This document provides a recommendation to continue detaining detainee US9AF-001021DP based on a JTF GTMO assessment. The detainee is assessed to be a high-ranking member of the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) with ties to Al-Qaida and its global terrorism network. He was implicated in a plot to kill Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan by placing bombs at the Presidential Palace and US Embassy. Consistent reporting indicates the detainee remains committed to the HIG and its goals. It is assessed that he poses a high risk and is likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies.
Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
DetaineeMohammedAmin is recommendedfor transferto the control of anothercountry for continueddetention.He is assessedto be a memberof Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddinwho attendedplanningmeetingswhereattacksagainstUS-ledcoalitionforcesandtheAfghangovernmentwere discussed.Detaineehasassociationswith TalibanandAl-Qaedafiguresandmay haveknowledgeof futureplannedattacksdue to his involvementwith Anti-Coalitionforcesin Afghanistan.While in custody,hehasbeengenerallycompliantbut remainsan enemycombatant.
Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan under the influence of his older brothers, one of whom was a senior al-Qaida member. Detainee received training at al-Qaida camps and guesthouses and worked closely with senior al-Qaida operatives, including having advance knowledge of attack plots. He was captured in 2002 during a raid on an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi with other detainees. The document provides details of detainee's travels, training, associates, and activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Detainee Habib Ullah is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He is assessed as a member of an anti-coalition group with ties to al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Detainee admitted to participating in a rocket attack against U.S. forces and was in frequent contact with senior Taliban leader Saifullah Rahman Mansour. He worked for and communicated with known militants, including living at the compound of a wanted al-Qaeda associate. Detainee possesses knowledge of attacks against U.S. forces and militant groups in the region.
Detaineeis recommendedfor transferout of DoD control basedon being an admittedTaliban memberwho spentfour yearsin the Taliban intelligenceservice.He hasfamilial ties to activeanti-coalitionmilitia membersandwould likely rejoin suchgroupsif released.The detaineeis assessedas a mediumrisk andthreatbasedon thesefactors. He hasbeencompliantin detentionbut his brother-in-lawandassociatesremainactiveinsurgentsin Afghanistan.
This document provides a summary and recommendation for transferring a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was previously assessed as "Retain in DoD" but is now recommended for transfer to the control of another country based on new information. Specifically, the detainee is assessed as a probable Al-Qaeda facilitator and possible anti-coalition militant supporter who aided Al-Qaeda members' escape from Afghanistan and may have ties to Pakistani intelligence services. The document recommends his transfer due to these assessments and potential intelligence value regarding border operations and militant groups.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000909DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was assessed to be a low-level member of an anti-coalition movement group commanded by his uncle, Samoud Khan, that operated in and around Gardez, Afghanistan. The detainee is assessed to pose a medium risk and may have information on the activities and locations of personnel in his uncle's group, including Saifullah Rahman Mansour, a former senior Taliban commander. The document recommends the detainee be transferred to another country for continued detention.
Haji Sahib Rohullah Wakil is assessedto pose a high risk threat. He is a 45-year-old Afghan citizen and important politician from Konar Province who provided operational support to al-Qaida. Detainee assisted Arabs associated with al-Qaida to infiltrate and exfiltrate from Afghanistan and Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban regime. He also worked with anti-Afghan government factions and Pakistani intelligence to destabilize the interim Afghan administration. Detainee remains a threat due to his past involvement with al-Qaida, support for insurgent groups, and efforts to undermine the Afghan government.
Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
DetaineeMohammedAmin is recommendedfor transferto the control of anothercountry for continueddetention.He is assessedto be a memberof Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddinwho attendedplanningmeetingswhereattacksagainstUS-ledcoalitionforcesandtheAfghangovernmentwere discussed.Detaineehasassociationswith TalibanandAl-Qaedafiguresandmay haveknowledgeof futureplannedattacksdue to his involvementwith Anti-Coalitionforcesin Afghanistan.While in custody,hehasbeengenerallycompliantbut remainsan enemycombatant.
Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan under the influence of his older brothers, one of whom was a senior al-Qaida member. Detainee received training at al-Qaida camps and guesthouses and worked closely with senior al-Qaida operatives, including having advance knowledge of attack plots. He was captured in 2002 during a raid on an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi with other detainees. The document provides details of detainee's travels, training, associates, and activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Detainee Habib Ullah is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He is assessed as a member of an anti-coalition group with ties to al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Detainee admitted to participating in a rocket attack against U.S. forces and was in frequent contact with senior Taliban leader Saifullah Rahman Mansour. He worked for and communicated with known militants, including living at the compound of a wanted al-Qaeda associate. Detainee possesses knowledge of attacks against U.S. forces and militant groups in the region.
Detaineeis recommendedfor transferout of DoD control basedon being an admittedTaliban memberwho spentfour yearsin the Taliban intelligenceservice.He hasfamilial ties to activeanti-coalitionmilitia membersandwould likely rejoin suchgroupsif released.The detaineeis assessedas a mediumrisk andthreatbasedon thesefactors. He hasbeencompliantin detentionbut his brother-in-lawandassociatesremainactiveinsurgentsin Afghanistan.
This document provides a summary and recommendation for transferring a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was previously assessed as "Retain in DoD" but is now recommended for transfer to the control of another country based on new information. Specifically, the detainee is assessed as a probable Al-Qaeda facilitator and possible anti-coalition militant supporter who aided Al-Qaeda members' escape from Afghanistan and may have ties to Pakistani intelligence services. The document recommends his transfer due to these assessments and potential intelligence value regarding border operations and militant groups.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000909DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was assessed to be a low-level member of an anti-coalition movement group commanded by his uncle, Samoud Khan, that operated in and around Gardez, Afghanistan. The detainee is assessed to pose a medium risk and may have information on the activities and locations of personnel in his uncle's group, including Saifullah Rahman Mansour, a former senior Taliban commander. The document recommends the detainee be transferred to another country for continued detention.
Haji Sahib Rohullah Wakil is assessedto pose a high risk threat. He is a 45-year-old Afghan citizen and important politician from Konar Province who provided operational support to al-Qaida. Detainee assisted Arabs associated with al-Qaida to infiltrate and exfiltrate from Afghanistan and Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban regime. He also worked with anti-Afghan government factions and Pakistani intelligence to destabilize the interim Afghan administration. Detainee remains a threat due to his past involvement with al-Qaida, support for insurgent groups, and efforts to undermine the Afghan government.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to release or transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes the detainee's background, capture information, and assessment. The detainee is assessed as a low-level supporter of the Taliban who may have low-level knowledge of anti-coalition militia activities in Afghanistan. Based on available information, it is recommended that he be released or transferred to another country due to low intelligence value and low threat level.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative with ties to senior leaders. He has admitted to affiliations with terrorist groups including GIA and HIG. Detainee trained at militant camps, fought Soviets in Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban Foreign and Intelligence Ministries. He was captured in Pakistan and transferred to Guantanamo for suspected involvement in terrorist plots and attacks. Detainee has omitted details of his activities prior to capture, making his threat level and intelligence value difficult to assess fully.
Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-Qaida who received terrorist training in Afghanistan. He reportedly attended training at al-Qaida affiliated camps, associated with known al-Qaida operatives, and resided in al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee likely participated in action against U.S. and coalition forces. He is assessed as a medium risk and threat, and of medium intelligence value.
