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Piggy Backing
&
Tail Gating
(Security)
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
Piggy Backing & Tailgating
• In security, piggybacking, similar to tailgating,
refers to when a person tags along with another
person who is authorized to gain entry into a
restricted area, or pass a certain checkpoint.
• The act may be legal or illegal, authorized or
unauthorized, depending on the circumstances.
However, the term more often has the
connotation of being an illegal or unauthorized
act.
Tailgating
Piggybacking
Piggy Backing & Tailgating
• To describe the act of an unauthorized
person who follows someone to a restricted
area without the consent of the authorized
person, the term tailgating is also used.
"Tailgating" implies without consent (similar
to a car tailgating another vehicle on the
freeway), while "piggybacking" usually
implies consent of the authorized person.
Tailgating
Piggy Backing & Tailgating
• Piggybacking came to the public's attention
particularly in 1999, when a series of
weaknesses were exposed in airport security.
• While a study showed that the majority of
undercover agents attempting to pass through
checkpoints, bring banned items on planes, or
board planes without tickets were successful,
piggybacking was revealed as one of the
methods that was used in order to enter off-
limits areas
Piggy Backing & Tailgating
Piggy Backing & Tailgating
• Piggy-backers have various methods of breaching
security. These may include:
• Surreptitiously following an individual authorized to
enter a location, giving the appearance of being
legitimately escorted.
• Joining a large crowd authorized to enter, and
pretending to be a member of the crowd that is largely
unchecked
• Finding an authorized person who either disregards the
law or the rules of the facility, or is tricked into believing
the piggy backer is authorized, and agreeably allows the
piggybacker to tag along.
• Piggybacking can be regarded as one of the simpler
forms of social engineering.
Surreptitiously following an individual
authorized to enter a location
Joining a large crowd authorized to enter, and
pretending to be a member of the crowd
Finding an authorized person who either disregards
the law or the rules of the facility
Piggy Backing & Tailgating
Common Courtesy
• Piggy Backing occurs when an authorized
individual permits others to follow behind
without showing or registering proper
authorization and gain access to a secure
area.
Piggy Backing occurs when an authorized
individual permits others to follow behind
Piggy Backing & Tailgating
• Tailgating is a function of both the attitude of the
individual and the corporate culture to wards adherence
to security measures.
• The impacts and costs of tailgating affect both the
business and personnel including
• ; Theft equipment and intellectual property
• ; Workplace violence
• ; Loss of business because of perception of lax security
• ; Lax compliance with other security measures
• ; Safety
• ; Increased costs due to lack of knowledge of true real
estate utilization
Piggy Backing & Tailgating
Piggy Backing & Tailgating
Introduction
• Access control is the single most important
component of the physical security and man guarding
role in corporate security.
• Access control is the management of the flow of
people to areas for which they are authorized .
• Access control must accommodate not only those
familiar with the security culture , employees , but
also others measures not familiar with the security
culture; such as , contractors, visitors, the public , and
occasionally the simply lost.
Access control
Introduction
• Access control is a primary responsibility of
company security.
• The concept behind access control is that if we
specifically determine in advance who is permitted
access to certain areas and then control that access, we
will have deterred improper activity from occurring, or
in the case that improper activity does occur, we will
be able to respond effectively.
• Good access control speeds resolution of an
incident by allowing security personnel to rapidly
focus on those who had access to the area, or
anomalies in access to an area.
Access Control
Introduction
• Unfortunately , good access controls are very
hard to achieve in an environment intended to
be inviting to employees and customers, and
also collaborative and productive .
• A corruption of access controls can take the
form of tailgating, in which the second person
takes advantage of the first person’s entry
without necessarily the complicit involvement
of the first person
Good Access Controls Are Very Hard
To Achieve
Tailgating
Introduction
• Another form is piggybacking, in which the
first person intentionally allows the second
person to enter.
Piggybacking
The Problem
• Common courtesy dictates holding doors open for
one another.
• In an access controlled environment, however, this
behaviour is called tailgating and allows entrants to
circumvent ‘badging’ by not presenting
authentication for entry.
