receives mental health treatment. The assessment recommends transfer and cites the detainee's admissions of traveling with Taliban groups and surrendering to Northern Alliance forces.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation on detainee ISN US9AF-000457DP. It recommends the detainee be released or transferred to another country's control based on the following: the detainee is assessed to pose a low threat; he is unlikely to be a member of al-Qaeda or Taliban; careful review found no new derogatory information; and other detainees captured with him provided no damaging information. The detainee may have general knowledge about air strikes in his village and Jalaluddin Haqqani's activities, but is assessed to have low intelligence value.
This document provides a recommendation to continue detaining detainee US9AF-001021DP based on a JTF GTMO assessment. The detainee is assessed to be a high-ranking member of the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) with ties to Al-Qaida and its global terrorism network. He was implicated in a plot to kill Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan by placing bombs at the Presidential Palace and US Embassy. Consistent reporting indicates the detainee remains committed to the HIG and its goals. It is assessed that he poses a high risk and is likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies.
Detainee Habib Ullah is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He is assessed as a member of an anti-coalition group with ties to al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Detainee admitted to participating in a rocket attack against U.S. forces and was in frequent contact with senior Taliban leader Saifullah Rahman Mansour. He worked for and communicated with known militants, including living at the compound of a wanted al-Qaeda associate. Detainee possesses knowledge of attacks against U.S. forces and militant groups in the region.
Detainee was assessed as a low-level Taliban recruit from Afghanistan who was willing to martyr himself. He was recruited in 2002 to fight against US and Northern Alliance forces. While traveling through areas of Afghanistan like Zormat and Shahi-Kot, he likely has information on extremist madrassas and anti-US militants in the region. JTF-GTMO recommends he be transferred to another country for continued detention due to his commitment to jihad and likelihood of returning to terrorism if released.
This document provides a summary and recommendation for transferring a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was previously assessed as "Retain in DoD" but is now recommended for transfer to the control of another country based on new information. Specifically, the detainee is assessed as a probable Al-Qaeda facilitator and possible anti-coalition militant supporter who aided Al-Qaeda members' escape from Afghanistan and may have ties to Pakistani intelligence services. The document recommends his transfer due to these assessments and potential intelligence value regarding border operations and militant groups.
Detainee Akhtiar Mohammad is assessed to be a high-level commander in the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group who has extensive knowledge of anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan. He is assessed to pose a high risk if released. Detainee was captured in 2003 at a suspected HIG compound during a raid. He has been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2004 and continues to be assessed as an enemy combatant with high intelligence value due to his connections and knowledge of HIG activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- Detainee was a senior al-Qaeda facilitator who swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and personally recruited his bodyguards. He has ties to many high-level al-Qaeda members and operatives involved in the 9/11 attacks.
- After the fall of the Taliban, detainee provided assistance to hundreds of foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan. He was responsible for moving money and fighters into Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban.
- Detainee traveled to Bosnia in the 1990s for jihad and spent a year fighting before returning to Yemen. He is associated with the planner of the 9/11 attacks and 11 of the hijackers.
This document discusses cover stories used by Al-Qaeda operatives detained at Guantanamo Bay to justify their travel to Afghanistan. Many claim they went to teach the Koran or provide humanitarian aid, but these have been disproven through interrogations and evidence showing the detainees' actual involvement with Al-Qaeda. Common cover stories included teaching religion, working for an NGO called Al Wafa that had Al-Qaeda ties, and claiming to help poor Afghans, but these have been exposed as false through corroborated confessions and identification of detainees as bodyguards of Osama bin Laden.
This document provides a recommendation to release or transfer a Guantanamo detainee. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed to pose a low risk and is unlikely to threaten the US or its allies. While initially suspected of money laundering, further review found no evidence to support this claim. The detainee's statements that he and his family are honest businessmen with no Taliban or Al Qaeda connections are considered truthful. It is recommended the detainee be released or transferred to another country.
This document provides an intelligence assessment and transfer recommendation for a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was a high-ranking member of the Taliban who held multiple positions, including as the head of the Sherbergan Oil Exploration Plant. While he has been deceptive during interrogations, he may possess key information on Taliban intelligence structures and operations. As such, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to posing a medium risk.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a threat. He is assessed as a member of an Algerian extremist group involved in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Bosnia. Detainee served as the Bosnia contact for a senior al-Qaeda facilitator and received advanced training in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He is linked to al-Qaeda's support network and coordinated travel for extremists to Afghanistan. Detainee denies his extremist activities and identities despite corroborating intelligence reporting.
