This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000560DP. It summarizes that the detainee has been compliant in detention but is assessed to be a high risk if released due to his prior role as a primary financial manager for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He facilitated large money transfers and the procurement of weapons for terrorist attacks. The detainee is reported to have strong ties to the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, and Jamaat Tablighi and to have been involved in narcotics trafficking. The document recommends the detainee remain in DoD custody due to concerns he could reengage in extremist support activities if released.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda operative and leader of an improvised explosive devices (IED) cell in Khowst, Afghanistan. He worked directly for senior al-Qaeda member Ali Ammar Ashur al-Raqiai, planning IED attacks against US and Coalition forces. Multiple sources reported that detainee's cell received instructions from al-Raqiai to make IEDs for attacks against US forces. Detainee recruited others to his al-Qaeda cell and provided explosives training. He is assessed to be a continued threat and is recommended for continued detention.
This document provides a detainee assessment for an individual currently held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It recommends continued detention based on the detainee's history with militant groups and assessed likelihood to reengage in hostilities if released. Specifically:
- The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and likely to pose a threat due to his prior role as an intelligence officer for the Taliban and reported ties to other extremist groups.
- He is a member of an anti-coalition militia group with ties to the Haqqani Network and planned and executed rocket attacks against U.S. forces.
- Since his detention, his brother has engaged in insurgent activities, increasing the risk the deta
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000832DP. It summarizes that the detainee was a senior Taliban official who served in multiple leadership roles and had strong ties to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other anti-coalition militant groups. The detainee admitted serving in Taliban leadership positions and was involved in attacks against US and Coalition forces. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his past positions and ongoing ties to active militant groups that pose a threat to the US.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative with ties to senior leaders. He has admitted to affiliations with terrorist groups including GIA and HIG. Detainee trained at militant camps, fought Soviets in Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban Foreign and Intelligence Ministries. He was captured in Pakistan and transferred to Guantanamo for suspected involvement in terrorist plots and attacks. Detainee has omitted details of his activities prior to capture, making his threat level and intelligence value difficult to assess fully.
Detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and weapons smuggler associated with senior Taliban officials. He was captured in 2003 with documents and materials indicating ties to the Taliban and extremist networks. Detainee worked closely with the Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister and other senior figures. He denies the full extent of his Taliban activities and affiliations. JTF-GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be detained due to his high-level Taliban connections and potential threat.
Detainee is assessed to be a high risk threat and of high intelligence value. He is a member of an Algerian armed group involved in an al-Qaeda linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Detainee fought in the Bosnian jihad in the 1990s and worked with several charities associated with terrorism. He also served as an instructor at al-Qaeda training camps. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan after 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia before departing. He denies all allegations.
Detainee served as the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence and had direct access to senior Taliban, al-Qaeda, and anti-coalition militia leadership. He coordinated intelligence activities between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and assisted their operatives in evading capture. Detainee is assessed to still pose a threat and have high intelligence value due to his role in the Taliban government and ties to other Islamic militant groups.
Detainee was a senior Taliban official who served as Minister of Interior, Governor of Herat province, and military commander. He was directly associated with al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Following 9/11, detainee represented the Taliban in meetings with Iran seeking support against U.S. forces. He also attended a meeting directed by Osama bin Laden. Detainee was involved in narcotics trafficking and likely used profits to support Taliban interests. The document provides detainee's background and capture information, evaluates his statements, and assesses him as a continued high threat who may have valuable intelligence.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda operative and leader of an improvised explosive devices (IED) cell in Khowst, Afghanistan. He worked directly for senior al-Qaeda member Ali Ammar Ashur al-Raqiai, planning IED attacks against US and Coalition forces. Multiple sources reported that detainee's cell received instructions from al-Raqiai to make IEDs for attacks against US forces. Detainee recruited others to his al-Qaeda cell and provided explosives training. He is assessed to be a continued threat and is recommended for continued detention.
This document provides a detainee assessment for an individual currently held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It recommends continued detention based on the detainee's history with militant groups and assessed likelihood to reengage in hostilities if released. Specifically:
- The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and likely to pose a threat due to his prior role as an intelligence officer for the Taliban and reported ties to other extremist groups.
- He is a member of an anti-coalition militia group with ties to the Haqqani Network and planned and executed rocket attacks against U.S. forces.
- Since his detention, his brother has engaged in insurgent activities, increasing the risk the deta
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000832DP. It summarizes that the detainee was a senior Taliban official who served in multiple leadership roles and had strong ties to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other anti-coalition militant groups. The detainee admitted serving in Taliban leadership positions and was involved in attacks against US and Coalition forces. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his past positions and ongoing ties to active militant groups that pose a threat to the US.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative with ties to senior leaders. He has admitted to affiliations with terrorist groups including GIA and HIG. Detainee trained at militant camps, fought Soviets in Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban Foreign and Intelligence Ministries. He was captured in Pakistan and transferred to Guantanamo for suspected involvement in terrorist plots and attacks. Detainee has omitted details of his activities prior to capture, making his threat level and intelligence value difficult to assess fully.
Detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and weapons smuggler associated with senior Taliban officials. He was captured in 2003 with documents and materials indicating ties to the Taliban and extremist networks. Detainee worked closely with the Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister and other senior figures. He denies the full extent of his Taliban activities and affiliations. JTF-GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be detained due to his high-level Taliban connections and potential threat.
Detainee is assessed to be a high risk threat and of high intelligence value. He is a member of an Algerian armed group involved in an al-Qaeda linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Detainee fought in the Bosnian jihad in the 1990s and worked with several charities associated with terrorism. He also served as an instructor at al-Qaeda training camps. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan after 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia before departing. He denies all allegations.
Detainee served as the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence and had direct access to senior Taliban, al-Qaeda, and anti-coalition militia leadership. He coordinated intelligence activities between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and assisted their operatives in evading capture. Detainee is assessed to still pose a threat and have high intelligence value due to his role in the Taliban government and ties to other Islamic militant groups.
Detainee was a senior Taliban official who served as Minister of Interior, Governor of Herat province, and military commander. He was directly associated with al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Following 9/11, detainee represented the Taliban in meetings with Iran seeking support against U.S. forces. He also attended a meeting directed by Osama bin Laden. Detainee was involved in narcotics trafficking and likely used profits to support Taliban interests. The document provides detainee's background and capture information, evaluates his statements, and assesses him as a continued high threat who may have valuable intelligence.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention due to his involvement in a terrorist plot. He was arrested in 2001 as part of an Algerian cell in Bosnia suspected of planning to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee has an extensive history with extremist groups in Algeria, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. He worked with several Islamic non-governmental organizations of concern. While cooperative, he likely withholds full details about personal ties to extremists.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
(S//NF) Detainee was a senior Taliban official who held multiple high-level positions including Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army. He commanded thousands of Taliban troops and had close ties to al-Qaeda members. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes and would likely rejoin militant groups and target US forces if released. He poses a high security risk and has high intelligence value.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AG-000533DP. It summarizes the detainee's personal information, travel history, activities in Afghanistan including possible ties to al-Qaeda, and capture in Tora Bora after being injured attempting to flee US bombing. The assessment determines he poses a high risk and high intelligence value, and recommends his continued detention due to concerns he could reengage in extremism if released.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a threat. He is assessed as a member of an Algerian extremist group involved in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Bosnia. Detainee served as the Bosnia contact for a senior al-Qaeda facilitator and received advanced training in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He is linked to al-Qaeda's support network and coordinated travel for extremists to Afghanistan. Detainee denies his extremist activities and identities despite corroborating intelligence reporting.
