The document discusses three standards related to safety integrity levels (SIL): IEC 61508, IEC 61511, and ANSI/ISA S84.01. It provides an overview of each standard, including their parts and scope. The key points are that IEC 61508 and 61511 define SIL on a scale from 1 to 4 based on reliability requirements for safety instrumented systems (SIS), while ANSI/ISA S84.01 was developed in parallel and also adopted by ANSI. The document then discusses various methods for assigning SILs to safety instrumented functions, including consequence-based, risk matrix, layered risk matrix, and layer of protection analysis (LOPA).
Safety is an important consideration in process design. Safety integrity level (or SIL) is often used to describe process safety requirements. However, there are often misconceptions or misunder- standings surrounding SIL. While the general subject, functional safety and SIL, can be highly technical, the general ideas can be distilled down to a few readily understandable concepts. In this paper, we will discuss what SIL is, why it is important, what certification means, and the implications and benefits of that certification to the end user.
The document discusses hazard and risk assessment techniques used in process industries, including HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) studies, LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis), and determining Safety Integrity Levels (SIL). It provides descriptions of these techniques, including how HAZOP studies are conducted to identify hazards and safeguards, how LOPA uses likelihood and consequence categories to evaluate risk, and how SIL levels from 1 to 4 are assigned based on required safety system reliability. The document also covers international standards like IEC 61511 that provide requirements for safety instrumented systems.
The document discusses a new fieldbus barrier product from MTA called the 9370-FB Series Fieldbus Barrier. It establishes some key benefits over existing fieldbus barrier implementations, including lower cost, safer operation, and higher reliability over the lifecycle of a fieldbus network. Some key features of the 9370-FB Series mentioned are that it allows for live pluggable modules, pluggable trunk and spur surge protectors, and screw-secured pluggable spur terminals. Overall, the new barrier aims to provide value to plant operators and those involved in the design and installation of fieldbus networks in hazardous areas.
This document discusses Safety Integrity Level (SIL) and how it is used to quantify safety in industrial processes. It provides background on the development of international safety standards and defines key terms like SIL, Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF), Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD), and Safe Failure Fraction (SFF). The document explains how hazards analysis is used to determine target SIL levels for safety systems and instrumentation. It also outlines methods for evaluating SIL, including Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEDA) and proven in use testing. Overall, the document provides a comprehensive overview of applying SIL standards to ensure safety in industrial control systems.
The document discusses functional safety and fire and gas (F&G) systems. It defines functional safety and outlines standards like IEC 61508. F&G systems aim to detect and respond to hazards to reduce risk. Key components discussed include detectors, logic solvers, and final elements. Specific final elements presented are Niagara monitors for delivering water, electric actuators for redundancy, and VDD deluge valves with a fully redundant design. These components are described and their advantages for achieving safety integrity levels are outlined.
Complying with New Functional Safety StandardsDesign World
The document is a presentation on complying with new functional safety standards. It discusses what functional safety is, what is happening in the functional safety market, what standards should be used for machines, and how to determine safety levels and perform calculations according to standards like ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061. It provides an example of applying the standards to a dual channel emergency stop application and calculating the resulting safety integrity level.
SIL = Safety Integrity Level
•Safety systems are becoming increasingly instrumented
•Depending less on human intervention and operator’s ability to respond correctly in a given situation
•Depending more on instrumentation and programmable systems
•SIL requirements are intended to ensure the reliability of such safety instrumented systems
SIS “Final Element” Diagnostics Including The SOV, Using A Digital Valve Cont...Emerson Exchange
This document discusses using a digital valve controller to improve diagnostics and testing of safety instrumented system (SIS) final control elements. Traditional testing methods are difficult and costly. A digital valve controller allows for partial stroke testing online which improves reliability while reducing costs. It also enables solenoid valve health monitoring and diagnostic capabilities. Field experience from Ras Gas in Qatar demonstrated benefits like reduced labor and improved predictive maintenance through signature-based testing and continuous monitoring.
Safety is an important consideration in process design. Safety integrity level (or SIL) is often used to describe process safety requirements. However, there are often misconceptions or misunder- standings surrounding SIL. While the general subject, functional safety and SIL, can be highly technical, the general ideas can be distilled down to a few readily understandable concepts. In this paper, we will discuss what SIL is, why it is important, what certification means, and the implications and benefits of that certification to the end user.
The document discusses hazard and risk assessment techniques used in process industries, including HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) studies, LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis), and determining Safety Integrity Levels (SIL). It provides descriptions of these techniques, including how HAZOP studies are conducted to identify hazards and safeguards, how LOPA uses likelihood and consequence categories to evaluate risk, and how SIL levels from 1 to 4 are assigned based on required safety system reliability. The document also covers international standards like IEC 61511 that provide requirements for safety instrumented systems.
The document discusses a new fieldbus barrier product from MTA called the 9370-FB Series Fieldbus Barrier. It establishes some key benefits over existing fieldbus barrier implementations, including lower cost, safer operation, and higher reliability over the lifecycle of a fieldbus network. Some key features of the 9370-FB Series mentioned are that it allows for live pluggable modules, pluggable trunk and spur surge protectors, and screw-secured pluggable spur terminals. Overall, the new barrier aims to provide value to plant operators and those involved in the design and installation of fieldbus networks in hazardous areas.
This document discusses Safety Integrity Level (SIL) and how it is used to quantify safety in industrial processes. It provides background on the development of international safety standards and defines key terms like SIL, Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF), Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD), and Safe Failure Fraction (SFF). The document explains how hazards analysis is used to determine target SIL levels for safety systems and instrumentation. It also outlines methods for evaluating SIL, including Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEDA) and proven in use testing. Overall, the document provides a comprehensive overview of applying SIL standards to ensure safety in industrial control systems.
The document discusses functional safety and fire and gas (F&G) systems. It defines functional safety and outlines standards like IEC 61508. F&G systems aim to detect and respond to hazards to reduce risk. Key components discussed include detectors, logic solvers, and final elements. Specific final elements presented are Niagara monitors for delivering water, electric actuators for redundancy, and VDD deluge valves with a fully redundant design. These components are described and their advantages for achieving safety integrity levels are outlined.
