The document discusses various reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS) concepts for avionics systems. It defines key terms like reliability, availability and maintainability. It also discusses faults, errors and failures, and distinguishes between them. Finally, it provides an overview of RAMS standards like EN50126, EN50128 and EN50129 that define processes for safety-critical systems development.
Introduction to Functional Safety and SIL CertificationISA Boston Section
This overview session will acquaint attendees with the key concepts in the IEC 61508 standard for functional safety of electrical/electronic and programmable electronic systems. An introduction is provided to safety integrity levels (SIL), the safety lifecycle and the requirements needed to achieve a functional safety certificate. Information will be provided on documentation requirements and an introduction to the basic objectives of product design for functional safety.
Complying with New Functional Safety StandardsDesign World
The document is a presentation on complying with new functional safety standards. It discusses what functional safety is, what is happening in the functional safety market, what standards should be used for machines, and how to determine safety levels and perform calculations according to standards like ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061. It provides an example of applying the standards to a dual channel emergency stop application and calculating the resulting safety integrity level.
This document provides information on safety layer of protection analysis (LOPA):
- It describes the steps of LOPA including expressing risk targets quantitatively, determining risk for a system, and reducing risk to meet targets.
- It gives examples of applying LOPA to process designs including a flash drum and fired heater. Initiating events are identified and protection layers are analyzed to determine overall risk. Enhancements may be needed to meet risk targets.
- Key aspects of LOPA are discussed such as determining probabilities of initiating events and protection layer failures, setting risk targets, and approaches to risk reduction including safety interlock systems.
Safety of machinery - Application of standard EN ISO 13849-1dnunez1984
This document provides an overview and comparison of two machinery safety standards: EN 62061 and EN ISO 13849-1. It outlines the basic procedures for complying with machinery directives, including performing a risk assessment. EN 62061 focuses on functional safety for electrical/electronic control systems, using Safety Integrity Levels (SILs). EN ISO 13849-1 applies to all machinery and determines Performance Levels (PLs) based on factors like categories and probability of failure. The document provides details on how each standard specifies safety parameters and calculations for achieving the required safety level.
- Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a systematic method used to examine systems from a top-down perspective to determine the causes of failures or accidents. It involves constructing a fault tree diagram with a top event and underlying causes.
- FTA was first developed at Bell Labs in 1962 for safety analysis of missile systems. It has since been widely used, especially in aerospace and nuclear industries.
- Constructing a fault tree provides benefits like understanding failure logic, evaluating failure probabilities, and determining improvement opportunities. It allows for both qualitative and quantitative reliability analysis.
This document provides guidance on conducting a DIY security assessment through summarizing background information on security life cycles and describing two assessment tools: ISS Internet Scanner and Nessus. It explains that assessments are an important part of the security life cycle. The security life cycle includes policies, assessment, design, deployment, management, and continual training. Assessments evaluate technical and non-technical areas to determine an organization's security posture. The document then gives examples of what to check during assessments and provides basic instructions for using ISS Scanner and Nessus to perform technical vulnerability assessments.
Fault Tree Analysis-Concepts and Application-Bill VeselyMassimo Talia
During the e-gate 46200 project in Logistics, i was involved in the hours of education in the study of FTA applied to the case project. This is an application of FTA in a real industrial case. This is a methodology evaluates the causes of a given undesired event.
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is an effective semi-quantitative tool for process hazard analysis and risk assessment. It lies between qualitative and quantitative analysis. LOPA evaluates risks by analyzing accident scenarios, their likelihood and severity. It also considers independent protective layers that can prevent or mitigate consequences. The key steps of LOPA include establishing consequence criteria, identifying scenarios, evaluating frequency and severity, examining protective layers, and comparing results to risk tolerance limits. LOPA is useful for decision making regarding safety systems and managing risks cost effectively.
Introduction to Functional Safety and SIL CertificationISA Boston Section
This overview session will acquaint attendees with the key concepts in the IEC 61508 standard for functional safety of electrical/electronic and programmable electronic systems. An introduction is provided to safety integrity levels (SIL), the safety lifecycle and the requirements needed to achieve a functional safety certificate. Information will be provided on documentation requirements and an introduction to the basic objectives of product design for functional safety.
Complying with New Functional Safety StandardsDesign World
The document is a presentation on complying with new functional safety standards. It discusses what functional safety is, what is happening in the functional safety market, what standards should be used for machines, and how to determine safety levels and perform calculations according to standards like ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061. It provides an example of applying the standards to a dual channel emergency stop application and calculating the resulting safety integrity level.
This document provides information on safety layer of protection analysis (LOPA):
- It describes the steps of LOPA including expressing risk targets quantitatively, determining risk for a system, and reducing risk to meet targets.
- It gives examples of applying LOPA to process designs including a flash drum and fired heater. Initiating events are identified and protection layers are analyzed to determine overall risk. Enhancements may be needed to meet risk targets.
- Key aspects of LOPA are discussed such as determining probabilities of initiating events and protection layer failures, setting risk targets, and approaches to risk reduction including safety interlock systems.
Safety of machinery - Application of standard EN ISO 13849-1dnunez1984
This document provides an overview and comparison of two machinery safety standards: EN 62061 and EN ISO 13849-1. It outlines the basic procedures for complying with machinery directives, including performing a risk assessment. EN 62061 focuses on functional safety for electrical/electronic control systems, using Safety Integrity Levels (SILs). EN ISO 13849-1 applies to all machinery and determines Performance Levels (PLs) based on factors like categories and probability of failure. The document provides details on how each standard specifies safety parameters and calculations for achieving the required safety level.
- Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a systematic method used to examine systems from a top-down perspective to determine the causes of failures or accidents. It involves constructing a fault tree diagram with a top event and underlying causes.
- FTA was first developed at Bell Labs in 1962 for safety analysis of missile systems. It has since been widely used, especially in aerospace and nuclear industries.
- Constructing a fault tree provides benefits like understanding failure logic, evaluating failure probabilities, and determining improvement opportunities. It allows for both qualitative and quantitative reliability analysis.
This document provides guidance on conducting a DIY security assessment through summarizing background information on security life cycles and describing two assessment tools: ISS Internet Scanner and Nessus. It explains that assessments are an important part of the security life cycle. The security life cycle includes policies, assessment, design, deployment, management, and continual training. Assessments evaluate technical and non-technical areas to determine an organization's security posture. The document then gives examples of what to check during assessments and provides basic instructions for using ISS Scanner and Nessus to perform technical vulnerability assessments.
Fault Tree Analysis-Concepts and Application-Bill VeselyMassimo Talia
During the e-gate 46200 project in Logistics, i was involved in the hours of education in the study of FTA applied to the case project. This is an application of FTA in a real industrial case. This is a methodology evaluates the causes of a given undesired event.
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is an effective semi-quantitative tool for process hazard analysis and risk assessment. It lies between qualitative and quantitative analysis. LOPA evaluates risks by analyzing accident scenarios, their likelihood and severity. It also considers independent protective layers that can prevent or mitigate consequences. The key steps of LOPA include establishing consequence criteria, identifying scenarios, evaluating frequency and severity, examining protective layers, and comparing results to risk tolerance limits. LOPA is useful for decision making regarding safety systems and managing risks cost effectively.
This document provides an overview of fault tree analysis including:
- Fault tree analysis models possible failure combinations using logic gates like AND and OR to relate events leading to an undesired top event.
- It involves defining the system, top event, tree structure, then exploring each branch in detail until all failure pathways are identified.
- Boolean algebra is used to evaluate the tree qualitatively by finding minimal cut sets, and quantitatively by calculating failure probabilities.
- An example fault tree is provided for a simple electric motor circuit to demonstrate the construction process and rules.
This document provides an overview of Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), a semi-quantitative risk assessment tool. LOPA evaluates risk scenarios by analyzing the initiating event frequency, consequence severity if the scenario occurs, and likelihood of failure of independent protection layers. The document discusses how to identify scenarios and protection layers, estimate initiating event frequencies and protection layer failure probabilities, and calculate risk. LOPA is used to determine if sufficient protection layers exist to reduce risk to a tolerable level for a given scenario.
1. The document discusses various tools and techniques used in systems safety analysis, including preliminary hazard analysis, hazard classification, fault hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, failure mode and effects analysis, and technique for human error rate prediction.
2. Key tools covered are preliminary hazard analysis, used to identify hazard sources and potential accidents, and failure mode and effects analysis, which involves analyzing how components could malfunction and their downstream effects.
3. The document provides details on each tool, including how they are used to identify hazards, assess risk, and determine ways to eliminate or reduce risks in a system.
This document discusses operational risk management and system safety. It defines key terms like system safety, hazard probability, and hazard severity. It describes the system safety process which involves defining objectives, hazard identification, analysis, risk evaluation, and hazard controls. It also discusses failure modes and effects analysis. Overall, the document provides an overview of operational risk management processes like identifying hazards, assessing and analyzing risks, making control decisions, and supervising risk controls. It discusses how to make risk management decisions and defines terms like identified risk and acceptable risk.
The document discusses three standards related to safety integrity levels (SIL): IEC 61508, IEC 61511, and ANSI/ISA S84.01. It provides an overview of each standard, including their parts and scope. The key points are that IEC 61508 and 61511 define SIL on a scale from 1 to 4 based on reliability requirements for safety instrumented systems (SIS), while ANSI/ISA S84.01 was developed in parallel and also adopted by ANSI. The document then discusses various methods for assigning SILs to safety instrumented functions, including consequence-based, risk matrix, layered risk matrix, and layer of protection analysis (LOPA).
This position paper of the SIL Platform (www.nen.nl) indicates that it is common practice to operate process plants at maximum performance, optimum capacity and minimum risk levels. A Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is often determined through e.g. a Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) [1] [2]
[3], which is a means to quantify risks. However, LOPA is usually not the starting point for quantifying risks. This is often done with the use of a Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM). Contrary to LOPA and SIL, the use and type of RAM is not clearly pre-scribed or defined.
The intention of this guide is to provide guidance on RAM and show the relations between RAM, LOPA and SIL levels. What are the pitfalls? What is usually applied? What is often missed? It is not the intention to explain in detail the various available risk assessment techniques.
How to arrive at a SIL level in the correct manner leading to a qualitatively proper design and implementation is described in the EN-IEC 61511 standard [4]. Achieving a SIL requires amongst other aspects:
Correct identification of Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF)
Correct determination of required SIL rating of the various SIFs.
This guide strives to improve this quality by improving the quality of the risk assessment(s) providing input to the SIL determination. The targeted audience of this guide is the Dutch Process Industry Sector.
