The document discusses process safety and functional safety. It covers topics like hazard and risk assessments, safety instrumented systems (SIS), safety integrity levels (SIL), and the safety lifecycle described in standards like IEC 61511. The purpose of process safety management is to reduce the frequency and severity of chemical accidents by implementing layers of protection that can include inherently safer design, equipment reliability, formal safety assessments, operating procedures, training and emergency response. Functional safety focuses specifically on instrumented safety systems and ensuring safety instrumented functions are designed and maintained to a reliability suitable for their risk reduction purpose.

1. Luis Avila
Functional Safety Engineer TUV #
Safety Life Cycle Seminar
For the Process Industry Sector

2. Not all activities in life are
safe…

3. …and we have different levels of risk
tolerance

4. Fall
Prevention
Personal
Protective
Equipment
Structural
Design
Ergonomics Work
Schedules
Employee
Training
Mechanical
Integrity
Management
Of Change
Policies &
Procedures
Process
safety
Personal
safety
Inherently
Safer
Design
Functional
Safety
Risk
Assessments
Facility
Siting
Total
Recordables
Emergency
Response
Safety
Audits
Occupational
safety

5. Process safety
Employee
Training
Mechanical
Integrity
Management
Of Change
Policies &
Procedures
Inherently
Safer
Design
Functional
Safety
Risk
Assessments
Facility
Siting
Emergency
Response
Safety
Audits

6. Bhopal, India, 1984
Chernobyl, Russia, 1986
Piper Alpha, UK, 1988
Texas City Refinery, USA, 2004
Why do accidents happen?

7. “You can have a very
good accident rate for
‘hard hat’ accidents
but not for process
ones.”

8. “The fact that you’ve
had 20 years without
a catastrophic event
is no guarantee that
there won’t be one
tomorrow.”

9. Process safety
Employee
Training
Mechanical
Integrity
Management
Of Change
Policies &
Procedures
Inherently
Safer
Design
Risk
Assessments
Facility
Siting
Emergency
Response
Safety
Audits
Functional
Safety
Functional
Safety

10. Functional safety
IEC 61511
PFDavg
LOPA
RRF
SIS
HAZOP
SRS
PHA
IEC 61508
FMEDA
BPCS
SIL
SIF

11. The purpose of Process safety management is to reduce the
frequency and severity of potentially catastrophic chemical
accidents

12. IEC61508:
All Industries
IEC61511:
Process Industry Sector
IEC62061:
Machinery Sector
IEC61513 :
Nuclear Sector
For product designers
and manufacturers
For system designers
integrators and users
ISA 84.01 mirrors IEC61511

14. Source: http://www.wordle.net/show/wrdl/2276332/IEC_61511

16. BPCS
• Basic Process
Control System
• Also: DCS, PAS
• PID Control
• Discrete control
• Sequencing
• Batch automation
• Dynamic
Control
element
Transmitter
Controller
Workstation

17. Final
element
Transmitter
Logic
solver
SIS
• Safety Instrumented
System
• Emergency
Shutdown (ESD)
• Burner Management
System (BMS)
• Fire & Gas System
(FGS)
A Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is defined as an instrumented system used
to implement one or more safety instrumented functions (SIF) composed of any
combination of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final elements(s). These systems
are designed to take action to bring the equipment under control to a safe state
when a process is beyond the range of normal operating limits and other layers
of control, including operators and the basic process control system (BPCS), are
unable keep the process within safe operating limits.

18. ICSS
BPCS SIS

19. Safety
function
Process conditions What to do SIL
SIF #1 High level Drive output 1 1
SIF #2 High pressure Drive outputs 1 + 2 3
SIF #2
SIF #1

20. PHA
• Identify hazards
• Evaluate safeguards
SRS
• Define SIF’s
• Define SIL for each SIF
Design
• Specify devices
• Design architecture
Verify
• Verify SIL meets SRS

21. PHA
HAZOP
What If?
Checklist
FMEA
Fault Tree
Event Tree
LOPA

22. SIL General description
4 Catastrophic community impact
3 Employee & community impact
2
Major Property and Production Impact;
Possible Injury to Employee
1 Minor Property and Production Impact

23. PFDSIF1 = PFDPT-101 + PFDlogic solver + PFDFV-101
SIF #1
FV-101
Logic
solver
PT-101

24. SIL PFDavg RRF
4 ≥10-5 to <10-4 >10,000 to ≤ 100,000
3 ≥10-4 to <10-3 >1000 to ≤ 10,000
2 ≥10-3 to <10-2 >100 to ≤ 1000
1 ≥10-2 to <10-1 >10 to ≤ 100
Source: IEC 61511-1, Table 3 – Safety Integrity Levels: probability of failure on demand