Complying with New Functional Safety StandardsDesign World
The document is a presentation on complying with new functional safety standards. It discusses what functional safety is, what is happening in the functional safety market, what standards should be used for machines, and how to determine safety levels and perform calculations according to standards like ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061. It provides an example of applying the standards to a dual channel emergency stop application and calculating the resulting safety integrity level.
SIL = Safety Integrity Level
•Safety systems are becoming increasingly instrumented
•Depending less on human intervention and operator’s ability to respond correctly in a given situation
•Depending more on instrumentation and programmable systems
•SIL requirements are intended to ensure the reliability of such safety instrumented systems
SIS “Final Element” Diagnostics Including The SOV, Using A Digital Valve Cont...Emerson Exchange
This document discusses using a digital valve controller to improve diagnostics and testing of safety instrumented system (SIS) final control elements. Traditional testing methods are difficult and costly. A digital valve controller allows for partial stroke testing online which improves reliability while reducing costs. It also enables solenoid valve health monitoring and diagnostic capabilities. Field experience from Ras Gas in Qatar demonstrated benefits like reduced labor and improved predictive maintenance through signature-based testing and continuous monitoring.
Safety instrumented systems angela summers Ahmed Gamal
This document discusses safety instrumented systems (SIS), which are designed to respond to hazardous conditions in industrial plants. An SIS monitors for conditions that could become hazardous and responds by taking actions to prevent or mitigate hazards. Examples provided include a furnace that shuts off fuel valves in response to high pressure and a reactor that opens a coolant valve when temperature rises too high. The document outlines standards for good engineering practices in designing, implementing, and maintaining SIS according to lifecycle phases from planning and design to operations and auditing. Key aspects covered are managing risks to people and procedures, assessing and mitigating risk through assigning safety integrity levels, and proving that SIS designs achieve the desired safety functionality.
The document discusses different voting logic architectures (1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 2oo3) used in safety instrumented systems and how to determine the appropriate architecture based on Safety Integrity Level (SIL) requirements. It provides an example of selecting a voting logic architecture to meet a SIL 3 requirement for a high pressure pipeline. Based on calculations of Probability of Failure on Demand for different combinations, architectures with 1oo2 pressure transmitters and either 1oo2 or 2oo3 shutdown valves can meet the SIL 3 requirement.
Reliability Instrumented System | Arrelic Insights Arrelic
An approach that strays from the conventional, coupled with
consistency, enables us to contribute to the company's overall
growth and success.
This Insights talks about RIS Process and applications
NIST Policy Mapped to 800-53-800-53A-controls-and-objectives (Legal Size)James W. De Rienzo
This document provides a mapping of program management and privacy control policies and procedures to various NIST cybersecurity documents. It shows that 17 control families have policies and procedures that map to between 1-7 total NIST documents each, with Identification and Authentication mapping to the most at 7 documents. The total number of mappings in the document is 48.
The document discusses High-Integrity Pressure Protection Systems (HIPPS), which are instrumented systems that can provide overpressure protection as an alternative to pressure relief devices. A HIPPS includes sensors, logic solvers, and final control elements arranged to reach a fail-safe state if overpressure occurs. HIPPS are safety instrumented systems that must meet standards like IEC 61511. They require careful documentation, design, testing and maintenance to ensure the level of protection is equal to or greater than a conventional pressure relief device system.
The document discusses burner management systems (BMS) and how programmable electronic systems (PES) can be used for burner control while ensuring safety. It outlines several key requirements for PES-based BMS to be certified, including using redundant safety-related PES, obtaining independent safety certification, and the designer demonstrating proper development and testing practices. The document also describes various safety features that can be designed into BMS, such as input/output monitoring, guarded outputs, processor watchdog timers, and power monitoring. It discusses architectures for safety programmable logic controllers (PLCs) including 1oo1D (one out of one with diagnostics) and 1oo2D (one out of two with diagnostics).
This document discusses Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) and methods for determining risk reduction requirements. An SIS monitors industrial processes for dangerous conditions and executes actions to prevent or mitigate hazardous events. The document describes various methods to determine the necessary level of risk reduction for a given process, including risk graphs and Layer of Protection Analysis, both of which consider the consequences, frequency, possibility of avoidance, and probability of occurrence of an event. The determined risk reduction requirement is characterized by a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) on a scale of 1 to 4. An SIS provides risk reduction by successfully performing its safety functions, with its effectiveness measured by its probability of failure on demand (PFD).
This document provides an overview of key concepts from IEC/EN 61508, the international standard for functional safety of electrical, electronic, and programmable electronic safety-related systems. It introduces safety life cycles, risk assessment, safety integrity levels (SIL), probability of failure calculations, and different system architectures. The document contains examples to illustrate these concepts and clarify technical terms defined in the standard.
The document discusses Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) and the Safety Life Cycle as defined by ANSI/ISA 84.00.01-2004. It outlines the steps in the Safety Life Cycle from initial Hazard and Risk Assessment to determine Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) and required Safety Integrity Levels (SILs), to design, installation, and ongoing maintenance of SIS including functional proof testing. The Safety Life Cycle is meant to guide safety systems through all stages from initial assessment to eventual decommissioning to minimize risk in industrial processes.
Asco Hazardous Area Solenoid Valves - Sil 3 Functional-SafetyThorne & Derrick UK
This document provides information on functional safety solutions for solenoid valves from ASCO Numatics. It discusses the key components of a safety loop including the sensing element, logic solver and final element. It then describes single solenoid certified pilot valves, manual reset valves, and redundant pilot valves that can be used as the final element. The document also discusses safety systems like bypass panels, actuator control systems, and redundant control systems to integrate and monitor the components. It provides an overview of terminology used in functional safety and examples of redundant control system configurations.