The document discusses various hazard analysis techniques used in industrial safety, including fault tree analysis (FTA) and failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). It provides an overview of FTA, including its basic structure, events, gates, functions, advantages, and disadvantages. It also summarizes FMEA, describing what a failure mode is, the uses and contents of a FMEA form, and the advantages and disadvantages of FMEA. The document aims to introduce these two key hazard analysis methods used for risk assessment in industrial systems.
Triconex is a leading supplier of emergency shutdown (ESD) systems that protect personnel, equipment, and the environment from hazardous situations. Their ESD systems use triple modular redundancy technology to ensure extremely high reliability and availability. By choosing a Triconex ESD system, customers can feel confident that their system will safely shutdown processes in an emergency without any single point of failure.
A Framework for Security Components Anomalies Severity Evaluation and Classif...IJNSA Journal
The document proposes a framework to evaluate and classify the severity of anomalies detected in network security components. It involves a four-step process: (1) detecting anomalies in components like firewalls, (2) evaluating the severity of anomalies using quantitative, semantic, and multi-anomaly criteria, (3) classifying anomalies by severity, and (4) correcting the anomalies. The paper focuses on steps 2 and 3, introducing metrics to evaluate anomaly severity based on the number of affected rules, impact on network services, and interactions between anomalies. Anomalies are then classified by severity to prioritize correction and identify vulnerabilities. A case study demonstrates applying the framework to a sample firewall configuration.
Failure analysis buisness impact-backup-archiveDavin Abraham
This document discusses failure analysis, business continuity, and backup strategies for IT systems. It covers identifying single points of failure, implementing redundancy, and performing business impact analysis. Backup methods like tape, disk, and archiving are compared, along with restoration processes. The key aspects covered are failure analysis, business impact analysis, backup technologies, and archiving.
FTA and FMEA Class
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a top-down deductive failure analysis technique that uses Boolean logic to analyze an undesired system state. FTA was originally developed in 1962 by Bell Laboratories to evaluate failure in missile launch control systems. FMEA is a structured approach to discovering potential failures early in product or process design. FMEA was developed by the US Military in the 1940s to reduce variation and potential failures in munitions production. Key aspects of FMEA include identifying failure modes, assigning severity, occurrence, and detection ratings, and calculating a risk priority number to determine the criticality of failures.
This document discusses safety standards for critical systems and proposes a new concept called Assured Reliability and Resilience Level (ARRL). It notes that while safety standards aim to reduce risk, their requirements differ across domains. The document argues that Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) alone are not sufficient and that Quality of Service is a more holistic criterion. It also notes standards provide little guidance on composing systems from components. The ARRL concept aims to address these issues and complement SIL by considering factors like component trustworthiness and fault behavior. The document suggests ARRL could help foster cross-domain safety engineering.
SIS “Final Element” Diagnostics Including The SOV, Using A Digital Valve Cont...Emerson Exchange
This document discusses using a digital valve controller to improve diagnostics and testing of safety instrumented system (SIS) final control elements. Traditional testing methods are difficult and costly. A digital valve controller allows for partial stroke testing online which improves reliability while reducing costs. It also enables solenoid valve health monitoring and diagnostic capabilities. Field experience from Ras Gas in Qatar demonstrated benefits like reduced labor and improved predictive maintenance through signature-based testing and continuous monitoring.
In this talk I explore the concepts of Failsafe Design and an example of implementing failsafe at the firmware/hardware interface, using LTSpice as a system tool to model and verify the failsafe approach. This has been applied to real systems that really exhibit the modeled failsafe behavior.
This document discusses functional safety and the certification process for functional safety compliance. It begins with definitions of safety from standards like IEC Guide 51 and discusses functional safety and how it protects against injury from incorrect system functioning. It then covers topics like low and high demand safety modes as defined in IEC 61508-4, safety strategies, the safety lifecycle, and certification requirements. It focuses on the process from the perspective of a company seeking certification and outlines some of the documentation, testing, and auditing requirements involved.
This document provides an overview and comparison of two machinery safety standards: EN 62061 and EN ISO 13849-1. It outlines the basic procedures for complying with machinery directives, including performing a risk assessment. EN 62061 focuses on functional safety for electrical/electronic control systems, using Safety Integrity Levels (SILs). EN ISO 13849-1 applies to all machinery and determines Performance Levels (PLs) based on factors like categories and probability of failure. The document provides details on how each standard specifies safety parameters and calculations for achieving the required safety level.
This document explains Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) which are used to quantify safety requirements for Safety Instrumented Systems. It discusses what SIL is, the four SIL levels and their required reliability, how SIL ratings are determined through a risk assessment process, and how hazards are protected against through a layered approach. The document also outlines the SIL life cycle including design, realization, and operation phases, how equipment failures can occur, and how a Safety Instrumented Function's performance is quantified through its Probability of Failure on Demand. It provides information on how components like actuators can be certified as "suitable for use" at a given SIL level and the role of proof and diagnostic testing.
LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis) is a technique used to evaluate risks from accident scenarios by estimating the likelihood and consequences of accidents, and determining if sufficient safety measures exist. It involves identifying scenarios, determining initiating event frequencies, identifying independent protection layers (IPLs) and their probability of failure, estimating risks, and comparing to a company's tolerable risk criteria. The key steps are: 1) identifying scenarios, 2) determining initiating event frequencies, 3) identifying IPLs and their failure probabilities, 4) estimating scenario risks, and 5) comparing risks to tolerability criteria.