25. Functional safety
IEC 61511
PFDavg
LOPA
RRF
SIS
HAZOP
SRS
PHA
IEC 61508
FMEDA
BPCS
SIL
SIF
TÜV

27. Safety Lifecycle
Management

28. The IEC 61511 Safety lifecycle

29. Safety Lifecycle Management

30. Functional Safety Management

31. Safety
Management
System
Organization and resources
Risk evaluation and risk management
Planning
Implementation and Monitoring
Assessment, auditing, and revisions
Configuration Management

32. Safety Managent System
The SMS should address the following:
 Functional safety management
 Safety organization
 Safety leadership team
 SIS management team
 Project leadership
 Safety audit and revision
 Competency policy
 Safety lifecycle
 Supporting processes
 Selection and approval of contractors
 Selection and approval of supplier equipment
 Selection and approval of safety tools
 Safety modification process.

33. Safety
Management
System
Quality
Management
System
• Organization and responsibilities
• Competency management
• Documentation structure and control
• Configuration management
• Supplier assessment process

34. Organization and Responsibilities
• Responsible for functional safety
policies and procedures
• Responsible for ensuring of
policies and procedures are
implemented by organization
Safety
Management
Team
• Responsible for
functional safety
management on projects
Project Leadership
• Competent
personnel doing
work on SIS
Safety Roles
Safety
Leadership
Team

35. Safety
Role
Safety
Activities
Mgmt. &
Leadership
skills
Experience
Knowledge
& Training
Competency
Requirements

37. • Activity / phaseVerification
• Installed and
commissioned SISValidation
• Overall process riskAssessment
• Procedures, policies
and processesAudit
Safety
Management
System
Safety
Requirements
Specification
Activity /
phase
objectives
Process
Hazards
Analysis

38. Verify

39. Source: IEC 61511-1, Figure 12 – Software development lifecycle (the V-Model)

40. Functional
safety
assessment
Hazard and risk assessment is carried out
PHA recommendations are implemented.
Design change procedures are in place and
implemented
Recommendations from the previous
assessment are resolved
SIS is properly validated against the SRS.
Procedures are in place for the Operate phase.
Employees are trained.
Future assessment plans are in place.

41. Safety Life-cycle Structure and Planning

42. Safety Lifecycle Planning
Ensure
safety
Criteria
Techniques Measures
Procedures

43. Verification Planning
Who?
• Responsible parties
• Levels of independence
What?
• Verification activities
• Items to be verified
• Information to be verified against
When?
• At which points verification will occur
How?
• Procedures, measures, techniques to be used
• Non-conformance management
• Tools and supporting analysis

44. Safety life-cycle structure

46. Analysis Phase

48. Hazard and risk
assessment
Allocation of safety functions to
protection layers
Source: IEC 61511-3, Figure 4 – Risk and safety integrity concepts

49. Source: IEC 61511-3, Figure 2

50. Containment,
Dike/Vessel Passive protection layer
Emergency response layer
Plant and
Emergency
Response
Operator
Intervention
Process control layer
Fire and Gas
System Active protection layer
Prevent
Mitigate
Process control layer
SIS
Emergency
Shutdown
System
Safety layer
Process
Value Normal behavior
Trip level alarm
Operator
intervention
Process alarm
Emergency
shutdown
BPCS
Incident

51. Unacceptable
Risk Region
Negligible
Risk Region
ALARP Risk
Region
Inherent Risk
of Process
Consequence
L
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
SIL3
Overall Risk
SIL2
SIL1
SIS Risk
Reduction
Overall Risk
Baseline Risk
Non-SIS
Preventative
Safeguards
Non-SIS
Mitigating
Safeguards
Overall Risk

52. As low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP)
10-3 / man-year (worker)
10-5 / man-year (worker)
10-4 /year (public)
Intolerable Risk
Negligible Risk
ALARP or Tolerable
Risk Region
10-6 /year (public)

53. Government mandates for tolerable
risk levels
10-2
10-3 10-4 10-5 10-6 10-7 10-8
Australia (NSW) -
Hong Kong -
Netherlands -
United Kingdom -
10-9
 The United States does not set tolerable risk levels, or offer
guidelines.

