Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.

1. s E c R E T //NOFORN | | 20300610
DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCEGUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA
APOAE 09360
JTFGTMO-CG l0 June2005
MEMORANDUMFORCommander,UnitedStatesSouthernCommand,3511NW 9lstAvenue,
Miami,FL33172.
SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DOD Control(DoD)for Guantanamo
Detainee,ISN:US9AG-000659DP(S)
JTFGTMODetaineeAssessment
1. (FOUO)PersonalInformation:
o JDIMSAIDRC ReferenceName: AbdenourSameur
o Aliasesand Current/TrueName: Mustafa. Sameur/Samir
Abdenour.Abdul Rashid.CarlosPerrera
o Placeof Birth: Alsiers. Alseria (AG)
o Dateof Birth: 28 March 1973
o Citizenship: Algeria
o IntemmentSerialNumber(ISN): US9AG-000659DP
2. (FOUO)Health: Detaineeis in goodhealth,hasnoknownallergiesandis notcurrentlyon
anymedications.Hehasnotravelrestrictions.'
3. (S/NF) JTF GTMOAssessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTFGTMOrecommendsthisdetaineebeRetainedin DoD
Control(DoD).
b. (S//NF)Summary: JTFGTMOpreviouslyassesseddetaineeasTransferto theControl
of AnotherCountryfor ContinuedDetention(TRCD)on30August2003. Basedupon
informationobtainedsincedetainee'spreviousassessment,it isnowrecommendedhebe
Retainedin DoDControl(DoD).
CLASSIFIEDBY: MULTIPLESOURCES
REASON:E.O.12958SECTION1.5(C)
DECLASSIFYON: 20300610
s E c R E T //NOFORNI / 20300610

2. S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2030O610
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo
Detainee,ISN: US9AG-000659DP(S)
For this updaterecommendation,detaineeis assessedasa memberof Al Qaida'sglobal
terrorist network with specificties to theNorth African Extremist Network Q.JAEN)in
London andAfghanistan.Detaineehasa history with Islamic Jihadandtrained at the Al-
QaidasponsoredAl FarouqCamp. Detaineewas armedandlikely participatedin hostilities
in JalalabadandToraBora. It is assessedthis detaineeis a HIGH risk, ashe is likely to pose
a threatto the US, its interestsandallies.
4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unlessotherwisenoted,thefollowing
paragraphsarebasedsolelyon the detainee'sstatements.
a. (S) Prior History: Detaineehelda varietyof oddjobs anddesertedfrom the Algerian
military aftera few monthsof service.In 1995detaineefoughtin thejihad in Bosnia.
Detaineeleft Algeria andtraveledvia Tunisia to Rome,Italy (IT). A man namedNouradin
facilitated his travel. From the airport in Rome,IT, detaineewent to a bus station. Herehe
askeda group of unknown Algerians for help in obtaining falsedocumentssohe could travel
to the United Kingdom (UK). An unknown associateof the groupprovided detaineewith a
SpanishID cardandtold him to travelto Londonvia Sicily, IT. In October1999,detainee
andan associatenamedKorim, variant Kareem,traveledto London, UK. They stayedfor a
yearanda half. In London, detaineeattendedthe Finsbury Parkmosque,the Baker Street
mosque,andthe Shepard'sBushmosque.
b. (S) Recruitment and Travel: At the FinsburyParkmosque,detaineemet Algerians,
JamalAl Din andToufik who told detaineeaboutliving in Afghanistan(AF). Detaineelived
in the UK illegally andAfghanistanappealedto him. (Analyst note: His illegal statusmay be
a referenceto traveling to the UK on falsedocuments.Detaineenotedhe haspolitical asylum
in the UK.) Detaineedecidedto travel to Afghanistanto studyIslam andseeka betterlife,
noting he did not like the treatmenthe receivedin the UK from the governmentandcitizens.
Toufik provided detaineewith a contactnumberfor Muhammad(Likely Muhammad Shah,
who servedasa facilitator undernetwork facilitators JafarAl Jazaieriand SulaymanAl
lazaierl) anda Pakistanivisa, but detaineepaid for his own ticket. Detaineetraveledwith
Nouradinfrom Londonto Islamabad,Pakistan(PK), in the summerof 2001. An Afghan
namedMuhammadescorteddetaineeto Peshawar,PK, andthento Jalalabad,AF. In
Jalalabad,detaineestayedabout40 daysat the Algerian guesthouserun by Abu Jaffar.
c. (S) Training and Activities: Detaineetraveledto Khandahar,AF andthento theAl-
QaidasponsoredAl Farouqtraining campwherehe trained on the AK-47 for aboutone
week. (Analyst note: In Kandahar,detaineelikely stayedat the Haji Habbashguesthouse.)
The 11 Septemberattackson the US occurredanddetainee'strainer, Abu AssadAl-Suri
(Asuri), informed the traineesthe programwas canceledbecausethe US would be bombing
the camp. Detaineetraveledto Abu Jaffar's Kabul, AF, guesthouse.Then he went to the
2
s E c R E T //NOFORNI I 20300610