This document provides an introduction to functional safety for machinery. It defines functional safety and explains that it involves ensuring automatic actions occur to reach a safe state. The document discusses relevant functional safety standards like ISO 13849 and IEC 61508. It also examines functional safety concepts like risk assessments, safety integrity levels, safety elements involving structure, reliability, diagnostics and systematic capability. The document uses an example safety circuit diagram to demonstrate functional safety concepts like input channel fault detection.
The document provides background on the development of a new control room management rule by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). It summarizes National Transportation Safety Board recommendations that prompted the rule relating to control room operations, fatigue, alarms, and training. The final rule requires pipeline operators to implement a control room management plan to define roles and responsibilities, provide necessary information to controllers, manage alarms and fatigue, and review incidents and operating experience. It aims to formalize best practices for control room oversight, but gives operators flexibility in how to comply with more general requirements.
Reliability engineering chapter-3 failure data collection and analysisCharlton Inao
This document provides an overview of failure data collection and analysis. It discusses:
- The importance of failure data for reliability studies and product improvement.
- Sources of failure data including warranty claims, testing records, and customer reports.
- Guidelines for designing effective failure reporting and data collection forms.
- External sources of failure data like databases and organizations that collect industry data.
- Examples of failure rates for electronic, mechanical, and human error data from previous studies.
- The Weibull distribution as a tool for modeling time-to-failure data and its parameters.
This document discusses machine safety and achieving regulatory compliance. It provides an overview of a training session that will discuss identifying and addressing safety concerns based on new global standards. The session agenda includes discussing safety functional requirements, the risk assessment process, the concept of risk, an overview of the evolution of safety standards, and the safety life cycle. The document provides background on how new functional safety standards like ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 evaluate safety systems based on their performance rather than categories, and the transition from the old EN954 standard. It also explains the risk assessment process and how it is used to identify hazards, estimate risks, and iteratively reduce risks to an acceptable level to inform the design of safety systems.
This document provides information on using the DeltaV SIS process safety system for safety instrumented functions up to SIL 3. It describes the certified components, applicable safety integrity levels for de-energized trip applications, response time requirements, and considerations for SIL verification. Restrictions, special features, limits, and recommendations for other applications like energized trip functions are also outlined.
Methods of determining_safety_integrity_levelMowaten Masry
This document discusses two popular methods for determining safety integrity level (SIL) requirements - risk graph methods and layer of protection analysis (LOPA). It outlines some advantages of both, but also limitations, particularly of risk graph methods. Specifically, it notes that risk graphs can produce a wide range of possible residual risk levels from a single hazard assessment. The document recommends calibrating risk graphs conservatively and only using them when the mean residual risk is a small portion of the overall risk target, to avoid underestimating required risk reduction. It also discusses how to account for backup mechanical protections like relief valves when assessing instrumented safety functions using a risk graph.
This is a three parts lecture series. The parts will cover the basics and fundamentals of reliability engineering. Part 1 begins with introduction of reliability definition and other reliability characteristics and measurements. It will be followed by reliability calculation, estimation of failure rates and understanding of the implications of failure rates on system maintenance and replacements in Part 2. Then Part 3 will cover the most important and practical failure time distributions and how to obtain the parameters of the distributions and interpretations of these parameters. Hands-on computations of the failure rates and the estimation of the failure time distribution parameters will be conducted using standard Microsoft Excel.
Part 1. Reliability Definitions
1.Reliability---Time dependent characteristic
2.Failure rate
3.Mean Time to Failure
4.Availability
5.Mean residual life
Safety Verification and Software aspects of Automotive SoCPankaj Singh
IP-SoC Conference 2017 Grenoble
Automotive industry has evolved over last 100 years. Electronic systems were
introduced into the automotive industry in 1960. Since then the complexity has grown
many fold and today’s automobiles have as many as 150 programmable computing
elements or Electronic Control Units(ECUs) with several wiring connections.
The software content has also increased significantly with today’s car having more than
100 million of lines of software code.
This increased hardware and software complexity increases the risk of failure that could
impact negatively on vehicle safety. This has led to concerns regarding the validation of
failure modes and the detection mechanisms. Car maker and suppliers need to prove
that, despite increasing complexity, their electronic systems will deliver the required
functionality safely and reliably.
This presentation describes the challenges and methodology related to Safety
verification and Software development aspects of Automotive Microcontroller SoC.
This document explains Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) which are used to quantify safety requirements for Safety Instrumented Systems. It discusses what SIL is, the four SIL levels and their required reliability, how SIL ratings are determined through a risk assessment process, and how hazards are protected against through a layered approach. The document also outlines the SIL life cycle including design, realization, and operation phases, how equipment failures can occur, and how a Safety Instrumented Function's performance is quantified through its Probability of Failure on Demand. It provides information on how components like actuators can be certified as "suitable for use" at a given SIL level and the role of proof and diagnostic testing.
Viewpoint on ISA TR84.0.02 - simplified methods and fault tree analysisISA Interchange
1) The document discusses simplified methods and fault tree analysis for determining a safety integrity level (SIL) as described in technical report ISA-TR84.0.02.
2) It outlines the use of simplified equations and fault tree analysis to calculate the average probability of failure on demand (PFDavg) and spurious trip rate (STR) of a safety instrumented system (SIS).
3) The limitations of the simplified equations include an inability to model time-dependent or sequence-dependent failures, or diverse technologies within the same voting configuration.
The article discusses writing a Safety Requirement Specification (SRS), which is the last stage of the analysis phase for a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) lifecycle. It outlines the key components of an SRS, including input information, functional requirements, and safety integrity requirements for each safety instrumented function. The article provides examples of the types of details to include in an SRS, such as the safe state of the process, sources of demand on the system, target safety integrity levels, and requirements for resetting the system. Developing a thorough SRS according to the findings of the hazard and risk assessment is important, as it forms the input for the design and realization phase of the SIS lifecycle.
Regulatory modifications have raised important issues in design and use of industrial safety systems. Certain changes in IEC 61508, now being widely implemented, mean that designers and users who desire full compliance must give new consideration to topics such as SIL levels and the transition to new methodologies.