• As soon as this occurs, access control measures such as
badge systems have been circumvented.
• Tailgating is surprisingly common in cooperative
workplaces and has been observed at rates of 40 -
60% of all entrants to a building.
Holding Doors Open For One
Another
Tailgating
Badging Systems
• One might argue that many of those who
“piggybacked in” (or “tailgated in”) have the
appropriate credentials to allow them entry in
to the space.
• However, once badging systems have been
circumvented, it is impossible to ascertain who
is authorized and who is not.
• This is a very big problem for an organization
and does not come without costs.
Badging Systems
Costs of Tailgating
• There are tangible and intangible costs to tailgating.
• here is value in knowing who is in sensitive areas at all
times.
• The tangible costs of tailgating include: theft of
equipment (e.g., laptops);
• theft of sensitive hardware (e.g., proprietary
hardware, roto-types )
• ; loss of intellectual property (e.g., software code)
• ;workplace violence (e.g., entry of person committing
violence at work)
• ; physical attacks to network equipment
Tangible Costs Of Tailgating Include: Theft Of Equipment
lack of access control is an obvious
security problem
• While lack of access control is an obvious
security problem with resulting tangible
damages that are easily attributable, there are
also intangible aspects of tailgating .
• The intangible aspect of such breaches. Sites
experiencing problems with non – compliance
with basic security measures such as tailgating
also tend to have other issues (e.g., management
issues, bad behaviour, harassment, and
others).
Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious
Security Problem
Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious
Security Problem
• An environment can be created slowly over time in
which there is a greater level of acceptance for poor
management behaviour, harassment, ethical short - cuts,
etc.
• Tailgating may be a symptom of a larger problem that
there is an attitude that security is not important and
creates obstacles and slows employees in doing their
jobs.
• If employees adopt this attitude and don’t comply with
security measures, there is greater potential for a security
breach.
• This tailgating behaviour can even affect customer
relations and the loss of business.
Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious
Security Problem
Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious
Security Problem
• Another intangible cost is the loss of productivity due to
an incident occurring.
• Loss of productivity in the event of a significant breach
,such as workplace violence or sabotage, is obvious.
• Small incidents such as a single laptop theft can result
in significant privacy issues, proprietary information
loss, and marketplace confidence issues.
• The resulting damage control diverts valuable resources to
dealing with a problem that may have been avoided.
• Even smaller incidents such as the theft of a wallet or
purse results in a feeling of personal insecurity and
violation that becomes the subject of extensive
discussion and mistrust
Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious
Security Problem
Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious
Security Problem
• In addition to the direct costs of theft, loss of
productivity and market credibility, there
are opportunity costs to the organization
with respect to real -estate space savings and
optimization.
Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious
Security Problem
• The costs of tailgating definitely depend on the
business model and product. For some
organizations , the primary risk is entry of non -
employees.
• For other organizations, there is also the potential loss
of proprietary hardware, personal or intellectual
property and/or risk to personal safety.
• While these risks are real, it is difficult to assess the
potential costs of tailgating and the standard
assessment tools either don’t exist or require such
extensive customization that they are not useful.
Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious
Security Problem
Best Practices
• A range of solutions to tailgating are presented
in Table 1, which focuses on hardware, and
Table 2, which focuses on social engineering.
Hardware Solutions
Electronic Turnstile
Revolving Door
Photo Beam Detection
People Eater
Card Reader
Intelligent Video Analytics
Iris Scan
Mantraps
Scissor Gates
Best Practices Social Engineering
• Tailgating is primarily a behavioural
problem, and physical security hardware is
not the only method to influence or stop the
behaviour.
• There are also ‘soft - power’ options such
as social engineering, where non - physical
security incentives can successfully alter
behaviour and increase compliance.
Best Practices Social Engineering
Badging Compliance
• In order to influence greater badge compliance
it is necessary to understand the reasons that
influence an individual’s reason not to wear a
badge , such as the following
• Cultural backlash to badging can occur; for
example, the security measures may generate the
perception that big brother is watching.