Detaineeis assessedas a mid-to-high level memberof the Taliban with ties to high-level membersof the Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and Al-Qaida's terrorist network. He served in a 40-man unit that provided security for Usama Bin Laden and helped plan insurgent operations against U.S. forces. Detainee has admitted to assisting in the escapeof a mujahideen general with alleged support from Iran. It is assessedhe poses a high risk and may be able to provide information on past and future plans against the U.S. and its allies.
Detainee is an admitted Taliban recruiter and commander of Military Base 4 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He has an extensive operational association with Usama Bin Laden and al-Qaida dating back to 1990. Detainee provided assistance to Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri during their escape from U.S. and Coalition forces in December 2001. He also provided security for al-Qaida personnel in Tora Bora in 1999-2000 and protection to Bin Laden in 1996. Detainee worked closely with al-Qaida and possibly participated in narcotics smuggling. JTF-GTMO assesses the detainee to be a high risk and of high intelligence value.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
The document discusses and compares the Kandahar hijacking incident under the BJP government and the Mumbai attacks under the Congress-led UPA government. It argues that the BJP government had no good options in Kandahar as negotiations were taking place in a hostile Taliban-controlled region of Afghanistan. In contrast, it criticizes the UPA government for its failure to prevent the 2008 Mumbai attacks despite intelligence warnings and delays in sending security forces to respond. It also questions the UPA's overall weak stance on national security issues like terrorism.
The document discusses the Kandahar hijacking incident in 1999 and compares it to the Mumbai attacks in 2008. It summarizes the key events in Kandahar, noting that the Indian government was faced with limited options as it negotiated with hijackers holding hostages in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. It argues that releasing terrorists in exchange for hostages' lives was the only viable choice. In contrast, it criticizes the UPA government's handling of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, where intelligence warnings were ignored and many lives were lost. It accuses the PM of hypocrisy for criticizing the BJP over Kandahar while failing to address terrorism effectively himself.
The document discusses the history of conflict between the cultural values and policies of the United States and Iran over several decades. It outlines how U.S. actions like installing a puppet regime in Iran in the 1950s, imposing sanctions, and rejecting diplomatic proposals have exacerbated tensions and distrust between the two countries. A more culturally sensitive approach that considers each side's perspectives could help resolve longstanding issues, according to theories discussed in the document.
The document discusses US involvement with Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq from the 1950s-2003. It notes that the CIA helped orchestrate a coup in 1963 that overthrew a Soviet-leaning Iraqi government, and another coup in 1968 that helped bring Saddam Hussein to power. The US supported Hussein throughout his dictatorship due to fears of Soviet influence in the region and to maintain a balance of power against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. However, the US eventually led an invasion to overthrow Hussein in 2003 after weapons inspections failed to uncover weapons of mass destruction programs.
The Taliban displayed weapons and vehicles left behind by US and Afghan forces at a victory parade in Kandahar. They posed for photos in aircraft that were rendered inoperable by the US military before withdrawal. Efforts to reopen Kabul airport have begun with a Qatari technical team visiting to discuss restoring commercial flights for humanitarian aid delivery and travel, as the country faces severe shortages. Fighting continues in Panjshir Valley, the only area resisting Taliban control, as negotiations between the NRF and Taliban have stalled.
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida associated passport forger and key travel facilitator supporting senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), and the Global Jihad Support Network. Detainee has additional ties to the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Detainee is also a suspected bomb maker and former commander of a special al-Qaida training camp, and he was identified as a front line
Attack on Afghanistan Formalised before 9/11: was Key to Unlock Route to Gas ...Sadanand Patwardhan
International oilcompanies had long been aware that the former USSR states of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistanand, Kazakhstan have huge reserves of oil and naturalgas. The problem forUS, and other Western oil companies, was how to get oil and gas from these huge land-locked reserves to seaports for export. In1995, the Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) gained an agreement with Turkmenistan to lay a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, across Afghanistan,to the Pakistan coast. Unocal also gained a natural gas agreement with Uzbekistan. Pipelines from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan could then merge and cross Afghanistan. Unocal then gained a deal with Uzbekistan's northernneighbour, Kazakhstan, and oil and gas pipelines could then run south from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan and link with the trans-Afghanistan pipelines.
During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US established a covert operation in Afghanistan code named `BearTrap'. This anti-Soviet operation established a base in Afghanistan jointly funded by the US and SaudiArabia--and run by the CIA and Pakistan's ISI. The ISI component was headed by Osama bin Laden [Saudi National and heir of powerful Saudi family with close ties to house of Saud]
In August 1996, Unocal led the formation of Central Asia Gas Pipeline Ltd (Centgas). Unocal invited Taliban leaders to Texas to finalise the Centgasproject. The Telegraph reported on December14,1997, ``Oil barons court Taliban in Texas''.
9/11 was blamed on Osama Bin Laden and Taliban without a shred of evidence being offered only to pre-text attack already planned attack on Afghanistan to have a unified single pro-US government there instead of the violently squabbling factions holding different regions, which made Centgas project impossible. On October 7, 2001, US and UK forces commenced their attack on Afghanistan. However, the US planned an invasion of Afghanistan before the events of 9/11. The Guardian reported on September 22, 2001, ``Threat of US strikes passed to Taliban weeks before New York attack''. Time magazine reported on August 12, 2002, ``They had a plan; long before 9/11''.
Between 2004 and 2011, there were over 34,000 deaths from terrorist violence in Pakistan, nearly 3,000 bomb blasts, and 236 drone attacks resulting in 1,968 deaths. While drones have caused civilian casualties, a Pakistani general said most of those killed in drone strikes were Taliban or al-Qaeda militants. In 2010 and 2011, the majority of drone attacks targeted North Waziristan. There appears to have been tacit approval of drone strikes between the CIA and Pakistan Army initially, but the CIA began exceeding agreed upon limits by 2010. The Pakistan Army is now attempting to renegotiate engagement rules with the CIA regarding drone strikes.
The document summarizes the history and geography of Iraq from its creation after World War 1 as a British mandate comprised of three Ottoman provinces, to its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent Gulf War that removed Iraqi forces. It then discusses the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 that toppled Saddam Hussein's regime and the ensuing insurgency that emerged in the aftermath.
Osama bin laden hand picked by saudi arabia and us to form al qaeda pressco...PublicLeaks
- Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor under Carter, initiated a campaign in 1979 to support mujaheddin (later known as al Qaeda) in Afghanistan to overthrow the communist government and embroil the Soviet Union in a conflict.
- In the late 1990s, the US worked with Saudi Arabia and chose Osama bin Laden to lead a force to fight in Afghanistan on behalf of fundamentalist group the Taliban. This formed the basis of the terrorist group al Qaeda.
- Declassified documents show that al Qaeda was formed by the US and Saudi Arabia to advance economic and geopolitical aims in the region, and the "war on terror" has been used to further these objectives,
The video provides a 3-part timeline of the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010 based on an investigation by an Israeli expert team:
1) Israeli naval forces attempted to board the ship but were blocked by demonstrators throwing objects and using electric saws on boarding ladders. Soldiers boarded by helicopter but their ropes were tied to the deck.
2) Soldiers descending the ropes faced attacks by demonstrators with knives, axes and metal poles. Five soldiers were injured by stabbing and blows before using live fire in self defense. Three soldiers were thrown overboard.