Safety instrumented systems angela summers Ahmed Gamal
This document discusses safety instrumented systems (SIS), which are designed to respond to hazardous conditions in industrial plants. An SIS monitors for conditions that could become hazardous and responds by taking actions to prevent or mitigate hazards. Examples provided include a furnace that shuts off fuel valves in response to high pressure and a reactor that opens a coolant valve when temperature rises too high. The document outlines standards for good engineering practices in designing, implementing, and maintaining SIS according to lifecycle phases from planning and design to operations and auditing. Key aspects covered are managing risks to people and procedures, assessing and mitigating risk through assigning safety integrity levels, and proving that SIS designs achieve the desired safety functionality.
The document discusses different voting logic architectures (1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 2oo3) used in safety instrumented systems and how to determine the appropriate architecture based on Safety Integrity Level (SIL) requirements. It provides an example of selecting a voting logic architecture to meet a SIL 3 requirement for a high pressure pipeline. Based on calculations of Probability of Failure on Demand for different combinations, architectures with 1oo2 pressure transmitters and either 1oo2 or 2oo3 shutdown valves can meet the SIL 3 requirement.
Reliability Instrumented System | Arrelic Insights Arrelic
An approach that strays from the conventional, coupled with
consistency, enables us to contribute to the company's overall
growth and success.
This Insights talks about RIS Process and applications
NIST Policy Mapped to 800-53-800-53A-controls-and-objectives (Legal Size)James W. De Rienzo
This document provides a mapping of program management and privacy control policies and procedures to various NIST cybersecurity documents. It shows that 17 control families have policies and procedures that map to between 1-7 total NIST documents each, with Identification and Authentication mapping to the most at 7 documents. The total number of mappings in the document is 48.
The document discusses High-Integrity Pressure Protection Systems (HIPPS), which are instrumented systems that can provide overpressure protection as an alternative to pressure relief devices. A HIPPS includes sensors, logic solvers, and final control elements arranged to reach a fail-safe state if overpressure occurs. HIPPS are safety instrumented systems that must meet standards like IEC 61511. They require careful documentation, design, testing and maintenance to ensure the level of protection is equal to or greater than a conventional pressure relief device system.
The document discusses burner management systems (BMS) and how programmable electronic systems (PES) can be used for burner control while ensuring safety. It outlines several key requirements for PES-based BMS to be certified, including using redundant safety-related PES, obtaining independent safety certification, and the designer demonstrating proper development and testing practices. The document also describes various safety features that can be designed into BMS, such as input/output monitoring, guarded outputs, processor watchdog timers, and power monitoring. It discusses architectures for safety programmable logic controllers (PLCs) including 1oo1D (one out of one with diagnostics) and 1oo2D (one out of two with diagnostics).
This document discusses Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) and methods for determining risk reduction requirements. An SIS monitors industrial processes for dangerous conditions and executes actions to prevent or mitigate hazardous events. The document describes various methods to determine the necessary level of risk reduction for a given process, including risk graphs and Layer of Protection Analysis, both of which consider the consequences, frequency, possibility of avoidance, and probability of occurrence of an event. The determined risk reduction requirement is characterized by a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) on a scale of 1 to 4. An SIS provides risk reduction by successfully performing its safety functions, with its effectiveness measured by its probability of failure on demand (PFD).
This document provides an overview of key concepts from IEC/EN 61508, the international standard for functional safety of electrical, electronic, and programmable electronic safety-related systems. It introduces safety life cycles, risk assessment, safety integrity levels (SIL), probability of failure calculations, and different system architectures. The document contains examples to illustrate these concepts and clarify technical terms defined in the standard.
The document discusses Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) and the Safety Life Cycle as defined by ANSI/ISA 84.00.01-2004. It outlines the steps in the Safety Life Cycle from initial Hazard and Risk Assessment to determine Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) and required Safety Integrity Levels (SILs), to design, installation, and ongoing maintenance of SIS including functional proof testing. The Safety Life Cycle is meant to guide safety systems through all stages from initial assessment to eventual decommissioning to minimize risk in industrial processes.
Asco Hazardous Area Solenoid Valves - Sil 3 Functional-SafetyThorne & Derrick UK
This document provides information on functional safety solutions for solenoid valves from ASCO Numatics. It discusses the key components of a safety loop including the sensing element, logic solver and final element. It then describes single solenoid certified pilot valves, manual reset valves, and redundant pilot valves that can be used as the final element. The document also discusses safety systems like bypass panels, actuator control systems, and redundant control systems to integrate and monitor the components. It provides an overview of terminology used in functional safety and examples of redundant control system configurations.
This document provides an introduction to functional safety for machinery. It defines functional safety and explains that it involves ensuring automatic actions occur to reach a safe state. The document discusses relevant functional safety standards like ISO 13849 and IEC 61508. It also examines functional safety concepts like risk assessments, safety integrity levels, safety elements involving structure, reliability, diagnostics and systematic capability. The document uses an example safety circuit diagram to demonstrate functional safety concepts like input channel fault detection.
The document provides background on the development of a new control room management rule by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). It summarizes National Transportation Safety Board recommendations that prompted the rule relating to control room operations, fatigue, alarms, and training. The final rule requires pipeline operators to implement a control room management plan to define roles and responsibilities, provide necessary information to controllers, manage alarms and fatigue, and review incidents and operating experience. It aims to formalize best practices for control room oversight, but gives operators flexibility in how to comply with more general requirements.
Reliability engineering chapter-3 failure data collection and analysisCharlton Inao
This document provides an overview of failure data collection and analysis. It discusses:
- The importance of failure data for reliability studies and product improvement.
- Sources of failure data including warranty claims, testing records, and customer reports.
- Guidelines for designing effective failure reporting and data collection forms.
- External sources of failure data like databases and organizations that collect industry data.
- Examples of failure rates for electronic, mechanical, and human error data from previous studies.
- The Weibull distribution as a tool for modeling time-to-failure data and its parameters.