• The badge as fashion statement can also create
a problem in getting people to wear badges
above the waist.
Badging Compliance
Badging Compliance
• A company must ensure compliance by clearly
documenting its policies and procedures on
badge wearing policy . Employees will then be
aware of what is expected and management is
supported when they are required to take action
against non - compliance.
• A documented policy should include that all
employees must wear badges at all times,
report stolen badges, and have temporary
badges issued in the event of missing or stolen
badges.
Badging Compliance
Badging Compliance
• To influence badge wearing behaviour, success has
been had by requiring multiple uses of the badges;
hourly workers need the badges to clock in and out, to
attend a class, to obtain a meal or work gloves in a
factor y, and to gain printer access in a corporate
setting.
• In some organizations the use of the badge may need
to be negotiated with a union; due to union concerns
about using badges to clock in on assembly lines
because of concern the data will be used to monitor
individual performance.
Badging Compliance
Badging Compliance
• Another important consideration in changing
behaviour is the physical placement of badge
reading equipment.
• Many times the readers are placed on the wall on
the hinge side of the door.
• While that works fine for the first person that reads
their badge, while the door is open, it becomes very
difficult for subsequent people to read their badge even
if they don’t want to piggyback.
• Placing the reader in a location where it is easily
accessible no matter the position of the door can
make it easier to change social behaviour.
Badging Compliance
The following table (Table 2) lists some methods to promote
the badge wearing behaviour within an organization.
Table 2 . Social Engineering Solutions
Mandatory Wearing Badges
Awareness Campaign
Ask for Badges
Positive Reinforcements
Active Technology Barrier
Implementation Considerations
• The most effective tailgating deterrent is
single person revolving doors, which
physically restrict access to a single user at a
time upon presentation of a valid credential.
• However, the deployment of single-person
revolving doors at all corporate access
points is untenable; issues of culture,
aesthetics, accountability, and climate affect
the solution that can be implemented.
Single-person Trap Doors At All
Corporate Access
Single-person Revolving Doors At All
Corporate Access
• Single-person revolving doors are highly
restrictive in throughput and would not be
appropriate in almost all main lobby
environments.
• They are expensive to install and maintain at
exterior peripheral doors.
• They are also not conducive to creating an
inviting culture of a collaborative work
environment, and certainly not an aesthetically
pleasing one
Single-person Revolving Doors At All
Corporate Access
Implementation Considerations
• The hardest and most difficult two
problems to solve is a corporate
environment that places high value on an
aesthetic welcoming environment and has
high throughput, and one in which the culture
resists physical security measures.
Implementation Considerations
• There are solutions available that are more
open, have greater throughput, and are more
aesthetically pleasing.
• Such solutions include several layers of access
controls prior to reaching a restricted space
(concentric circles approach), high-speed
electronic turnstiles (with and without physical
barriers), photo-beam detectors, intelligent video,
biometrics, guard presence / identity validation
during high traffic hours, or a combination of
such measures.
Implementation Considerations
Buildings and Building Function
• Businesses with periods of high flow through, such as
factories, require solutions that don’t delay traffic flow;
like a mantrap would.
• The implementation of physical security measures are
further complicated with the repurposing of real estate, and
leased buildings; owner approval is required and changes
will need to be negotiated.
• Many commercial buildings are like a sieve, and many
thefts occur in commercial buildings. Many companies
also have large campuses with many different buildings,
some with better compliance than others. There are also
campuses which house multiple companies that act
independently but report to the same parent company.
Implementation Considerations
Implementation Considerations
• Laws - Privacy issues, and different data
retention laws by country (e.g., Italian privacy
law prohibits the use of cameras on warehouse
doors).
• Many try to have a standard, but one which is
open to country laws. Social political issues can
be different depending on country of origin; the
US thinks the Middle East is high risk, but locals
use a different risk filter. This difference of
perspective also applies to the regulatory
environment (e.g., working with animals).