54. Chemical industry benchmarks for
tolerable risk
10-2 10-3 10-4 10-5 10-6 10-7 10-8
Company I -
Company II -
Company III -
Small companies -
10-9
 Large, multinational chemical companies tend to set levels consistent
with international mandates
 Smaller companies tend to operate in wider ranges and implicitly, at
higher levels of risk

55. Quantitative Risk Assessment
• Time consuming
• Resource intensive
• Complex, difficult to use
• Can produce same results via
qualitative analysis
• More rigorous
• Least conservative
• Good for complex scenarios
• Better quantification of
incremental protection layers

56. Qualitative Risk Assessment
• High subjectivity
• Inconsistent results
• Hard to document rationale
• Not much resolution between
protection layers
• Easy to use
• Good for subjective
consequence assessment
• Good for screening and
categorizing hazards
• Team approach provides better
evaluations

57. Risk Reduction
Risk is recuded by one of two ways
 Prevention – Reducing the likelihood of a risk
No smoking policies enforced around gasoline pumps reduce the
likelihood of a fire, but don’t change the consequence of a fire
 Mitigation – Reducing the consequence of a risk
Fire insurance reduces the financial consequence of a fire, but
don’t do anything to change the likelihood of a fire
Either prevention of mitigation will reduce risk. A combination fo both
might be more effective than either alone

58. Prevention – Reducing likelihood
 Avoidance – Avoiding a hazardous activity altogether
 Simplification – Minimizing or eliminating the chances for human error
or equipment failure.
 Substitution – Replacing process chemicals, technology or process
equipment with less hazardous options
 Primary contaiment – Using equipment designed or built to higher
codes or standards
 Process Control – Using automated procedures and control systems
to reduce or limit the demands on the process
 Detection and suppression – Provide independent active systems
wich override the normal process when unsafe conditions are
detected

59. Mitigation – Reducing Consequence
 Reduction – Reducing the amount of hazardous chemical used or
stored in process, reducing the number og dangerous pieces of
equipment in use
 Dilution – Operating with large volumes of reduced concentrations so
that the outcome of release will be less intense.
 Intensification – Operating at a more intense conditions sp that rates
can be maintained with less chemical in the process.
 Secondary Contaiment – Using systems capable of capturing and
holding releases until they can be safely trated.
 Emergency Response – Providing training, plans and capabilities for
plant staff, public safety personnel and general public to react
appropiately a hazardous event

60. Hazard and Risk Assessment
 Objetive: This assessment is conducted to identify hazards and hazardous
events of the process and associated equipment, process risks,
requirements for risk reduction, and safety functions necessary to achieve an
acceptable level of risk.
 Outputs: A description of the hazards, of the required safety function(s), and
of the associated risks, including:
 Identified hazardous events and contributing factors
 Consequences and likelihood of the event
 Consideration of operational conditions (startup, normal, shutdown)
 Required risk reduction to achieve required safety
 References and assumptions
 Allocation of safety functions to layers of protection
 Identified safety functions as SIFs.
 Responsibility: Process Manufacturer

61. PHA
HAZOP
What If?
Checklist
FMEA
Fault Tree
Event Tree
LOPA
Process Hazards and Risk Assesment
Methods

62. Fault Tree to Calculate Fault Prob

63. Calculate the Prob of independent OR
gate

64. Calculate the Probality of the AND
gate

65. Calculating the Probability of AND gate

66. Item Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Action
Vessel High level Failure of
BPCS
High pressure Operator
High pressure 1) High level
2) External
fire
Release to
environment
1) Alarm
operator,
protection
layer
2) Deluge
system
Evaluate
conditions for
release to
environment
Low / no flow Failure of
BPCS
No consequence of
interest
Reverse flow No consequence of
interest

67. Qualitative risk analysis –
Safety layer matrix
Consequence
Severity
Category SIL Requirement
Extensive 3 3 3* 1 2 3 1 1
Serious 1 2 3 1 2
Minor 1 2 1
Consequence
Frequency
Category
Low
Med
High
Low
Med
High
Low
Med
High
1 2 3
Number of non-SIS Protection Layers

68. SIL 1
51%
SIL 2
32%
SIL 3
8%
SIL 4
1%
No SIL
8%
Process Industry I/O by Safety Integrity Level
Source: Exida Safety and Critical Control Systems in Process and Machine Automation July 2007

69. Safety Requirement Specification

70. Safety Requirement Specification
The SRS specifies the requirements for the SIS in
terms of the required safety instrumented functions
in order to achieve the required functional safety.
Responsibility: Process manufacturer with
support from the engineering contractor and/or
SIS supplier