This document discusses machine safety and achieving regulatory compliance. It provides an overview of a training session that will discuss identifying and addressing safety concerns based on new global standards. The session agenda includes discussing safety functional requirements, the risk assessment process, the concept of risk, an overview of the evolution of safety standards, and the safety life cycle. The document provides background on how new functional safety standards like ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 evaluate safety systems based on their performance rather than categories, and the transition from the old EN954 standard. It also explains the risk assessment process and how it is used to identify hazards, estimate risks, and iteratively reduce risks to an acceptable level to inform the design of safety systems.
This document provides information on using the DeltaV SIS process safety system for safety instrumented functions up to SIL 3. It describes the certified components, applicable safety integrity levels for de-energized trip applications, response time requirements, and considerations for SIL verification. Restrictions, special features, limits, and recommendations for other applications like energized trip functions are also outlined.
Methods of determining_safety_integrity_levelMowaten Masry
This document discusses two popular methods for determining safety integrity level (SIL) requirements - risk graph methods and layer of protection analysis (LOPA). It outlines some advantages of both, but also limitations, particularly of risk graph methods. Specifically, it notes that risk graphs can produce a wide range of possible residual risk levels from a single hazard assessment. The document recommends calibrating risk graphs conservatively and only using them when the mean residual risk is a small portion of the overall risk target, to avoid underestimating required risk reduction. It also discusses how to account for backup mechanical protections like relief valves when assessing instrumented safety functions using a risk graph.
This is a three parts lecture series. The parts will cover the basics and fundamentals of reliability engineering. Part 1 begins with introduction of reliability definition and other reliability characteristics and measurements. It will be followed by reliability calculation, estimation of failure rates and understanding of the implications of failure rates on system maintenance and replacements in Part 2. Then Part 3 will cover the most important and practical failure time distributions and how to obtain the parameters of the distributions and interpretations of these parameters. Hands-on computations of the failure rates and the estimation of the failure time distribution parameters will be conducted using standard Microsoft Excel.
Part 1. Reliability Definitions
1.Reliability---Time dependent characteristic
2.Failure rate
3.Mean Time to Failure
4.Availability
5.Mean residual life
Safety Verification and Software aspects of Automotive SoCPankaj Singh
IP-SoC Conference 2017 Grenoble
Automotive industry has evolved over last 100 years. Electronic systems were
introduced into the automotive industry in 1960. Since then the complexity has grown
many fold and today’s automobiles have as many as 150 programmable computing
elements or Electronic Control Units(ECUs) with several wiring connections.
The software content has also increased significantly with today’s car having more than
100 million of lines of software code.
This increased hardware and software complexity increases the risk of failure that could
impact negatively on vehicle safety. This has led to concerns regarding the validation of
failure modes and the detection mechanisms. Car maker and suppliers need to prove
that, despite increasing complexity, their electronic systems will deliver the required
functionality safely and reliably.
This presentation describes the challenges and methodology related to Safety
verification and Software development aspects of Automotive Microcontroller SoC.
This document explains Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) which are used to quantify safety requirements for Safety Instrumented Systems. It discusses what SIL is, the four SIL levels and their required reliability, how SIL ratings are determined through a risk assessment process, and how hazards are protected against through a layered approach. The document also outlines the SIL life cycle including design, realization, and operation phases, how equipment failures can occur, and how a Safety Instrumented Function's performance is quantified through its Probability of Failure on Demand. It provides information on how components like actuators can be certified as "suitable for use" at a given SIL level and the role of proof and diagnostic testing.
Viewpoint on ISA TR84.0.02 - simplified methods and fault tree analysisISA Interchange
1) The document discusses simplified methods and fault tree analysis for determining a safety integrity level (SIL) as described in technical report ISA-TR84.0.02.
2) It outlines the use of simplified equations and fault tree analysis to calculate the average probability of failure on demand (PFDavg) and spurious trip rate (STR) of a safety instrumented system (SIS).
3) The limitations of the simplified equations include an inability to model time-dependent or sequence-dependent failures, or diverse technologies within the same voting configuration.
The article discusses writing a Safety Requirement Specification (SRS), which is the last stage of the analysis phase for a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) lifecycle. It outlines the key components of an SRS, including input information, functional requirements, and safety integrity requirements for each safety instrumented function. The article provides examples of the types of details to include in an SRS, such as the safe state of the process, sources of demand on the system, target safety integrity levels, and requirements for resetting the system. Developing a thorough SRS according to the findings of the hazard and risk assessment is important, as it forms the input for the design and realization phase of the SIS lifecycle.
Regulatory modifications have raised important issues in design and use of industrial safety systems. Certain changes in IEC 61508, now being widely implemented, mean that designers and users who desire full compliance must give new consideration to topics such as SIL levels and the transition to new methodologies.
The combustion process has always been considered having the potential for a hazardous event which could lead to personnel injury or loss of production. To mitigate this risk, the process industry is now implementing Safety Instrumented Systems which can identify hazardous operating conditions and correctly respond in such a way to bring the combustion process back to a safe operating condition or implement an automatically controlled shutdown sequence to reduce the risk of operator error causing a catastrophic event. Oxygen and combustible flue gas analyzers are now being utilized in these combustion Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) to identify hazardous operating conditions and automatically return the process to a safe state. The standards of IEC 61511 and API RP 556 will be reviewed as they apply to flue gas analyzers, as well as the process variables of the oxygen and combustible analyzer available for implementation into the SIS system for combustion monitoring, and the resultant actions required to return the process to a safe condition.
This document provides an overview of APS ACIS (Advanced Photon Source Accelerator Control Interlock System) from the perspective of a functional safety assessor.
The original ACIS design, implemented in 1992 before functional safety standards, is examined against IEC 61508. While the design has strong safety practices, some areas could be improved like requirements tracking.
The upgraded LEA ACIS addresses many observations by clearly identifying safety functions and requirements. Reliability is also a key part of standards not fully addressed in original ACIS.