Detainee is an Algerian national assessed to be a member of an al-Qaeda linked GIA cell in Bosnia. He is suspected of participating in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan for jihad following 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia beforehand. While in Bosnia, he threatened to attack international forces and was associated with al-Qaeda linked extremists. Detainee is also reported to have fought in Bosnia and Afghanistan as the chief martial arts instructor for an Islamic militant group. He was employed by several NGOs with ties to terrorism over seven years.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000941DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. Key details include:
- The detainee is assessed to be associated with al-Qaeda and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin due to his close ties with known al-Qaeda facilitators Abu Nasim al-Tunisi and Abu Sulayman al-Jazairi.
- He was captured in Pakistan during a raid on three suspected al-Qaeda safehouses linked to al-Jazairi and al-Tunisi.
- It is assessed that the detainee poses a medium risk and may
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was identified as an operative for the Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group who specialized in mine laying and explosives. Detainee was believed to have been involved in an assassination plot against Afghan military forces and may have knowledge of future attacks planned by HIG commanders still operating against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. While detainee denied involvement in militant activities, multiple credible sources identified him as an expert mine layer who worked for HIG commander Mullah Nasim. It was recommended that detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to his ties to terrorist groups and suspected threat to the
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AF-000831DP to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who provided support to extremist groups including Al-Qaida. He has ties to other detainees involved in moving Al-Qaida members and conducting attacks. While the detainee claims not to be involved, evidence links him to supporting a bomb-making cell and safe houses used by terrorists. He is assessed to have intelligence value and still poses a medium risk.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for transferring detainee ISN US9AF-001035DP to another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable former Taliban commander from Afghanistan who is currently in good health. He is assessed as a MEDIUM risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The detainee was captured with documents indicating ties to the Taliban and admitted being a member of an anti-coalition group. He provided information on weapon caches and personalities within the Taliban and Konar province government that expanded US intelligence. Based on this information, JTF-GTMO now recommends the detainee for transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
The document provides a 3-part summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay:
1) It recommends the detainee for release or transfer to another country due to having only nominal affiliations with anti-coalition militants based on tribal relationships. The detainee is assessed to be a low risk.
2) It details the detainee's background, including being captured with two others in Afghanistan and having loose connections to two tribal leaders involved in anti-coalition activities.
3) It assesses the detainee as having low intelligence value, though provides some potential areas of exploitation, and recommends he remain classified as an enemy combatant.
This document provides a summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is believed to have worked for a known member of the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group and traveled between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for over a decade. Concerns were raised about inconsistencies in his story and links to anti-coalition militant groups. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining him in the Department of Defense's control due to these associations and assessed intelligence value.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000118DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of the Taliban who received weapons training at Taliban facilities and may have been involved in military action against coalition forces, posing a medium risk. He is in good physical health but receives mental health treatment. The assessment recommends transfer and cites the detainee's admissions of traveling with Taliban groups and surrendering to Northern Alliance forces.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation on detainee ISN US9AF-000457DP. It recommends the detainee be released or transferred to another country's control based on the following: the detainee is assessed to pose a low threat; he is unlikely to be a member of al-Qaeda or Taliban; careful review found no new derogatory information; and other detainees captured with him provided no damaging information. The detainee may have general knowledge about air strikes in his village and Jalaluddin Haqqani's activities, but is assessed to have low intelligence value.
This document provides a recommendation to continue detaining detainee US9AF-001021DP based on a JTF GTMO assessment. The detainee is assessed to be a high-ranking member of the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) with ties to Al-Qaida and its global terrorism network. He was implicated in a plot to kill Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan by placing bombs at the Presidential Palace and US Embassy. Consistent reporting indicates the detainee remains committed to the HIG and its goals. It is assessed that he poses a high risk and is likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies.
Detainee Habib Ullah is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He is assessed as a member of an anti-coalition group with ties to al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Detainee admitted to participating in a rocket attack against U.S. forces and was in frequent contact with senior Taliban leader Saifullah Rahman Mansour. He worked for and communicated with known militants, including living at the compound of a wanted al-Qaeda associate. Detainee possesses knowledge of attacks against U.S. forces and militant groups in the region.
