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The New Process Safety KPI

      Edward M. Marszal, PE, CFSE
President, Kenexis Consulting Corporation
Speaker Information

Edward M. Marszal, PE, CFSE
President, Kenexis
13 Years Experience
ISA Author “SIL Selection”
ISA Committees - S84, S91, S18
ISA Safety Division Director
ISA, AIChE, NFPA Member
BSChE, Ohio State University
Introduction

Process industry safety performance can be improved
   • Major Hazards Still a Problem
Upper management disconnected from operations
   • No “feel” for day-to-day operation
   • Important information not available (can be hidden)
Actionable metrics allow oversight
Typical safety metrics not effective
   • Slips, trips, and falls not well correlated to major losses
Better Metrics Essential
   • Predictive information can be developed from process history
   • Collection and presentation possible with existing tools
Management 101

Improved major loss prevention though improved
  management
Management process
   • Determine the objective
   • Identify parameters affecting the objective (KPI)
   • Measure performance against the parameters
   • Adjust processes, procedures, and equipment to optimize KPI
     values
Current Metrics

Process industry safety management is based on metrics
   •   First Aid Cases
   •   Reportable Injury Rate
   •   “Near-Miss” Report Rate (good, but lagging, infrequent, and
       reliant on human reports)
   •   Unsafe Activity Reports
   •   Unresolved PHA Action Items
Current metrics not well correlated with major losses
Metrics Desirable Attributes

New metrics are essential to improvement
New metrics fore-shadowed in recent standards
Must “predict” major loss issues
   • Could lead to major loss, but stops short
Must be clearly defined and consistently applied
Must be relatively frequent events
Automatic collection and reporting beneficial
Accident Causation Model
 Hypothesis: Most major accidents happen because
   multiple failures occur; starting with an initiating event



   Failure              Failure             Failure          Accident
  Initiating Event   Propagating Event   Propagating Event
The New KPI

Major loss prevention distilled to two numbers

Initiating Events (Demand Rate)
   • Actual/expected frequency of occurrence
Safeguard Unavailability
   • Probability safeguards will operate on demand


Metrics applied at all levels, and allow “drill-down”
   • Organization -> Site -> Unit -> Hazard
Demand Rate

Scaled Demand Rate – Actual/Expected Frequency
   • Target 1.0 – Higher is unsafe


Expected demand rate obtained from existing PHA
   • Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) requires this data
Can be automatically logged, tracked, and reported
   •   Demands typically historized
   •   Critical alarm activations
   •   Safety instrumented function activations
   •   Pressure relief alarms
Safeguard Effectiveness

Safeguard Scaled Unavailability –
   Actual Unavailability/Target Unavailability
   •   Greater than 1.0 is unsafe
Unavailability – fraction of time a safeguard can not perform
  is intended function
   •   Safeguard equipment is in failed state
   •   Safeguard is bypassed
Required safeguards listed in good PHA (e.g., LOPA)
Data collection and reporting (combined system)
   1. Functional test of equipment (database logged)
   2. Time in bypass – historized
Example

A CEO receives safety KPI as part of a monthly briefing

                               Actual        Target

    Scaled Demand Rate         1.413         1.0

    Scaled Unavailability      0.877         1.0
Example

The CEO drills down into the data to determine the source
  of the problem
    Facility                   Scaled Demand Rate

    Chemical City              3.45

    Port Process               0.877

    Polymer Valley             0.351

    New Chemical City          0.798


The CEO places a call to the chemical city plant manager
Example

The chemical city plant manager goes online and views his
  plants data
    Process Unit              Scaled Demand Rate

    Utilities                        0.694

    Monomer Preparation              0.887

    Gas Preparation                  10.40

    Polymerization                   0.899
Example

The chemical city plant manager then drills down into the
  data, in conference with the operations supervisor and
  unit engineer
    Hazard                     Scaled Demand Rate

    Separator High Alarm              0.100

    Separator Low Shutoff             0.887

    Separator Relief                  35.00

    Liquid Pump Shutoff               0.899
Example                                             BPCS
                                                   LIC-101
                   The chemical city team review
                     the separator low level
                     shutoff



         V-101


LT-101           LT-001

                                                        To Low
                                                        Pressure
                                                        Separator
                            LV-001             LV-101
Example
                                                                              Consequence (Risk Matrix )
     Tag
Item            IPF Description              Hazard Prevented                                        Severity
     No.                                                                       Consequence
                                                                                                     - Safety
1.    LSC- High Pressure              Low-Low level in the               High pressure in                  4
      001 Separator Low-              separator vessel may result        downstream vessels may
           Low Level Closes           in gas blowby of high              result in overpressure and
           Separator Liquid           pressure gas into                  rupture of the equipment.
           Outlet Valve               downstream equipment that          This could lead to release of
                                      is not rated to withstand          flammable material to the
                                      that higher pressures.             atmosphere with subsequent
                                                                         fire or explosion potentially
                                                                         resulting in injury or fatality
        D e s c ri p ti o n o f re q u i re d ac ti o n
                      Likelihood
                                     Independent Protection Layers        Required
                      Category                                                      Selected
 Initiating Event                                                          SIL (All
                                                     IPL         IPL                  SIL
                      L     RR        IPLs                                Causes)
                                                  Category      Credit
1. Failure of level   4     3      1. Operator Operator           1         SIL 2      SIL 2
controller LIC-101                 intervention Intervention
such that valve                    based on
LV-101 fails to                    low level
the open position.                 alarm.
Example

The team determine that the expected demand rate of once
  in ten years was being significantly exceeded because
  level control was very frequently failing.
The level control scheme and equipment was replaced to
  reduce the initiating event
Conclusions