Detainee is an admitted Taliban recruiter and commander of Military Base 4 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He has an extensive operational association with Usama Bin Laden and al-Qaida dating back to 1990. Detainee provided assistance to Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri during their escape from U.S. and Coalition forces in December 2001. He also provided security for al-Qaida personnel in Tora Bora in 1999-2000 and protection to Bin Laden in 1996. Detainee worked closely with al-Qaida and possibly participated in narcotics smuggling. JTF-GTMO assesses the detainee to be a high risk and of high intelligence value.
1) The document provides a recommendation to continue detaining a Guantanamo detainee named Sabir Lahmar Manfud due to his involvement with the Armed Islamic Group and ties to terrorist plots and activities in Bosnia.
2) It notes he advocated hostility against US forces, intended to travel to Afghanistan and Iran, and would likely engage in anti-US activities if released.
3) New information since the last review includes reports of his presence at an al-Qaeda guest house in Afghanistan and attempts to meet with al-Qaeda leaders in Iran.
Detainee is an Algerian national assessed to be a member of an al-Qaeda linked GIA cell in Bosnia. He is suspected of participating in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan for jihad following 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia beforehand. While in Bosnia, he threatened to attack international forces and was associated with al-Qaeda linked extremists. Detainee is also reported to have fought in Bosnia and Afghanistan as the chief martial arts instructor for an Islamic militant group. He was employed by several NGOs with ties to terrorism over seven years.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000955DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have connections to anti-coalition activities in Afghanistan and may have been involved in rocket attacks against US forces. He was found deceptive during a polygraph about his participation. The detainee has also been tentatively identified as the chief of investigations for the Taliban in Zormat province. It is recommended he be transferred for continued detention due to posing a medium risk of engaging in future anti-coalition activities if released.
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida associated passport forger and key travel facilitator supporting senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), and the Global Jihad Support Network. Detainee has additional ties to the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Detainee is also a suspected bomb maker and former commander of a special al-Qaida training camp, and he was identified as a front line
The document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000987DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee was the former Security Commander for Shinwar District in Afghanistan and was arrested in 2003 following the discovery of an improvised explosive device production facility near his compound. He was found with letters linking him to senior Taliban officials. While cooperative, his veracity is questionable and he is assessed to pose a medium risk. The document recommends his transfer for further interrogation on topics including local politics, the narcotics trade, and his associates.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed as a senior-level Taliban member who organized networks and disrupted coalition operations. He facilitated operations that likely resulted in US casualties. The detainee poses a high risk and can provide intelligence on extremist activities, drug trafficking, and Taliban networks. The Joint Task Force recommends continued detention.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000900DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who willingly participated in training and then traveled with a group to Kabul to carry out attacks against US forces. He was captured in the grenade attack on US Special Forces on December 17, 2002 in Kabul. While the detainee is assessed as a high risk and threat to the US, its interests, and allies, he has been compliant in detention and is assessed to be of low intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends releasing or transferring a Guantanamo detainee. The detainee was likely falsely accused of participating in an ambush by Afghan forces seeking to cover up their own involvement. Records indicate the detainee poses a low risk and likely has no valuable intelligence. While the Criminal Investigation Task Force assesses the detainee as medium risk, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo recommends release or transfer based on the fraudulent circumstances of his capture.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for transferring detainee ISN US9AF-001035DP to another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable former Taliban commander from Afghanistan who is currently in good health. He is assessed as a MEDIUM risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The detainee was captured with documents indicating ties to the Taliban and admitted being a member of an anti-coalition group. He provided information on weapon caches and personalities within the Taliban and Konar province government that expanded US intelligence. Based on this information, JTF-GTMO now recommends the detainee for transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000948DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable arms smuggler with ties to the Taliban. He has changed his story during interrogations and provided information about Taliban members, activities, and weapons caches. The memorandum recommends he be transferred with conditions due to still being assessed as a medium risk and having intelligence value regarding weapons smuggling and the Taliban.
Detainee Hiztullah Nasrat Yar is assessed as a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander with links to al-Qaeda, and participated in meetings to plan attacks on US/Coalition forces. If released, he would be capable of planning, supporting, or facilitating hostile acts. He maintained large weapons caches and supported HIG operations. His brother remains a HIG commander conducting anti-coalition activities. Detainee possesses knowledge of HIG operations and connections that could provide intelligence if exploited.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000845DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes the detainee's background, including his work as a security guard for the Karzai government in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. It assesses the detainee as a medium risk and possibly associated with anti-coalition militia activity. The document recommends his transfer based on information obtained since his previous assessment that designates him as a threat to the US and its allies.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000562DP, to another country for continued detention. Key details include:
- The detainee is a 25-year-old Afghan national who was captured in 2002 and may have worked briefly as a clerk for an individual linked to the Taliban.
- He has been diagnosed with a dissociative disorder and poses a medium risk, though he claims to have no terrorist affiliations or training.
- The assessment recommends transferring the detainee to his country of citizenship for further psychiatric care due to his deteriorating mental state.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AF-000831DP to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who provided support to extremist groups including Al-Qaida. He has ties to other detainees involved in moving Al-Qaida members and conducting attacks. While the detainee claims not to be involved, evidence links him to supporting a bomb-making cell and safe houses used by terrorists. He is assessed to have intelligence value and still poses a medium risk.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was identified as an operative for the Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group who specialized in mine laying and explosives. Detainee was believed to have been involved in an assassination plot against Afghan military forces and may have knowledge of future attacks planned by HIG commanders still operating against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. While detainee denied involvement in militant activities, multiple credible sources identified him as an expert mine layer who worked for HIG commander Mullah Nasim. It was recommended that detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to his ties to terrorist groups and suspected threat to the
This document discusses cover stories used by Al-Qaeda operatives detained at Guantanamo Bay to justify their travel to Afghanistan. Many claim they went to teach the Koran or provide humanitarian aid, but these have been disproven through interrogations and evidence showing the detainees' actual involvement with Al-Qaeda. Common cover stories included teaching religion, working for an NGO called Al Wafa that had Al-Qaeda ties, and claiming to help poor Afghans, but these have been exposed as false through corroborated confessions and identification of detainees as bodyguards of Osama bin Laden.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention due to his involvement in a terrorist plot. He was arrested in 2001 as part of an Algerian cell in Bosnia suspected of planning to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee has an extensive history with extremist groups in Algeria, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. He worked with several Islamic non-governmental organizations of concern. While cooperative, he likely withholds full details about personal ties to extremists.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
(S//NF) Detainee was a senior Taliban official who held multiple high-level positions including Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army. He commanded thousands of Taliban troops and had close ties to al-Qaeda members. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes and would likely rejoin militant groups and target US forces if released. He poses a high security risk and has high intelligence value.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AG-000533DP. It summarizes the detainee's personal information, travel history, activities in Afghanistan including possible ties to al-Qaeda, and capture in Tora Bora after being injured attempting to flee US bombing. The assessment determines he poses a high risk and high intelligence value, and recommends his continued detention due to concerns he could reengage in extremism if released.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a threat. He is assessed as a member of an Algerian extremist group involved in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Bosnia. Detainee served as the Bosnia contact for a senior al-Qaeda facilitator and received advanced training in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He is linked to al-Qaeda's support network and coordinated travel for extremists to Afghanistan. Detainee denies his extremist activities and identities despite corroborating intelligence reporting.