71. SRS Should include:
 Identified all SIFs necessary for required functional safety
 Identified common cause failures
 Defined safe state for each SIF. (Normally energized, Normally de-energized)
 Demand rate for SIFs
 Proof test intervals
 Response time required
 SIL for each SIF
 SIS process measurements and trip points
 SIS process outputs for successful operation
 Relationship of inputs, outputs and logic required
 Manual shutdown, overrides, inhibits, and bypass requirements
 Starting up and resetting of SIS
 Allowable spurious trip rate
 SIF requirements for each operational mode
 Meantime to repair for SIS
 Identified dangerous combination of SIS output states
 Identified extreme environmental conditions
 Identified normal and abnormal modes and requirements for SIS to survive
 major event.

72. Primary Causes of SIS Failure
Primary Causes of SIS Failure
14% Design &
Implement
6% Installation &
Commisioning
44 % Specification
15% Operation and
Maint
21% Changes after
Commisioning
Source: Health, Safety excecutive Agency (USA)

74. Implementation Phase

75. Implementation Phase

76. Implementation Phase

77. Design and Engineering of the
Safety Instrumented System
Select
technology
Select
architecture
Determine test
philosophy
Reliability
evaluation
Detailed
design
Iterate if
requirements
are not met.

78. Technology selection
Select
technology
Select
architecture
Determine test
philosophy
Reliability
evaluation
Detailed
design
 Sensors
– Analog vs. discrete signal
– Smart vs. conventional transmitter
– Certified vs. proven-in-use

79. SIS Design and Engineering

80. Pressure
50%
Temperature
13%
Flow
8%
Level
8%
Fire and Gas
21%
Sensor Sales by
Measurement Type

81. PFD
PFD
PFD
User proves
It’s safe
SIS Application?
Certified Prior-Use
Mfg proves
It’s safe
User proves
It’s safe

82. Technology selection
Select
technology
Select
architecture
Determine test
philosophy
Reliability
evaluation
Detailed
design
 Logic solver
– Relays vs. PLC vs. Safety PLC
– HART I/O vs. conventional analog
– Centralized vs. modular
– Integrated vs. Standalone

84. 1oo2
2oo3
2oo2
1oo2D
2oo4
Safety PLC
(SIS Logic Solver)
Centralized Logic Solver
– 100’s of SIF’s in one box.
– Good for large projects.
– Single point of failure.
Modular Logic Solver
– Isolates SIF’s
– Scalable for large & small
projects
– Eliminates single point of
failure.

85. Source: ARC Advisory Group

86. Technology selection
Select
technology
Select
architecture
Determine test
philosophy
Reliability
evaluation
Detailed
design
 Final element
– Solenoid vs. DVC
– Automated vs. manual diagnostics
– Response time considerations

87. SIL 2
Proof Test Interval (years)
PFD

88. Architecture selection
Select
technology
Select
architecture
Determine test
philosophy
Reliability
evaluation
Detailed
design
 Hardware fault tolerance (HFT)
impacts performance
– Safety integrity
– Availability
– SIL capability

89. Architecture (MooN) 1oo1 2oo2 1oo2
Valve count (N) 1 2 2
Number to trip (M) 1 2 1
Safety HFT 0 0 1
Availability HFT 0 1 0
Valve
HFTs(MooN) = N – M
HFTa(MooN) = M – 1
Valve 1
Valve 2
Valve 2Valve 1

90. Dangerous
undetected
failures
Dangerous
detected
Safe detected
Safe
undetected
Safe failure
fraction

91. Device
Type
SFF HFTs = 0 HFTs = 1
Type A
<60% SIL1 SIL2
60% to < 90% SIL2 SIL3
90% to < 99% SIL3 SIL4
≥ 99% SIL3 SIL4
Type B
<60% Not allowed SIL1
60% to < 90% SIL1 SIL2
90% to < 99% SIL2 SIL3
≥ 99% SIL3 SIL4

92. Proof test philosophy
Select
technology
Select
architecture
Determine test
philosophy
Reliability
evaluation
Detailed
design
 Proof test frequency
– 5 yrs, 1 yr, 6 mos, 3 mos?
 Online vs. offline proof testing.
 Turnaround schedule?
 Total SIF proof test or proof test
components on different intervals?