3) Reinforcements arrived by helicopter and combined with soldiers on the ship roof but faced continued violence as they worked
Detainee is an Afghan national captured in 2002 for suspected involvement with al-Qaida. He worked closely with al-Qaida commander IZ-10026 for approximately 5 years, serving as his assistant, facilitator, translator, and distributing funds on his behalf. Detainee admitted participating in hostilities against US forces and operating al-Qaida guesthouses. He is assessed to still pose a threat and would likely reengage in extremist activities if released. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention.
The secret covenant the elite’s manual for global enslavementBaddddBoyyyy
The document describes a "Secret Covenant" allegedly outlining plans for global domination and enslavement by a covert elite group. It was anonymously sent to a website in 2002. While its origins cannot be verified, some of its content aligns with concerns about growing control by social elites over the population and environment. It claims the elite will weaken the masses through poison, misinformation, economic oppression, and by keeping them divided to prevent rebellion against the elite's covert rule.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to release or transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes the detainee's background, capture information, and assessment. The detainee is assessed as a low-level supporter of the Taliban who may have low-level knowledge of anti-coalition militia activities in Afghanistan. Based on available information, it is recommended that he be released or transferred to another country due to low intelligence value and low threat level.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative with ties to senior leaders. He has admitted to affiliations with terrorist groups including GIA and HIG. Detainee trained at militant camps, fought Soviets in Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban Foreign and Intelligence Ministries. He was captured in Pakistan and transferred to Guantanamo for suspected involvement in terrorist plots and attacks. Detainee has omitted details of his activities prior to capture, making his threat level and intelligence value difficult to assess fully.
Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-Qaida who received terrorist training in Afghanistan. He reportedly attended training at al-Qaida affiliated camps, associated with known al-Qaida operatives, and resided in al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee likely participated in action against U.S. and coalition forces. He is assessed as a medium risk and threat, and of medium intelligence value.
Detaineeis assessedas a mid-to-high level memberof the Taliban with ties to high-level membersof the Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and Al-Qaida's terrorist network. He served in a 40-man unit that provided security for Usama Bin Laden and helped plan insurgent operations against U.S. forces. Detainee has admitted to assisting in the escapeof a mujahideen general with alleged support from Iran. It is assessedhe poses a high risk and may be able to provide information on past and future plans against the U.S. and its allies.
Detainee is an admitted Taliban recruiter and commander of Military Base 4 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He has an extensive operational association with Usama Bin Laden and al-Qaida dating back to 1990. Detainee provided assistance to Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri during their escape from U.S. and Coalition forces in December 2001. He also provided security for al-Qaida personnel in Tora Bora in 1999-2000 and protection to Bin Laden in 1996. Detainee worked closely with al-Qaida and possibly participated in narcotics smuggling. JTF-GTMO assesses the detainee to be a high risk and of high intelligence value.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
The document discusses and compares the Kandahar hijacking incident under the BJP government and the Mumbai attacks under the Congress-led UPA government. It argues that the BJP government had no good options in Kandahar as negotiations were taking place in a hostile Taliban-controlled region of Afghanistan. In contrast, it criticizes the UPA government for its failure to prevent the 2008 Mumbai attacks despite intelligence warnings and delays in sending security forces to respond. It also questions the UPA's overall weak stance on national security issues like terrorism.
The document discusses the Kandahar hijacking incident in 1999 and compares it to the Mumbai attacks in 2008. It summarizes the key events in Kandahar, noting that the Indian government was faced with limited options as it negotiated with hijackers holding hostages in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. It argues that releasing terrorists in exchange for hostages' lives was the only viable choice. In contrast, it criticizes the UPA government's handling of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, where intelligence warnings were ignored and many lives were lost. It accuses the PM of hypocrisy for criticizing the BJP over Kandahar while failing to address terrorism effectively himself.
The document discusses the history of conflict between the cultural values and policies of the United States and Iran over several decades. It outlines how U.S. actions like installing a puppet regime in Iran in the 1950s, imposing sanctions, and rejecting diplomatic proposals have exacerbated tensions and distrust between the two countries. A more culturally sensitive approach that considers each side's perspectives could help resolve longstanding issues, according to theories discussed in the document.
The document discusses US involvement with Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq from the 1950s-2003. It notes that the CIA helped orchestrate a coup in 1963 that overthrew a Soviet-leaning Iraqi government, and another coup in 1968 that helped bring Saddam Hussein to power. The US supported Hussein throughout his dictatorship due to fears of Soviet influence in the region and to maintain a balance of power against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. However, the US eventually led an invasion to overthrow Hussein in 2003 after weapons inspections failed to uncover weapons of mass destruction programs.
The Taliban displayed weapons and vehicles left behind by US and Afghan forces at a victory parade in Kandahar. They posed for photos in aircraft that were rendered inoperable by the US military before withdrawal. Efforts to reopen Kabul airport have begun with a Qatari technical team visiting to discuss restoring commercial flights for humanitarian aid delivery and travel, as the country faces severe shortages. Fighting continues in Panjshir Valley, the only area resisting Taliban control, as negotiations between the NRF and Taliban have stalled.
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida associated passport forger and key travel facilitator supporting senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), and the Global Jihad Support Network. Detainee has additional ties to the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Detainee is also a suspected bomb maker and former commander of a special al-Qaida training camp, and he was identified as a front line
Attack on Afghanistan Formalised before 9/11: was Key to Unlock Route to Gas ...Sadanand Patwardhan
International oilcompanies had long been aware that the former USSR states of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistanand, Kazakhstan have huge reserves of oil and naturalgas. The problem forUS, and other Western oil companies, was how to get oil and gas from these huge land-locked reserves to seaports for export. In1995, the Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) gained an agreement with Turkmenistan to lay a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, across Afghanistan,to the Pakistan coast. Unocal also gained a natural gas agreement with Uzbekistan. Pipelines from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan could then merge and cross Afghanistan. Unocal then gained a deal with Uzbekistan's northernneighbour, Kazakhstan, and oil and gas pipelines could then run south from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan and link with the trans-Afghanistan pipelines.
During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US established a covert operation in Afghanistan code named `BearTrap'. This anti-Soviet operation established a base in Afghanistan jointly funded by the US and SaudiArabia--and run by the CIA and Pakistan's ISI. The ISI component was headed by Osama bin Laden [Saudi National and heir of powerful Saudi family with close ties to house of Saud]
In August 1996, Unocal led the formation of Central Asia Gas Pipeline Ltd (Centgas). Unocal invited Taliban leaders to Texas to finalise the Centgasproject. The Telegraph reported on December14,1997, ``Oil barons court Taliban in Texas''.
9/11 was blamed on Osama Bin Laden and Taliban without a shred of evidence being offered only to pre-text attack already planned attack on Afghanistan to have a unified single pro-US government there instead of the violently squabbling factions holding different regions, which made Centgas project impossible. On October 7, 2001, US and UK forces commenced their attack on Afghanistan. However, the US planned an invasion of Afghanistan before the events of 9/11. The Guardian reported on September 22, 2001, ``Threat of US strikes passed to Taliban weeks before New York attack''. Time magazine reported on August 12, 2002, ``They had a plan; long before 9/11''.
Between 2004 and 2011, there were over 34,000 deaths from terrorist violence in Pakistan, nearly 3,000 bomb blasts, and 236 drone attacks resulting in 1,968 deaths. While drones have caused civilian casualties, a Pakistani general said most of those killed in drone strikes were Taliban or al-Qaeda militants. In 2010 and 2011, the majority of drone attacks targeted North Waziristan. There appears to have been tacit approval of drone strikes between the CIA and Pakistan Army initially, but the CIA began exceeding agreed upon limits by 2010. The Pakistan Army is now attempting to renegotiate engagement rules with the CIA regarding drone strikes.