Detainee is an admitted Taliban recruiter and commander of Military Base 4 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He has an extensive operational association with Usama Bin Laden and al-Qaida dating back to 1990. Detainee provided assistance to Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri during their escape from U.S. and Coalition forces in December 2001. He also provided security for al-Qaida personnel in Tora Bora in 1999-2000 and protection to Bin Laden in 1996. Detainee worked closely with al-Qaida and possibly participated in narcotics smuggling. JTF-GTMO assesses the detainee to be a high risk and of high intelligence value.
1) The document provides a recommendation to continue detaining a Guantanamo detainee named Sabir Lahmar Manfud due to his involvement with the Armed Islamic Group and ties to terrorist plots and activities in Bosnia.
2) It notes he advocated hostility against US forces, intended to travel to Afghanistan and Iran, and would likely engage in anti-US activities if released.
3) New information since the last review includes reports of his presence at an al-Qaeda guest house in Afghanistan and attempts to meet with al-Qaeda leaders in Iran.
Detainee is an Algerian national assessed to be a member of an al-Qaeda linked GIA cell in Bosnia. He is suspected of participating in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan for jihad following 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia beforehand. While in Bosnia, he threatened to attack international forces and was associated with al-Qaeda linked extremists. Detainee is also reported to have fought in Bosnia and Afghanistan as the chief martial arts instructor for an Islamic militant group. He was employed by several NGOs with ties to terrorism over seven years.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000955DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to have connections to anti-coalition activities in Afghanistan and may have been involved in rocket attacks against US forces. He was found deceptive during a polygraph about his participation. The detainee has also been tentatively identified as the chief of investigations for the Taliban in Zormat province. It is recommended he be transferred for continued detention due to posing a medium risk of engaging in future anti-coalition activities if released.
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida associated passport forger and key travel facilitator supporting senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), and the Global Jihad Support Network. Detainee has additional ties to the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Detainee is also a suspected bomb maker and former commander of a special al-Qaida training camp, and he was identified as a front line
The document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000987DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee was the former Security Commander for Shinwar District in Afghanistan and was arrested in 2003 following the discovery of an improvised explosive device production facility near his compound. He was found with letters linking him to senior Taliban officials. While cooperative, his veracity is questionable and he is assessed to pose a medium risk. The document recommends his transfer for further interrogation on topics including local politics, the narcotics trade, and his associates.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed as a senior-level Taliban member who organized networks and disrupted coalition operations. He facilitated operations that likely resulted in US casualties. The detainee poses a high risk and can provide intelligence on extremist activities, drug trafficking, and Taliban networks. The Joint Task Force recommends continued detention.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000900DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who willingly participated in training and then traveled with a group to Kabul to carry out attacks against US forces. He was captured in the grenade attack on US Special Forces on December 17, 2002 in Kabul. While the detainee is assessed as a high risk and threat to the US, its interests, and allies, he has been compliant in detention and is assessed to be of low intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends releasing or transferring a Guantanamo detainee. The detainee was likely falsely accused of participating in an ambush by Afghan forces seeking to cover up their own involvement. Records indicate the detainee poses a low risk and likely has no valuable intelligence. While the Criminal Investigation Task Force assesses the detainee as medium risk, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo recommends release or transfer based on the fraudulent circumstances of his capture.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for transferring detainee ISN US9AF-001035DP to another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable former Taliban commander from Afghanistan who is currently in good health. He is assessed as a MEDIUM risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The detainee was captured with documents indicating ties to the Taliban and admitted being a member of an anti-coalition group. He provided information on weapon caches and personalities within the Taliban and Konar province government that expanded US intelligence. Based on this information, JTF-GTMO now recommends the detainee for transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
This memorandum provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000948DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable arms smuggler with ties to the Taliban. He has changed his story during interrogations and provided information about Taliban members, activities, and weapons caches. The memorandum recommends he be transferred with conditions due to still being assessed as a medium risk and having intelligence value regarding weapons smuggling and the Taliban.
Detainee Hiztullah Nasrat Yar is assessed as a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander with links to al-Qaeda, and participated in meetings to plan attacks on US/Coalition forces. If released, he would be capable of planning, supporting, or facilitating hostile acts. He maintained large weapons caches and supported HIG operations. His brother remains a HIG commander conducting anti-coalition activities. Detainee possesses knowledge of HIG operations and connections that could provide intelligence if exploited.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000845DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes the detainee's background, including his work as a security guard for the Karzai government in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. It assesses the detainee as a medium risk and possibly associated with anti-coalition militia activity. The document recommends his transfer based on information obtained since his previous assessment that designates him as a threat to the US and its allies.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000562DP, to another country for continued detention. Key details include:
- The detainee is a 25-year-old Afghan national who was captured in 2002 and may have worked briefly as a clerk for an individual linked to the Taliban.
- He has been diagnosed with a dissociative disorder and poses a medium risk, though he claims to have no terrorist affiliations or training.
- The assessment recommends transferring the detainee to his country of citizenship for further psychiatric care due to his deteriorating mental state.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AF-000831DP to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who provided support to extremist groups including Al-Qaida. He has ties to other detainees involved in moving Al-Qaida members and conducting attacks. While the detainee claims not to be involved, evidence links him to supporting a bomb-making cell and safe houses used by terrorists. He is assessed to have intelligence value and still poses a medium risk.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was identified as an operative for the Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group who specialized in mine laying and explosives. Detainee was believed to have been involved in an assassination plot against Afghan military forces and may have knowledge of future attacks planned by HIG commanders still operating against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. While detainee denied involvement in militant activities, multiple credible sources identified him as an expert mine layer who worked for HIG commander Mullah Nasim. It was recommended that detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to his ties to terrorist groups and suspected threat to the
This document discusses cover stories used by Al-Qaeda operatives detained at Guantanamo Bay to justify their travel to Afghanistan. Many claim they went to teach the Koran or provide humanitarian aid, but these have been disproven through interrogations and evidence showing the detainees' actual involvement with Al-Qaeda. Common cover stories included teaching religion, working for an NGO called Al Wafa that had Al-Qaeda ties, and claiming to help poor Afghans, but these have been exposed as false through corroborated confessions and identification of detainees as bodyguards of Osama bin Laden.