Detainee was assessed as a low-level Taliban recruit from Afghanistan who was willing to martyr himself. He was recruited in 2002 to fight against US and Northern Alliance forces. While traveling through areas of Afghanistan like Zormat and Shahi-Kot, he likely has information on extremist madrassas and anti-US militants in the region. JTF-GTMO recommends he be transferred to another country for continued detention due to his commitment to jihad and likelihood of returning to terrorism if released.
This document provides a summary and recommendation for transferring a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was previously assessed as "Retain in DoD" but is now recommended for transfer to the control of another country based on new information. Specifically, the detainee is assessed as a probable Al-Qaeda facilitator and possible anti-coalition militant supporter who aided Al-Qaeda members' escape from Afghanistan and may have ties to Pakistani intelligence services. The document recommends his transfer due to these assessments and potential intelligence value regarding border operations and militant groups.
Detainee Akhtiar Mohammad is assessed to be a high-level commander in the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group who has extensive knowledge of anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan. He is assessed to pose a high risk if released. Detainee was captured in 2003 at a suspected HIG compound during a raid. He has been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2004 and continues to be assessed as an enemy combatant with high intelligence value due to his connections and knowledge of HIG activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Haji Sahib Rohullah Wakil is assessedto pose a high risk threat. He is a 45-year-old Afghan citizen and important politician from Konar Province who provided operational support to al-Qaida. Detainee assisted Arabs associated with al-Qaida to infiltrate and exfiltrate from Afghanistan and Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban regime. He also worked with anti-Afghan government factions and Pakistani intelligence to destabilize the interim Afghan administration. Detainee remains a threat due to his past involvement with al-Qaida, support for insurgent groups, and efforts to undermine the Afghan government.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-001012DP, to the control of Afghanistan for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have worked as a facilitator for Al Wafa, transporting Arabs from Iran to the Afghanistan border from 2000-2002. He facilitated travel for Al-Qaida operatives and is linked to the director of Al Wafa activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While not a member of Al-Qaida or the Taliban, he is deemed a medium risk and may pose a threat to US interests due to his ties to terrorist organizations. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay and the Criminal Investigative Task Force agree on the assessment
Detainee is a 52-year old Algerian national assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and the North African Extremist Network who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and received small arms training at an al-Qaida camp. He is assessed to be a high risk and threat to the US due to his extremist connections and admitted associations with known terrorists. The document recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention, preferably Algeria, if a satisfactory agreement can be reached. If not, he should remain in DoD custody due to contradictions in his story and suspected deception during interrogations.
Detainee Hiztullah Nasrat Yar is assessed as a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander with links to al-Qaeda, and participated in meetings to plan attacks on US/Coalition forces. If released, he would be capable of planning, supporting, or facilitating hostile acts. He maintained large weapons caches and supported HIG operations. His brother remains a HIG commander conducting anti-coalition activities. Detainee possesses knowledge of HIG operations and connections that could provide intelligence if exploited.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000948DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable arms smuggler with ties to the Taliban. He has changed his story during interrogations and provided information about Taliban members, activities, and weapons caches. The memorandum recommends he be transferred with conditions due to still being assessed as a medium risk and having intelligence value regarding weapons smuggling and the Taliban.
The document provides an assessment and recommendation for transferring Guantanamo detainee Zahir Shah, ISN US9AF-00101ODP, to the control of another country with conditions. It summarizes that Zahir Shah is assessed to be the deputy commander of a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) cell in Afghanistan and affiliated with al-Qaeda. He is assessed to pose a medium risk. The document recommends his transfer subject to an acceptable agreement while noting he may have intelligence value on HIG operations, weapons caches, and al-Qaeda affiliations.