The document summarizes the history and geography of Iraq from its creation after World War 1 as a British mandate comprised of three Ottoman provinces, to its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent Gulf War that removed Iraqi forces. It then discusses the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 that toppled Saddam Hussein's regime and the ensuing insurgency that emerged in the aftermath.
Osama bin laden hand picked by saudi arabia and us to form al qaeda pressco...PublicLeaks
- Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor under Carter, initiated a campaign in 1979 to support mujaheddin (later known as al Qaeda) in Afghanistan to overthrow the communist government and embroil the Soviet Union in a conflict.
- In the late 1990s, the US worked with Saudi Arabia and chose Osama bin Laden to lead a force to fight in Afghanistan on behalf of fundamentalist group the Taliban. This formed the basis of the terrorist group al Qaeda.
- Declassified documents show that al Qaeda was formed by the US and Saudi Arabia to advance economic and geopolitical aims in the region, and the "war on terror" has been used to further these objectives,
The video provides a 3-part timeline of the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010 based on an investigation by an Israeli expert team:
1) Israeli naval forces attempted to board the ship but were blocked by demonstrators throwing objects and using electric saws on boarding ladders. Soldiers boarded by helicopter but their ropes were tied to the deck.
2) Soldiers descending the ropes faced attacks by demonstrators with knives, axes and metal poles. Five soldiers were injured by stabbing and blows before using live fire in self defense. Three soldiers were thrown overboard.
3) Reinforcements arrived by helicopter and combined with soldiers on the ship roof but faced continued violence as they worked
Detainee is an Afghan national captured in 2002 for suspected involvement with al-Qaida. He worked closely with al-Qaida commander IZ-10026 for approximately 5 years, serving as his assistant, facilitator, translator, and distributing funds on his behalf. Detainee admitted participating in hostilities against US forces and operating al-Qaida guesthouses. He is assessed to still pose a threat and would likely reengage in extremist activities if released. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention.
The secret covenant the elite’s manual for global enslavementBaddddBoyyyy
The document describes a "Secret Covenant" allegedly outlining plans for global domination and enslavement by a covert elite group. It was anonymously sent to a website in 2002. While its origins cannot be verified, some of its content aligns with concerns about growing control by social elites over the population and environment. It claims the elite will weaken the masses through poison, misinformation, economic oppression, and by keeping them divided to prevent rebellion against the elite's covert rule.
TeamLogic IT is an IT services company that provides managed IT services, highly skilled technicians, help desk support, and network monitoring to help businesses leverage technology. They offer strategic guidance, proactive IT management, and responsive support to deliver secure, flexible, and highly available IT systems. TeamLogic IT can assist with projects like implementing unified communications, cloud services, mobility solutions, security services, and business continuity plans to help businesses run more efficiently and gain a competitive advantage through innovative use of technology.
This musical score features an arrangement for brass band of the song "Kathleen Mavourneen" by Frederick Crouch. The score contains parts for trumpet, cornet, horn, trombone, euphonium, and tuba. It is arranged by P.G. Saganski and contains the musical notation for each instrument throughout the song.
This document discusses the design and implementation of an e-commerce website called FashionToday.com for online cosmetic sales. It outlines the technologies needed to develop an e-commerce site including multi-tier architecture, server-side scripting, ASP.NET, databases like MySQL. It describes the data modeling process including creating entity relationship diagrams and transforming it into relational database tables. It also explains the user interface design and functional flows for customer registration, login, shopping, and administrator functions like adding products. The goal is to create a fully functional online cosmetic store.
The document provides a 3-part summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay:
1) It recommends the detainee for release or transfer to another country due to having only nominal affiliations with anti-coalition militants based on tribal relationships. The detainee is assessed to be a low risk.
2) It details the detainee's background, including being captured with two others in Afghanistan and having loose connections to two tribal leaders involved in anti-coalition activities.
3) It assesses the detainee as having low intelligence value, though provides some potential areas of exploitation, and recommends he remain classified as an enemy combatant.
Roark v. usa plaintiff's reply and responseBaddddBoyyyy
This document is Plaintiff Diane Roark's reply to the Defendant's response to her cross-motion for summary judgment in her case against the United States. She argues that the government had no legal right to conduct additional searches of her seized materials without new search warrants. She also argues that the government is improperly withholding some of her documents and has failed to account for all documents seized. Finally, she maintains that the NSA and her former employer have overreached in their claims of authority over her unclassified materials.
This document provides a massive list of links related to paranormal and unexplained topics. It includes over 100 website links, recommendations for radio shows and podcasts, dozens of relevant Wikipedia articles, and a pastebin link containing video recommendations. The poster compiled these resources to serve as an easily accessible collection for those interested in paranormal topics. Some of the links may be outdated or broken but most cover websites, videos, and articles about strange phenomena, conspiracy theories, cryptids, occult topics, and more.
This document outlines a 3-month SEO workout challenge to improve a business's online presence and rankings. It involves evaluating current keyword rankings, creating a content plan around targeted keywords, publishing new articles incorporating those keywords monthly, and getting backlinks from relevant sites. Committing to regular blogging and link-building is recommended to see results over 2-3 months through increased traffic and leads. Participants are encouraged to contact SkyPoint for assistance analyzing their SEO situation and implementing the program.
Sales Skills Identify the Decision MakerAlan Gordon
Sales Techniques - How to identify the decision maker early in the sales process. This is a critical sales skill. More important than sales closing techniques, understanding your customer's decision process is the key sales skill. Successful selling depends on understanding who makes the buying decisions and what criteria they will use to make their buying decision. Improve your sales results with this valuable sales skill.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AF-000831DP to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who provided support to extremist groups including Al-Qaida. He has ties to other detainees involved in moving Al-Qaida members and conducting attacks. While the detainee claims not to be involved, evidence links him to supporting a bomb-making cell and safe houses used by terrorists. He is assessed to have intelligence value and still poses a medium risk.
Detainee is a 52-year old Algerian national assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and the North African Extremist Network who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and received small arms training at an al-Qaida camp. He is assessed to be a high risk and threat to the US due to his extremist connections and admitted associations with known terrorists. The document recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention, preferably Algeria, if a satisfactory agreement can be reached. If not, he should remain in DoD custody due to contradictions in his story and suspected deception during interrogations.
This document provides a summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is believed to have worked for a known member of the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group and traveled between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for over a decade. Concerns were raised about inconsistencies in his story and links to anti-coalition militant groups. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining him in the Department of Defense's control due to these associations and assessed intelligence value.
Surajadin Abib (ISN: US9AF-000458DP) is recommended for transfer to another country with conditions based on his close ties to Jalaluddin Haqqani, the former Taliban Minister of Borders. Haqqani oversees anti-coalition militia operations in the Khowst area. It is believed Haqqani was attending a meeting at the detainee's compound when it was bombed in November 2001. The detainee denies knowledge of Haqqani or Taliban in the area despite evidence to the contrary. He poses a medium risk and may have information on Haqqani and ongoing militant activities.