93. Reliability evaluation
Select
technology
Select
architecture
Determine test
philosophy
Reliability
evaluation
Detailed
design
 Confirm that performance meets
specifications
– Safety integrity (PFD)
– Availability (MTTFs)
– Response time

94. Architecture Average Probability
of Failure on Demand
(PFDAVG)
Spurious Trip Rate
(STR)
1oo1 λD T / 2 λS
1oo2 (λDT)2 / 3 2λS
2oo2 λDT
2λS
2
( 3λS + 2/T )
2oo3 (λDT)2 6λS
2
( 5λS + 2/T )

95. PFDSIF1 = PFDPT-101 + PFDlogic solver + PFDFV-101
SIF #1
FV-101
Logic
solver
PT-101

96. SIL PFDavg RRF
4 ≥10-5 to <10-4 >10,000 to ≤ 100,000
3 ≥10-4 to <10-3 >1000 to ≤ 10,000
2 ≥10-3 to <10-2 >100 to ≤ 1000
1 ≥10-2 to <10-1 >10 to ≤ 100
Source: IEC 61511-1, Table 3 – Safety Integrity Levels: probability of failure on demand

97. Detailed design & build
Select
technology
Select
architecture
Determine test
philosophy
Reliability
evaluation
Detailed
design & build
 Instrument design / specifications
 Wiring drawings
 Hardware design & build
 Software design & implementation
 BPCS / SIS integration
 Factory acceptance testing

98. Factory Acceptance Testing
(FAT)
Black box functionality tests
Performance tests
Environmental tests
Interface testing
Degraded mode tests
Exception testing

99. Installation, Commissioning and
Validation

100. • Validate, through
inspection and
testing, that SIS
achieves
requirements
stated in the SRS
Validation
• Commission the
SIS so that it is
ready for final
system validation.
Commissioning
• Install the SIS
according to
specifications and
drawings
Installation
Installation, commissioning,
and Validation
Validation is the key
difference between
control and safety
systems.

102. Operation Phase

104. Operation and
Maintenance Planning
Who?
• Responsible parties
• Competence and training
What?
• Routine and abnormal operation activities
• Proof testing and repair maintenance activities
• Recording of events and performance
When?
• Proof testing frequencies
• On process demand
• On failure of SIS
How?
• Procedures, measures, techniques to be used
• Non-conformance management
• Tools and supporting analysis

105. Procedures
and training
Operation
Bypasses
Proof testing
Inspection
Performance
monitoring
Maintenance and
repair
Modification

106. • Reveals dangerous faults undetected by
diagnostics
• Entire SIS tested:
sensors, logic solver, final element
• Frequency determined during SIF design.
Proof Testing
• Ensures no unauthorized changes or
deterioration of equipment
Inspection

107. Tests and Inspections Documentation
Description of tasks performed
Dates performed
Name of person(s) involved
Identifier of system (loop, tag, SIF name)
Results (“as-found” and “as-left”)

108. Fail Dangerous
Undetected
7%
Fail Dangerous
Detected
66%
Fail Safe
Undetected
27%
Proof testing uncovers
DU failures
SFF = 93%

109. Safely test the SIF
using actual process
variables
Test sensors in-situ
by other means
Perform wiring
continuity test
Remove sensor
and test on bench
Sensor testing options
Use smart features
to test electronics
and wiring continuity

110. Example –
Rosemount 3051S Proof Test
Proof Test 1:
Analog output Loop Test
Satisfies proof test requirement
Coverage > 50% of DU failures
Proof Test 2:
2 point sensor calibration check
Coverage > 95% of DU failures
Note – user to determine
impulse piping proof test

111. Valve Testing Options
Offline
• Total Stroke
• Process is down
Online
• Total stroke
• By-pass in service
• Component test
• Solenoid valve
• Partial stroke

112. Conventional testing methods
• Process unprotected during testing
• SIF not returned to normal after
testing
• Risk of spurious trip
• Manually initiated in field
• Manpower intensive
• Subject to error

113. SIL 2
Proof Test Interval (years)
PFD

114. Source: Instrument Engineers’ Handbook, Table 6.10e – Dangerous Failures, Failure Modes, and Test Strategy
Failures Failure Modes
Partial
Stroke
Full
Stroke
Valve packing is seized Fails to close X X
Valve packing is tight Slow to move X X
Actuator air line crimped Slow to move X X
Actuator air line blocked Fails to close X X
Valve stem sticks Fails to close X X
Valve seat is scarred Fails to seal off X
Seat contains debris Fails to seal off X
Seat plugged Fails to seal off X

115. Modification
Documentation
• Description
• Reason
• Hazards
• Impact on SIS
• Approvals
• Competency mgmt.
• Tests / verification
• Configuration history