This document provides an overview of fault tree analysis including:
- Fault tree analysis models possible failure combinations using logic gates like AND and OR to relate events leading to an undesired top event.
- It involves defining the system, top event, tree structure, then exploring each branch in detail until all failure pathways are identified.
- Boolean algebra is used to evaluate the tree qualitatively by finding minimal cut sets, and quantitatively by calculating failure probabilities.
- An example fault tree is provided for a simple electric motor circuit to demonstrate the construction process and rules.
This document provides an overview of Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), a semi-quantitative risk assessment tool. LOPA evaluates risk scenarios by analyzing the initiating event frequency, consequence severity if the scenario occurs, and likelihood of failure of independent protection layers. The document discusses how to identify scenarios and protection layers, estimate initiating event frequencies and protection layer failure probabilities, and calculate risk. LOPA is used to determine if sufficient protection layers exist to reduce risk to a tolerable level for a given scenario.
1. The document discusses various tools and techniques used in systems safety analysis, including preliminary hazard analysis, hazard classification, fault hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, failure mode and effects analysis, and technique for human error rate prediction.
2. Key tools covered are preliminary hazard analysis, used to identify hazard sources and potential accidents, and failure mode and effects analysis, which involves analyzing how components could malfunction and their downstream effects.
3. The document provides details on each tool, including how they are used to identify hazards, assess risk, and determine ways to eliminate or reduce risks in a system.
This document discusses operational risk management and system safety. It defines key terms like system safety, hazard probability, and hazard severity. It describes the system safety process which involves defining objectives, hazard identification, analysis, risk evaluation, and hazard controls. It also discusses failure modes and effects analysis. Overall, the document provides an overview of operational risk management processes like identifying hazards, assessing and analyzing risks, making control decisions, and supervising risk controls. It discusses how to make risk management decisions and defines terms like identified risk and acceptable risk.
The document discusses three standards related to safety integrity levels (SIL): IEC 61508, IEC 61511, and ANSI/ISA S84.01. It provides an overview of each standard, including their parts and scope. The key points are that IEC 61508 and 61511 define SIL on a scale from 1 to 4 based on reliability requirements for safety instrumented systems (SIS), while ANSI/ISA S84.01 was developed in parallel and also adopted by ANSI. The document then discusses various methods for assigning SILs to safety instrumented functions, including consequence-based, risk matrix, layered risk matrix, and layer of protection analysis (LOPA).
This position paper of the SIL Platform (www.nen.nl) indicates that it is common practice to operate process plants at maximum performance, optimum capacity and minimum risk levels. A Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is often determined through e.g. a Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) [1] [2]
[3], which is a means to quantify risks. However, LOPA is usually not the starting point for quantifying risks. This is often done with the use of a Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM). Contrary to LOPA and SIL, the use and type of RAM is not clearly pre-scribed or defined.
The intention of this guide is to provide guidance on RAM and show the relations between RAM, LOPA and SIL levels. What are the pitfalls? What is usually applied? What is often missed? It is not the intention to explain in detail the various available risk assessment techniques.
How to arrive at a SIL level in the correct manner leading to a qualitatively proper design and implementation is described in the EN-IEC 61511 standard [4]. Achieving a SIL requires amongst other aspects:
Correct identification of Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF)
Correct determination of required SIL rating of the various SIFs.
This guide strives to improve this quality by improving the quality of the risk assessment(s) providing input to the SIL determination. The targeted audience of this guide is the Dutch Process Industry Sector.
The document discusses various hazard analysis techniques used in industrial safety, including fault tree analysis (FTA) and failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). It provides an overview of FTA, including its basic structure, events, gates, functions, advantages, and disadvantages. It also summarizes FMEA, describing what a failure mode is, the uses and contents of a FMEA form, and the advantages and disadvantages of FMEA. The document aims to introduce these two key hazard analysis methods used for risk assessment in industrial systems.
Triconex is a leading supplier of emergency shutdown (ESD) systems that protect personnel, equipment, and the environment from hazardous situations. Their ESD systems use triple modular redundancy technology to ensure extremely high reliability and availability. By choosing a Triconex ESD system, customers can feel confident that their system will safely shutdown processes in an emergency without any single point of failure.
A Framework for Security Components Anomalies Severity Evaluation and Classif...IJNSA Journal
The document proposes a framework to evaluate and classify the severity of anomalies detected in network security components. It involves a four-step process: (1) detecting anomalies in components like firewalls, (2) evaluating the severity of anomalies using quantitative, semantic, and multi-anomaly criteria, (3) classifying anomalies by severity, and (4) correcting the anomalies. The paper focuses on steps 2 and 3, introducing metrics to evaluate anomaly severity based on the number of affected rules, impact on network services, and interactions between anomalies. Anomalies are then classified by severity to prioritize correction and identify vulnerabilities. A case study demonstrates applying the framework to a sample firewall configuration.
Failure analysis buisness impact-backup-archiveDavin Abraham
This document discusses failure analysis, business continuity, and backup strategies for IT systems. It covers identifying single points of failure, implementing redundancy, and performing business impact analysis. Backup methods like tape, disk, and archiving are compared, along with restoration processes. The key aspects covered are failure analysis, business impact analysis, backup technologies, and archiving.