Overall APS has a very safe system but original ACIS could be strengthened by fully addressing requirements tracking, reliability calculations, and accounting for all components in safety functions
LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis) is a technique used to evaluate risks from accident scenarios by estimating the likelihood and consequences of accidents, and determining if sufficient safety measures exist. It involves identifying scenarios, determining initiating event frequencies, identifying independent protection layers (IPLs) and their probability of failure, estimating risks, and comparing to a company's tolerable risk criteria. The key steps are: 1) identifying scenarios, 2) determining initiating event frequencies, 3) identifying IPLs and their failure probabilities, 4) estimating scenario risks, and 5) comparing risks to tolerability criteria.
ARRL: A Criterion for Composable Safety and Systems EngineeringVincenzo De Florio
While safety engineering standards define rigorous and controllable
processes for system development, safety standards’ differences in distinct
domains are non-negligible. This paper focuses in particular on the aviation,
automotive, and railway standards, all related to the transportation market.
Many are the reasons for the said differences, ranging from historical reasons,
heuristic and established practices, and legal frameworks, but also from the
psychological perception of the safety risks. In particular we argue that the
Safety Integrity Levels are not sufficient to be used as a top level requirement
for developing a safety-critical system. We argue that Quality of Service is a
more generic criterion that takes the trustworthiness as perceived by users better
into account. In addition, safety engineering standards provide very little
guidance on how to compose safe systems from components, while this is the
established engineering practice. In this paper we develop a novel concept
called Assured Reliability and Resilience Level as a criterion that takes the
industrial practice into account and show how it complements the Safety
Integrity Level concept.
The document discusses Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) and the Safety Life Cycle as defined by ANSI/ISA 84.00.01-2004. It outlines the steps in the Safety Life Cycle from initial Hazard and Risk Assessment to determine Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) and required Safety Integrity Levels (SILs), to design, installation, and ongoing maintenance of SIS including functional proof testing. The Safety Life Cycle is meant to guide safety systems through all stages from initial assessment to eventual decommissioning to minimize risk in industrial processes.
This document discusses safety standards for critical systems and proposes a new concept called Assured Reliability and Resilience Level (ARRL). It notes that while safety standards aim to reduce risk, their requirements differ across domains. The document argues that Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) alone are not sufficient and that Quality of Service is a more holistic criterion. It also notes standards provide little guidance on composing systems from components. The ARRL concept aims to address these issues and complement SIL by considering factors like component trustworthiness and fault behavior. The document suggests ARRL could help foster cross-domain safety engineering.
This document provides an overview and definitions related to Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS). It discusses the need for SIS to protect personnel, equipment, and the environment from hazardous events in industries like chemical and oil & gas. SIS are designed to reduce the likelihood or impact of emergencies. The document defines common SIS terms and describes the basic components and purpose of SIS, which include sensors to detect process parameters, a logic solver to determine necessary actions, and final control elements like valves to isolate the process. It also discusses the concept of layers of protection to prevent and mitigate hazardous events, with SIS comprising the final active prevention layer.
Safety management is critical for process industries like Oil, Gas, Chemicals, and Petrochemicals to implement and follow the safety standards of IEC Standards.
It demands stringent verification of the Safety Integrated System (SIS) that provides the required risk reduction and meets the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) for each Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) during its operation.
#IEC61508 #sil #sif #sis #pfd #rrf #wordoftheweek #erp #erpsoftware #softwareservices
1) IEC 61508 is an international standard for functional safety of electrical, electronic, and programmable electronic safety-related systems. It standardizes safety requirements and assessment methodologies that can be applied across industries.
2) The nuclear industry could benefit from using components certified to IEC 61508, as it offers advantages in technical rigor and economics. Components certified as SIL 2 or higher have undergone reliability and correctness assessments that align with nuclear industry needs.
3) IEC 61508 certification of individual components, like sensors, controllers, and actuators, remains compatible with existing nuclear safety system requirements and could facilitate commercial-grade dedication or suitability evaluations for digital equipment.
Safety Lifecycle Management - Emerson Exchange 2010 - Meet the Experts Mike Boudreaux
The document discusses process safety and functional safety. It covers many topics related to ensuring safety in industrial processes, including safety lifecycles, risk assessments, safety instrumented systems, standards like IEC 61511, and maintaining safety through proper design, installation, operation and modification of systems.
Safety Instrumented System (SIS) Principles Comprehensive&Understanding Train...DEVELOP
DEVELOP Training Center (TM) menyelenggarakan Training Safety Instrumented System (SIS) Principles Comprehensive&Understanding yang sangat berguna untuk mendapatkan skill tentang Safety Instrumented System (SIS) Design, Analisis dan Report pada Project&Plant Operation.
Materi Training di DEVELOP Training Center (TM) dirancang khusus oleh para praktisi engineer dan designer disesuaikan dengan kebutuhan project. Anda akan mendapat sharing ilmu langsung dari para praktisi yang berpengalaman bertahun-tahun.
This document provides an overview of plant operation systems including distributed control systems (DCS), programmable logic controllers (PLC), and fieldbus technology. It discusses typical objectives of plant operation like protecting people, equipment, and the environment. It describes DCS architecture with components like transmitters, actuators, and control units connected via a data highway. Fieldbus technology is introduced to replace wires for signal transfer between smart field devices. The document also covers sensor systems for measuring variables like temperature, pressure, flow, and level. It discusses actuators, control valves, safety features, and reliability calculations. Safety integrity levels (SIL) are defined on a scale of 1 to 4 based on probability of failure on demand.
SIL Awareness | Introduction to Safety Life-Cycle | IEC - 61508 & IEC- 61511 ...Gaurav Singh Rajput
This document provides an overview of the safety lifecycle (SLC) process as defined in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 standards. The SLC consists of three main phases - analysis, realization, and operation. The analysis phase involves identifying process hazards, estimating risks, and determining safety instrumented functions (SIFs) required to reduce risk to a tolerable level. Key activities in the analysis phase include hazard identification techniques like HAZOP and assessing the likelihood and consequences of hazardous events. The realization phase focuses on designing, implementing, and testing the safety instrumented systems (SIS) to achieve the required SIFs. The operation phase centers around maintaining and managing the SIS to ensure ongoing functional safety
Reliability Instrumented System | Arrelic InsightsArrelic
Reliability Instrumented System is characterized by a relative level of hazard lessening gave by a security work, or to indicate an objective level of hazard decrease. In straight forward terms, RIS is an estimation of execution required for a Safety Instrumented Function.