Implementation Considerations
Implementation Considerations
• Accountability - A general security plan is
relatively easy to implement when there is a
single site with a single site executive.
Difficulties arise with a campus where there
is no single site director responsible, or there
is a campus housing different companies
with boards of directors that all report to a
single parent company.
Implementation Considerations
Implementation Considerations
• Climate- It is also necessary to work within
your climate. A very windy environment can
require revolving doors to keep them shut
because it is windy and others don’t stay
closed. This allows them culturally to
retrofit buildings with more secure
revolving doors.
Implementation Considerations
Implementation Considerations
• Aesthetics – See the case study for a layered
solution in an aesthetically pleasing lobby of
a major firm using audible alarms with
secondary full stop barriers.
• Emergency Evacuation - A well-executed
access control system can provide useful
information in accounting for employees in
an emergency evacuation (muster situation).
Aesthetics
Emergency Evacuation
Conclusion
• You can install the most advanced security
system on the market, but your security
measures will fail if your occupants aren’t
on board.
• You need to create a secure building culture.
Think about the difference between a casual
office setting and going through airport
security. Clear expectations and constant
communication shape behaviour.
Conclusion
Conclusions
• Tailgating is a common corporate security problem with
high potential tangible and intangible costs.
• Solutions for deterring/eliminating tailgating include
hardware and social engineering approaches, which
differ in cost, throughput, aesthetics, and other factors.
• Badge-wearing compliance is a particularly challenging
issue, and many lessons are provided for increasing
compliance.
• Implementation of solutions must be tailored to the
aesthetic and cultural needs of a given scenario; the most
challenging being providing access control in a welcoming,
high-throughput, aesthetically pleasing lobby. The case
study illustrates a real-world solution to this challenging
scenario, which ultimately uses a combination of solutions
Tailgating
Tailgating
Tailgating: A Common Courtesy and
a Common Risk
References
• Tail-gating (Piggybacking)
https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/tailgating-piggybacking
• Tailgating: A Common Courtesy and a Common Risk
https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/86026-tailgating-a-common-courtesy-
and-a-common-risk
• Piggybacking (security)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piggybacking_(security)
• Security Tailgating (aka Piggybacking)
http://www.alliedbarton.com/Portals/0/SRC/WhitePapers/Security%20Tailgating
%20-%20Best%20Practices%20in%20Access%20Control.pdf
• 10 Strategies to Prevent Tailgating
https://www.buildings.com/article-details/articleid/13274/title/10-strategies-to-
prevent-tailgating
Thanks…

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Piggy Backing & Tailgating (Security)

  • 1. Piggy Backing & Tail Gating (Security) Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
  • 2. Piggy Backing & Tailgating • In security, piggybacking, similar to tailgating, refers to when a person tags along with another person who is authorized to gain entry into a restricted area, or pass a certain checkpoint. • The act may be legal or illegal, authorized or unauthorized, depending on the circumstances. However, the term more often has the connotation of being an illegal or unauthorized act.
  • 5. Piggy Backing & Tailgating • To describe the act of an unauthorized person who follows someone to a restricted area without the consent of the authorized person, the term tailgating is also used. "Tailgating" implies without consent (similar to a car tailgating another vehicle on the freeway), while "piggybacking" usually implies consent of the authorized person.
  • 7. Piggy Backing & Tailgating • Piggybacking came to the public's attention particularly in 1999, when a series of weaknesses were exposed in airport security. • While a study showed that the majority of undercover agents attempting to pass through checkpoints, bring banned items on planes, or board planes without tickets were successful, piggybacking was revealed as one of the methods that was used in order to enter off- limits areas
  • 8. Piggy Backing & Tailgating
  • 9. Piggy Backing & Tailgating • Piggy-backers have various methods of breaching security. These may include: • Surreptitiously following an individual authorized to enter a location, giving the appearance of being legitimately escorted. • Joining a large crowd authorized to enter, and pretending to be a member of the crowd that is largely unchecked • Finding an authorized person who either disregards the law or the rules of the facility, or is tricked into believing the piggy backer is authorized, and agreeably allows the piggybacker to tag along. • Piggybacking can be regarded as one of the simpler forms of social engineering.
