Detainee is an admitted Taliban recruiter and commander of Military Base 4 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He has an extensive operational association with Usama Bin Laden and al-Qaida dating back to 1990. Detainee provided assistance to Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri during their escape from U.S. and Coalition forces in December 2001. He also provided security for al-Qaida personnel in Tora Bora in 1999-2000 and protection to Bin Laden in 1996. Detainee worked closely with al-Qaida and possibly participated in narcotics smuggling. JTF-GTMO assesses the detainee to be a high risk and of high intelligence value.
(S//NF) Detainee was a senior Taliban official who held multiple high-level positions including Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army. He commanded thousands of Taliban troops and had close ties to al-Qaeda members. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes and would likely rejoin militant groups and target US forces if released. He poses a high security risk and has high intelligence value.
Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan under the influence of his older brothers, one of whom was a senior al-Qaida member. Detainee received training at al-Qaida camps and guesthouses and worked closely with senior al-Qaida operatives, including having advance knowledge of attack plots. He was captured in 2002 during a raid on an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi with other detainees. The document provides details of detainee's travels, training, associates, and activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative with ties to senior leaders. He has admitted to affiliations with terrorist groups including GIA and HIG. Detainee trained at militant camps, fought Soviets in Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban Foreign and Intelligence Ministries. He was captured in Pakistan and transferred to Guantanamo for suspected involvement in terrorist plots and attacks. Detainee has omitted details of his activities prior to capture, making his threat level and intelligence value difficult to assess fully.
Detainee was a senior Taliban official who served as Minister of Interior, Governor of Herat province, and military commander. He was directly associated with al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Following 9/11, detainee represented the Taliban in meetings with Iran seeking support against U.S. forces. He also attended a meeting directed by Osama bin Laden. Detainee was involved in narcotics trafficking and likely used profits to support Taliban interests. The document provides detainee's background and capture information, evaluates his statements, and assesses him as a continued high threat who may have valuable intelligence.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000899DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on his admitted membership in Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, ties to anti-coalition militias, possible ties to al-Qaeda and Iranian extremists, and participation in attacks against US and coalition forces. Materials found in his possession at capture included an al-Qaeda training manual. The detainee is uncooperative and continues to support anti-US elements, so continued detention is advised for risk of reengagement if released.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as a high-risk member of al-Qaeda. He is assessed to have been an explosives expert for an IED cell in Khowst subordinate to senior al-Qaeda operative Abu Layth al-Libi. As part of the cell, the detainee directly assisted in planning and implementing attacks against US and Coalition forces. Evidence includes 23 mines found buried at his compound and notebooks with IED assembly instructions. He is reported to have surveyed targets and planted mines to ambush forces, and suggested using a Stinger missile.
Detainee served as the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence and had direct access to senior Taliban, al-Qaeda, and anti-coalition militia leadership. He coordinated intelligence activities between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and assisted their operatives in evading capture. Detainee is assessed to still pose a threat and have high intelligence value due to his role in the Taliban government and ties to other Islamic militant groups.
(S//NF) Detainee was a senior Taliban official who held multiple high-level positions including Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army. He commanded thousands of Taliban troops and had close ties to al-Qaeda members. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes and would likely rejoin militant groups and target US forces if released. He poses a high security risk and has high intelligence value.
Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan under the influence of his older brothers, one of whom was a senior al-Qaida member. Detainee received training at al-Qaida camps and guesthouses and worked closely with senior al-Qaida operatives, including having advance knowledge of attack plots. He was captured in 2002 during a raid on an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi with other detainees. The document provides details of detainee's travels, training, associates, and activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative with ties to senior leaders. He has admitted to affiliations with terrorist groups including GIA and HIG. Detainee trained at militant camps, fought Soviets in Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban Foreign and Intelligence Ministries. He was captured in Pakistan and transferred to Guantanamo for suspected involvement in terrorist plots and attacks. Detainee has omitted details of his activities prior to capture, making his threat level and intelligence value difficult to assess fully.
Detainee was a senior Taliban official who served as Minister of Interior, Governor of Herat province, and military commander. He was directly associated with al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Following 9/11, detainee represented the Taliban in meetings with Iran seeking support against U.S. forces. He also attended a meeting directed by Osama bin Laden. Detainee was involved in narcotics trafficking and likely used profits to support Taliban interests. The document provides detainee's background and capture information, evaluates his statements, and assesses him as a continued high threat who may have valuable intelligence.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000899DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on his admitted membership in Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, ties to anti-coalition militias, possible ties to al-Qaeda and Iranian extremists, and participation in attacks against US and coalition forces. Materials found in his possession at capture included an al-Qaeda training manual. The detainee is uncooperative and continues to support anti-US elements, so continued detention is advised for risk of reengagement if released.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as a high-risk member of al-Qaeda. He is assessed to have been an explosives expert for an IED cell in Khowst subordinate to senior al-Qaeda operative Abu Layth al-Libi. As part of the cell, the detainee directly assisted in planning and implementing attacks against US and Coalition forces. Evidence includes 23 mines found buried at his compound and notebooks with IED assembly instructions. He is reported to have surveyed targets and planted mines to ambush forces, and suggested using a Stinger missile.
Detainee served as the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence and had direct access to senior Taliban, al-Qaeda, and anti-coalition militia leadership. He coordinated intelligence activities between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and assisted their operatives in evading capture. Detainee is assessed to still pose a threat and have high intelligence value due to his role in the Taliban government and ties to other Islamic militant groups.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda operative and leader of an improvised explosive devices (IED) cell in Khowst, Afghanistan. He worked directly for senior al-Qaeda member Ali Ammar Ashur al-Raqiai, planning IED attacks against US and Coalition forces. Multiple sources reported that detainee's cell received instructions from al-Raqiai to make IEDs for attacks against US forces. Detainee recruited others to his al-Qaeda cell and provided explosives training. He is assessed to be a continued threat and is recommended for continued detention.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000832DP. It summarizes that the detainee was a senior Taliban official who served in multiple leadership roles and had strong ties to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other anti-coalition militant groups. The detainee admitted serving in Taliban leadership positions and was involved in attacks against US and Coalition forces. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his past positions and ongoing ties to active militant groups that pose a threat to the US.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was captured with Taliban leaders and admitted to being a bodyguard for a high-ranking Taliban commander. Detainee received training at a Taliban camp and fought against U.S. forces on the Taliban front lines. While detainee claims to have been a low-level fighter, evidence suggests he was more significant due to being captured alongside senior Taliban leaders.
The document is a memorandum recommending the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000934DP. It finds that he poses a high security risk, as he was likely a member of a Taliban militia unit and involved in rocket attacks against U.S. forces. If released, it assesses he would reconnect with extremists and resume hostile activities. The detainee has been inconsistent about his involvement and maintains contact with Taliban members, posing a threat to the U.S. and allies.
