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Safety Critical Systems
Safety Critical Systems ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
What is Safety? ,[object Object],Safety is NOT an absolute quantity! Safety is also defined as "freedom from unacceptable risk of harm" A basic concept in System Safety Engineering is the avoidance of " hazards "
Safety vs. Security ,[object Object],[object Object]
SILs and Dangerous Failure Probability
Railway Signalling Systems ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
(Old) Interlocking Systems Mechanical /  Electromechanical Systems
Signal Box / Interlocking Tower ,[object Object]
Modern Signal Box / Interlocking Tower  ,[object Object]
What is a Hazard? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Hazard Severity Level (Example) Category Id. Definition CATASTROPHIC I General : A hazard, which may cause death, system  loss, or severe property or environmental damage. CRITICAL II General : A hazard, which may cause severe injury, major system, property or environmental damage. MARGINAL III General : A hazard, which may cause marginal injury, marginal system, property or environmental damage.  NEGLIGIBLE IV General : A hazard, which does not cause injury, system, property or environmental damage.
Hazard Probability Level (Example) Level Probability [h -1 ] Definition Occurrences per year Frequent P ≥ 10 -3 may occur several times a month More than 10 Probable 10 -3  > P ≥ 10 -4 likely to occur once a year 1 to 10 Occasional 10 -4  > P ≥ 10 -5 likely to occur in the life of the system 10 -1  to 1 Remote 10 -5  > P ≥ 10 -6 unlikely but possible to occur in the life of the system 10 -2  to 10 -1 Improbable 10 -6  > P ≥ 10 -7 very unlikely to occur 10 -3  to 10 -2 Incredible P < 10 -7 extremely unlikely, if not inconceivable to occur Less than 10 -3
Risk Classification Scheme (Example) Hazard Severity Hazard Probability CATASTROPHIC CRITICAL MARGINAL NEGLIGIBLE Frequent A A A B Probable A A B C Occasional A B C C Remote B C C D Improbable C C D D Incredible C D D D
Risk Class Definition (Example) Risk Class Interpretation A Intolerable B Undesirable and shall only be accepted when risk reduction is impracticable. C Tolerable with the endorsement of the authority. D Tolerable with the endorsement of the normal project reviews.
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Risk Acceptability
Risk Tolerability Hazard Severity Probability Risk Risk Criteria Tolerable? No Risk Reduction Measures Yes
What are Safety Requirements ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
 
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Diversity ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],&quot;The most certain and effectual check upon errors which arise in the process of computation, is to cause the same computations to be made by separate and independent computers; and this check is rendered still more decisive if they make their computations by different methods .&quot; Dionysius Lardner, 1834
Layers of Diversity
Examples for Diversity ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Some faults to be targeted: programming bugs, specification faults, compiler faults, CPU faults, random hardware faults (e.g. bit flips), security attacks,...
Compiler Diversity ,[object Object]
Compiler Diversity: Issues ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Systematic Automatic Diversity ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

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Safety Integrity Levels

  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5. SILs and Dangerous Failure Probability
  • 6.
  • 7. (Old) Interlocking Systems Mechanical / Electromechanical Systems
  • 8.
  • 9.
  • 10.
  • 11. Hazard Severity Level (Example) Category Id. Definition CATASTROPHIC I General : A hazard, which may cause death, system loss, or severe property or environmental damage. CRITICAL II General : A hazard, which may cause severe injury, major system, property or environmental damage. MARGINAL III General : A hazard, which may cause marginal injury, marginal system, property or environmental damage. NEGLIGIBLE IV General : A hazard, which does not cause injury, system, property or environmental damage.
  • 12. Hazard Probability Level (Example) Level Probability [h -1 ] Definition Occurrences per year Frequent P ≥ 10 -3 may occur several times a month More than 10 Probable 10 -3 > P ≥ 10 -4 likely to occur once a year 1 to 10 Occasional 10 -4 > P ≥ 10 -5 likely to occur in the life of the system 10 -1 to 1 Remote 10 -5 > P ≥ 10 -6 unlikely but possible to occur in the life of the system 10 -2 to 10 -1 Improbable 10 -6 > P ≥ 10 -7 very unlikely to occur 10 -3 to 10 -2 Incredible P < 10 -7 extremely unlikely, if not inconceivable to occur Less than 10 -3
  • 13. Risk Classification Scheme (Example) Hazard Severity Hazard Probability CATASTROPHIC CRITICAL MARGINAL NEGLIGIBLE Frequent A A A B Probable A A B C Occasional A B C C Remote B C C D Improbable C C D D Incredible C D D D
  • 14. Risk Class Definition (Example) Risk Class Interpretation A Intolerable B Undesirable and shall only be accepted when risk reduction is impracticable. C Tolerable with the endorsement of the authority. D Tolerable with the endorsement of the normal project reviews.
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  • 16. Risk Tolerability Hazard Severity Probability Risk Risk Criteria Tolerable? No Risk Reduction Measures Yes
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Editor's Notes

  1. WSN: health monitoring systems, bridge monitoring, tire pressure sensors with MEMs,
  2. Safety Standards relevance in future
  3. Safety Integrity applies to a function, not a system/subsystem/component! Note that the implication good process  good product is assumed to be valid Mention that there is another SIL table for demand mode Mention that many SIL standards define SILs – and they may be different!
  4. Risk Matrix must be agreed with customer/regulatot/ISA