  • 10. Surreptitiously following an individual authorized to enter a location
  • 11. Joining a large crowd authorized to enter, and pretending to be a member of the crowd
  • 12. Finding an authorized person who either disregards the law or the rules of the facility
  • 13. Piggy Backing & Tailgating Common Courtesy • Piggy Backing occurs when an authorized individual permits others to follow behind without showing or registering proper authorization and gain access to a secure area.
  • 14. Piggy Backing occurs when an authorized individual permits others to follow behind
  • 15. Piggy Backing & Tailgating • Tailgating is a function of both the attitude of the individual and the corporate culture to wards adherence to security measures. • The impacts and costs of tailgating affect both the business and personnel including • ; Theft equipment and intellectual property • ; Workplace violence • ; Loss of business because of perception of lax security • ; Lax compliance with other security measures • ; Safety • ; Increased costs due to lack of knowledge of true real estate utilization
  • 16. Piggy Backing & Tailgating
  • 17. Piggy Backing & Tailgating
  • 18. Introduction • Access control is the single most important component of the physical security and man guarding role in corporate security. • Access control is the management of the flow of people to areas for which they are authorized . • Access control must accommodate not only those familiar with the security culture , employees , but also others measures not familiar with the security culture; such as , contractors, visitors, the public , and occasionally the simply lost.
  • 20. Introduction • Access control is a primary responsibility of company security. • The concept behind access control is that if we specifically determine in advance who is permitted access to certain areas and then control that access, we will have deterred improper activity from occurring, or in the case that improper activity does occur, we will be able to respond effectively. • Good access control speeds resolution of an incident by allowing security personnel to rapidly focus on those who had access to the area, or anomalies in access to an area.
  • 22. Introduction • Unfortunately , good access controls are very hard to achieve in an environment intended to be inviting to employees and customers, and also collaborative and productive . • A corruption of access controls can take the form of tailgating, in which the second person takes advantage of the first person’s entry without necessarily the complicit involvement of the first person
  • 23. Good Access Controls Are Very Hard To Achieve
  • 25. Introduction • Another form is piggybacking, in which the first person intentionally allows the second person to enter.
  • 27. The Problem • Common courtesy dictates holding doors open for one another. • In an access controlled environment, however, this behaviour is called tailgating and allows entrants to circumvent ‘badging’ by not presenting authentication for entry. • As soon as this occurs, access control measures such as badge systems have been circumvented. • Tailgating is surprisingly common in cooperative workplaces and has been observed at rates of 40 - 60% of all entrants to a building.
  • 28. Holding Doors Open For One Another
  • 30. Badging Systems • One might argue that many of those who “piggybacked in” (or “tailgated in”) have the appropriate credentials to allow them entry in to the space. • However, once badging systems have been circumvented, it is impossible to ascertain who is authorized and who is not. • This is a very big problem for an organization and does not come without costs.
  • 32. Costs of Tailgating • There are tangible and intangible costs to tailgating. • here is value in knowing who is in sensitive areas at all times. • The tangible costs of tailgating include: theft of equipment (e.g., laptops); • theft of sensitive hardware (e.g., proprietary hardware, roto-types ) • ; loss of intellectual property (e.g., software code) • ;workplace violence (e.g., entry of person committing violence at work) • ; physical attacks to network equipment
  • 33. Tangible Costs Of Tailgating Include: Theft Of Equipment
  • 34. lack of access control is an obvious security problem • While lack of access control is an obvious security problem with resulting tangible damages that are easily attributable, there are also intangible aspects of tailgating . • The intangible aspect of such breaches. Sites experiencing problems with non – compliance with basic security measures such as tailgating also tend to have other issues (e.g., management issues, bad behaviour, harassment, and others).