Haji Sahib Rohullah Wakil is assessedto pose a high risk threat. He is a 45-year-old Afghan citizen and important politician from Konar Province who provided operational support to al-Qaida. Detainee assisted Arabs associated with al-Qaida to infiltrate and exfiltrate from Afghanistan and Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban regime. He also worked with anti-Afghan government factions and Pakistani intelligence to destabilize the interim Afghan administration. Detainee remains a threat due to his past involvement with al-Qaida, support for insurgent groups, and efforts to undermine the Afghan government.
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida associated passport forger and key travel facilitator supporting senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), and the Global Jihad Support Network. Detainee has additional ties to the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Detainee is also a suspected bomb maker and former commander of a special al-Qaida training camp, and he was identified as a front line
This document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed as a senior-level Taliban member who organized networks and disrupted coalition operations. He facilitated operations that likely resulted in US casualties. The detainee poses a high risk and can provide intelligence on extremist activities, drug trafficking, and Taliban networks. The Joint Task Force recommends continued detention.
Detaineeis recommendedfor transferout of DoD control basedon being an admittedTaliban memberwho spentfour yearsin the Taliban intelligenceservice.He hasfamilial ties to activeanti-coalitionmilitia membersandwould likely rejoin suchgroupsif released.The detaineeis assessedas a mediumrisk andthreatbasedon thesefactors. He hasbeencompliantin detentionbut his brother-in-lawandassociatesremainactiveinsurgentsin Afghanistan.
Detainee Akhtiar Mohammad is assessed to be a high-level commander in the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group who has extensive knowledge of anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan. He is assessed to pose a high risk if released. Detainee was captured in 2003 at a suspected HIG compound during a raid. He has been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2004 and continues to be assessed as an enemy combatant with high intelligence value due to his connections and knowledge of HIG activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This document provides a recommendation to continue detaining detainee US9AF-001021DP based on a JTF GTMO assessment. The detainee is assessed to be a high-ranking member of the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) with ties to Al-Qaida and its global terrorism network. He was implicated in a plot to kill Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan by placing bombs at the Presidential Palace and US Embassy. Consistent reporting indicates the detainee remains committed to the HIG and its goals. It is assessed that he poses a high risk and is likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies.
This document provides a summary and recommendation for transferring a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was previously assessed as "Retain in DoD" but is now recommended for transfer to the control of another country based on new information. Specifically, the detainee is assessed as a probable Al-Qaeda facilitator and possible anti-coalition militant supporter who aided Al-Qaeda members' escape from Afghanistan and may have ties to Pakistani intelligence services. The document recommends his transfer due to these assessments and potential intelligence value regarding border operations and militant groups.
Detaineeis assessedas a mid-to-high level memberof the Taliban with ties to high-level membersof the Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and Al-Qaida's terrorist network. He served in a 40-man unit that provided security for Usama Bin Laden and helped plan insurgent operations against U.S. forces. Detainee has admitted to assisting in the escapeof a mujahideen general with alleged support from Iran. It is assessedhe poses a high risk and may be able to provide information on past and future plans against the U.S. and its allies.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000890DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a former Taliban commander who led over 4,000 men and had connections to senior Taliban leaders. He is assessed as a high risk and likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies. The memorandum recommends transfer conditional on the other country agreeing to continued detention and intelligence access.
Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
The 42nd Infantry Division and Task Force Liberty in Iraq, 2005COL G_NYARNG
The document provides a history of the 42nd Infantry Division from World War I through its deployment to Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2004 to 2005. It details the Division's operations against insurgents in Iraq and its efforts to train Iraqi security forces, complete reconstruction projects, and facilitate the transition of control to Iraqi authorities. The Division helped set conditions for democratic elections in Iraq before departing in 2005.
Lutton, charles pearl harbor - fifty years of controversy - journal of hist...RareBooksnRecords
The document summarizes the events and controversy surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 that brought the United States into World War 2. It describes how the initial investigations blamed local commanders Kimmel and Short, but revisionist historians argued that President Roosevelt and other high-level officials in Washington were also culpable for failing to adequately warn Pearl Harbor or increase its defenses, despite intercepting messages indicating Japan's intent and deadline for negotiations. This led to Congressional hearings that unearthed more evidence but still mostly absolved Roosevelt, though some reports assigned more responsibility to Washington as well. The debate over responsibility continued for decades.
The 42nd Infantry Division has a long history serving in multiple conflicts. It was formed in 1917 for World War I and deployed to France. In World War II, it fought in southern France and liberated the Dachau concentration camp. During the Cold War, it served as a strategic reserve. More recently, it has responded to domestic disasters and the 9/11 attacks. In 2004, the division headquarters deployed to Iraq as Task Force Liberty to help stabilize the country. The division continues to train with units from across the United States and participate in missions around the world.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for transferring detainee ISN US9AF-001035DP to another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable former Taliban commander from Afghanistan who is currently in good health. He is assessed as a MEDIUM risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The detainee was captured with documents indicating ties to the Taliban and admitted being a member of an anti-coalition group. He provided information on weapon caches and personalities within the Taliban and Konar province government that expanded US intelligence. Based on this information, JTF-GTMO now recommends the detainee for transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
This document provides an intelligence assessment and transfer recommendation for a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was a high-ranking member of the Taliban who held multiple positions, including as the head of the Sherbergan Oil Exploration Plant. While he has been deceptive during interrogations, he may possess key information on Taliban intelligence structures and operations. As such, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to posing a medium risk.
The document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee, ISN:US9AF-000953DP, under Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee was the president of Ariana Airlines in Afghanistan, which is alleged to have provided logistical support to Al-Qaeda. As the airline's president, it is assessed that the detainee has knowledge of key financial and transportation networks. The detainee is determined to be of high intelligence value and continues to pose a high threat risk.
Detainee was a senior Taliban commander who led troops against US and Coalition forces in northern Afghanistan in late 2001. He commanded forces near Mazar-e-Sharif and is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his senior Taliban role and associations with other extremist groups and leaders that pose a threat to US interests.
Detainee is an Afghan national captured in 2002 for suspected involvement with al-Qaida. He worked closely with al-Qaida commander IZ-10026 for approximately 5 years, serving as his assistant, facilitator, translator, and distributing funds on his behalf. Detainee admitted participating in hostilities against US forces and operating al-Qaida guesthouses. He is assessed to still pose a threat and would likely reengage in extremist activities if released. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda operative and leader of an improvised explosive devices (IED) cell in Khowst, Afghanistan. He worked directly for senior al-Qaeda member Ali Ammar Ashur al-Raqiai, planning IED attacks against US and Coalition forces. Multiple sources reported that detainee's cell received instructions from al-Raqiai to make IEDs for attacks against US forces. Detainee recruited others to his al-Qaeda cell and provided explosives training. He is assessed to be a continued threat and is recommended for continued detention.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000832DP. It summarizes that the detainee was a senior Taliban official who served in multiple leadership roles and had strong ties to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other anti-coalition militant groups. The detainee admitted serving in Taliban leadership positions and was involved in attacks against US and Coalition forces. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his past positions and ongoing ties to active militant groups that pose a threat to the US.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was captured with Taliban leaders and admitted to being a bodyguard for a high-ranking Taliban commander. Detainee received training at a Taliban camp and fought against U.S. forces on the Taliban front lines. While detainee claims to have been a low-level fighter, evidence suggests he was more significant due to being captured alongside senior Taliban leaders.