FTA and FMEA Class
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a top-down deductive failure analysis technique that uses Boolean logic to analyze an undesired system state. FTA was originally developed in 1962 by Bell Laboratories to evaluate failure in missile launch control systems. FMEA is a structured approach to discovering potential failures early in product or process design. FMEA was developed by the US Military in the 1940s to reduce variation and potential failures in munitions production. Key aspects of FMEA include identifying failure modes, assigning severity, occurrence, and detection ratings, and calculating a risk priority number to determine the criticality of failures.
This document discusses safety standards for critical systems and proposes a new concept called Assured Reliability and Resilience Level (ARRL). It notes that while safety standards aim to reduce risk, their requirements differ across domains. The document argues that Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) alone are not sufficient and that Quality of Service is a more holistic criterion. It also notes standards provide little guidance on composing systems from components. The ARRL concept aims to address these issues and complement SIL by considering factors like component trustworthiness and fault behavior. The document suggests ARRL could help foster cross-domain safety engineering.
SIS “Final Element” Diagnostics Including The SOV, Using A Digital Valve Cont...Emerson Exchange
This document discusses using a digital valve controller to improve diagnostics and testing of safety instrumented system (SIS) final control elements. Traditional testing methods are difficult and costly. A digital valve controller allows for partial stroke testing online which improves reliability while reducing costs. It also enables solenoid valve health monitoring and diagnostic capabilities. Field experience from Ras Gas in Qatar demonstrated benefits like reduced labor and improved predictive maintenance through signature-based testing and continuous monitoring.
In this talk I explore the concepts of Failsafe Design and an example of implementing failsafe at the firmware/hardware interface, using LTSpice as a system tool to model and verify the failsafe approach. This has been applied to real systems that really exhibit the modeled failsafe behavior.
This document discusses functional safety and the certification process for functional safety compliance. It begins with definitions of safety from standards like IEC Guide 51 and discusses functional safety and how it protects against injury from incorrect system functioning. It then covers topics like low and high demand safety modes as defined in IEC 61508-4, safety strategies, the safety lifecycle, and certification requirements. It focuses on the process from the perspective of a company seeking certification and outlines some of the documentation, testing, and auditing requirements involved.
This document provides an overview and comparison of two machinery safety standards: EN 62061 and EN ISO 13849-1. It outlines the basic procedures for complying with machinery directives, including performing a risk assessment. EN 62061 focuses on functional safety for electrical/electronic control systems, using Safety Integrity Levels (SILs). EN ISO 13849-1 applies to all machinery and determines Performance Levels (PLs) based on factors like categories and probability of failure. The document provides details on how each standard specifies safety parameters and calculations for achieving the required safety level.
This document explains Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) which are used to quantify safety requirements for Safety Instrumented Systems. It discusses what SIL is, the four SIL levels and their required reliability, how SIL ratings are determined through a risk assessment process, and how hazards are protected against through a layered approach. The document also outlines the SIL life cycle including design, realization, and operation phases, how equipment failures can occur, and how a Safety Instrumented Function's performance is quantified through its Probability of Failure on Demand. It provides information on how components like actuators can be certified as "suitable for use" at a given SIL level and the role of proof and diagnostic testing.
LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis) is a technique used to evaluate risks from accident scenarios by estimating the likelihood and consequences of accidents, and determining if sufficient safety measures exist. It involves identifying scenarios, determining initiating event frequencies, identifying independent protection layers (IPLs) and their probability of failure, estimating risks, and comparing to a company's tolerable risk criteria. The key steps are: 1) identifying scenarios, 2) determining initiating event frequencies, 3) identifying IPLs and their failure probabilities, 4) estimating scenario risks, and 5) comparing risks to tolerability criteria.
The document discusses safety systems used in industrial plants, including emergency shutdown systems (ESD), process shutdown systems (PSD), and fire and gas control systems (F&G). It defines these terms and describes their objectives, typical components, and functions. Safety is measured by factors like average probability of failure on demand (PFDavg) and risk reduction factor (RRF). The document also covers related topics like hazard analysis, risk, reliability, availability, and definitions of key safety terminology.
This document provides an overview and definitions related to Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS). It discusses the need for SIS to protect personnel, equipment, and the environment from hazardous events in industries like chemical and oil & gas. SIS are designed to reduce the likelihood or impact of emergencies. The document defines common SIS terms and describes the basic components and purpose of SIS, which include sensors to detect process parameters, a logic solver to determine necessary actions, and final control elements like valves to isolate the process. It also discusses the concept of layers of protection to prevent and mitigate hazardous events, with SIS comprising the final active prevention layer.
This document discusses machine safety and achieving regulatory compliance. It provides an overview of a training session that will discuss identifying and addressing safety concerns based on new global standards. The session agenda includes discussing safety functional requirements, the risk assessment process, the concept of risk, an overview of the evolution of safety standards, and the safety life cycle. The document provides background on how new functional safety standards like ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 evaluate safety systems based on their performance rather than categories, and the transition from the old EN954 standard. It also explains the risk assessment process and how it is used to identify hazards, estimate risks, and iteratively reduce risks to an acceptable level to inform the design of safety systems.
This document discusses Safety Integrity Level (SIL) and how it is used to quantify safety in industrial processes. It provides background on the development of international safety standards and defines key terms like SIL, Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF), Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD), and Safe Failure Fraction (SFF). The document explains how hazards analysis is used to determine target SIL levels for safety systems and instrumentation. It also outlines methods for evaluating SIL, including Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEDA) and proven in use testing. Overall, the document provides a comprehensive overview of applying SIL standards to ensure safety in industrial control systems.