3. S E C R E T // NOFORN I / 2O3OO6IO
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo
Detainee,ISN: US9AG-000659DP(S)
Algerian guesthousein Jalalabadto retrievehis belongingsandattemptedto leave
Afghanistan. Detaineestayedat the guesthouseuntil forcedto leavedueto the US campaign
(probablymid November2001). Detaineeandotherresidentsfled to the mountainsof Tora
Bora wherehe remainedfor approximatelyonemonth. Detaineeanda group of over 100
menthen fled to Pakistan.While at the guesthousein Jalalabad,prior to fleeing to Tora Bora,
an unknown individual assignedan AK-47 to detainee.
d. Capture Information: In February2002,Pakistanimilitary captureddetaineeandhis
entire group afterthey had crossedinto Pakistan. Pakistaniforcesheld the group andduring
a transferto anotherprison, the prisonersrioted, flipped a bus detaineewas on, anddetainee
attemptedto escape.During this escapeattempt,Pakistaniforcesshotandwounded
detainee.(Analyst note: Basedon detainee'saccount,he was likely capturedin the operation
that nettedover 100Al-Qaida/extremistmemberswho were led out of Afghanistanby Ibn
SheikhAl Libi.) On 5 April 2002,the Pakistanigovernmenthandeddetaineeto US custody.
e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 14 June2002
f. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provideinformationon the
following:
o The Algerian Guesthouse
. Terrorist personalitiesat the Algerian Guesthouse
o Terroristpersonalitiesandmethodsin theUK
5. (S/NF)DetaineeThreat:
a. (S)Assessment:It isassessedthedetaineeposesaHIGHrisk,asheislikelytoposea
threatto the US, its interestsandallies.
b. (S//NF)Reasonsfor ContinuedDetention:
. (S) Detaineetrained at the Al-Qaida sponsoredAl-Farouq training camp. He is
assessedto be a memberof the NAEN becauseof his recruitmentandnotedassociations
in London andCentralAsia. (Analyst note: The NAEN is a Tier 0 Counterterrorism
targetdefinedasterrorist groupswhich posea clearandimmediatedangerto US persons
or interests. DetaineenotedToufiq might haveperformeda backgroundcheckon him
through Toufiq's connectionsto the mujahideenin Algeria. This indicatesdetaineehad
associationswith otherextremistorganizationsin Algeria, possibly including the Armed
Islamic Group (GIA) andthe SalafistGroup for PreachingandCombat(GSPC).)
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SE C R E T // NOFORNI I 2O3O0610

4. s E c R E T // NOFORN/ / 20300610
JTFGTMO-CG
SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control(DoD)for Guantanamo
Detainee,ISN:US9AG-000659DP(S)
o (S) Detaineewas an associateof extremistsincluding Toufik in London,
Muhammadin Pakistan,andJaffarin Jalalabad.Detaineeattendedjihad
indoctrination classesgiven by Jaffar at the Algerian guesthouse.(Analyst note:
Toufik is likely RabahKadre akaToufiq. Toufiq wasthe numbertwo man of the Al-
Qaidacell in London andassumedcontrol of the Al-QaidaA{orth African Extremist
Network recruiting andfacilitation segmentin London. Al-Qaida memberAbu Doha
ran this segmentuntil his arrest. Toufiq operatedout of the mosquesin London and
servedasa recruiterand facilitator for the campsin Afghanistan. Muhammadis
likely Muhammad Shah. Shahwas involved in a radiological plot involving uranium
andred mercury (a nuclearscammaterial). Shahalso servedasa facilitator under
network facilitators JafarAl Jazaieriand SulaymanAl Jazaieri. He movedpersonnel
acrossthe Afghanistan/Pakistanboarder. Jaffar is JafarAl JazaieriakaOmar
Chabani,a known extremistfacilitator with direct links to Algerian training campsin
JalalabadandtheNorth African Extremist Network. He alsohasdirect links to Al-
Qaidaoperativesin the UK andthroughoutEurope.)
o (S) In London,detaineeattendedthe Shepard'sBushMosque,theFinsburyPark
Mosque,andthe BakerStreetMosque. All threemosqueshavereportedlinks to
extremistrecruiting andfacilitating.
. (S) Detaineehashistorical ties to Islamicjihad andextremistgroups. Interrogators
believemuchof detainee'scoverstoryis fabricated.Detaineedeniedfighting in Bosnia
althoughhe previouslyadmittedto doing so.(Analystnote: Detaineebelieveshe is
smarterthaninterrogatorsbut hasunwittingly given information of intelligencevalue.
Additional claims andrecantationsby detaineearedesignedto negatesuchincriminating
statements.Detaineelikely did participatein the Bosniajihad, indicatingan established
history with Islamicjihad andlikely extremistentitiesthat arealsoknown to have
participatedin Bosnia. This indicatesdetaineelikely receivedadditionaltrainingin 1995.
If his military training from Algeria was deemedsufficient, detaineecould havebypassed
trainingin Bosniaandimmediatelyjoined thehostilities.)
o (S) Detaineeis a supporterof the IslamicLiberationFront (ILF), which advocates
violent oppositionto thegovemmentof Algeria.(Analystnote:The ILF is the Islamic
SalvationFront(FIS). The FIS, asa memberof theNAEN.)
. (S) Detaineeutilized counterinterrogationtechniquesby recantingprevious
information or leaving out significant information when discussinghis past,associates,
andactivities in an attemptto preventassociationwith incriminating entitiesand
activities. Detaineerarely repeatedthe sameinformation with the samedetails.
o (S) Detaineeclaimedadvanceknowledgeof the 11 September2001attacks
againstthe US. Detaineeadmittedan unidentified individual informed him oneweek
prior to the attacksthat somethingwas going to happento the US. (Analyst note:
Anyone with information aboutattackson the US would not provide such
+
SE C RE T // NOF'ORNI I 203OO610