The document is a memorandum recommending the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000934DP. It finds that he poses a high security risk, as he was likely a member of a Taliban militia unit and involved in rocket attacks against U.S. forces. If released, it assesses he would reconnect with extremists and resume hostile activities. The detainee has been inconsistent about his involvement and maintains contact with Taliban members, posing a threat to the U.S. and allies.
Haji Sahib Rohullah Wakil is assessedto pose a high risk threat. He is a 45-year-old Afghan citizen and important politician from Konar Province who provided operational support to al-Qaida. Detainee assisted Arabs associated with al-Qaida to infiltrate and exfiltrate from Afghanistan and Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban regime. He also worked with anti-Afghan government factions and Pakistani intelligence to destabilize the interim Afghan administration. Detainee remains a threat due to his past involvement with al-Qaida, support for insurgent groups, and efforts to undermine the Afghan government.
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida associated passport forger and key travel facilitator supporting senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), and the Global Jihad Support Network. Detainee has additional ties to the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Detainee is also a suspected bomb maker and former commander of a special al-Qaida training camp, and he was identified as a front line
This document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed as a senior-level Taliban member who organized networks and disrupted coalition operations. He facilitated operations that likely resulted in US casualties. The detainee poses a high risk and can provide intelligence on extremist activities, drug trafficking, and Taliban networks. The Joint Task Force recommends continued detention.
Detaineeis recommendedfor transferout of DoD control basedon being an admittedTaliban memberwho spentfour yearsin the Taliban intelligenceservice.He hasfamilial ties to activeanti-coalitionmilitia membersandwould likely rejoin suchgroupsif released.The detaineeis assessedas a mediumrisk andthreatbasedon thesefactors. He hasbeencompliantin detentionbut his brother-in-lawandassociatesremainactiveinsurgentsin Afghanistan.
Detainee Akhtiar Mohammad is assessed to be a high-level commander in the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group who has extensive knowledge of anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan. He is assessed to pose a high risk if released. Detainee was captured in 2003 at a suspected HIG compound during a raid. He has been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2004 and continues to be assessed as an enemy combatant with high intelligence value due to his connections and knowledge of HIG activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This document provides a recommendation to continue detaining detainee US9AF-001021DP based on a JTF GTMO assessment. The detainee is assessed to be a high-ranking member of the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) with ties to Al-Qaida and its global terrorism network. He was implicated in a plot to kill Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan by placing bombs at the Presidential Palace and US Embassy. Consistent reporting indicates the detainee remains committed to the HIG and its goals. It is assessed that he poses a high risk and is likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies.
This document provides a summary and recommendation for transferring a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was previously assessed as "Retain in DoD" but is now recommended for transfer to the control of another country based on new information. Specifically, the detainee is assessed as a probable Al-Qaeda facilitator and possible anti-coalition militant supporter who aided Al-Qaeda members' escape from Afghanistan and may have ties to Pakistani intelligence services. The document recommends his transfer due to these assessments and potential intelligence value regarding border operations and militant groups.
Detaineeis assessedas a mid-to-high level memberof the Taliban with ties to high-level membersof the Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and Al-Qaida's terrorist network. He served in a 40-man unit that provided security for Usama Bin Laden and helped plan insurgent operations against U.S. forces. Detainee has admitted to assisting in the escapeof a mujahideen general with alleged support from Iran. It is assessedhe poses a high risk and may be able to provide information on past and future plans against the U.S. and its allies.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000890DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a former Taliban commander who led over 4,000 men and had connections to senior Taliban leaders. He is assessed as a high risk and likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies. The memorandum recommends transfer conditional on the other country agreeing to continued detention and intelligence access.
Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
The 42nd Infantry Division and Task Force Liberty in Iraq, 2005COL G_NYARNG
The document provides a history of the 42nd Infantry Division from World War I through its deployment to Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2004 to 2005. It details the Division's operations against insurgents in Iraq and its efforts to train Iraqi security forces, complete reconstruction projects, and facilitate the transition of control to Iraqi authorities. The Division helped set conditions for democratic elections in Iraq before departing in 2005.
Lutton, charles pearl harbor - fifty years of controversy - journal of hist...RareBooksnRecords
The document summarizes the events and controversy surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 that brought the United States into World War 2. It describes how the initial investigations blamed local commanders Kimmel and Short, but revisionist historians argued that President Roosevelt and other high-level officials in Washington were also culpable for failing to adequately warn Pearl Harbor or increase its defenses, despite intercepting messages indicating Japan's intent and deadline for negotiations. This led to Congressional hearings that unearthed more evidence but still mostly absolved Roosevelt, though some reports assigned more responsibility to Washington as well. The debate over responsibility continued for decades.
The 42nd Infantry Division has a long history serving in multiple conflicts. It was formed in 1917 for World War I and deployed to France. In World War II, it fought in southern France and liberated the Dachau concentration camp. During the Cold War, it served as a strategic reserve. More recently, it has responded to domestic disasters and the 9/11 attacks. In 2004, the division headquarters deployed to Iraq as Task Force Liberty to help stabilize the country. The division continues to train with units from across the United States and participate in missions around the world.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for transferring detainee ISN US9AF-001035DP to another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable former Taliban commander from Afghanistan who is currently in good health. He is assessed as a MEDIUM risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The detainee was captured with documents indicating ties to the Taliban and admitted being a member of an anti-coalition group. He provided information on weapon caches and personalities within the Taliban and Konar province government that expanded US intelligence. Based on this information, JTF-GTMO now recommends the detainee for transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
This document provides an intelligence assessment and transfer recommendation for a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was a high-ranking member of the Taliban who held multiple positions, including as the head of the Sherbergan Oil Exploration Plant. While he has been deceptive during interrogations, he may possess key information on Taliban intelligence structures and operations. As such, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to posing a medium risk.
The document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee, ISN:US9AF-000953DP, under Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee was the president of Ariana Airlines in Afghanistan, which is alleged to have provided logistical support to Al-Qaeda. As the airline's president, it is assessed that the detainee has knowledge of key financial and transportation networks. The detainee is determined to be of high intelligence value and continues to pose a high threat risk.
Detainee was a senior Taliban commander who led troops against US and Coalition forces in northern Afghanistan in late 2001. He commanded forces near Mazar-e-Sharif and is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his senior Taliban role and associations with other extremist groups and leaders that pose a threat to US interests.