Introduction to Functional Safety and SIL CertificationISA Boston Section
This overview session will acquaint attendees with the key concepts in the IEC 61508 standard for functional safety of electrical/electronic and programmable electronic systems. An introduction is provided to safety integrity levels (SIL), the safety lifecycle and the requirements needed to achieve a functional safety certificate. Information will be provided on documentation requirements and an introduction to the basic objectives of product design for functional safety.
Comparative analysis between traditional aquaponics and reconstructed aquapon...bijceesjournal
The aquaponic system of planting is a method that does not require soil usage. It is a method that only needs water, fish, lava rocks (a substitute for soil), and plants. Aquaponic systems are sustainable and environmentally friendly. Its use not only helps to plant in small spaces but also helps reduce artificial chemical use and minimizes excess water use, as aquaponics consumes 90% less water than soil-based gardening. The study applied a descriptive and experimental design to assess and compare conventional and reconstructed aquaponic methods for reproducing tomatoes. The researchers created an observation checklist to determine the significant factors of the study. The study aims to determine the significant difference between traditional aquaponics and reconstructed aquaponics systems propagating tomatoes in terms of height, weight, girth, and number of fruits. The reconstructed aquaponics system’s higher growth yield results in a much more nourished crop than the traditional aquaponics system. It is superior in its number of fruits, height, weight, and girth measurement. Moreover, the reconstructed aquaponics system is proven to eliminate all the hindrances present in the traditional aquaponics system, which are overcrowding of fish, algae growth, pest problems, contaminated water, and dead fish.
TIME DIVISION MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUE FOR COMMUNICATION SYSTEMHODECEDSIET
Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) is a method of transmitting multiple signals over a single communication channel by dividing the signal into many segments, each having a very short duration of time. These time slots are then allocated to different data streams, allowing multiple signals to share the same transmission medium efficiently. TDM is widely used in telecommunications and data communication systems.
### How TDM Works
1. **Time Slots Allocation**: The core principle of TDM is to assign distinct time slots to each signal. During each time slot, the respective signal is transmitted, and then the process repeats cyclically. For example, if there are four signals to be transmitted, the TDM cycle will divide time into four slots, each assigned to one signal.
2. **Synchronization**: Synchronization is crucial in TDM systems to ensure that the signals are correctly aligned with their respective time slots. Both the transmitter and receiver must be synchronized to avoid any overlap or loss of data. This synchronization is typically maintained by a clock signal that ensures time slots are accurately aligned.
3. **Frame Structure**: TDM data is organized into frames, where each frame consists of a set of time slots. Each frame is repeated at regular intervals, ensuring continuous transmission of data streams. The frame structure helps in managing the data streams and maintaining the synchronization between the transmitter and receiver.
4. **Multiplexer and Demultiplexer**: At the transmitting end, a multiplexer combines multiple input signals into a single composite signal by assigning each signal to a specific time slot. At the receiving end, a demultiplexer separates the composite signal back into individual signals based on their respective time slots.
### Types of TDM
1. **Synchronous TDM**: In synchronous TDM, time slots are pre-assigned to each signal, regardless of whether the signal has data to transmit or not. This can lead to inefficiencies if some time slots remain empty due to the absence of data.
2. **Asynchronous TDM (or Statistical TDM)**: Asynchronous TDM addresses the inefficiencies of synchronous TDM by allocating time slots dynamically based on the presence of data. Time slots are assigned only when there is data to transmit, which optimizes the use of the communication channel.
### Applications of TDM
- **Telecommunications**: TDM is extensively used in telecommunication systems, such as in T1 and E1 lines, where multiple telephone calls are transmitted over a single line by assigning each call to a specific time slot.
- **Digital Audio and Video Broadcasting**: TDM is used in broadcasting systems to transmit multiple audio or video streams over a single channel, ensuring efficient use of bandwidth.
- **Computer Networks**: TDM is used in network protocols and systems to manage the transmission of data from multiple sources over a single network medium.
### Advantages of TDM
- **Efficient Use of Bandwidth**: TDM all
Presentation of IEEE Slovenia CIS (Computational Intelligence Society) Chapte...University of Maribor
Slides from talk presenting:
Aleš Zamuda: Presentation of IEEE Slovenia CIS (Computational Intelligence Society) Chapter and Networking.
Presentation at IcETRAN 2024 session:
"Inter-Society Networking Panel GRSS/MTT-S/CIS
Panel Session: Promoting Connection and Cooperation"
IEEE Slovenia GRSS
IEEE Serbia and Montenegro MTT-S
IEEE Slovenia CIS
11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC AND COMPUTING ENGINEERING
3-6 June 2024, Niš, Serbia
Embedded machine learning-based road conditions and driving behavior monitoringIJECEIAES
Car accident rates have increased in recent years, resulting in losses in human lives, properties, and other financial costs. An embedded machine learning-based system is developed to address this critical issue. The system can monitor road conditions, detect driving patterns, and identify aggressive driving behaviors. The system is based on neural networks trained on a comprehensive dataset of driving events, driving styles, and road conditions. The system effectively detects potential risks and helps mitigate the frequency and impact of accidents. The primary goal is to ensure the safety of drivers and vehicles. Collecting data involved gathering information on three key road events: normal street and normal drive, speed bumps, circular yellow speed bumps, and three aggressive driving actions: sudden start, sudden stop, and sudden entry. The gathered data is processed and analyzed using a machine learning system designed for limited power and memory devices. The developed system resulted in 91.9% accuracy, 93.6% precision, and 92% recall. The achieved inference time on an Arduino Nano 33 BLE Sense with a 32-bit CPU running at 64 MHz is 34 ms and requires 2.6 kB peak RAM and 139.9 kB program flash memory, making it suitable for resource-constrained embedded systems.