5. S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 203006IO
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo
Detainee,ISN: US9AG-000659DP(S)
information to a simple acquaintance.Detaineewould haveto be a trustedmember
of the network in orderto haveacquiredthe information.)
. Detaineelater claimed no onehad discussedthe attacksdirectly with him,
contradictinginformation he admittedto in previousdebriefings.
o (S) Detaineeacknowledgedthat otherindividuals actively conductedfundraising
andrecruiting activities in the mosquesin London, but deniedhe went to Afghanistan
dueto theseactivities. (Analyst note: Detaineehasnot provided specificdetailed
information on theseactivities, althoughhe notedmoney collectedat the Finsbury
ParkmosquefundedAbu Jaffar'sAlgerian guesthousein Afghanistan.It is possible
detainee,andotherrecruits,courieredmoney from the UK to Abu Jaffar. Detainee
canlikely provide information concerningrecruiters,fundraisers,methods,
couriering,facilities,andrecruitsthemselves.)
o (S) Detaineeclaimedhe paid he own way to Pakistan,but later contradicted
himself andstatedthe Finsbury Park Mosque(likely Toufik) provided him with a
ticket,Pakistanivisa,andfalseFrenchpassport.This is assessedto bethe most
accurateaccount. At onetime, detaineehadfour passports.
o (S) In initial interviews,detaineedid not disclosehe andLondonassociate
Nouradin traveledto Pakistantogether. Detaineealsochangedhis storyto state
Toufik hadprovidedthe phonenumberfor Muhammadto Nouradin insteadof
detainee. Detaineefunher changeddetailsstatingNouradin andToufik werethe
sameindividual, but detaineetraveledalone. Another changeis detaineestatedhe
sawNouradin in London andthen in Jalalabad.(Analyst note: Changingthe story in
this mannerattemptsto placeextremistassociationswith Nouradin andremovethem
from detaineein oneinstance,andhelpsto protectthe identitiesof associatesand
attemptto avoid incriminating himself with the others. Detaineehimself, asnoted
above,is assessedto havebeena memberof, andhaveassociationswith, extremists
in the NAEN in London andItaly. Detaineehad severalvariationsin his story
regardinghis travels.)
o (S) Detaineestatedhe traveledto London via Romeafter leaving Tunisia,then
contradictedhimself and statedhe traveledto Sicilv from Tunisia.
c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee'sbehavioris generallynoncompliantand
aggressive.Detaineehasthreatenedto kill military membersseveraltimes andhasbeen
cited routinely for failure to comply andharassingguards. Detaineeincited disturbanceson
at leasttwo occasions.
6. (S/NF)DetaineeIntelligenceValueAssessment:
a. (S)Assessment: JTFGTMOdeterminedthisdetaineeisofMEDIUMintelligence
value.
s E c R E T //NOFORN I | 20300610

6. SE C R E T //NOFORN I I 203O061O
JTFGTMO-CG
SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control(DoD)for Guantanamo
Detainee,ISN:US9AG-000659DP(S)
. (S) Detaineeis routinely notedfor deceptionduring interrogationsandwas identified
asa habitualliar with a superiority complex. He likely hasinformation of high value,but
doesnot provide it willingly, if at all. He likely hasinformation regardingterrorist
operationsin Algeria, North African Extremist Network personnelandoperationsin the
UK. He maypossessinformationon Al-Qaidain Afghanistanandon the 11 September
terrorist attacks.
b. (S//NF)Areasof PotentialExploitation:
o l1 September2001terroristattacks- personnelin Afghanistanduring2001with
advanceknowledgeof the attacks
o Terrorist facilities
o Al-Qaida/network personnelin Afghanistan/Pakistan
o Algerian terrorist groups
7. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon 4 October2004,and
he remainsan enemvcombatant.
L.bl"g
TAYW. HOOD
BrigadierGeneral,USA
Commanding
6
s E c R E T //NOFORN I I 20300610