  • 35. Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious Security Problem
  • 36. Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious Security Problem • An environment can be created slowly over time in which there is a greater level of acceptance for poor management behaviour, harassment, ethical short - cuts, etc. • Tailgating may be a symptom of a larger problem that there is an attitude that security is not important and creates obstacles and slows employees in doing their jobs. • If employees adopt this attitude and don’t comply with security measures, there is greater potential for a security breach. • This tailgating behaviour can even affect customer relations and the loss of business.
  • 37. Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious Security Problem
  • 38. Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious Security Problem • Another intangible cost is the loss of productivity due to an incident occurring. • Loss of productivity in the event of a significant breach ,such as workplace violence or sabotage, is obvious. • Small incidents such as a single laptop theft can result in significant privacy issues, proprietary information loss, and marketplace confidence issues. • The resulting damage control diverts valuable resources to dealing with a problem that may have been avoided. • Even smaller incidents such as the theft of a wallet or purse results in a feeling of personal insecurity and violation that becomes the subject of extensive discussion and mistrust
  • 39. Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious Security Problem
  • 40. Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious Security Problem • In addition to the direct costs of theft, loss of productivity and market credibility, there are opportunity costs to the organization with respect to real -estate space savings and optimization.
  • 41. Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious Security Problem • The costs of tailgating definitely depend on the business model and product. For some organizations , the primary risk is entry of non - employees. • For other organizations, there is also the potential loss of proprietary hardware, personal or intellectual property and/or risk to personal safety. • While these risks are real, it is difficult to assess the potential costs of tailgating and the standard assessment tools either don’t exist or require such extensive customization that they are not useful.
  • 42. Lack Of Access Control Is An Obvious Security Problem
  • 43. Best Practices • A range of solutions to tailgating are presented in Table 1, which focuses on hardware, and Table 2, which focuses on social engineering.
  • 54. Best Practices Social Engineering • Tailgating is primarily a behavioural problem, and physical security hardware is not the only method to influence or stop the behaviour. • There are also ‘soft - power’ options such as social engineering, where non - physical security incentives can successfully alter behaviour and increase compliance.
  • 55. Best Practices Social Engineering
  • 56. Badging Compliance • In order to influence greater badge compliance it is necessary to understand the reasons that influence an individual’s reason not to wear a badge , such as the following • Cultural backlash to badging can occur; for example, the security measures may generate the perception that big brother is watching. • The badge as fashion statement can also create a problem in getting people to wear badges above the waist.
  • 58. Badging Compliance • A company must ensure compliance by clearly documenting its policies and procedures on badge wearing policy . Employees will then be aware of what is expected and management is supported when they are required to take action against non - compliance. • A documented policy should include that all employees must wear badges at all times, report stolen badges, and have temporary badges issued in the event of missing or stolen badges.
  • 60. Badging Compliance • To influence badge wearing behaviour, success has been had by requiring multiple uses of the badges; hourly workers need the badges to clock in and out, to attend a class, to obtain a meal or work gloves in a factor y, and to gain printer access in a corporate setting. • In some organizations the use of the badge may need to be negotiated with a union; due to union concerns about using badges to clock in on assembly lines because of concern the data will be used to monitor individual performance.
  • 62. Badging Compliance • Another important consideration in changing behaviour is the physical placement of badge reading equipment. • Many times the readers are placed on the wall on the hinge side of the door. • While that works fine for the first person that reads their badge, while the door is open, it becomes very difficult for subsequent people to read their badge even if they don’t want to piggyback. • Placing the reader in a location where it is easily accessible no matter the position of the door can make it easier to change social behaviour.
  • 64. The following table (Table 2) lists some methods to promote the badge wearing behaviour within an organization. Table 2 . Social Engineering Solutions
  • 70. Implementation Considerations • The most effective tailgating deterrent is single person revolving doors, which physically restrict access to a single user at a time upon presentation of a valid credential. • However, the deployment of single-person revolving doors at all corporate access points is untenable; issues of culture, aesthetics, accountability, and climate affect the solution that can be implemented.