The document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000987DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee was the former Security Commander for Shinwar District in Afghanistan and was arrested in 2003 following the discovery of an improvised explosive device production facility near his compound. He was found with letters linking him to senior Taliban officials. While cooperative, his veracity is questionable and he is assessed to pose a medium risk. The document recommends his transfer for further interrogation on topics including local politics, the narcotics trade, and his associates.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000886DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a mid-level, trusted member of the Taliban who served as a courier for senior leaders. He possesses significant connections to high-level Taliban and al-Qaeda figures. The detainee has been uncooperative during interviews and is assessed to pose a high risk threat. It is recommended he be transferred subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
Detainee ISN US9AF-001037DP is assessed to be a high-ranking commander in the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group. He was captured along with another high-ranking HIG commander, ISN 1036, during a raid on a HIG safe house. Detainee and ISN 1036 have provided conflicting statements about their roles in HIG and how long they have known each other. Detainee is assessed to pose a high risk as he likely would threaten U.S. interests. JTF GTMO assesses the detainee to be of high intelligence value and recommends he continue to be detained in DoD custody.
Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AG-000533DP. It summarizes the detainee's personal information, travel history, activities in Afghanistan including possible ties to al-Qaeda, and capture in Tora Bora after being injured attempting to flee US bombing. The assessment determines he poses a high risk and high intelligence value, and recommends his continued detention due to concerns he could reengage in extremism if released.
Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-Qaida who received terrorist training in Afghanistan. He reportedly attended training at al-Qaida affiliated camps, associated with known al-Qaida operatives, and resided in al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee likely participated in action against U.S. and coalition forces. He is assessed as a medium risk and threat, and of medium intelligence value.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
Detainee Ahmed Bin Saleh Bel Bachao is assessed as a probable member of al-Qaida who received weapons training in Afghanistan. He traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 after being influenced by extremist lectures at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London. In Afghanistan, he stayed at an Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad known to facilitate foreign fighters, where he received small arms training. He fled to Tora Bora during US attacks and was later captured with a large group of fighters. It is assessed he poses a medium risk and may have participated in hostilities against US forces.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay to another facility. It summarizes the detainee's personal information and assesses him as a probable member of al-Qaeda's support network who likely received improvised explosive device training. The detainee is believed to have traveled from France to Afghanistan via the UK and Pakistan, staying at guesthouses associated with extremist groups. He is assessed to pose a medium risk and high intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AG-000284DP to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and al-Qaeda's global terrorist network. He has been identified as receiving terrorist training, but does not appear to be a senior leader. While sometimes cooperative, he has also been uncooperative and obstinate during interrogations. The Joint Task Force assesses he poses a medium risk but defers to the Criminal Investigative Task Force's assessment that he poses a high risk.
Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaida'sGlobal Jihad SupportNetwork who attendedtraining in Afghanistan andresidedin guesthousesoperatedby al-Qaidamembers.He occupiedpositionsin the Tora Bora Mountainsandparticipatedin hostilities againstUS andcoalition forces. JTF-GTMO previouslyassessedhim asa ContinuedDetentionrisk but now recommendshis TransferOut of DoD Controlbasedon his MEDIUM intelligencevalueandthreatlevel.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AG-000175DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on evidence that he was an al-Qaida member who received training at al-Faruq camp and possibly explosives training. He is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US forces as a leader coordinating supplies for al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora, and was possibly selected for training as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. The document recommends his continued detention due to these assessments and his lack of cooperation.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for detainee ISN US9AG-000070DP held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is a 24-year old Algerian man with a history of significant head trauma resulting in blindness in one eye and brain injuries causing difficulties with speech, understanding, and controlling behaviors. Due to his medical condition, he requires long-term custodial care. While previously assessed as medium intelligence value, he now poses a low risk. The Joint Task Force recommends releasing or transferring the detainee to another country for continued detention based on his health status and low risk level.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
Detainee Mohammed Mussa Yakubi is assessed as a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia in Afghanistan with connections to a global terrorist network. He is believed to have helped engineer IED and mortar attacks against US forces. Detainee was arrested after weapons were found in his compound, including an AK-47, mortar tubes, and ammunition. He is assessed as a HIGH risk and having MEDIUM intelligence value regarding the Gardez cell, planned attacks, and connections to other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. JTF GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be held in DoD custody.
Detainee Mohammed Shah is assessed as a probable member of al Qaeda who has ties to terrorist political parties in Iran. He is assessed to be a medium risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The document recommends transferring the detainee to another country with conditions, subject to an acceptable transfer agreement. It provides details of the detainee's background, including fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, working as a doctor in Iran, and traveling between Afghanistan and Iran with large sums of money to support terrorist activities. The detainee is considered of medium intelligence value and may be able to provide information on Taliban commanders, couriers, and training camps in Iran with links to terrorist groups.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
This memorandum recommends releasing or transferring a Guantanamo detainee. The detainee was likely falsely accused of participating in an ambush by Afghan forces seeking to cover up their own involvement. Records indicate the detainee poses a low risk and likely has no valuable intelligence. While the Criminal Investigation Task Force assesses the detainee as medium risk, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo recommends release or transfer based on the fraudulent circumstances of his capture.
Detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and weapons smuggler associated with senior Taliban officials. He was captured in 2003 with documents and materials indicating ties to the Taliban and extremist networks. Detainee worked closely with the Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister and other senior figures. He denies the full extent of his Taliban activities and affiliations. JTF-GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be detained due to his high-level Taliban connections and potential threat.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a Guantanamo detainee, ISN: US9AF-001100DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was involved in anti-coalition militia operations and planned an attack on US forces in Afghanistan. He has direct ties to senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. The document assesses the detainee as a medium risk and recommends his transfer based on derogatory information obtained since his previous assessment.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-001075DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be of medium intelligence value and a medium threat risk. He was captured in Afghanistan in possession of weapons and has ties to anti-coalition militant groups in the Gardez region. While the detainee denies involvement, he has knowledge about a bombing in Gardez. The task force recommends his transfer to allow another country to take over his continued detention.
DetaineeMohammedAmin is recommendedfor transferto the control of anothercountry for continueddetention.He is assessedto be a memberof Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddinwho attendedplanningmeetingswhereattacksagainstUS-ledcoalitionforcesandtheAfghangovernmentwere discussed.Detaineehasassociationswith TalibanandAl-Qaedafiguresandmay haveknowledgeof futureplannedattacksdue to his involvementwith Anti-Coalitionforcesin Afghanistan.While in custody,hehasbeengenerallycompliantbut remainsan enemycombatant.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo Bay detainee, ISN US9AF-001045DP, in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee (1) is assessed to be a key member of anti-coalition militant groups who has participated in weapons trafficking, explosives training, and attacks against US and coalition forces; (2) has admitted ties to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations; and (3) poses a high risk and is likely to provide intelligence on terrorist networks, operations, and leaders if retained in DoD control.
1. SE C R E T // NOFORN/ / 2O3OO8O1
DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCEGUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA
APOAE 09360
JTFGTMO-CG l5 Ausust2005
MEMORANDUMFORCommander,UnitedStatesSouthernCommand,3511NW 9lstAvenue,
Miami,FL33172.
SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationfor Transferto theControlof AnotherCountryWith
Conditions(TWC),Subjectto theConclusionof anAcceptableTransferAgreementfor
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN:US9AF-000458DP(S)
JTFGTMODetaineeAssessment
1. (FOUO)PersonalInformation:
o JDIMSA{DRC ReferenceName: SurajadinAbib
o AliasesandCurrent/TrueName: Abib Saraiuddin
o Placeof Birth: Khowst. Afghanistan(AF)
o Date of Birth: 1 Jarnary 1942
o Citizenship: Afehanistan
r InternmentSerialNumber(ISN): US9AF-000458DP
2. (FOUO) Health: He is in goodhealth. He hasno known drugallergies.
3. (S//NF)JTF GTMOAssessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTFGTMOrecommendsthisdetaineebeTransferredtothe
Controlof AnotherCountryWith Conditions(TWC),Subjectto theConclusionof an
AcceptableTransferAgreement.
b. (S/NF) Summary: JTFGTMOpreviouslyassesseddetaineeasTransferto theControl
of AnotherCountryfor ContinuedDetention(TRCD)on 18June2004.