Detainee is an Afghan national captured in 2002 for suspected involvement with al-Qaida. He worked closely with al-Qaida commander IZ-10026 for approximately 5 years, serving as his assistant, facilitator, translator, and distributing funds on his behalf. Detainee admitted participating in hostilities against US forces and operating al-Qaida guesthouses. He is assessed to still pose a threat and would likely reengage in extremist activities if released. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AG-000175DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on evidence that he was an al-Qaida member who received training at al-Faruq camp and possibly explosives training. He is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US forces as a leader coordinating supplies for al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora, and was possibly selected for training as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. The document recommends his continued detention due to these assessments and his lack of cooperation.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AG-000533DP. It summarizes the detainee's personal information, travel history, activities in Afghanistan including possible ties to al-Qaeda, and capture in Tora Bora after being injured attempting to flee US bombing. The assessment determines he poses a high risk and high intelligence value, and recommends his continued detention due to concerns he could reengage in extremism if released.
This document provides a detainee assessment for an individual currently held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It recommends continued detention based on the detainee's history with militant groups and assessed likelihood to reengage in hostilities if released. Specifically:
- The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and likely to pose a threat due to his prior role as an intelligence officer for the Taliban and reported ties to other extremist groups.
- He is a member of an anti-coalition militia group with ties to the Haqqani Network and planned and executed rocket attacks against U.S. forces.
- Since his detention, his brother has engaged in insurgent activities, increasing the risk the deta
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
Detainee was captured in possession of improvised explosive devices and admitted to being part of a four-man cell that planned attacks against US and Coalition forces using IEDs. He was assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militia member with possible ties to al-Qaeda, and may have received explosives training in Pakistan. If released, it is assessed he could reengage in militant activities. While in detention, he has been largely compliant but also verbally harassed guards on occasions. He is considered a medium risk and of low intelligence value.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000560DP. It summarizes that the detainee has been compliant in detention but is assessed to be a high risk if released due to his prior role as a primary financial manager for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He facilitated large money transfers and the procurement of weapons for terrorist attacks. The detainee is reported to have strong ties to the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, and Jamaat Tablighi and to have been involved in narcotics trafficking. The document recommends the detainee remain in DoD custody due to concerns he could reengage in extremist support activities if released.
Detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and weapons smuggler associated with senior Taliban officials. He was captured in 2003 with documents and materials indicating ties to the Taliban and extremist networks. Detainee worked closely with the Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister and other senior figures. He denies the full extent of his Taliban activities and affiliations. JTF-GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be detained due to his high-level Taliban connections and potential threat.
Detainee is assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militias (ACM) member suspected of participating in the 27 March 2003 murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) worker in Afghanistan. He was captured with a satellite phone he was using to contact Mullah Haji Satar, an ACM commander suspected of the ICRC murder. Detainee has provided inconsistent accounts and an uncertain identity. He is assessed to present a high risk threat due to his ties to ACM commanders conducting attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces.
Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaida'sGlobal Jihad SupportNetwork who attendedtraining in Afghanistan andresidedin guesthousesoperatedby al-Qaidamembers.He occupiedpositionsin the Tora Bora Mountainsandparticipatedin hostilities againstUS andcoalition forces. JTF-GTMO previouslyassessedhim asa ContinuedDetentionrisk but now recommendshis TransferOut of DoD Controlbasedon his MEDIUM intelligencevalueandthreatlevel.
- Detainee was a senior al-Qaeda facilitator who swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and personally recruited his bodyguards. He has ties to many high-level al-Qaeda members and operatives involved in the 9/11 attacks.
- After the fall of the Taliban, detainee provided assistance to hundreds of foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan. He was responsible for moving money and fighters into Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban.
- Detainee traveled to Bosnia in the 1990s for jihad and spent a year fighting before returning to Yemen. He is associated with the planner of the 9/11 attacks and 11 of the hijackers.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention due to his involvement in a terrorist plot. He was arrested in 2001 as part of an Algerian cell in Bosnia suspected of planning to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee has an extensive history with extremist groups in Algeria, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. He worked with several Islamic non-governmental organizations of concern. While cooperative, he likely withholds full details about personal ties to extremists.
Detainee is assessed to be a high risk threat and of high intelligence value. He is a member of an Algerian armed group involved in an al-Qaeda linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Detainee fought in the Bosnian jihad in the 1990s and worked with several charities associated with terrorism. He also served as an instructor at al-Qaeda training camps. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan after 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia before departing. He denies all allegations.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000955DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have connections to anti-coalition activities in Afghanistan and may have been involved in rocket attacks against US forces. He was found deceptive during a polygraph about his participation. The detainee has also been tentatively identified as the chief of investigations for the Taliban in Zormat province. It is recommended he be transferred for continued detention due to posing a medium risk of engaging in future anti-coalition activities if released.
Bismulah is an Afghan national detained at Guantanamo Bay since June 2002. He claims he was conscripted by the Taliban and forced to stand guard at a checkpoint for 17 days. After fleeing, he was captured by a Northern Alliance militia and eventually transferred to US forces. Based on interrogations, Bismulah is assessed to have low intelligence value and pose a medium threat. He is recommended for release or transfer to another government's control for continued detention.
Aiysan Ollah is an Afghan national detained at Guantanamo Bay since June 2002. He served as a guard at a Taliban facility in Nahreen, Afghanistan for about three months until the facility fell. While he provided some information, his interrogators assess he has no further intelligence value. The memorandum recommends his transfer or release, as he is not affiliated with Al Qaeda, was low-level Taliban, provided no useful intelligence, and poses no future threat.
Detainee is a 52-year old Algerian national assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and the North African Extremist Network who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and received small arms training at an al-Qaida camp. He is assessed to be a high risk and threat to the US due to his extremist connections and admitted associations with known terrorists. The document recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention, preferably Algeria, if a satisfactory agreement can be reached. If not, he should remain in DoD custody due to contradictions in his story and suspected deception during interrogations.
Abdul Hanan is a 44-year-old Afghan national detained at Guantanamo Bay who traveled to Afghanistan to search for his forcibly conscripted brother. After spending two weeks unsuccessfully asking about his brother in Konduz, he was detained by Northern Alliance forces and transferred to U.S. custody. While initially detained for possible knowledge of al-Qaeda, interrogations found him unknowledgeable and not a future threat. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay now recommends his transfer or release from custody.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer the detainee, ISN US9AF-000914DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a medium risk threat who was a member of an anti-coalition movement group led by warlord Samoud Khan that was affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He received religious indoctrination at a madrassa led by a known al-Qaeda and Taliban affiliated leader. While the detainee's information may be useful, his credibility is questionable as he has provided inconsistent statements and instructed other detainees to lie. The memorandum recommends transfer for continued detention due to the detainee's affiliations and associations with terrorist groups and personalities.
Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-Qaida who received terrorist training in Afghanistan. He reportedly attended training at al-Qaida affiliated camps, associated with known al-Qaida operatives, and resided in al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee likely participated in action against U.S. and coalition forces. He is assessed as a medium risk and threat, and of medium intelligence value.
Detainee Ahmed Bin Saleh Bel Bachao is assessed as a probable member of al-Qaida who received weapons training in Afghanistan. He traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 after being influenced by extremist lectures at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London. In Afghanistan, he stayed at an Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad known to facilitate foreign fighters, where he received small arms training. He fled to Tora Bora during US attacks and was later captured with a large group of fighters. It is assessed he poses a medium risk and may have participated in hostilities against US forces.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay to another facility. It summarizes the detainee's personal information and assesses him as a probable member of al-Qaeda's support network who likely received improvised explosive device training. The detainee is believed to have traveled from France to Afghanistan via the UK and Pakistan, staying at guesthouses associated with extremist groups. He is assessed to pose a medium risk and high intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AG-000284DP to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and al-Qaeda's global terrorist network. He has been identified as receiving terrorist training, but does not appear to be a senior leader. While sometimes cooperative, he has also been uncooperative and obstinate during interrogations. The Joint Task Force assesses he poses a medium risk but defers to the Criminal Investigative Task Force's assessment that he poses a high risk.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for detainee ISN US9AG-000070DP held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is a 24-year old Algerian man with a history of significant head trauma resulting in blindness in one eye and brain injuries causing difficulties with speech, understanding, and controlling behaviors. Due to his medical condition, he requires long-term custodial care. While previously assessed as medium intelligence value, he now poses a low risk. The Joint Task Force recommends releasing or transferring the detainee to another country for continued detention based on his health status and low risk level.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
Detainee Mohammed Mussa Yakubi is assessed as a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia in Afghanistan with connections to a global terrorist network. He is believed to have helped engineer IED and mortar attacks against US forces. Detainee was arrested after weapons were found in his compound, including an AK-47, mortar tubes, and ammunition. He is assessed as a HIGH risk and having MEDIUM intelligence value regarding the Gardez cell, planned attacks, and connections to other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. JTF GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be held in DoD custody.
This document provides a summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is believed to have worked for a known member of the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group and traveled between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for over a decade. Concerns were raised about inconsistencies in his story and links to anti-coalition militant groups. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining him in the Department of Defense's control due to these associations and assessed intelligence value.
Detainee Mohammed Shah is assessed as a probable member of al Qaeda who has ties to terrorist political parties in Iran. He is assessed to be a medium risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The document recommends transferring the detainee to another country with conditions, subject to an acceptable transfer agreement. It provides details of the detainee's background, including fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, working as a doctor in Iran, and traveling between Afghanistan and Iran with large sums of money to support terrorist activities. The detainee is considered of medium intelligence value and may be able to provide information on Taliban commanders, couriers, and training camps in Iran with links to terrorist groups.
This memorandum recommends releasing or transferring a Guantanamo detainee. The detainee was likely falsely accused of participating in an ambush by Afghan forces seeking to cover up their own involvement. Records indicate the detainee poses a low risk and likely has no valuable intelligence. While the Criminal Investigation Task Force assesses the detainee as medium risk, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo recommends release or transfer based on the fraudulent circumstances of his capture.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a Guantanamo detainee, ISN: US9AF-001100DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was involved in anti-coalition militia operations and planned an attack on US forces in Afghanistan. He has direct ties to senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. The document assesses the detainee as a medium risk and recommends his transfer based on derogatory information obtained since his previous assessment.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-001075DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be of medium intelligence value and a medium threat risk. He was captured in Afghanistan in possession of weapons and has ties to anti-coalition militant groups in the Gardez region. While the detainee denies involvement, he has knowledge about a bombing in Gardez. The task force recommends his transfer to allow another country to take over his continued detention.
DetaineeMohammedAmin is recommendedfor transferto the control of anothercountry for continueddetention.He is assessedto be a memberof Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddinwho attendedplanningmeetingswhereattacksagainstUS-ledcoalitionforcesandtheAfghangovernmentwere discussed.Detaineehasassociationswith TalibanandAl-Qaedafiguresandmay haveknowledgeof futureplannedattacksdue to his involvementwith Anti-Coalitionforcesin Afghanistan.While in custody,hehasbeengenerallycompliantbut remainsan enemycombatant.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo Bay detainee, ISN US9AF-001045DP, in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee (1) is assessed to be a key member of anti-coalition militant groups who has participated in weapons trafficking, explosives training, and attacks against US and coalition forces; (2) has admitted ties to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations; and (3) poses a high risk and is likely to provide intelligence on terrorist networks, operations, and leaders if retained in DoD control.
This memorandum recommends retaining a detainee, ISN US9AF-001043DP, under Department of Defense control at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who possesses intelligence on terrorist operations and personnel. He was formerly the Taliban Minister of Commerce and deputy to a senior Taliban commander. New information indicates he was involved in the killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross employee in 2003. The detainee poses a high risk and should continue to be detained.
Detainee ISN US9AF-001037DP is assessed to be a high-ranking commander in the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group. He was captured along with another high-ranking HIG commander, ISN 1036, during a raid on a HIG safe house. Detainee and ISN 1036 have provided conflicting statements about their roles in HIG and how long they have known each other. Detainee is assessed to pose a high risk as he likely would threaten U.S. interests. JTF GTMO assesses the detainee to be of high intelligence value and recommends he continue to be detained in DoD custody.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN:US9AF-001019DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is an Afghan national who fought with the mujahideen and Taliban. He is assessed to have been a corrupt government official in Zabol province who associated with known terrorists like Hamidullah. While somewhat cooperative, he has been evasive about his full role. He poses a medium security risk and may have intelligence value. The Joint Task Force recommends his transfer for continued detention based on these assessments.
A memorandum from the Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining a detainee under Department of Defense control. The detainee, captured in Mexico attempting to enter the US, has provided inconsistent stories about his travel and background. He is considered of high intelligence value due to his potential knowledge of smuggling routes and operations. While generally compliant in detention, he has failed polygraph tests regarding combat training and intentions in the US. The task force assesses he poses a medium security risk.
1. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330215
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330115
JTF-GTMO-CDR 15 February 2008
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000782DP (S)
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment
1. (S) Personal Information:
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Awal Gul
Current/True Name and Aliases: Awal Malim Gul, Malem,
Commander Gul, Haji Malim
Place of Birth: Swaty Ghundi Village, Karchay District,
Laghman Province, Afghanistan (AF)
Date of Birth: 1 July 1962
Citizenship: Afghanistan
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-000782DP
2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.