This document provides an intelligence assessment and transfer recommendation for a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It summarizes that the detainee was a high-ranking member of the Taliban who held multiple positions, including as the head of the Sherbergan Oil Exploration Plant. While he has been deceptive during interrogations, he may possess key information on Taliban intelligence structures and operations. As such, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention due to posing a medium risk.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000941DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. Key details include:
- The detainee is assessed to be associated with al-Qaeda and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin due to his close ties with known al-Qaeda facilitators Abu Nasim al-Tunisi and Abu Sulayman al-Jazairi.
- He was captured in Pakistan during a raid on three suspected al-Qaeda safehouses linked to al-Jazairi and al-Tunisi.
- It is assessed that the detainee poses a medium risk and may
- Detainee was a senior al-Qaeda facilitator who swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and personally recruited his bodyguards. He has ties to many high-level al-Qaeda members and operatives involved in the 9/11 attacks.
- After the fall of the Taliban, detainee provided assistance to hundreds of foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan. He was responsible for moving money and fighters into Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban.
- Detainee traveled to Bosnia in the 1990s for jihad and spent a year fighting before returning to Yemen. He is associated with the planner of the 9/11 attacks and 11 of the hijackers.
Detaineeis assessedas a memberof the Taliban and Al-Qaida terrorist network. He served in a 40-man Taliban unit that provided security for Usama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida leaders. The unit also conducted assassinations, kidnappings and bombings against US forces. Detainee admits connections to senior Taliban commanders and fighting against US troops. He poses a high security risk and likely would rejoin insurgent operations if released.
This document provides a recommendation to release or transfer a Guantanamo detainee. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed to pose a low risk and is unlikely to threaten the US or its allies. While initially suspected of money laundering, further review found no evidence to support this claim. The detainee's statements that he and his family are honest businessmen with no Taliban or Al Qaeda connections are considered truthful. It is recommended the detainee be released or transferred to another country.
Surajadin Abib (ISN: US9AF-000458DP) is recommended for transfer to another country with conditions based on his close ties to Jalaluddin Haqqani, the former Taliban Minister of Borders. Haqqani oversees anti-coalition militia operations in the Khowst area. It is believed Haqqani was attending a meeting at the detainee's compound when it was bombed in November 2001. The detainee denies knowledge of Haqqani or Taliban in the area despite evidence to the contrary. He poses a medium risk and may have information on Haqqani and ongoing militant activities.
Detainee was assessed to be a medium risk and of medium intelligence value. He was captured with Taliban leaders and admitted to being a bodyguard for a high-ranking Taliban commander. Detainee received training at a Taliban camp and fought against U.S. forces on the Taliban front lines. While detainee claims to have been a low-level fighter, evidence suggests he was more significant due to being captured alongside senior Taliban leaders.
1. JTF GTMO recommends detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention.
2. Detainee is assessed as a low-level member of Al-Qaida's terrorist network and a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia who planned insurgent operations against U.S. forces in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
3. Detainee was captured with improvised explosive devices intended to be attached to bicycles and motorcycles near U.S. targets for remote detonation. He poses a medium risk and may threaten U.S. interests and allies.
The document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo detainee under Department of Defense control. It summarizes the detainee's background, including admitting to being a member of a 40-person Taliban unit that conducted attacks on U.S. and coalition forces. It also notes the detainee participated in a rocket attack on Kandahar Airfield and conducted surveillance of U.S. forces. The joint task force assesses the detainee poses a high risk and is likely to threaten the U.S. and its allies if released. They recommend retaining the detainee under DoD control.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000899DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on his admitted membership in Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, ties to anti-coalition militias, possible ties to al-Qaeda and Iranian extremists, and participation in attacks against US and coalition forces. Materials found in his possession at capture included an al-Qaeda training manual. The detainee is uncooperative and continues to support anti-US elements, so continued detention is advised for risk of reengagement if released.
The document is a memorandum recommending the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000934DP. It finds that he poses a high security risk, as he was likely a member of a Taliban militia unit and involved in rocket attacks against U.S. forces. If released, it assesses he would reconnect with extremists and resume hostile activities. The detainee has been inconsistent about his involvement and maintains contact with Taliban members, posing a threat to the U.S. and allies.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as a high-risk member of al-Qaeda. He is assessed to have been an explosives expert for an IED cell in Khowst subordinate to senior al-Qaeda operative Abu Layth al-Libi. As part of the cell, the detainee directly assisted in planning and implementing attacks against US and Coalition forces. Evidence includes 23 mines found buried at his compound and notebooks with IED assembly instructions. He is reported to have surveyed targets and planted mines to ambush forces, and suggested using a Stinger missile.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AG-000175DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on evidence that he was an al-Qaida member who received training at al-Faruq camp and possibly explosives training. He is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US forces as a leader coordinating supplies for al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora, and was possibly selected for training as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. The document recommends his continued detention due to these assessments and his lack of cooperation.
Detainee is assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militias (ACM) member suspected of participating in the 27 March 2003 murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) worker in Afghanistan. He was captured with a satellite phone he was using to contact Mullah Haji Satar, an ACM commander suspected of the ICRC murder. Detainee has provided inconsistent accounts and an uncertain identity. He is assessed to present a high risk threat due to his ties to ACM commanders conducting attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces.
Detainee is an Afghan national captured in 2002 for suspected involvement with al-Qaida. He worked closely with al-Qaida commander IZ-10026 for approximately 5 years, serving as his assistant, facilitator, translator, and distributing funds on his behalf. Detainee admitted participating in hostilities against US forces and operating al-Qaida guesthouses. He is assessed to still pose a threat and would likely reengage in extremist activities if released. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention.
Detainee was captured in possession of improvised explosive devices and admitted to being part of a four-man cell that planned attacks against US and Coalition forces using IEDs. He was assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militia member with possible ties to al-Qaeda, and may have received explosives training in Pakistan. If released, it is assessed he could reengage in militant activities. While in detention, he has been largely compliant but also verbally harassed guards on occasions. He is considered a medium risk and of low intelligence value.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
Detainee was a senior Taliban commander who led troops against US and Coalition forces in northern Afghanistan in late 2001. He commanded forces near Mazar-e-Sharif and is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his senior Taliban role and associations with other extremist groups and leaders that pose a threat to US interests.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention due to his involvement with an al-Qaeda linked Algerian Armed Islamic Group cell that was plotting to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. He has an extensive history as an extremist involved in jihad and terrorist activities in Bosnia, Algeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Detainee worked for over two years at an Islamic school in Pakistan with ties to extremism and admits to extensive travel throughout the Middle East. He was arrested in October 2001 along with other members of the cell for the embassy plot and poses a continued threat if released.
Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan under the influence of his older brothers, one of whom was a senior al-Qaida member. Detainee received training at al-Qaida camps and guesthouses and worked closely with senior al-Qaida operatives, including having advance knowledge of attack plots. He was captured in 2002 during a raid on an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi with other detainees. The document provides details of detainee's travels, training, associates, and activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Detainee was assessed as a low-level Taliban recruit from Afghanistan who was willing to martyr himself. He was recruited in 2002 to fight against US and Northern Alliance forces. While traveling through areas of Afghanistan like Zormat and Shahi-Kot, he likely has information on extremist madrassas and anti-US militants in the region. JTF-GTMO recommends he be transferred to another country for continued detention due to his commitment to jihad and likelihood of returning to terrorism if released.
Abdul Hanan is a 44-year-old Afghan national detained at Guantanamo Bay who traveled to Afghanistan to search for his forcibly conscripted brother. After spending two weeks unsuccessfully asking about his brother in Konduz, he was detained by Northern Alliance forces and transferred to U.S. custody. While initially detained for possible knowledge of al-Qaeda, interrogations found him unknowledgeable and not a future threat. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay now recommends his transfer or release from custody.
This document provides a summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is believed to have worked for a known member of the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group and traveled between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for over a decade. Concerns were raised about inconsistencies in his story and links to anti-coalition militant groups. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining him in the Department of Defense's control due to these associations and assessed intelligence value.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000118DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of the Taliban who received weapons training at Taliban facilities and may have been involved in military action against coalition forces, posing a medium risk. He is in good physical health but receives mental health treatment. The assessment recommends transfer and cites the detainee's admissions of traveling with Taliban groups and surrendering to Northern Alliance forces.
Mohammed Yusef is an Afghan national detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2002. He owned shops in a bazaar in Pakistan but was captured during a raid on suspicion of being an Al-Qaeda facilitator due to calls made from his store. Yusef claims no knowledge of suspicious activity. Assessments found Yusef has low intelligence value and poses a low threat. The memorandum recommends transferring Yusef to another government for continued detention.
Detaineeis assessedto be a veteranjihadist who fled with othermujahideento Tora Bora, AF, wherehe participatedin armedhostilities againstUS andcoalitionforces. Detaineewascapturedwith senioral-QaidamemberIbn Sheikhal-Libi's, ISN US9LY-000212DP(LY-212),group, who fled theToraBora Mountainsinto Pakistan.JTF-GTMO determinedthis detaineeto be a MEDIUM risk, a HIGH threatfrom a detentionperspective,andof MEDIUM intelligencevalue.
Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaida'sGlobal Jihad SupportNetwork who attendedtraining in Afghanistan andresidedin guesthousesoperatedby al-Qaidamembers.He occupiedpositionsin the Tora Bora Mountainsandparticipatedin hostilities againstUS andcoalition forces. JTF-GTMO previouslyassessedhim asa ContinuedDetentionrisk but now recommendshis TransferOut of DoD Controlbasedon his MEDIUM intelligencevalueandthreatlevel.
Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-Qaida who received terrorist training in Afghanistan. He reportedly attended training at al-Qaida affiliated camps, associated with known al-Qaida operatives, and resided in al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee likely participated in action against U.S. and coalition forces. He is assessed as a medium risk and threat, and of medium intelligence value.
Detainee is a 52-year old Algerian national assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and the North African Extremist Network who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and received small arms training at an al-Qaida camp. He is assessed to be a high risk and threat to the US due to his extremist connections and admitted associations with known terrorists. The document recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention, preferably Algeria, if a satisfactory agreement can be reached. If not, he should remain in DoD custody due to contradictions in his story and suspected deception during interrogations.
Detainee Ahmed Bin Saleh Bel Bachao is assessed as a probable member of al-Qaida who received weapons training in Afghanistan. He traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 after being influenced by extremist lectures at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London. In Afghanistan, he stayed at an Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad known to facilitate foreign fighters, where he received small arms training. He fled to Tora Bora during US attacks and was later captured with a large group of fighters. It is assessed he poses a medium risk and may have participated in hostilities against US forces.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay to another facility. It summarizes the detainee's personal information and assesses him as a probable member of al-Qaeda's support network who likely received improvised explosive device training. The detainee is believed to have traveled from France to Afghanistan via the UK and Pakistan, staying at guesthouses associated with extremist groups. He is assessed to pose a medium risk and high intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AG-000284DP to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and al-Qaeda's global terrorist network. He has been identified as receiving terrorist training, but does not appear to be a senior leader. While sometimes cooperative, he has also been uncooperative and obstinate during interrogations. The Joint Task Force assesses he poses a medium risk but defers to the Criminal Investigative Task Force's assessment that he poses a high risk.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for detainee ISN US9AG-000070DP held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is a 24-year old Algerian man with a history of significant head trauma resulting in blindness in one eye and brain injuries causing difficulties with speech, understanding, and controlling behaviors. Due to his medical condition, he requires long-term custodial care. While previously assessed as medium intelligence value, he now poses a low risk. The Joint Task Force recommends releasing or transferring the detainee to another country for continued detention based on his health status and low risk level.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
Detainee Mohammed Mussa Yakubi is assessed as a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia in Afghanistan with connections to a global terrorist network. He is believed to have helped engineer IED and mortar attacks against US forces. Detainee was arrested after weapons were found in his compound, including an AK-47, mortar tubes, and ammunition. He is assessed as a HIGH risk and having MEDIUM intelligence value regarding the Gardez cell, planned attacks, and connections to other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. JTF GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be held in DoD custody.
Detainee Mohammed Shah is assessed as a probable member of al Qaeda who has ties to terrorist political parties in Iran. He is assessed to be a medium risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The document recommends transferring the detainee to another country with conditions, subject to an acceptable transfer agreement. It provides details of the detainee's background, including fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, working as a doctor in Iran, and traveling between Afghanistan and Iran with large sums of money to support terrorist activities. The detainee is considered of medium intelligence value and may be able to provide information on Taliban commanders, couriers, and training camps in Iran with links to terrorist groups.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a Guantanamo detainee, ISN: US9AF-001100DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was involved in anti-coalition militia operations and planned an attack on US forces in Afghanistan. He has direct ties to senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. The document assesses the detainee as a medium risk and recommends his transfer based on derogatory information obtained since his previous assessment.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-001075DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be of medium intelligence value and a medium threat risk. He was captured in Afghanistan in possession of weapons and has ties to anti-coalition militant groups in the Gardez region. While the detainee denies involvement, he has knowledge about a bombing in Gardez. The task force recommends his transfer to allow another country to take over his continued detention.
DetaineeMohammedAmin is recommendedfor transferto the control of anothercountry for continueddetention.He is assessedto be a memberof Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddinwho attendedplanningmeetingswhereattacksagainstUS-ledcoalitionforcesandtheAfghangovernmentwere discussed.Detaineehasassociationswith TalibanandAl-Qaedafiguresandmay haveknowledgeof futureplannedattacksdue to his involvementwith Anti-Coalitionforcesin Afghanistan.While in custody,hehasbeengenerallycompliantbut remainsan enemycombatant.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo Bay detainee, ISN US9AF-001045DP, in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee (1) is assessed to be a key member of anti-coalition militant groups who has participated in weapons trafficking, explosives training, and attacks against US and coalition forces; (2) has admitted ties to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations; and (3) poses a high risk and is likely to provide intelligence on terrorist networks, operations, and leaders if retained in DoD control.