The document provides an assessment and recommendation for transferring Guantanamo detainee Zahir Shah, ISN US9AF-00101ODP, to the control of another country with conditions. It summarizes that Zahir Shah is assessed to be the deputy commander of a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) cell in Afghanistan and affiliated with al-Qaeda. He is assessed to pose a medium risk. The document recommends his transfer subject to an acceptable agreement while noting he may have intelligence value on HIG operations, weapons caches, and al-Qaeda affiliations.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer the detainee, ISN US9AF-000914DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk threat who was a member of an anti-coalition movement group led by warlord Samoud Khan that was affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He received religious indoctrination at a madrassa led by a known al-Qaeda and Taliban affiliated leader. While the detainee's information may be useful, his credibility is questionable as he has provided inconsistent statements and instructed other detainees to lie. The memorandum recommends transfer for continued detention due to the detainee's affiliations and associations with terrorist groups and personalities.
Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaida'sGlobal Jihad SupportNetwork who attendedtraining in Afghanistan andresidedin guesthousesoperatedby al-Qaidamembers.He occupiedpositionsin the Tora Bora Mountainsandparticipatedin hostilities againstUS andcoalition forces. JTF-GTMO previouslyassessedhim asa ContinuedDetentionrisk but now recommendshis TransferOut of DoD Controlbasedon his MEDIUM intelligencevalueandthreatlevel.
Detainee Mohammed Mussa Yakubi is assessed as a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia in Afghanistan with connections to a global terrorist network. He is believed to have helped engineer IED and mortar attacks against US forces. Detainee was arrested after weapons were found in his compound, including an AK-47, mortar tubes, and ammunition. He is assessed as a HIGH risk and having MEDIUM intelligence value regarding the Gardez cell, planned attacks, and connections to other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. JTF GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be held in DoD custody.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed as a senior-level Taliban member who organized networks and disrupted coalition operations. He facilitated operations that likely resulted in US casualties. The detainee poses a high risk and can provide intelligence on extremist activities, drug trafficking, and Taliban networks. The Joint Task Force recommends continued detention.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was identified as an operative for the Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group who specialized in mine laying and explosives. Detainee was believed to have been involved in an assassination plot against Afghan military forces and may have knowledge of future attacks planned by HIG commanders still operating against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. While detainee denied involvement in militant activities, multiple credible sources identified him as an expert mine layer who worked for HIG commander Mullah Nasim. It was recommended that detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to his ties to terrorist groups and suspected threat to the
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000845DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes the detainee's background, including his work as a security guard for the Karzai government in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. It assesses the detainee as a medium risk and possibly associated with anti-coalition militia activity. The document recommends his transfer based on information obtained since his previous assessment that designates him as a threat to the US and its allies.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000955DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have connections to anti-coalition activities in Afghanistan and may have been involved in rocket attacks against US forces. He was found deceptive during a polygraph about his participation. The detainee has also been tentatively identified as the chief of investigations for the Taliban in Zormat province. It is recommended he be transferred for continued detention due to posing a medium risk of engaging in future anti-coalition activities if released.
The document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee, ISN:US9AF-000953DP, under Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee was the president of Ariana Airlines in Afghanistan, which is alleged to have provided logistical support to Al-Qaeda. As the airline's president, it is assessed that the detainee has knowledge of key financial and transportation networks. The detainee is determined to be of high intelligence value and continues to pose a high threat risk.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000900DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who willingly participated in training and then traveled with a group to Kabul to carry out attacks against US forces. He was captured in the grenade attack on US Special Forces on December 17, 2002 in Kabul. While the detainee is assessed as a high risk and threat to the US, its interests, and allies, he has been compliant in detention and is assessed to be of low intelligence value.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000118DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of the Taliban who received weapons training at Taliban facilities and may have been involved in military action against coalition forces, posing a medium risk. He is in good physical health but receives mental health treatment. The assessment recommends transfer and cites the detainee's admissions of traveling with Taliban groups and surrendering to Northern Alliance forces.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for transferring detainee ISN US9AF-001035DP to another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable former Taliban commander from Afghanistan who is currently in good health. He is assessed as a MEDIUM risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The detainee was captured with documents indicating ties to the Taliban and admitted being a member of an anti-coalition group. He provided information on weapon caches and personalities within the Taliban and Konar province government that expanded US intelligence. Based on this information, JTF-GTMO now recommends the detainee for transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000943DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of an Anti-Coalition Militia group in Afghanistan and a medium risk, who may have been recruited by Abdul Rahim to fight against U.S. and Coalition forces. While the detainee claims he was just a student in Pakistan, information indicates he assisted Rahim and participated in recruiting others to conduct jihad. The document recommends transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a Guantanamo detainee, ISN: US9AF-001100DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was involved in anti-coalition militia operations and planned an attack on US forces in Afghanistan. He has direct ties to senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. The document assesses the detainee as a medium risk and recommends his transfer based on derogatory information obtained since his previous assessment.
Detainee Ahmed Bin Saleh Bel Bachao is assessed as a probable member of al-Qaida who received weapons training in Afghanistan. He traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 after being influenced by extremist lectures at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London. In Afghanistan, he stayed at an Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad known to facilitate foreign fighters, where he received small arms training. He fled to Tora Bora during US attacks and was later captured with a large group of fighters. It is assessed he poses a medium risk and may have participated in hostilities against US forces.
Detainee Hiztullah Nasrat Yar is assessed as a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander with links to al-Qaeda, and participated in meetings to plan attacks on US/Coalition forces. If released, he would be capable of planning, supporting, or facilitating hostile acts. He maintained large weapons caches and supported HIG operations. His brother remains a HIG commander conducting anti-coalition activities. Detainee possesses knowledge of HIG operations and connections that could provide intelligence if exploited.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AG-000533DP. It summarizes the detainee's personal information, travel history, activities in Afghanistan including possible ties to al-Qaeda, and capture in Tora Bora after being injured attempting to flee US bombing. The assessment determines he poses a high risk and high intelligence value, and recommends his continued detention due to concerns he could reengage in extremism if released.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay to another facility. It summarizes the detainee's personal information and assesses him as a probable member of al-Qaeda's support network who likely received improvised explosive device training. The detainee is believed to have traveled from France to Afghanistan via the UK and Pakistan, staying at guesthouses associated with extremist groups. He is assessed to pose a medium risk and high intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AG-000284DP to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and al-Qaeda's global terrorist network. He has been identified as receiving terrorist training, but does not appear to be a senior leader. While sometimes cooperative, he has also been uncooperative and obstinate during interrogations. The Joint Task Force assesses he poses a medium risk but defers to the Criminal Investigative Task Force's assessment that he poses a high risk.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AG-000175DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on evidence that he was an al-Qaida member who received training at al-Faruq camp and possibly explosives training. He is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US forces as a leader coordinating supplies for al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora, and was possibly selected for training as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. The document recommends his continued detention due to these assessments and his lack of cooperation.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for detainee ISN US9AG-000070DP held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is a 24-year old Algerian man with a history of significant head trauma resulting in blindness in one eye and brain injuries causing difficulties with speech, understanding, and controlling behaviors. Due to his medical condition, he requires long-term custodial care. While previously assessed as medium intelligence value, he now poses a low risk. The Joint Task Force recommends releasing or transferring the detainee to another country for continued detention based on his health status and low risk level.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
Detainee Mohammed Shah is assessed as a probable member of al Qaeda who has ties to terrorist political parties in Iran. He is assessed to be a medium risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The document recommends transferring the detainee to another country with conditions, subject to an acceptable transfer agreement. It provides details of the detainee's background, including fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, working as a doctor in Iran, and traveling between Afghanistan and Iran with large sums of money to support terrorist activities. The detainee is considered of medium intelligence value and may be able to provide information on Taliban commanders, couriers, and training camps in Iran with links to terrorist groups.