3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention
Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 27 June 2007.
b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is an admitted Taliban recruiter and
commander of Military Base 4 in Jalalabad. In Jalalabad, detainee associated with senior
members of the Hezb-e-Islami Khalis (HIK) and operated a guesthouse open to al-Qaida
members.1
Detainee has an extensive operational association with Usama Bin Laden (UBL)
1
Analyst Note: HIK is an offshoot of the Hezb-e-Islami (HI). In 1989, after the Soviets were defeated in
Afghanistan, HI leaders Yunis Khalis and Hekmatyar Gulbuddin split from the main HI group and formed the Hezb-
2. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN US9AF-000782DP (S)
2
and al-Qaida dating to 1990. Detainee provided assistance to UBL and Ayman al-Zawahiri
during their escape from US and Coalition forces in December 2001. In November 2001,
UBL gave $100,000 US to detainee who, in 1999 and 2000, provided security for al-Qaida
personnel in Tora Bora. Detainee also provided protection to UBL in 1996 during UBL’s
travels between Jalalabad and a camp in Tora Bora. Detainee worked closely with al-Qaida
commander Abu Layth al-Libi and was possibly part of a narcotics smuggling network that
distributed heroin throughout Europe and the Middle East. [ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN A SCI
SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:
A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
A LOW threat from a detention perspective.
Of HIGH intelligence value.
c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s
assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be
annotated by ¡ next to the footnote.)
Added information on detainee’s support of UBL and al-Qaida personnel during
UBL’s return to Afghanistan in 1996
Added reporting detainee provided a safe-haven for UBL after UBL fled Tora Bora
Added information on detainee’s position as commander of a group at Tora Bora
Added information on detainee’s participation in drug smuggling
4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events:
The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account.
These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee received 12 years of education including technical
schooling in Jalalabad, where he studied to be an electrician. Detainee served as a mujahid
with Engineer Maulawi Mahmoud during the Soviet occupation. After Mahmoud was killed
and the Taliban gained control of Jalalabad, detainee took command of over 100 mujahideen
fighters.2
Detainee performed the hajj in Saudi Arabi.3
e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and Hezb-e-Islami Khalis (HIK), named after each leader (see IIR 6 044 6068 04). Nur
al-Haq is the son of Yunis Khalis and was the Taliban Foreign Minister. Current HIK leader, Dr. Amin al-Haq, is
Khalis’ brother.
2
000782 KB 11-01-2002
3
000782 Handnote 11-Oct-2002
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
3. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN US9AF-000782DP (S)
3
b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In the early 1990s, detainee was put in charge of
logistical efforts supporting hostilities along the Jalalabad highway. His responsibilities
included distributing food, oil, and other supplies to the fighters on the front lines. In 1992,
detainee became commander of Military Base 4, located near Jalalabad. Military Base 4 was
a staging area for fighters heading to the front lines. After the Taliban gained control of
Kabul, AF in late 1996, detainee departed Afghanistan for Pakistan (PK). Detainee was only
at the Shamshatu Refugee Camp in Pakistan for one or two months, when the Taliban asked
detainee to return and command Military Base 4 again, but this time only as a figurehead
with no real power. Detainee decided to return to Afghanistan and take the Taliban’s offer
because there were no jobs in Pakistan, and he felt he would be safer in Jalalabad away from
his enemies in Pakistan.4
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee cooperated with the Taliban at the
beginning of their reign hoping they would stabilize the Jalalabad area. Detainee’s Jalalabad
base grew to approximately 300-400 men and included a tank unit.5
Detainee was unhappy
with the Taliban because they did not promote peace as they had promised. Consequently,
detainee traveled to Kandahar and personally submitted his resignation letter to Taliban
Supreme Leader Mullah Muhammad Omar. Detainee was limited to a logistics position
following his resignation.6
After the Northern Alliance defeated the Taliban, detainee
regained command of his previous base, which had been renamed “Supply Base 4,” a
position he held until his arrest. Detainee was located at Hadda Farms with over 400-500
men who provided security for Jalalabad and Nangarhar Province.7
5. (U) Capture Information:
a. (S//NF) On 26 December 2001, Afghan officials led by Northern Alliance commander
Hazrat Ali (detainee’s former friend), arrested detainee for assisting UBL and Ayman al-
Zawahiri escape Afghanistan. Afghan officials transferred detainee to US custody in June
2002.8
b. (S) Property Held:
Miscellaneous items, including clothes and plastic beads
4
000782 KB 11-01-2002, 000782 KB NOTES 28-OCT-2002, 00782 Intsum 01 0811
5
000782 KB 11-01-2002
6
000782 SIR 12-Sep-2006, 000782 SIR 31-Aug-2006, 000782 SIR 16-Jun-2004, 000782 KB NOTES 28-OCT-
2002; Analyst Note: Detainee has provided conflicting information about his resignation. For an example, see
000782 MFR 04-MAR-2003 and 000782 SIR 31-Aug-2006. According to detainee, he possessed the letter at the
time he was captured.
7
000782 KB NOTES 28-OCT-2002, Analyst Note: Hadda Farms was owned by Yunis Khalis, leader of the HIK.
8
OSC SAP20011225000041, 000782 Handnote 11-Oct-2002
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
4. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN US9AF-000782DP (S)
4
c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 28 October 2002
d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the
following:
Anti-Coalition leadership of Nangarhar Province
Known and suspected terrorists and al-Qaida sympathizers in Nangarhar Province
Information on how al-Qaida members escaped from Tora Bora
Hidden weapons caches in Nangarhar Province
6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Detainee’s account is partially true, but
detainee fails to fully disclose his involvement with persons, organizations, and activities in
Afghanistan. Detainee claimed he saw UBL only three times. However, other reporting
identified detainee’s operational assistance to UBL and al-Qaida dating from at least 1996 and
culminating in detainee’s personal assistance to UBL and Ayman al-Zawahiri in escaping from
US and Coalition forces. Detainee’s role in UBL’s escape from Tora Bora require further
exploitation as does detainee’s specific support to al-Qaida. While detainee has discussed known
members of the HIK, he has avoided discussing the HIK itself.
7. (U) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely pose a threat to
the US, its interests and allies.
b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is an admitted Taliban recruiter
and commander of Military Base 4 in Jalalabad. In Jalalabad, detainee is associated with
senior members of the HIK and operated a guesthouse open to al-Qaida members. Detainee
has an extensive operational association with UBL and al-Qaida dating to 1990. Detainee
provided assistance to UBL and Ayman al-Zawahiri during their escape from US and
Coalition forces in 2001. UBL gave $100,000 US to detainee who, in 1999 and 2000,
provided a security force for al-Qaida personnel in Tora Bora. Detainee also provided
protection to UBL in 1996 during his travels between Jalalabad and a camp in Tora Bora.
Detainee also worked closely with al-Qaida commander Abu Layth al-Libi and was possibly
part of a narcotics smuggling network.
(S//NF) Detainee admitted being a Taliban recruiter and commander in Jalalabad. As
commander, he controlled Jalalabad and the Nangarhar Province and was associated with
the HIK.