Forthisupdaterecommendation,it is assessedthatthisdetaineeis closelytiedto former
TalibanMinisterof BordersandTribalareas,JalaluddinHaqqani.Haqqanihasoverseen
Anti-CoalitionMilitia (ACM) operationsin thevicinity of KhowstsincetheTalibanfell. It
CLASSIFIEDBY: MULTIPLESOURCES
REASON:E.O.12958SECTION1.5(C)
DECLASSIFYON: 2030080I
s E c R E T // NOFORN/ / 20300801
2. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 2O3OO8O1
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationfor Transferto the Control of Another Country With
Conditions(TWC), Subjectto the Conclusionof anAcceptableTransferAgreementfor
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-000458DP(S)
wasreportedthat HaqqaniandotherTaliban membersattendeda Shura(meeting)in the
villageof ZanikhelwhenU.S./Coalitionforcesbombedthe detainee'scompoundon 16
November 200L The detainee'scompoundwas destroyedandHaqqaniwas seriously
injured. Detaineehasstatedthat he hasno knowledgeof Taliban in the areawherehe lives,
eventhough Haqqaniis widely recognizedand comesfrom the samevillage. Detaineehas
not beencompletelyhonestandforthright with the interrogators. He knows a greatdealof
information concerningHaqqaniandhis son,Sarajuddin,who remainhighly involved in
ACM activities in the Pakia,PaktiaandKhowst provinces. It is imperativeto notethat the
detainee'srelativesreportedthat the detaineewasharboringHaqqaniwhen the compound
wasbombed. It is assessedthis detaineeis a MEDIUM risk, ashe may posea threatto the
US, its interestsandallies.
4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unlessotherwisenoted,the following
paragraphsarebasedsolely on the detainee'sstatements.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detaineelived in a village of 5 or 6 houseshis entirelife.
Therewere approximately6,000membersin his tribe that camefrom six families/fathers,all
of whom live in the village of Zanikhel, Afghanistan (AF). Detaineestatedhis wife was
deceasedandhe gavethe namesof his family members. He also statedthat he hadbeento
SaudiArabia twice for Hajj andhadonly beento Pakistanonce. Detaineeclaimedhe moved
to Pakistanin the 80's becauseof the war with the SovietUnion. He traveledto Saudi
Arabia briefly for the Hajj, but could not rememberthe exactyear. He went to Miram Shah,
Pakistan(PK), with his family during the Sovietwar andlived therefor approximately 10
years. Detaineemoved backto Afghanistanfrom Pakistanin the 90's. Detaineeclaimedto
be a farmer,but admittedthat farming was difficult dueto the drought.
b. (S//NF) Activities: Approximately onemonth beforecapture,detaineeworked for a
mannamedHaji Nazim. Nazim recruitedpersonnelfor the "militia" of PachaKhan, the
Governorof the PaktiaProvinceto fight againstthe Taliban. Detainee'stribe did not like the
Taliban andwantedthem out of power.
c. (S/NF) Gapture Informatiofl: Detaineewasarrestedby U.S. Forcesin theearly
morning hours(believedto be approx20 January2002),when helicopterslandedtroopsin
the area. Detainee,MohammadGul, US9AF-00457DP(ISN 457),Khan Zaman,US9AF-
00460DP(ISN 460),andGul ZamanUS9AF-00459DP(ISN 459)werecapturedtogether.
US Forcescapturedthemat ISN 457's homein thevillage of ZanikhelnearKhowst,AF.
Detaineewere soonafter transferredto BagramDetentionCenter.
d. (S)Transferredto JTFGTMO:07February2002
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3. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 2O3OO8O1
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationfor Transferto the Control of Another Country With
Conditions (TWC), Subjectto the Conclusionof an AcceptableTransferAgreementfor
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-000458DP(S)
e. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provideinformationon Pacha
Khan Zadran,governorof Patkiaprovince,who holds the provincial seatin Khowst, andhis
brotherAmanullah Khan Zadran,Minister of Bordersfor Afghanistan.
5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: It is assessedthedetaineeposesa MEDIUM risk, ashe is unlikely to
posea threatto the US, its interestsandallies.
b. (S/NF) Reasons for Gontinued Detention:
o (S/A{F) It is assessedthat detaineehada closerelationshipwith former Taliban
Minister of BordersandTribal Affairs, JalaluddinHaqqani. Haqqaniis in chargeof
(Anti-Coalition Militia) ACM operationsin the Paktika,PaktiaandKhowst provinces.