This memorandum recommends releasing or transferring a Guantanamo detainee. The detainee was likely falsely accused of participating in an ambush by Afghan forces seeking to cover up their own involvement. Records indicate the detainee poses a low risk and likely has no valuable intelligence. While the Criminal Investigation Task Force assesses the detainee as medium risk, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo recommends release or transfer based on the fraudulent circumstances of his capture.
Detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and weapons smuggler associated with senior Taliban officials. He was captured in 2003 with documents and materials indicating ties to the Taliban and extremist networks. Detainee worked closely with the Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister and other senior figures. He denies the full extent of his Taliban activities and affiliations. JTF-GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be detained due to his high-level Taliban connections and potential threat.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-001075DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be of medium intelligence value and a medium threat risk. He was captured in Afghanistan in possession of weapons and has ties to anti-coalition militant groups in the Gardez region. While the detainee denies involvement, he has knowledge about a bombing in Gardez. The task force recommends his transfer to allow another country to take over his continued detention.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo Bay detainee, ISN US9AF-001045DP, in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee (1) is assessed to be a key member of anti-coalition militant groups who has participated in weapons trafficking, explosives training, and attacks against US and coalition forces; (2) has admitted ties to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations; and (3) poses a high risk and is likely to provide intelligence on terrorist networks, operations, and leaders if retained in DoD control.
This memorandum recommends retaining a detainee, ISN US9AF-001043DP, under Department of Defense control at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who possesses intelligence on terrorist operations and personnel. He was formerly the Taliban Minister of Commerce and deputy to a senior Taliban commander. New information indicates he was involved in the killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross employee in 2003. The detainee poses a high risk and should continue to be detained.
Detainee ISN US9AF-001037DP is assessed to be a high-ranking commander in the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group. He was captured along with another high-ranking HIG commander, ISN 1036, during a raid on a HIG safe house. Detainee and ISN 1036 have provided conflicting statements about their roles in HIG and how long they have known each other. Detainee is assessed to pose a high risk as he likely would threaten U.S. interests. JTF GTMO assesses the detainee to be of high intelligence value and recommends he continue to be detained in DoD custody.
Detainee Akhtiar Mohammad is assessed to be a high-level commander in the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group who has extensive knowledge of anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan. He is assessed to pose a high risk if released. Detainee was captured in 2003 at a suspected HIG compound during a raid. He has been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2004 and continues to be assessed as an enemy combatant with high intelligence value due to his connections and knowledge of HIG activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Detainee is assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militias (ACM) member suspected of participating in the 27 March 2003 murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) worker in Afghanistan. He was captured with a satellite phone he was using to contact Mullah Haji Satar, an ACM commander suspected of the ICRC murder. Detainee has provided inconsistent accounts and an uncertain identity. He is assessed to present a high risk threat due to his ties to ACM commanders conducting attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN:US9AF-001019DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is an Afghan national who fought with the mujahideen and Taliban. He is assessed to have been a corrupt government official in Zabol province who associated with known terrorists like Hamidullah. While somewhat cooperative, he has been evasive about his full role. He poses a medium security risk and may have intelligence value. The Joint Task Force recommends his transfer for continued detention based on these assessments.
A memorandum from the Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining a detainee under Department of Defense control. The detainee, captured in Mexico attempting to enter the US, has provided inconsistent stories about his travel and background. He is considered of high intelligence value due to his potential knowledge of smuggling routes and operations. While generally compliant in detention, he has failed polygraph tests regarding combat training and intentions in the US. The task force assesses he poses a medium security risk.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-001012DP, to the control of Afghanistan for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have worked as a facilitator for Al Wafa, transporting Arabs from Iran to the Afghanistan border from 2000-2002. He facilitated travel for Al-Qaida operatives and is linked to the director of Al Wafa activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While not a member of Al-Qaida or the Taliban, he is deemed a medium risk and may pose a threat to US interests due to his ties to terrorist organizations. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay and the Criminal Investigative Task Force agree on the assessment
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DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCEGUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA
APOAE 09360
JTFGTMO-CG 17August2005
MEMORANDUMFORCommander,UnitedStatesSouthernCommand,3511NW 9lstAvenue,
Miami,FL33172.
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnderDoD Control(CD) for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-001021DP(S)
JTFGTMODetaineeAssessment
1. (FOUO)Personallnformation:
o JDIMSAIDRC ReferenceName: FNU Chaman
o Aliasesand CurrentiTrueName: ChamanGul. Commander
Chaman.Feroz.numberone.ChamanKhan
o Placeof Birth: LoearProvince.Afghanistan(AF)
o Dateof Birth: 0110111963
o Citizenship: Afghanistan
o IntemmentSerialNumber(ISN): US9AF-001021DP
2. (FOUO) Health: Detaineeis in goodhealth. Detaineehascompletedtreatmentfor latent
TB without difficulty. Detainee'ssurgicalhistoryincludesbulletremovalfrom his chest,left
arm andleft leg. Detaineehasno travel restricitons.
3. (S//NF)JTFGTMOAssessment:
a. (S)Recommendation:JTFGTMOrecommendsthisdetaineebeheldforContinued
DetentionUnderDoD Control(CD).
b. (S) Summary: JTF GTMO previouslyassesseddetaineeasRetainin DoD (DoD) onlT
September2004.
For this updaterecommendation,detaineeis assessedasa high-ranking memberof the
Hezbi-e-IslamiGulbuddin(HIG) with tiesto Al-Qaidaandit's globalterrorismnetwork.
CLASSIFIEDBY:MULTIPLESOURCES
REASON:E.O.12958SECTION1.5(C)
DECLASSIFYON:20300807
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2. S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3OO8O7
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control(CD) for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-001021DP(S)
Detaineewas implicated in a plot to kill Afghan PresidentHamid Karzai andthe American
Ambassadorto Afghanistanby placing bombsat the PresidentialPalaceandUS Embassy.
Detaineehasdemonstrateda willingness to provide considerableinformation aboutothers,
but nothing incriminating abouthimself. Consistentreporting,however,indicatesthat he
remainsa committedmemberto the HIG andits goals. Detaineeworked for the Afghan
NationalDirectorateof Security(NDS), PakistaniInter-ServiceIntelligenceDirectorate
(ISID), andthe Afghan DefenseMinistry underFahim Khan. This detaineehaddirect
contactwith thehighestlevelsof theAnti-Coalitionmovement(ACM). His commitmentto
jihad, links to key facilitators in the Al-Qaida's intemationalterrorist network, participation
in terroristtraining andinvolvement in hostilities againstthe US andcoalition forcesleadto
the determinationthatheposesa high risk. It is assessedthis detaineeis a HIGH risk, ashe
is likely to posea threatto theUS, its interestsandallies.
4. (S/NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unlessotherwisenoted,thefollowing
paragraphsarebasedsolelyon the detainee'sstatements.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detaineewasborn in 1963in LogarProvince,Afghanistan
(AF). Detaineefought in thejihad againstthe SovietsunderHekmatyarGulbuddin, leaderof
the Hezbi-e-IslamiGulbuddin(HIG). Detaineeclaimedhe wasan ordinaryfoot soldierwho
becamewell known asa fighter andwas subsequentlygiven commandof 80 Mujahdeen.