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
5. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN US9AF-000782DP (S)
5
(S//NF) Detainee became commander of Military Base 4 after HIK Commander
Engineer Maulawi Mahmoud was killed in 1996. Detainee retained this position after
the Taliban gained control that year and remained in command until 1999.9
According to detainee, detainee provided logistical support to the Taliban after
resigning his command.10
(S//NF) According to a sensitive source, detainee was Mahmoud’s deputy and
aligned his forces with the Taliban. Following Mahmoud’s death, detainee
assumed command of Mahmoud’s forces.11
(S//NF) Detainee admitted he recruited and trained fighters for the Taliban and
stated he worked for the Taliban for the first three years of the Taliban rule.12
(Analyst Note: Detainee was more loyal to HIK than to the Taliban. It is assessed
the Taliban employed detainee to keep order within Jalalabad, but detainee retained
independent command over his own forces.)
(S//NF) Senior al-Qaida operative Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash, aka
(Khallad), aka (Silver), ISN US9YM-010014DP (YM-10014), acknowledged a
limited association with detainee in Jalalabad from approximately 1996-2001. YM-
10014 also stayed at a guesthouse owned by detainee in August 1997 for
approximately three weeks. YM-10014 said detainee was a respected person who
held a position of an “honored leader” among the people of Jalalabad. Moreover,
YM-10014 stated detainee was a highly regarded leader during the Afghan-Soviet
War. According to YM-10014, detainee met with the Taliban as an honorable
representative of Jalalabad in order to officially surrender the town to Taliban rule.13
(S//NF) According to a Tajik government service, detainee attempted to
assume a tribal leadership role in Nangarhar Province after the Taliban were
removed from power in 2001.14
¡ (S//NF) Detainee assisted UBL and Ayman al-Zawahiri escape from US and
Coalition forces. Detainee provided support to UBL and al-Qaida beginning
approximately 1996 and continued through late 2001.15
(S//NF) According to an Afghan government official, UBL and al-Zawahiri
stayed at detainee’s house to rest while escaping from hostilities against US and
Coalition forces in Tora Bora.16
9
000782 FM40 01-OCT-2005
10
000782 SIR 12-Sep-2006, 000782 SIR 31-Aug-2006, 000782 SIR 16-Jun-2004, 000782 KB NOTES 28-OCT-
2002, 000782 MFR 04-MAR-2003, 000782 SIR 31-Aug-2006
11
TD-314/21198-96
12
000782 SIR 07-JUN-2006; Analyst Note: The Taliban came to power in 1996.
13
TD-314/33000-05
14
TD-314/45797-01
15
IIR 4 201 1787 05, IIR 6 044 5085 05
16
IIR 6 044 5085 05
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
6. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN US9AF-000782DP (S)
6
(S//NF) In corroborative reporting, Harun al-Afghani, ISN US9AF-
003148DP (AF-3148), reported detainee met UBL and al-Zawahiri when they
fled from Tora Bora.17
UBL and al-Zawahiri rested at detainee’s house in
Jalalabad before continuing by horse to the mountainous area of Khwar, AF via
Konar.18
AF-3148 also reported he heard from HIG members that UBL and al-
Zawahiri remained in Konar for 10 months, possibly in the Shigal Valley. 19
(S//NF) Further corroborating AF-3148’s statement, detainee was reported to
be an escort for UBL and other al-Qaida members to Konar Province. In Shigal
Valley, Konar Province, they met Haji Kashmir Khan who provided protection
for the group before they continued to an unknown location at the request of
Hekmatyar.20
(S//NF) Detainee claimed he met UBL only three times, the first time in
1990. Detainee, while recounting his second meeting with UBL, stated it was
customary to welcome and greet foreigners who come to Afghanistan.21
(U) According to a Pakistani press report, detainee went with UBL to contact
Arab fighters located in Tora Bora (probably in November or December 2001). The
same press report claimed Northern Alliance forces gave detainee a satellite phone
and 1 million Rs (probably rupees) to help capture UBL; however, detainee
disappeared with the phone and money.22
(S//NF) In late November 2001, UBL gave detainee $100,000 US to distribute to
tribal commanders in Nangarhar Province. The commanders were to further
distribute the money to Arabs who were attempting to flee Nangarhar to Pakistan or
other areas.23
(S//NF) On 10 November 2001, detainee, along with Dr. Amin al-Haq
(personal security advisor to UBL), and other UBL-affiliated Arabs and Afghans,
held a discussion with three tribal elders concerning security arrangements along
the Pakistan-Afghan border. The groups agreed to provide protection for each
other. Al-Haq gave each of the tribal elders $10,000 US, clothing items, a
headdress and a horse. In return, the tribal elders agreed to refuse entry into tribal
lands of anyone representing a threat to al-Haq or the mujahideen. The tribal
elders also promised refuge for al-Haq’s men.24
(Analyst Note: The money
17
¡IIR 6 105 4589 07
18
¡IIR 6 044 5085 05
19
¡IIR 6 105 4589 07
20
¡TD-314/49376-07
21
000782 SIR 07-JUN-2006, Analyst Note: Detainee has given a timeline discrepancy of 6 years for the first time
he met UBL. See also 000782 SIR 15-May-2006
22
OSC SAP20020215000028
23
TD-314/46611-01
24
TD-314/45081-01
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
7. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN US9AF-000782DP (S)
7
provided to tribal elders is probably part of the $100,000 US provided to detainee
by UBL, but may indicate a separate exchange of funds for services.)
(S//NF) In early October 2001, detainee’s associate Yunis Khalis sent a
message to UBL advising him to come to Nangarhar or Konar Province where he
would be given safe haven.25
(Analyst Note: This invitation probably resulted in
the exchange of money and Dr. al-Haq’s discussion with the tribal elders.)