Current typical process safety metrics are not adequate
New KPI should predict major losses
Typical accidents can be predicted by process demands
  and safeguard effectiveness
The required KPI can mostly be collected and reported
  automatically
The major limitation to this approach is the inability to
  measure accidents that are the direct result of the
  initiating event

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Ti ps conference ed marszal new process kpi

  • 1. The New Process Safety KPI Edward M. Marszal, PE, CFSE President, Kenexis Consulting Corporation
  • 2. Speaker Information Edward M. Marszal, PE, CFSE President, Kenexis 13 Years Experience ISA Author “SIL Selection” ISA Committees - S84, S91, S18 ISA Safety Division Director ISA, AIChE, NFPA Member BSChE, Ohio State University
  • 3. Introduction Process industry safety performance can be improved • Major Hazards Still a Problem Upper management disconnected from operations • No “feel” for day-to-day operation • Important information not available (can be hidden) Actionable metrics allow oversight Typical safety metrics not effective • Slips, trips, and falls not well correlated to major losses Better Metrics Essential • Predictive information can be developed from process history • Collection and presentation possible with existing tools
  • 4. Management 101 Improved major loss prevention though improved management Management process • Determine the objective • Identify parameters affecting the objective (KPI) • Measure performance against the parameters • Adjust processes, procedures, and equipment to optimize KPI values
  • 5. Current Metrics Process industry safety management is based on metrics • First Aid Cases • Reportable Injury Rate • “Near-Miss” Report Rate (good, but lagging, infrequent, and reliant on human reports) • Unsafe Activity Reports • Unresolved PHA Action Items Current metrics not well correlated with major losses
  • 6. Metrics Desirable Attributes New metrics are essential to improvement New metrics fore-shadowed in recent standards Must “predict” major loss issues • Could lead to major loss, but stops short Must be clearly defined and consistently applied Must be relatively frequent events Automatic collection and reporting beneficial
  • 7. Accident Causation Model Hypothesis: Most major accidents happen because multiple failures occur; starting with an initiating event Failure Failure Failure Accident Initiating Event Propagating Event Propagating Event
  • 8. The New KPI Major loss prevention distilled to two numbers Initiating Events (Demand Rate) • Actual/expected frequency of occurrence Safeguard Unavailability • Probability safeguards will operate on demand Metrics applied at all levels, and allow “drill-down” • Organization -> Site -> Unit -> Hazard
  • 9. Demand Rate Scaled Demand Rate – Actual/Expected Frequency • Target 1.0 – Higher is unsafe Expected demand rate obtained from existing PHA • Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) requires this data Can be automatically logged, tracked, and reported • Demands typically historized • Critical alarm activations • Safety instrumented function activations • Pressure relief alarms
  • 10. Safeguard Effectiveness Safeguard Scaled Unavailability – Actual Unavailability/Target Unavailability • Greater than 1.0 is unsafe Unavailability – fraction of time a safeguard can not perform is intended function • Safeguard equipment is in failed state • Safeguard is bypassed Required safeguards listed in good PHA (e.g., LOPA) Data collection and reporting (combined system) 1. Functional test of equipment (database logged) 2. Time in bypass – historized
  • 11. Example A CEO receives safety KPI as part of a monthly briefing Actual Target Scaled Demand Rate 1.413 1.0 Scaled Unavailability 0.877 1.0
  • 12. Example The CEO drills down into the data to determine the source of the problem Facility Scaled Demand Rate Chemical City 3.45 Port Process 0.877 Polymer Valley 0.351 New Chemical City 0.798 The CEO places a call to the chemical city plant manager
  • 13. Example The chemical city plant manager goes online and views his plants data Process Unit Scaled Demand Rate Utilities 0.694 Monomer Preparation 0.887 Gas Preparation 10.40 Polymerization 0.899
  • 14. Example The chemical city plant manager then drills down into the data, in conference with the operations supervisor and unit engineer Hazard Scaled Demand Rate Separator High Alarm 0.100 Separator Low Shutoff 0.887 Separator Relief 35.00 Liquid Pump Shutoff 0.899
  • 15. Example BPCS LIC-101 The chemical city team review the separator low level shutoff V-101 LT-101 LT-001 To Low Pressure Separator LV-001 LV-101
  • 16. Example Consequence (Risk Matrix ) Tag Item IPF Description Hazard Prevented Severity No. Consequence - Safety 1. LSC- High Pressure Low-Low level in the High pressure in 4 001 Separator Low- separator vessel may result downstream vessels may Low Level Closes in gas blowby of high result in overpressure and Separator Liquid pressure gas into rupture of the equipment. Outlet Valve downstream equipment that This could lead to release of is not rated to withstand flammable material to the that higher pressures. atmosphere with subsequent fire or explosion potentially resulting in injury or fatality D e s c ri p ti o n o f re q u i re d ac ti o n Likelihood Independent Protection Layers Required Category Selected Initiating Event SIL (All IPL IPL SIL L RR IPLs Causes) Category Credit 1. Failure of level 4 3 1. Operator Operator 1 SIL 2 SIL 2 controller LIC-101 intervention Intervention such that valve based on LV-101 fails to low level the open position. alarm.
  • 17. Example The team determine that the expected demand rate of once in ten years was being significantly exceeded because level control was very frequently failing. The level control scheme and equipment was replaced to reduce the initiating event
  • 18. Conclusions Current typical process safety metrics are not adequate New KPI should predict major losses Typical accidents can be predicted by process demands and safeguard effectiveness The required KPI can mostly be collected and reported automatically The major limitation to this approach is the inability to measure accidents that are the direct result of the initiating event