Detainee'sfame wasa result of his performanceat a mountainpassnearSorubiwhen he did
not allow the Sovietsto breachthe pass.
b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detaineeworkedfor the HIG until Hekmatyar
becameVice-Presidentof Afghanistan.Detaineeclaimedhe askedHekmatyarif he couldbe
governorof LogarProvince,however,Hekmatyardeniedhis request.Detaineedecidedhe
would begin to work for Ahmad ShahMasood,the leaderof theNorthern Alliance. Detainee
claimed Yacoubrecruitedhim for a securityjob with theKarzai government.
c. (S/NF) Training and Activities: Detaineeclaimedthe British intelligenceservice
usedhim asan informant. Detaineealsoclaimed he worked for the NDS, ISID andthe
Afghan DefenseMinister Fahim Khan asan intelligencecollector. Detaineeclaimedhe
supervisedintelligenceoperativesin many of the major provinces. Detaineemaintained
closetiesto high-levelHIG members.
d. (S//NF) Capture Informationl Detaineeworkedfor DynCorp. He providedsecurity
on the road betweenKabul, AF andJalalabad,AF. MohammedMustafa SohailUS9AF-
001008DP(ISN 1008),who workedat DynCorpin the administrativesectionidentified
detaineeasthe personwho coercedhim into giving securityinformation aboutthe US
EmbassyandPresidentialPalace. PresidentHamid Karzai personallyordereddetainee's
1
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JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control(CD) for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-00102lDP(S)
arrestafter consultationwith the US Ambassadorto Afghanistanwhen information led them
to believedetaineewaspartof a plot to blow up theUS EmbassyandPresidentialcomplex.
e. (S)Transferredto JTFGTMO:09May2003
f. (S/NF)Reasonsfor Transferto JTFGTMO:Toprovideinformationonthe
followins:
o (S/AIF) Al-Qaida/Taliban/HIGAIDS/ISID membersandactivities in Afghanistan.
o (S/AIF) FutureattacksagainstU. S.andits Allies usingImprovisedExplosive
Devices(IEDs).
o (SiAIF) IntelligencecollectionactivitiestargetingU.S.interests.
5. (S//NF)DetaineeThreat:
a. Assessment: It isassessedthedetaineeposesaHIGHrisk,asheislikelytoposea
threatto theUS, its interestsandallies.
b. Reasonsfor ContinuedDetention:
o (S/A{F) Detaineewas a high-ranking HIG operationsofficer who, underthe cover of
employmentwith a U.S.-basedcompany,orchestrateda planto assassinatePresident
Karzai andthe U.S. Ambassadorby settingoff an IED at the newly constructed
PresidentialcompoundandUS Embassyin Kabul. He recruitedpersonnelto gather
intelligenceon securityfor the buildings andattemptedto recruit individuals to conduct
suicide-bombingsat eachof thebuildings.
o (S/AIF) DetaineerecruitedISN 1008asoperativein theplannedbombing. ISN
1008wasemployedby the sameU.S.-basedcompanyasdetaineeandadmittedhe
provided detaineewith detailedsecurityinformation aboutthe Afghan Presidential
compoundandtheU.S. Embassy.This includedaccesspassesanda rosterwith
namesof the Turkish guardson the President'ssecurityforce and serialnumbersof
their weapons.
o (SiAfD DetaineeaskedISN 1008to be a suicidebomberin the operation.ISN
1008refused.
o (S/A{F) ISN 1008statedthat detaineeplannedto assassinatePresidentKarzai and
the U.S.Ambassador.He plannedto gainaccessto the ceremonyfor the openingof
thenew buildingsby usingaccessbadgesprocuredby ISN I 008.
t
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JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control(CD) for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-001021DP(S)
o (S/A{F) Detaineewas subordinateto Kashmir Khan. Khan is second-in-command
to Gulbuddin Hekmatyarin the HIG.
o (S/AfF) Detaineehasbeenidentified asKashmir Khan's assistant.
o (S/AIF)DetaineeandISN 1288wereidentifiedasHIG Generals.EsatullahYar
US9AF-00977DP(ISN 977)identifieddetaineeasa HIG commanderafterhe viewed
detainee'sphotograph.
o (S/A{F) Detaineereportedin detail abouta meetingof the leadersof the Taliban,
HIG andAl-Qaidawherethey discussedhow to regainpowerin Afghanistan.Hilal
Gulbuddin representedthe HIG, an unknown Arab representedUsamaBin Ladenand
Amir Khan Mutaqi representedthe Taliban. .
o (S/AIF) Analyst Note: Although detaineeclaimed he heardaboutthis meeting
from a source,it is assessedthatdetaineewaspresentat themeetingdueto his level
of knowledgeof the specificsof the event.
o (S/A{F) A plannedmeetingbetweendetaineeandHekmatyarGulbuddin in mid-
May 2002did not occur dueto an attempton Hekmatyar's life.
o (S/AIIF)Detaineewasalsoinvolvedwith otherhigh-echelonHIG membersandACM
operationsagainsttheU.S./CoalitionForces.
o (S/A{F)Detaineeis associatedwith known HIG commandersQalamUS9AF-
001288DP(ISN 1288)andSardat(variants:Zardat,Sardad).Zardatwascapturedin
London,UK. He wastried andconvictedof torture. ISN 1288wascapturedin
Kabul.
o (S/A{D Detainee,ISN 1288andSardatwereidentifiedasHIG commanderswho
terrorized,bombedanddestroyedKabul during the Civil War.
o (S/AIF)A high-rankingHIG leaderinstructeddetaineeandISN 1288to place
explosivesalongthe Jalalabadto Kabul highway andattackvehiclesusedby
foreigners.
o (S/AID The HIG hasthreatenedto captureforeignersto useasa bargainingtool
for the releaseof capturedHIG commandersincluding detaineeandISN 977.
o (S/AIF)An Afghanvillager,identifiedasHaji Alim, from thevillage of Aroki,
claimedhe shotdown a helicopterin the Bagramareaduring Ramadan2004. Alim
claimedhereceivedUS $50.000for theattack. The otherrocketsin Alim's
possessionmay havebeenmovedto thehomeof detainee.The rocketsmay have
beenSA-7B rockets.
o (S/AID Detaineewrote two lettershomedescribing"woods." It hasbeen
assessedthat"woods"
is a codewordfor rockets.
o (S/AfD Oneof detainee'sassistants,CommanderZadran,led a teamthat
conducteda suicidecar bomb attackagainstIntemational StabilizationandAssistance
Force(ISAF) on 07 June03.
' (S/AIF) The following targetswere identified for this attack: the US
Embassy,ISAF Headquarters,Flower streetandthe United Nations headquarters
+
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JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control(CD) for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-001021DP(S)
. (S/A{F)Detainee,ISN 1288,andcommanderZadranwereseendriving
aroundKabul in a car with specialpolice licenseplates. They were probably
identifying targets.
. (U) AnalystNote: Flower streetis locatedin centralKabul, AF andis heavily
usedby foreigners.
' (SiA{F)AnalystNote: The licenseplatesenableddetaineeunfetteredaccess
to Kabul.