This document provides an overview of functional safety. It begins with definitions of functional safety and discusses relevant standards like IEC 61508. It then explains the functional safety lifecycle and certification process. This includes performing a hazard and risk analysis, defining safety requirements, and conducting audits. Examples of functional safety products are also provided. The document discusses how functional safety applies to electrical and programmable electronic safety systems and their role in risk reduction. It outlines approaches to achieve hardware safety integrity through techniques like redundancy, detection, and reliability.
1) The document discusses fault detection, consequence prevention, and control of defeat for critical systems. It provides information on designing redundancy, diagnostics, and fault tolerance to ensure systems can still function even if a component fails.
2) When taking a critical safety device out of service for maintenance, a formal Control of Defeat process is required to provide alternate protection and notify all relevant parties of the change.
3) Failure to follow proper Control of Defeat procedures when disabling a critical safety device, such as switching off a collision warning system without plans for alternate protection, can have severe consequences like loss of life if an incident occurs.
The document discusses Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) which is a step-by-step approach to identify all possible failures in a design. It defines key terms like failure modes, effects and criticality. The document outlines the phases, purpose, benefits and techniques of FMECA including hardware and functional approaches. It provides examples of applying FMECA to analyze components and recommends corrective actions to address high risks.
Fault Tree Analysis in Maintenance Principlessshoaib1
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a deductive reasoning technique that uses a graphic model called a fault tree to display combinations of equipment failures and human errors that can result in an accident event. The fault tree breaks down an accident into basic causes to identify preventive measures. FTA provides a listing of minimum sets of failures sufficient to cause the event. It is used in design to uncover hidden failures and in operation to study potential accident combinations. FTA requires understanding system functions, failure modes, and probabilistic data when evaluating fault trees quantitatively.
This document provides an introduction to functional safety and an overview of IEC 61508, an international standard on functional safety. It defines functional safety as safety that depends on a system operating correctly in response to inputs. Functional safety is achieved through safety functions performed by safety-related systems. IEC 61508 provides a framework for achieving functional safety in electrical, electronic, and programmable electronic systems by defining safety integrity levels and requiring safety lifecycle activities like hazard and risk analysis. The standard can be applied directly or serve as the basis for other functional safety standards.
This document provides an introduction to functional safety for machinery. It defines functional safety and explains that it involves ensuring automatic actions occur to reach a safe state. The document discusses relevant functional safety standards like ISO 13849 and IEC 61508. It also examines functional safety concepts like risk assessments, safety integrity levels, safety elements involving structure, reliability, diagnostics and systematic capability. The document uses an example safety circuit diagram to demonstrate functional safety concepts like input channel fault detection.
ARRL: A Criterion for Composable Safety and Systems EngineeringVincenzo De Florio
While safety engineering standards define rigorous and controllable
processes for system development, safety standards’ differences in distinct
domains are non-negligible. This paper focuses in particular on the aviation,
automotive, and railway standards, all related to the transportation market.
Many are the reasons for the said differences, ranging from historical reasons,
heuristic and established practices, and legal frameworks, but also from the
psychological perception of the safety risks. In particular we argue that the
Safety Integrity Levels are not sufficient to be used as a top level requirement
for developing a safety-critical system. We argue that Quality of Service is a
more generic criterion that takes the trustworthiness as perceived by users better
into account. In addition, safety engineering standards provide very little
guidance on how to compose safe systems from components, while this is the
established engineering practice. In this paper we develop a novel concept
called Assured Reliability and Resilience Level as a criterion that takes the
industrial practice into account and show how it complements the Safety
Integrity Level concept.
This document discusses domino effect analysis, which predicts the occurrence and consequences of incidents that could propagate from one item to nearby items. It describes analyzing domino incidents by increasing either the consequences of an incident at a fixed frequency, or the failure frequency of an incident at fixed consequences. Two approaches are fault tree analysis and event tree analysis. The document provides examples and outlines the process of domino incident investigation and analysis.
Proposed Algorithm for Surveillance ApplicationsEditor IJCATR
Technological systems are vulnerable to faults. In many fault situations, the system operation has to be stopped to avoid
damage to machinery and humans. As a consequence, the detection and the handling of faults play an increasing role in modern
technology, where many highly automated components interact in a complex way such that a fault in a single component may cause
the malfunction of the whole system. This work introduces the main ideas of fault diagnosis and fault-tolerant control under the optics
of various research work done in this area. It presents the Arduino technology in both hardware and software sides. The purpose of this
paper is to propose a diagnostic algorithm based on this technology. A case study is proposed for this setting. Moreover, we explained
and discussed the result of our algorithm.
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4. RAMS - DEFINITIONS
Reliability – the probability that an item can perform a required
function under given conditions for a given time interval.
Availability – the ability of a product to be in a state to perform a
required function under given conditions at a given instant of time
or over a given time interval assuming that the required external
resources are provided.
Maintainability – the probability that a given maintenance action, for
an item under given conditions of use can be carried out within a
stated time interval when the maintenance is performed under
stated conditions and using stated procedures and resources.
Safety – freedom from unacceptable risk of harm. (EN50126)
Quality – a users perception about the attributes of a product.
(EN50129) NOTE: Quality is NOT testing!