He is associatedwith Al-Qaida,TalibanandtheHezb-E-IslamiGulbuddin(HIG).
o (S/AIF) In mid-July 2003,Haqqaniwas given the operationalcontrol of ACM
activities for the Pakia,PaktiaandKhowst provincesin an agreementbetweenthe
HIG, TalibanandAl-Qaida. (AnalystNote: HIG is a Tier 1terroristtarget,which is
definedasterrorist groups,especiallythosewith statesupport,that havedemonstrated
the intention andthe capability to attackUS personsor interests.)
o (S/AIF)Haqqaniis associatedwith Al-Qaida,TalibanandHIG.
o (S/AIF)Haqqani'ssonSarajuddinis alsohighly activein ACM activitiesin the
Paktia,PaktikaandKhowst provinces.
o (S/AIIF)On 16November 2001,Haqqaniwas reportedlyinvolved in a Shura
(meeting)at detainee'scompoundin Zanikhel village, PaktiaProvince,AF, when
coalition bombsstruckthe builing. Haqqanisuffereda severeleft shoulderinjury
from shrapnelandwastakento a hospital in Miram Shah,PK, for treatmentandto
evadeCoalitionforces.
o (S/AIF)During the samebombingevent,detainee'scompound,alsolocatedin
Zanil<helvillage, Paktiaprovince,AF, wasbombedanddestroyed.
o (S/ilF) Detainee'sson,ISN 459, hasstatedthat he wasnot awareof any air strikes
on otherresidencesin his village on l6 November2001. He alsostatedthatthere
were35-38peoplein his residencewhenit washit by the air strike. He said 12
peoplewerekilled.
o (S/AIF) According to openpress,the detainee'sfamily saidthat Jalaluddin
Haqqaniwas,in fact, stayingat the detainee'scompoundduring this timeframe.
(Analyst Note: Although detaineedeniedknowing Haqqanior any other Taliban
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4. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 2O3OO8()1
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationfor Transferto the Control of Another Country With
Conditions (TWC), Subjectto the Conclusionof an AcceptableTransferAgreementfor
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-000458DP(S)
members,the information listed aboveleavesreinforcesthe reportthat Haqqaniwas
at the detainee'sresidenceattendinga Shurawhen it washit by an air strike.
o (S/AIF) A VHF radio (ICOM) that hadbeenmodified for extendedrangewas
confiscatedduring the USSF raid afterthe bombing wherethe detaineeandthreeothers
were captured.
o (S/A{F) A requestfor information was sentto Bagramto identify wherethe radio
was actually found, the actualcapturelocation, andwhy thesefour (ISN 457, 458,
459, and460) detaineeswerepicked out of the group. (Analyst Note: Bagramwas
not ableto provide any further information concemingthe radio.)
o (S/A.JF)Therewas a suspectedTaliban facility closeto the location where detainee
was capturedin Khowst, AF. Detaineehasnot explainedthe facility's actual
purpose.
o (SiAIF) Detaineestatedthat Mullah Omar of the Taliban "is the King."
o (SiNF) Detaineestatedthathe helpedHaji Nazim, a formerlocal Talibanminister;
securea position on GovernorHakim Taniwals' staff.
c. (S/NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detaineeis assessedasa LOW threatfrom a detention
perspective.Detainee'soverallbehaviorpatternhasbeencompliantandnon-hostile,with
sporadicreporting showing detaineeto occasionallybe annoyingto the guards. Detainee
currently hasfour Reportsof Disciplinary Infractions.
6. (S/NF) DetaineeIntelligenceValueAssessment:
a. (S) Assessment: JTFGTMOdetermineddetaineeisof MEDIUM intelligencevalue.
. (S)Detaineeshouldbeableto giveinformationonbothJalaluddinandSarajuddin
Haqqani.Hemayknowof ongoingACM operationsandthepersonnelinvolvedwith
them. Healsomayknowof weaponscachesandsafehousesusedby Talibanin the
Paktika,PakiaandKhowstprovinces.
b. (S//NF)Areas of PotentialExploitation:
o AfghanistanHigh Value TargetsJalaluddinand SarajuddinHaqqani.
o OngoingACM activity underthe direction Haqqani.
o Locationsof safehousesusedby Taliban.
o ACM Operationsin the Pakia,PaktiaandKhowst, provincesof Afghanistan.
o Use of communicationsequipmentby the Taliban.
I
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 2O3OO8O1
5. SE C R E T // NOFORN/ / 2O3OO8O1
JTFGTMO-CG
SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationfor Transferto theControlof AnotherCountryWith
Conditions(TWC),Subjectto theConclusionof anAcceptableTransferAgreementfor
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN:US9AF-000458DP(S)
7. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon20January2005,
andheremainsanenemycombatant.
JAYW. HOOD
MajorGeneral,USA
Commanding
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