This memorandum recommends retaining a detainee, ISN US9AF-001043DP, under Department of Defense control at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who possesses intelligence on terrorist operations and personnel. He was formerly the Taliban Minister of Commerce and deputy to a senior Taliban commander. New information indicates he was involved in the killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross employee in 2003. The detainee poses a high risk and should continue to be detained.
Detainee ISN US9AF-001037DP is assessed to be a high-ranking commander in the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group. He was captured along with another high-ranking HIG commander, ISN 1036, during a raid on a HIG safe house. Detainee and ISN 1036 have provided conflicting statements about their roles in HIG and how long they have known each other. Detainee is assessed to pose a high risk as he likely would threaten U.S. interests. JTF GTMO assesses the detainee to be of high intelligence value and recommends he continue to be detained in DoD custody.
Detainee Akhtiar Mohammad is assessed to be a high-level commander in the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group who has extensive knowledge of anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan. He is assessed to pose a high risk if released. Detainee was captured in 2003 at a suspected HIG compound during a raid. He has been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2004 and continues to be assessed as an enemy combatant with high intelligence value due to his connections and knowledge of HIG activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This document provides a recommendation to continue detaining detainee US9AF-001021DP based on a JTF GTMO assessment. The detainee is assessed to be a high-ranking member of the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) with ties to Al-Qaida and its global terrorism network. He was implicated in a plot to kill Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan by placing bombs at the Presidential Palace and US Embassy. Consistent reporting indicates the detainee remains committed to the HIG and its goals. It is assessed that he poses a high risk and is likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN:US9AF-001019DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is an Afghan national who fought with the mujahideen and Taliban. He is assessed to have been a corrupt government official in Zabol province who associated with known terrorists like Hamidullah. While somewhat cooperative, he has been evasive about his full role. He poses a medium security risk and may have intelligence value. The Joint Task Force recommends his transfer for continued detention based on these assessments.
A memorandum from the Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining a detainee under Department of Defense control. The detainee, captured in Mexico attempting to enter the US, has provided inconsistent stories about his travel and background. He is considered of high intelligence value due to his potential knowledge of smuggling routes and operations. While generally compliant in detention, he has failed polygraph tests regarding combat training and intentions in the US. The task force assesses he poses a medium security risk.
1. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20331013
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
JTF-GTMO-CDR 23 October 2008
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000560DP (S)
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment
1. (S//NF) Personal Information:
2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.
3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention
under DOD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for recommends
Continued Detention under DOD Control (CD) on 16 August 2007.
b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and
means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it is assessed
detainee would probably seek out prior associates and reengage in extremist support
activities at home and abroad. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has been compliant
with guard force personnel and debriefers. He has made statements indicating his intentions
not to rejoin the fight as a member of the Taliban and/or insurgent groups. He appears to
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Hajawali Mohmad
Current/True Name and Aliases: Haji Wali Mohammed,
Hadji Wali Mohammed Saraf, Yarkin Mohammed, Abd
Manan
Place of Birth: Wazirabad, Puli Khumri District, Baghlan
Province, Afghanistan (AF)
Date of Birth: 15 February 1966
Citizenship: Afghanistan
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-000560DP
2. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000560DP (S)
2
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
withhold information of intelligence value during debriefings. Detainee is reported to be a
primary financier for al-Qaida and the Taliban. Detainee facilitated money transfers for al-
Qaida weapons purchases and terrorist operations, including those supporting the 1998 East
Africa US Embassy bombings. Some of these purchases were done with support from the
Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISID). Detainee is associated with Jamaat
Tablighi (JT) and Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG).1
Detainee was involved in the narcotics
trade in Pakistan (PK) and Afghanistan. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:
A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
A LOW threat from a detention perspective
Of HIGH intelligence value
c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s
assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be
annotated by ¡ next to the footnote.).
Detainee’s correspondence with family members and former detainee’s
4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events:
The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account.
These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), detainee and his
family were displaced in Afghanistan, then to the Barki refugee camp in Sawaby, PK.
Detainee and his brothers operated a cloth business within the camp. While at the refugee
camp, detainee observed a man who displayed wares in a case, which had a separate
compartment that contained money to exchange Afghan currency for Pakistani rupees.
Detainee believed this would be a good way to earn a living, so during the next six or seven
years, detainee’s family ran a cloth and currency exchange business.2
1
Analyst Note: JT is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Counterterrorism (CT) Priority 3 terrorist
support entities (TSE). Priority 3 TSE have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to
terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2
terrorist groups. The HIG is a NIPF-CT Priority 2 target. Priority 2 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or
threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM
Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support,
countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have
demonstrated both intention and capability to attack U.S. persons or interests.
2
IIR 6 034 0583 03
3. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000560DP (S)
3
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee, his uncle, and his brothers traveled
between Pakistan and Afghanistan to earn a profit in the currency exchange business. In
1988-89, detainee contacted an individual named Aqbal who operated an established
currency exchange in Peshawar, PK.3
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee and Aqbal were business partners for two
years at a currency exchange store located in the Azad building, Shop Number Four in
Peshawar. Detainee then opened his own store in the Azad building, Shop Number Two.
Detainee and his brothers dissolved the business when the Taliban gained control of
Afghanistan. Detainee then opened an exchange business in Kabul with Muhammad Rafi.4
In 1996, detainee obtained a $1.5 million US business loan from an individual named Abdul
Rahman Zahid, then director of the Bank of Afghanistan. Detainee agreed to use the money
to purchase gold in Dubai and bring it back to Afghanistan to sell, taking 25 percent of the
profits for himself and turning over the remaining 75 percent to the Taliban. On his way to
Dubai to buy the gold, detainee changed the money into Pakistani rupees and then into UAE
dirhams (AED), losing a total of $500,000 US in exchange fees. Detainee then used the
remaining money to buy gold, which he transported back to Afghanistan. When detainee
returned to Afghanistan, Zahid was angry at detainee for losing so much of the money and
took all the gold. Detainee insisted this was the only deal he did with the Taliban, and that he
never had any dealings with al-Qaida.5
5. (U) Capture Information:
a. (S//NF) Pakistani intelligence officers captured detainee at his home in Peshawar on 26
January 2002. Pakistani forces transferred detainee to US forces control in February 2002
and they arrived at JTF-GTMO on or about 30 April 2002..6
b. (S) Property Held:
Republic of Afghanistan business passport issued in Kandahar, AF7
Airline ticket for 26 January 2002 flight from Peshawar to Dubai
Notebook with Arabic writing (translated)
Miscellaneous personal items, including Koran, jewelry, and medicinal items
c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 1 May 2002
3
IIR 6 034 0583 03, Analyst Note: A variant of Aqbal is Iqbal.