Using recycled concrete aggregates (RCA) for pavements is crucial to achieving sustainability. Implementing RCA for new pavement can minimize carbon footprint, conserve natural resources, reduce harmful emissions, and lower life cycle costs. Compared to natural aggregate (NA), RCA pavement has fewer comprehensive studies and sustainability assessments.
Understanding Inductive Bias in Machine LearningSUTEJAS
This presentation explores the concept of inductive bias in machine learning. It explains how algorithms come with built-in assumptions and preferences that guide the learning process. You'll learn about the different types of inductive bias and how they can impact the performance and generalizability of machine learning models.
The presentation also covers the positive and negative aspects of inductive bias, along with strategies for mitigating potential drawbacks. We'll explore examples of how bias manifests in algorithms like neural networks and decision trees.
By understanding inductive bias, you can gain valuable insights into how machine learning models work and make informed decisions when building and deploying them.
KuberTENes Birthday Bash Guadalajara - K8sGPT first impressionsVictor Morales
K8sGPT is a tool that analyzes and diagnoses Kubernetes clusters. This presentation was used to share the requirements and dependencies to deploy K8sGPT in a local environment.
Optimizing Gradle Builds - Gradle DPE Tour Berlin 2024Sinan KOZAK
Sinan from the Delivery Hero mobile infrastructure engineering team shares a deep dive into performance acceleration with Gradle build cache optimizations. Sinan shares their journey into solving complex build-cache problems that affect Gradle builds. By understanding the challenges and solutions found in our journey, we aim to demonstrate the possibilities for faster builds. The case study reveals how overlapping outputs and cache misconfigurations led to significant increases in build times, especially as the project scaled up with numerous modules using Paparazzi tests. The journey from diagnosing to defeating cache issues offers invaluable lessons on maintaining cache integrity without sacrificing functionality.
CHINA’S GEO-ECONOMIC OUTREACH IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES AND FUTURE PROSPECTjpsjournal1
The rivalry between prominent international actors for dominance over Central Asia's hydrocarbon
reserves and the ancient silk trade route, along with China's diplomatic endeavours in the area, has been
referred to as the "New Great Game." This research centres on the power struggle, considering
geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic variables. Topics including trade, political hegemony, oil
politics, and conventional and nontraditional security are all explored and explained by the researcher.
Using Mackinder's Heartland, Spykman Rimland, and Hegemonic Stability theories, examines China's role
in Central Asia. This study adheres to the empirical epistemological method and has taken care of
objectivity. This study analyze primary and secondary research documents critically to elaborate role of
china’s geo economic outreach in central Asian countries and its future prospect. China is thriving in trade,
pipeline politics, and winning states, according to this study, thanks to important instruments like the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Belt and Road Economic Initiative. According to this study,
China is seeing significant success in commerce, pipeline politics, and gaining influence on other
governments. This success may be attributed to the effective utilisation of key tools such as the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation and the Belt and Road Economic Initiative.
Advanced control scheme of doubly fed induction generator for wind turbine us...IJECEIAES
This paper describes a speed control device for generating electrical energy on an electricity network based on the doubly fed induction generator (DFIG) used for wind power conversion systems. At first, a double-fed induction generator model was constructed. A control law is formulated to govern the flow of energy between the stator of a DFIG and the energy network using three types of controllers: proportional integral (PI), sliding mode controller (SMC) and second order sliding mode controller (SOSMC). Their different results in terms of power reference tracking, reaction to unexpected speed fluctuations, sensitivity to perturbations, and resilience against machine parameter alterations are compared. MATLAB/Simulink was used to conduct the simulations for the preceding study. Multiple simulations have shown very satisfying results, and the investigations demonstrate the efficacy and power-enhancing capabilities of the suggested control system.
16. New and Existing Systems
The first step for assign ment of target SILs is to use tthe (updated) Pl-I As or conduct new
PHAs to screen for the potential haza rds. HAZOP is the most commonly used method. If
the risk is unacceptab le then it is preferable to reduce it to an acceptable level using non
SIS and SIS elements. I lowever, SISs are considered o n )' after a ll the non-SIS protect ion
layers have been considered. HAZOPs identify the potentia l hazards, using risk matrices in
te1111s of the likelihood and the severity of tbe hazards. Requ ired S!Ls are assigned to SIFs
identified in the PHA studies.
As introduced in the 615 1I, the intent of safety functions is to achieve or maintai n a safe
state for tbe specific haza rdous event in a process. Only those safety functions that are
assigned to the SlS are called SJF. Accordi ng to 615 11, the BPCS, relief systems, and
other layers of protection may be defined as safety functions for SJL analysis. A SIS may
contain one or many SJFs and each is assigned a SJ L. As well, a SJF may be achieved by
EX-103
tube or
tube sheet
rupture
Overpressuring of
stripper.
to
overpressure
of the vessel
relieving to
Oare.
siz ng to handle (a)
fire case,(b) tube
rupture on reboiler, (c)
total loss of renux to
stripper,(d)loss of
coolfng to condenser
EX- 102,(e)
Instrument or
controller failure,
(f) instrument air
failure,(g) power
fai ure etc.
2. PV-106
opens to
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Operations
s M 2 1
Ecological
s L 2 c)
20. Important Aspects of SIL Application
• There is danger of placing complete reliance on any one PL to cover hazards. For
example, the notion that pressure rel ief systems alone can protect against all I.ass of
containment situations. lf for example, toxic or flammable gas releases can occur
without overpressu re, e.g., through flange gaskets or seals leaking, then other forms
of protection are almost certainly required.
• Ful l compliance with 615 11 is an extremely onerous responsibi lity requinng
considerable deployment of resources. Lt wou ld be high ly undesirable to undertake
tbis exercise with too limi ted resources. Ful l planning as wou ld occur for a major
project would involve qualified personnel with adequate expertise.
• The earlier standa rd, S84.0 I, offers fewer options than the current (as of date)
61511 as (a) it does not recognize SIL 4 and (b) it does not permit/address the
contributions made by PLs.