5. IS IT A FAULT, AN ERROR, OR A
FAILURE? (1)
Fault
• An abnormal condition that could lead to an error in a system. A fault can be
random or systematic.
Examples: a defective hardware component or a software bug.
Error
• A deviation from the intended design which could result in unintended system
behaviour or state within the system boundary. E.g. excessive stress on a
hardware component due to a fault in another component, or a handled
software exemption (say divide by zero).
Failure
• A deviation from the specified performance of a system visible at the
system boundary. A failure is a consequence of a fault or error in a system.
Failures may be graded depending on their effect on the operation of the
system e.g. minor, significant, major etc. E.g. unnecessary emergency brake
application in an ATP system.
6. IS IT A FAULT, AN ERROR, OR A
FAILURE? (2)
Dormant (or latent) faults/errors
• Are faults/errors that have occurred but lie undetected and do not lead to a
failure (unless perhaps in a combination with other faults/errors).
So what is a HAZARD?
Hazard – A physical situation with the potential to cause harm
N A hazard is NOT an accident e.g. electrocution is
not a hazard it is an accident
N A hazard is NOT an event
N A hazard IS a “state of a system” e.g. an exposed voltage is a hazard
N It is an error or a failure
7. FAULTS, ERRORS, AND FAILURES
– WHAT IS WHAT?
Sub-System
Fault Error Failure
System
Fault Error Failure -> Hazard Accident
N Faults cannot be avoided but failures can be prevented
N Unrecognised faults become failures
8. WHY NOT DETECTING A SINGLE
FAULT IS FATAL
Some time later…
0 .. right
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 .. straight
Voted: 1 Voted: 1
FAULT 1 (undetected) FAULT 2 (undetected)
0 1 1 0 0 1
Voted: 1 Voted: 0 FAILURE
9. SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVEL
SIL4 means roughly 25+
years of continuous
operation without any
safety-critical faultILURE
FA
THR … Tolerable Hazard Rate
10. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA)
FTA is a top down analysis technique used for finding the causes of the top
event
The top even is usually a system hazard
The analysis proceeds by considering the immediate, necessary and
sufficient causes of the top event
These causes are drawn on the tree using logic gates to show their
combination
When all immediate causes have been identified then the analysis moves
down to these causes and finds what were their immediate causes
The analysis completes when it gets down to the basic events that cannot
be broken down any further
FTA can be quantified by assigning the probabilities to the basic events and
using Boolean algebra to calculate the probability of the top event
19. RISK REDUCTION
METHODS (OVERVIEW)
Measures to be considered in priority order are
Remove the hazard or the causes of the hazard
or eliminate the effects at the design phase
1st – Elimination (E.g. operate at a safe working voltage).
A hazardous element is substituted with a
2nd – Substitution nonhazardous element. E.g. specify fireproof
cables when fire is a hazard.
Safety guards/safety barriers are inserted to
3rd – Engineering controls minimise the exposure or probability of a
hazard, i.e., isolating the hazard. The hazard
remains and becomes active if the defence is
4th – Administrative controls for any reason removed. E.g. of measures are
• simplification
• decoupling
• redundancy
5th – Providing protective
systems/subsystems/products/equipment.
20. EN50126
„Railway applications – The specification and demonstration
of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS)“
• General discussion of RAMS
• Introduces risk assessment and the risk assessment matrix
• Introduces Safety Integrity Levels
• Defines a system life-cycle made up of fourteen phases and
describes typical general, RAM and Safety tasks in each
phase.
• Describes the V representation of the life-cycle
22. EN 50128
„Railway applications – Communications, signalling and processing
systems – Software for railway control and protection systems“
• Describes software development lifecycle and the inputs,
requirements and outputs for each phase
• Annex A (normative) provides tables of techniques and measures
to be applied at each phase according to SIL of the software (SIL
0 to SIL4)
• Each technique/measure is given a rating from Mandatory, Highly
Recommended, Recommended, No Recommendation to Not
Recommended
• Some tables give sets of techniques/measures that can be used
in combinations to meet a particular SIL
• Annex B (informative) gives a brief description of each of the
techniques
27. EN 50129
„Railway applications – Communications, signalling and processing
systems – Safety related electronic systems for signalling”
• Describes the structure and expected content of a safety case
• Annex A (normative) describes how Safety Integrity Levels are
determined and gives the SIL versus THR table.
• Annex B (normative) gives detail technical requirements for the
content of the Technical Safety Report part of the safety case
• Annex C (normative) describes expected failure modes of
components
• Annex D (informative) gives information on analysing
independence of items
• Annex E (informative) gives techniques recommended for
different stages in the development life-cycle against SIL0 to SIL4
28. SOME MORE…..
EN 50121-3-2/ IEC 62236-3-2 Railway applications - Electromagnetic
compatibility Part 3-2: Rolling Stock – Apparatus
EN 50121- 4 / IEC 62236-4 Railway applications – Electromagnetic
compatibility. Part 4: Emission and immunity of the signalling and
telecommunications apparatus
EN 50124-1 Railway applications - Insulation coordination - Part 1: Basic
requirements - Clearances and creepage distances for all electrical and
electronic equipment
EN 50125-1 Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 1: Equipment
on board rolling stock
EN 50125-3 Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 3: Equipment
for signalling and telecommunications.
EN 50153 Rolling stock - Protective provisions relating to electrical
hazards
EN 50155 Railway applications - Electronic equipment used on rolling
stock
29. WHAT IS
VERIFICATION?
Confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that the
specified process requirements have been fulfilled (EN50126)
Activity of determination, by review and inspection, that the output of each
phase of the life-cycle fulfils the requirements of the previous phase
(EN50128)
The activity of determination, by review and inspection, at each phase of the
lifecycle, that the requirements of the phase under consideration meet the
output of the previous phase and that the output of the phase under
consideration fulfils the requirements (EN50129)
Conclusions?
• Verification can be review or inspection
• Its specific to a particular object (e.g. document, module of code etc.) or
lifecycle phase
• It makes sure the object has been produced according to the specified inputs
30. WHAT IS
VALIDATION?
Confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that the
particular requirements for a specified intended use have been fulfilled
(EN50126)
Activity of demonstration, by analysis and test, that the product meets, in all
respects, its specified requirements (EN50128)
The activity applied in order to demonstrate, by test and analysis, that the
product meets in all respects its specified requirements (EN50129)
Conclusions?
• Validation can be analysis or test
• Validation involves demonstration
• Validation applies to a complete product or system
• Validation ensures the product or system meets its specified requirements
31. TESTING TYPES
Functional testing
Performance testing
• Aims to check the quantified system requirements, e.g. does it do what is
supposed to do in the required time, or under maximum load/stress, or
without using more power than it is allowed to etc.
Usability testing
• Usability test to examine how people use a system to find problems and
improvements
Destructive testing
• To find the limits of operation.
Robustness testing
• E.g. Turn the main supply off – will it start up again properly
Degraded mode testing
• E.g. Tests with some parts of the system failed.
32. TEST PHASES (1)
Sub-System testing
• aims to find problems with sub-systems where test coverage is
easier to manage and faults easier to localize, rather than attempting
the same thing in a system test
Integration testing
• To ensure sub-systems interface together correctly
System Tests
• With the complete system in the laboratory to exercise as much of the
system requirements as feasible
Product Qualification Tests
• Type tests e.g. heat, cold, damp, EMC, vibration, pollutants etc.
• Special tests e.g. re-type testing a product from the manufacturing
line to show initial type tests are still valid
Manufacturing Tests
33. TEST PHASES (2)
Factory Acceptance Test
• A test to ensure the system is ready to be taken to site
Site Acceptance Test
• An acceptance test for and with the customer
Field Trials
• Environmental conditions
• Operating procedures
Set-to-work testing
• To ensure sub-system or system at least performs its basic
functions, as a prerequisite to more extensive testing
Installation testing
• To find installation errors (bell tests, insulation tests)
34. TEST PHASES (3)
Commissioning tests
• Correspondence tests (e.g. right light at right cable branch?)
Safety Qualification Test
• Testing in operation but with additional safety controls in place (e.g.
limited speed, backup monitoring systems etc.)
Field Operational Performance Tests
• E.g. headway and schedule running tests
RAM Proving Tests
• Obtaining real RAM figures for the system in operation to
demonstrate the results of the RAM analysis
35. AUTOMATIC TESTING
Wherever feasible automatic testing is to be preferred, the
benefits are
• Doesn’t suffer from human errors caused by boredom,
fatigue, lack of motivation, repetition etc.
• Makes 100% regression tests feasible
• Repeatability
• Can work 24 hours a day
But there are issues too
• You need to design the test system first!
• Verification of the test data
• Validation of the test system
• What SIL do the simulators need to be?
• Maybe slow to setup so delays early testing
Not much used today in this industry, slowly coming
36. TOOLS, AND WHY TO SELECT
THEM CAREFULLY
Tool Classes T1-T3 (EN50128:2011)
Class T1
• generates no outputs which can directly or indirectly contribute to the
executable code (including data) of the software
Class T2
• supports the test or verification of the design or executable code,
where errors in the tool can fail to reveal defects but cannot directly
create errors in the executable software
Class T3
• generates outputs which can directly or indirectly contribute to the
executable code (including data) of the safety related system
37. TOOL CLASS REQUIREMENTS
(EN50128)
„All tools in classes T2 and T3 shall have a specification or manual which clearly
defines the behaviour of the tool and any instructions or constraints on its use”
“For each tool in class T3, evidence shall be available that the output of the tool
conforms to the specification of the output or failures in the output are detected.
Evidence may be based on the same steps necessary for a manual process as a
replacement for the tool and an argument presented if these steps are replaced by
alternatives (e. g. validation of the tool). Evidence may also be based on
• a) a suitable combination of history of successful use in similar environments and for
similar applications (within the organisation or other organisations),
• b) tool validation as specified in 6.7.4.5,
• c) diverse redundant code which allows the detection and control of failures resulting
in faults introduced by a tool,
• d) compliance with the safety integrity levels derived from the risk analysis of the
process and procedures including the tools,
• e) other appropriate methods for avoiding or handling failures introduced by tools.”
39. MAIN PROBLEMS (2)
• Single-Pass V life-cycle
• Testing manual, late in the project
• Long setup-phase for project
• Extensive reviews
• Traceability
• Documentation
• Documentation
• Documentation
• Did I mention:
• Documentation?
40. STRATEGY USING
AN AGILE APPROACH
Reduce cycle-time (1 month vs 1-3 years) to:
• reduce batch-size
• manage complexity step by step
• perform activities as early and often as possible
• provide feedback