4
IIR 6 034 0583 03
5
000560 302 27-JUN-2002
6
TD-314/06141-02, 000560 SIR 12-AUG-2004, Multiple ISNs DMO MANIFEST TO GTMO 28-APR-2002
7
¡IIR 6 034 0265 08
4. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000560DP (S)
4
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the
following:
Funding of Taliban Government or possibly the al-Qaida terrorist organization by use
of currency exchange investments in precious metals and money transfers
Banking apparatus of the former Taliban government
Location of Taliban officials
6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Detainee shows signs of deception and the use
of counter-interrogation techniques. Detainee has maintained a consistent cover story: that he
worked with the Taliban only as a money exchanger. However, detainee has denied contact
with, or providing support for, al-Qaida. Detainee facilitated the transfers of large sums of
money, which he has yet to describe.
7. (U) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat
to the US, its interests, and allies.
b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: If released without rehabilitation, close
supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it
is assessed detainee would probably seek out prior associates and reengage in extremist
support activities at home and abroad. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has been
compliant with guard force personnel and debriefers. He has made statements indicating his
intentions not to rejoin the fight as a member of the Taliban and/or insurgent groups. He
appears to withhold information of intelligence value during debriefings. Detainee has been
identified as a top financial manager for both al-Qaida and the Taliban. Detainee acted as a
facilitator for al-Qaida in the procurement of weapons and financing for terrorist attacks.
Detainee has ties to the Taliban, HIG, and JT. Detainee was involved in trafficking
narcotics, which was possibly related to Taliban and al-Qaida financing.
(S//NF) Detainee provided financial services for the Taliban and served as al-Qaida’s
primary financial manager.
(S//NF) Detainee admitted that for 18 months, from early 1996 until June 1997,
Taliban Vice President Mullah Muhammad Rabbani (deceased) used detainee as a
conduit for exchanging money to raise money for the Taliban. However, detainee
claimed that after he lost $500,000 US of the Taliban’s money in June 1997 due to
currency devaluation, he fell out of favor with the Taliban. Detainee claims Pakistani
authorities arrested detainee’s cousin, Hajji Lall Muhammad, due to his connection
5. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000560DP (S)
5
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
with the detainee and the loss of $500,000 US.8
(Analyst Note: Other sources
contradict detainee’s assertion that he stopped cooperating with the Taliban in 1997.)
(S//NF) According to the Pakistani Intelligence Bureau (PIB), detainee was a
wealthy Afghan “Saraf” (money changer) who was affiliated with the HIG. They
reported that the detainee was very close to Taliban supreme leader Mullah
Mohammad Omar and to Mullah Mohammad Rabbani. The PIB reported that the
detainee traveled often between Kandahar, Dubai, United Arab emirates (UAE) and
Peshawar, PK. 9
(S//NF) According to a foreign government service, detainee was an associate of
Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) who did business with the Taliban. As of April 2000,
Mullah Mohammad Omar had reportedly given detainee $1 million US to manage.10
(S//NF) According to Jordanian intelligence, detainee was al-Qaida’s primary
financial manager, replacing Abu Hajer al-Iraqi, aka (Mamdouh Mahmud Salim),
who was arrested in Germany in September 1998.11
(S//NF) Qari Hasan Ulla Peerzai, ISN US9AF-000562DP (AF-562, transferred)
reported detainee was a financial manager for UBL. Detainee reportedly traveled to
Japan, Europe, and the UAE with UBL’s money.12
(S//NF) Detainee claimed he transported gold from Dubai to Afghanistan on
Ariana Airlines, and that he trusted the airline employees because the Taliban ran the
airline.13
Detainee stated he knew Hajji Farid, the manager of the Ariana Airlines
office in Dubai, and that Hajji Farid also personally moved money from Afghanistan
to the UAE for al-Qaida. Detainee stated Hajji Farid carried gold and currency to
Mullah Muhammad Omar.14
(S//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) Hajji Zabbi, an FBI contact, stated Arabs
often sent money to Afghanistan through the Taliban-controlled Ariana Airlines.
Hajji Zabbi reported the Taliban and al-Qaida operated together. Al-Qaida
received the majority of their funding through Pakistan via Ariana Airways.15
(S//NF) A trade passport issued to detainee on 15 February 1996 by the
Republic of Afghanistan showed a high level of travel to and from the UAE
between November 1997 and June 2001.16
8
IIR 2 340 6534 02
9
TD-314/24628-99
10
TD-314/13244-00
11
TD-314/20068-00, Analyst Note: Abu Hajer al-Iraqi was extradited to the US and subsequently convicted for his
role in the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings.
12
000562 SIR 12-JUN-2006 (Analyst Note: AF-562 was told this information by Muhammad Sharif, ISN US9AF-
000562DP (AF-532, transferred)
13
000560 302 27-JUN-2002
14
TD-314/06141-02
15
IIR 4 201 1988 05
16
¡IIR 6 034 0265 08
6. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000560DP (S)
6
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
(S//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) Hajji Zabbi stated detainee was the most
important member of detainee’s hawala group (banking system external of
established international systems), which also included Sher Khan Saraf and Hajji
Obaidullah.17
¡ (S//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) According to detainee, detainee’s sister is
married to HIG leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s nephew Obaidullah. Detainee
stated Obaidullah was a money exchanger in Dubai with Sher Khan. Detainee
stated he was a business partner with Obaidullah until 2000, when they broke
relations because the business was not profitable.18
(Analyst Note: These are
the same Hajji Obaidullah and Sher Khan Saraf noted by Hajji Zabbi as
detainee’s business partners. It is common for powerful families in
Afghanistan to solidify their ties by intermarrying, as in the case of
Obaidullah. Detainee also stated his brother, Hajji Wakil, is married to
Hekmatyar’s niece, and an Afghan source of unknown reliability reported that
six of detainee’s nephews are related to Hekmatyar.19
Pakistani ISID
confirmed detainee was previously tied to the HIG.20
)
(C) Detainee admitted being acquainted with Hajji Muhammad Kandahar,
aka (Muhammad Saraf), ISN US9AF-001098DP (AF-1098, released), who was
arrested by US Forces in Kandahar in June 2003 under suspicion of being a
Taliban financier and funding anti-US activities. Detainee considered
Muhammad Saraf to be one of the most prominent money changers in
Afghanistan. Detainee claimed to have met Muhammad Saraf four times; twice
during flights on Ariana Airlines, and twice in Kabul.21
¢ (S//NF) Detainee facilitated the movement of funds that supported al-Qaida terrorist
operations.
(S//NF) Jordanian intelligence reported detainee financed the 7 August 1998 East
Africa US Embassy bombings, which killed and wounded over 200 civilians.
Detainee also financed an al-Qaida cell in Jordan led by Khadr Abu Hawshar, which
planned to conduct terrorist operations in Jordan in conjunction with the Millennium
celebrations.22
(S//NF) In March 2000, at the direction of UBL and with ISID’s assistance,
detainee facilitated the financing for the purchase of shoulder-fired surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) through Muhammad Rahim, according to sensitive reporting. Al-
Qaida reportedly purchased the SAMs for fighters in Chechnya.23
17
IIR 4 201 1988 05, Analyst Note: The title “saraf” indicates a money exchange businessman.
18
IIR 4 201 3494 05
19
IIR 6 044 6018 03
20
TD-314/24628-99
21
£IIR 6 034 1257 04, Analyst Note: AF-1098 was held at the Bagram detention facility.