(S//NF) Analyst Note: The HIK provided assistance to the Arab fighters
escaping into Pakistan after the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom,26
and
in 2003, the HIK declared jihad against the US.27
Additionally HIK
representatives were identified as Taliban administrators at a 21 March 2005
meeting with other Taliban in which they agreed to conduct jihad against US
forces. The HIK also attended an 18 April 2005 Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM)
meeting with members of the Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin to formulate
a plan to continue the fight against the US and Coalition forces.28
(S//NF) In March 2000, detainee attended a three-day conference UBL hosted
with Afghan leaders in the Jalalabad area who were allied with UBL. UBL discussed
religious worship and the political situation of Arabs in Afghanistan. UBL also spoke
about the need for better operational security, warning the attendees that the US was
aware of their actions. He advised the group to seek out and identify those who were
reporting to US intelligence agencies. He told them to focus on supporting Taliban
Defense Minister Obaidullah in his fight against the Northern Alliance.29
(S//NF) Other conference attendees included HIK founder Yunis Khalis; HIK
Shura members Qari al-Hamuddin, Qari Mahmoud Shah, and Qazi Shamsuddin;
Director of Plans for Jalalabad Abu Khalil Habibullah; Deputy Director of Plans
for Jalalabad Dr. Amin al-Haq; Governor of Jalalabad Maulawi Sadar Azam; and
Commander of Taliban forces in Jalalabad region Mullah Abd al-Salaam
Rocketti.30
(S//NF) Detainee commanded the Taliban Unit 4 which occupied a camp south of
Jalalabad in November 1999 and had a detached element at Tora Bora in January
2000. Unit 4 was composed of approximately 40 Arabs from Algeria, Iraq, and
Yemen, and 26 Afghans who were not members of the unit, but performed sentry
25
TD-314/36374-01
26
¡IIR 6 034 0080 05
27
¡IIR 6 044 5085 05
28
¡IIR 2 120 0984 06, Analyst Note: The ACM is an NIPF Priority 2 CT target defined as issues, opportunities, or
threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM
Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support,
countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have
demonstrated both intention and capability to attack U.S. persons or interests
29
TD/314/08273-00
30
TD/314/08273-00
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
8. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN US9AF-000782DP (S)
8
duty securing the perimeter of the camp. Detainee was the commander of Unit 4
while Rais Khan was the commander of the detached element residing at Tora Bora.31
(S//NF) Analyst Note: Unit 4 was probably subordinate to Base 4 in
Jalalabad which was also under detainee’s command. As the Unit 4 element in
Tora Bora was reportedly made up entirely of Arabs, it is assessed this unit was
comprised of UBL’s forces, with detainee’s Afghans providing security at the
camp against local warlords and bandits.
(S//NF) In September 1996, detainee provided quarters and protection to UBL
and 40 Arab families in Jalalabad.32
Additionally, detainee’s forces controlled a
camp in Tora Bora and a location northwest of Agam, Nangarhar Province, in
September 1996. At the time, UBL was constructing a facility at the Agam
location.33
(S//NF) Possibly related, Ayman Said Abdallah Batarfi, ISN US9YM-
000627DP (YM-627), reported detainee was in charge of all Taliban in Jalalabad
and managed a house owned by UBL. YM-627 stated the house, which was in
detainee’s name, was called the Yunis Khalis Village.34
(Analyst Note: The
house was probably not named this, but located in an area controlled by Yunis
Khalis.)
(S//NF) According to an unidentified senior HIK commander, Taliban troops
under detainee’s command protected UBL during travel between Jalalabad and a Tora
Bora camp in October 1996. For security reasons, UBL frequently moved and
resided in various locations including the Hadda Farm area.35
(Analyst Note:
Detainee’s associate, HIK founder Yunis Khalis, owned a compound at Hadda Farm,
where detainee lived.36
)
(S//NF) Detained al-Qaida member Sharif al-Masri reported al-Qaida commander
Ali Ammar Ashur al-Raqiai, aka (Abu Layth al-Libi), had good relations and worked
closely with detainee and detainee’s associate Mullah Rocketti.37
(Analyst Note: Al-
Libi was probably involved in al-Qaida logistics, weapons, and training camps in the
Nangarhar Province/Pakistan border area before assuming a greater role in al-Qaida
following arrests of key members. Al-Libi was recently reported killed in open press
articles.)
¡ (S//NF) Detainee was possibly part of a 12-man Afghan narcotics smuggler
cooperative that coordinated with Taliban and United Islamic Front for the Salvation of
31
¢TD-314/05021-00
32
¢TD-314/21198-96, CJTF76 INTSUM 6-Nov-2004
33
TD-314/21198-96
34
¢000627 SIR 06-Jul-2006
35
TD-314/24727-96
36
TD-314/07546-02, 000782 KB NOTES 28-OCT-2002
37
TD 314/63197-04, TD 314/19118-05
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
9. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN US9AF-000782DP (S)
9
Afghanistan (UIFSA) President Burhanuddin Rabbani and contacts within countries from
the Middle East and Europe.
(S//NF) Mullah Awal Gul, possibly detainee, was identified as a member of a 12-
man cooperative of narcotic smugglers with contacts in the United Arab Emirates,
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and
Germany. This group also had some European and Iranian associates, who handled
transactions bound for the United Kingdom, Iran, the US, and Germany.38
(S//NF) The group was divided into two groups to conduct business with minimal
conflict with their heroin source.39
(Analyst Note: Haji Rohullah, probably Haji
Sahib Rohullah Wakil, ISN US9AF000798DP, (AF-798), was also listed as one of
the cooperative members.)
(S//NF) According to an established source, members of the cooperative met with
Rabbani in mid-January 2001 and paid him $2 million US in profits from their
smuggling operation.40
c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a LOW threat from a detention
perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and
staff. He currently has one Report of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS which occurred
on 4 July 2006, when he was wearing an altered pair of pants. He has no Reports of
Disciplinary Infraction for assault; other incidents for which he has been disciplined include
altering government property. In 2007 and 2008, he has no Reports of Disciplinary
Infraction.
8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainee’s
most recent interrogation session occurred on 31 January 2008.
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee is a Taliban commander with access to the
Taliban hierarchy and leaders of Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) groups. Detainee had a long
association with UBL and was trusted by him for his safety. Detainee was a veteran mujahid
soldier serving in various units and as commander. Detainee also worked closely with Yunis
Khalis and the HIK organization.
c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee should know the egress route UBL and his
entourage used to escape from Afghanistan to Pakistan as well as probably others UBL
would seek out for further assistance. He also should know all cave systems used by al-
38
TD-314/03170-00
39
TD-314/03170-00
40
TD-314/13614-01
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330215
10. S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20330215
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control for Guantanamo
Detainee,ISN US9AF-000782DP(S)
Qaidain the ToraBoraregion. Detaineepossessesinformationon the HIK including
personnelandoperations.Detaineemay know more aboutthe relationshipbetweenal-Qaida
andotherextremistorganizations.
d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:
o UBL andal-Qaida
o Personnel,basesof operation,safehouses,andweaponscaches
o ToraBora caves
o PossibleUBL hiding places
o Talibanpersonnel,basesof operation,weaponscaches
. HIK, including Yunis Khalis andother leadershippersonnel
o Terrorist biographical/psychologicalinformation
o Terroristoperationsin CENTCOM AOR
o Suspectedterrorist individuals in the greaterPeshawar,PK, area
o Terrorist/foreignfighters-movementandlogistics-Qaida
o Information on Kenyanterrorist attack
9. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon 20 September2004,
andhe remainsan enemycombatant. l
4L,
7il,&4/"/<MARK H. BUZBY (// L-'
RearAdmiral,USNavy
Commanding
'
Definitions for intelligenceterms usedin the assessmentcanbe found in the Joint Military Intelligence College
October2001 guideIntelligence Warning Terminologt.
1 0
SE C RE T // NOFORNI / 20330215