' (S/A{F)AnalystNote: Although detaineewasin US custodyduringthese
attacks,detaineestill gatheredintelligenceand surveillancefor this group.
o (S/NF) Thereis evidencethatindicatesdetaineeconductedintelligencecollection
andpropagandaoperationsfor andagainstthe HIG. He alsoconductedoperationsfor the
NDS againstU.S./CoalitionForces.
o (S/AIF) Detaineereceivedmoney from Afghan Defenseminister Fahim Khan for
information on Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
o (S/AID Khan gavethe moneyto Taj Mohammadwho was commanderof the
55th Afghan Corps. Taj, in tum, gavethe money to detaineefor the information on
Hekmatyar.
. (S/A{F) Detaineeusedmoney from Taj Mohammedto pay for food, lodging
andtransportationfor the 80 menthat he commanded.
' (U) AnalystNote: FahimKhan is no longerthe DefenseMinister for
Afghanistan.
o (Si {F) Detaineeworkedfor the AfghanNationalDirectorateof Security(NDS).
Detaineereceivedhis ordersfrom EngineerArif, the Headof the NDS, Hafiz Khan,
andArifs brother in law Haji ShaAgha. Bismullah Khan of the Afghan military
provided detaineewith threearmedsecuritypersonnelanda letter-authorizing
detaineeto carry a weapon.
o (S/AIF) Detaineehada fourteen-memberIntelligencecollectiongroup. These
fourteenmenhelpeddetaineegatherintelligencefor the headof the NDS, Engineer
Arif.
o (S/AfF) On25 April 03, Gulbuddin Hekmatyarorderedfive HIG commandersto
travel to Sorubi,AF, to spreadanti-Americanpropagandaandrecruit membersfor the
HIG.
o (S/AIF)Thesecommanderswereidentifiedas:Anwar Danger,Zardat,ISN 1288,
Sharif anddetainee.
. (S//liF) Analyst Note: Anwar Dangaris a former Taliban commanderand
HIG supporter. He is involved in recruiting for attacksagainstUS/coalition
forces.Dangaris listedasnumber34 on CENTCOM'sblacklist.
o (S/AfD Detaineewrote a letterto his brotherShin Wari, his sonJijrat andhis
assistantZadran. The purposeof this letter wasto convincehis interviewersthat he
could find Gulbuddin Hekmatyarin exchangefor his release
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SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnderDoD Control(CD)for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN:US9AF-00102lDP(S)
o (S/ {F) Detaineewrote a secondletter that he sentthroughthe ICRC to his son
Hijratullah. Detaineetold his sonthat "Sardarhasour woods andto askhim for the
woods." He alsoaskedhis sonto usethewood to build thenew house.(Analyst
Note: Wood is assessedto be a codewordfor "rocket.")
o (S/AIF) Detaineeadmittedhe hasties with Dost Mohammed,a top Taliban
commander.
o (S/AID Detainee,Marshal Fahim Khan's brother-in-law, ShaAgah, andMast Gul
conducteda meetingin the Kashmir region of Pakistansometimein February2003.
Detaineetraveledthrough Pakistanin a latemodel Land Cruiserwith licenseplate
numberAF- 113I . ISID issuedthis licenseplateandit grantedthebearera numberof
privileges. The "AF" precludedsearchesat theborderandcausedpatrolofficersto
be lenient during routine traffic stops.
. (S/A{F) Analyst Note: A former Major in the PakistaniA*y, Mast Gul is a
notoriousterrorist. He fought againstthe Indian governmentin Kashmir and
plannedterrorist attacksagainsta numberof targetsin Kabul, AF. Gul is also
closelyalignedwith the HIG andthe ISID.
o (SinfF) DetaineereportedMast Gul hadthecapabilityto put explosivesinsideof
a Pepsicanto usein a terrorist attack. Detaineeclaimedthe Pepsibombsarefilled
with a substance,which is likely TATP (Tri-AcetateTri-Peroxide).This type of
explosiveis becomingmorecommonin Afghanistanandis easyto make. Detainee
claimedhe sawthesebombsbeing manufacturedandMast Gul himself showed
detaineehow sucha bomb would work.
o (SiAtF) Detaineereportedon Guerilla fighters in Kashmir. He statedthey travel
light anddependon other Muslims in their operatingareafor support. Detainee
claimed a typical deploymentfor thesefighters lastedbetween3 and4 months.
Detaineeclaimed Mast Gul controlled all Guerilla activity in Kashmir from his home
basein Muzaferabad.
o (SinfD DetaineeclaimedUS forceswerein dangerfrom HIG forcesin the Azra
districtof the LogarProvince. Accordingto detainee,five Americansbasedon top of
a mountainwere in dangerfrom HIG forcescommandedby CommandersGafar and
Hedaitullah.
. (S/AtrF)Analyst Note: Detaineehasalwaysmaintainedthat he hasnot seen
the HIG leadersincehe left the HIG in 1995. The fact that he attemptedto meet
with Hekmatyar,suggesteddetaineehada more currentrelationshipwith him
than he sharedwith his interviewer.
o Detainee,ISN1288andoperativeAlmas,werewell known associates.Theywere
heavily involved in the drug tradeandotherillegal activities in Kabul.
o (S/AID Detainee,ISN 1288anda numberof otherswereidentifiedasbeing
involved in the narcoticsandweaponstradethat was controlled by Bashir Solangi,
Kabul's Chief of police,controlled.
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SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control(CD) for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-001021DP(S)
o Analyst Note: Bashir Solangiwas killed when he was gunneddown outsidea
Mosque.)
c. Detainee's Gonduct: Detaineeis assessedasa LOW threatfrom a detention
perspective.Detainee'soverallbehaviorhasbeennon-aggressive,andcompliantwith a few
spikesin his behaviorin regardsto the destructionof governmentproperty.
6. (S/NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. Assessmen* JTF GTMO determineddetaineeis of HIGH intelligencevalue.
o (S/AIIF)Detaineeis assessedasa high-levelHIG commanderwith accessto
numerousterrorist groupsandvarious govemmentauthorities. Although detaineeis very
knowledgeableandcooperativewhen reporting on othergroupsandpeople,he refusesto
give incriminatingdetailsabouthis own activities. Detaineewould be knowledgeable
aboutsubjectsconcemingthe HIG andits leadership. Detaineehad a personal
relationshipwith HekmatyarGulbuddinandothertop HIG leaders.Detaineeclaimedhe
fought for theNorthern Alliance againstthe Taliban. Detaineeworked in an intelligence
capacityfor theNDS, ISID, andtheAfghanistanDefenseMinistry. He alsoclaimedhe
worked asan informant for the British intelligenceservice. Detaineehasknowledgeof
operationalandplanning cyclesof terrorist operationsfor the HIG.
b. Areasof PotentialExploitation:
o Hezbi-e-IslamiGulbuddin
o Personalities
o Operations
o Operationalties to
' Al-Qaidanetwork
. Taliban
. ISID
. NDS
. Afghan Governmentauthorities.
o NDS
o Personalities
o Illegal operations
o Narcotics
o Financialties
o Collection
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8. S E C R E T //NOFORN I / 2O3OO8O7
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control(CD) for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9AF-00102lDP(S)
o Othercriminal activity
o ISID
o Personalities
o Weapons
o Financial input into the HIG
o Supportto terrorists
7. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon 20 December2004,
andhe remainsan enemycombatant.
/
L.g""L
JAYW. HOOD
MajorGeneral,USA
Commanding
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