22
TD-314/20068-00
23
TD-314/10425-00
7. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000560DP (S)
7
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
(S//NF) Detainee and his business partner, Hajji Gulla Jan, facilitated the
transfers and exchanges of funds from UBL-controlled accounts for the SAM
purchases arranged by Rahim. Two ISID officers, Colonel Muhammad Shoaib
and Colonel Muhammad Wahid Jan, were in contact with Rahim and supported
his efforts to purchase SAM systems for al-Qaida. The ISID support included
providing a subsidy of $4,000 US for each SAM purchased from suppliers in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.24
(S//NF) The SAMs purchased in the deal included both Russian and Chinese
versions of the SA-7 and SA-16, which were priced from $1,600 to $7,000 US.25
Rahim had previously purchased over 180 weapons for al-Qaida with the
assistance of the ISID.26
(S//NF) Detainee admitted having license plates on his vehicle from 1999-
2000 that allowed him to cross the Afghanistan-Pakistan border without being
searched or impeded. Detainee stated the plates could be purchased from the
ISID for $350 US. Detainee referred to the money paid for the plates as
“corruption money.”27
(S//NF) During 2001, detainee was involved in several large money transfers
possibly related to terrorist activities. According to a cooperative source, the transfers
were suspicious because of their unusual size and connection to individuals possibly
involved in terrorist activity. In each case of the following; detainee was to pick up
the transferred money in Peshawar.28
(S//NF) On 26 April 2001, 188,557 AED was transmitted from Mahmud
Muhammad Ibrahim Juman through the al-Yousef exchange in Dubai.29
(S//NF) On 29 April 2001, 174,353 AED was transmitted from Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia-based Salah Muhammad al-Faraib to Dubai-based Abbas Darwish
Abdallah Abd al-Razzaq.30
(S//NF) On 1 May 2001, 253,887 AED was transmitted from an unidentified
party at the al-Yousef exchange in Dubai.31
¡ (S//NF) Detainee was involved in narcotics smuggling.
(S//NF) Detainee was reportedly a well-known narcotics smuggler and business
partner of Muhammad Karimi. Detainee was identified as trafficking large shipments
of hashish and heroin to Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Europe, and the United States.32
24
TD-314/10425-00
25
TD-314/10425-00
26
TD-314/10425-00, Analyst Note: The SA-7 is a man-portable, heat seeking missile system with an approximate
range of 5 km and a maximum altitude of 4 km. The SA-16 is a lighter and updated version of the SA-7.
27
IIR 6 034 0585 04
28
TD-314/35993-01
29
Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $51,300 US.
30
Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $47,500 US.
31
Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $69,100 US.
8. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000560DP (S)
8
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
(S//NF) Muhammad Karimi was one of the owners of the Rahim Karimi
Corporation, an import/export business in Peshawar. Karimi was an opium
producer and heroin smuggler in Afghanistan. An individual named Muhammad
Rahim was also a shareholder in the Rahim Karimi Corporation as of mid-1999.33
(Analyst Note: Although the name Mohammad Rahim is common, this
Mohammad Rahim may be the individual through whom detainee purchased
SAMs in March 200034
)
¡ (S//NF) Detainee admitted having ties to the JT. (Analyst Note: Al-Qaida is known
to have used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travels of its members.)35
(S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Detainee attended a three-day JT
conference in a mosque in Peshawar in the early 1990s. Detainee later attended a
meeting in Lahore, PK at the JT headquarters. During the summer of 2001,
Muhammad Sharif, detainee’s friend and a well-known preacher, introduced detainee
to an elderly Arab named Shaykh al-Rasheed. Rasheed donated 250,000 AED to
build a mosque in Kandahar.36
(Analyst Note: There is no further information
available regarding the disposition of these funds. However, during the summer of
2001, numerous foreign fighters were traveling to Afghanistan, using missionary
work under JT auspices as a cover story. Many stayed in al-Qaida guesthouses and
trained in al-Qaida facilities in the Kandahar area, usually for free. Money from JT
may have been used to cover their costs.)
c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a LOW threat from a detention
perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and
staff. Detainee currently has 20 reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the
most recent occurring on 27 July 2007, when he was reported refusing to come out of the
recreation yard. He has five reports of disciplinary infraction for assault with the most recent
occurring on 22 April 2006, when he was reported elbowing a guard in the chest. Other
incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass
disturbances, damage to government property, assaults, and possession of food and non-
weapon type contraband. In 2007, detainee had a total of three reports of disciplinary
infraction and none so far in 2008.
32
TD-314/16299-99
33
TD-314/16299-99, TD-314/24628-99
34
TD-314/10425-00
35
IR 2 227 0131 03; Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover 28-DEC-2005; JITFCT Special Analysis US Jamaat Tabligh;
AFOSI Report on Jamaat Tabligh 27-OCT-2004; Jamaat Al Tabligh (JT) Members - TRRS-04-03-1083 10-MAR-
2004
36
IIR 4 201 3536 05, IIR 6 034 1187 04, Analyst Note: In January 2001, 250,000 AED was approximately
equivalent to $68,000 US.
9. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000560DP (S)
9
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331023
8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainee’s
most recent interrogation session occurred on 22 February 2007.
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee is associated with the highest leaders in al-
Qaida and the Taliban. He was the primary financial advisor for al-Qaida and was involved
in financial transactions and purchases leading directly to acts of terrorism, including the
1998 East Africa US Embassy bombings. Detainee has ties to several members of terrorist
organizations, including familial ties to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the HIG.
c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee should be able to provide information on al-
Qaida and Taliban financial operations, including personal financial information about UBL
and Mullah Muhammad Omar. He can also provide information on weapons purchases on
behalf of al-Qaida and the Taliban. Detainee is likely to know how terrorist-related money
transfers are conducted. He may possess knowledge involving the financial operations of the
HIG and JT. Detainee possibly knows how and where money derived from the narcotics
trade has been dispersed.
d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:
Al-Qaida
UBL and other al-Qaida personnel, including financiers
Bank accounts and financing of al-Qaida terrorist operations and weapon
purchases
Taliban
Mullah Muhammad Omar
Bank accounts and finances of the Taliban and Taliban weapon purchases
HIG
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Relatives involved in terrorist activities
Finances and personnel involved in HIG cells in Afghanistan
Finances and terrorist affiliated with the JT
Narcotics financing and distribution
Terrorist connections in Dubai, including hawalas
Detainee’s intentions after release from US custody
Terrorist operations in CENTCOM AOR
Means of communications in Afghanistan and Pakistan between extremists, terrorists,
and their associated organizations
10. SE C R E T // NOFORNI I 20331023
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT:Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnderDoDControl(CD)for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISNUS9AF-000560DP(S)
g. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon 18June2004,andhe
remainsan enemycombatant.
Commanding
-
Definitionsfor intelligencetermsusedin the assessmentcanbe found in the JointMilitary IntelligenceCollege
October2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminolog't'
1 0
s E c R E T / /NOFORN | | 20331023