  • 71. Single-person Trap Doors At All Corporate Access
  • 72. Single-person Revolving Doors At All Corporate Access • Single-person revolving doors are highly restrictive in throughput and would not be appropriate in almost all main lobby environments. • They are expensive to install and maintain at exterior peripheral doors. • They are also not conducive to creating an inviting culture of a collaborative work environment, and certainly not an aesthetically pleasing one
  • 73. Single-person Revolving Doors At All Corporate Access
  • 74. Implementation Considerations • The hardest and most difficult two problems to solve is a corporate environment that places high value on an aesthetic welcoming environment and has high throughput, and one in which the culture resists physical security measures.
  • 75. Implementation Considerations • There are solutions available that are more open, have greater throughput, and are more aesthetically pleasing. • Such solutions include several layers of access controls prior to reaching a restricted space (concentric circles approach), high-speed electronic turnstiles (with and without physical barriers), photo-beam detectors, intelligent video, biometrics, guard presence / identity validation during high traffic hours, or a combination of such measures.
  • 77. Buildings and Building Function • Businesses with periods of high flow through, such as factories, require solutions that don’t delay traffic flow; like a mantrap would. • The implementation of physical security measures are further complicated with the repurposing of real estate, and leased buildings; owner approval is required and changes will need to be negotiated. • Many commercial buildings are like a sieve, and many thefts occur in commercial buildings. Many companies also have large campuses with many different buildings, some with better compliance than others. There are also campuses which house multiple companies that act independently but report to the same parent company.
  • 79. Implementation Considerations • Laws - Privacy issues, and different data retention laws by country (e.g., Italian privacy law prohibits the use of cameras on warehouse doors). • Many try to have a standard, but one which is open to country laws. Social political issues can be different depending on country of origin; the US thinks the Middle East is high risk, but locals use a different risk filter. This difference of perspective also applies to the regulatory environment (e.g., working with animals).
  • 81. Implementation Considerations • Accountability - A general security plan is relatively easy to implement when there is a single site with a single site executive. Difficulties arise with a campus where there is no single site director responsible, or there is a campus housing different companies with boards of directors that all report to a single parent company.
  • 83. Implementation Considerations • Climate- It is also necessary to work within your climate. A very windy environment can require revolving doors to keep them shut because it is windy and others don’t stay closed. This allows them culturally to retrofit buildings with more secure revolving doors.
  • 85. Implementation Considerations • Aesthetics – See the case study for a layered solution in an aesthetically pleasing lobby of a major firm using audible alarms with secondary full stop barriers. • Emergency Evacuation - A well-executed access control system can provide useful information in accounting for employees in an emergency evacuation (muster situation).
  • 88. Conclusion • You can install the most advanced security system on the market, but your security measures will fail if your occupants aren’t on board. • You need to create a secure building culture. Think about the difference between a casual office setting and going through airport security. Clear expectations and constant communication shape behaviour.
  • 90. Conclusions • Tailgating is a common corporate security problem with high potential tangible and intangible costs. • Solutions for deterring/eliminating tailgating include hardware and social engineering approaches, which differ in cost, throughput, aesthetics, and other factors. • Badge-wearing compliance is a particularly challenging issue, and many lessons are provided for increasing compliance. • Implementation of solutions must be tailored to the aesthetic and cultural needs of a given scenario; the most challenging being providing access control in a welcoming, high-throughput, aesthetically pleasing lobby. The case study illustrates a real-world solution to this challenging scenario, which ultimately uses a combination of solutions
  • 93. Tailgating: A Common Courtesy and a Common Risk
  • 94. References • Tail-gating (Piggybacking) https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/tailgating-piggybacking • Tailgating: A Common Courtesy and a Common Risk https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/86026-tailgating-a-common-courtesy- and-a-common-risk • Piggybacking (security) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piggybacking_(security) • Security Tailgating (aka Piggybacking) http://www.alliedbarton.com/Portals/0/SRC/WhitePapers/Security%20Tailgating %20-%20Best%20Practices%20in%20Access%20Control.pdf • 10 Strategies to Prevent Tailgating https://www.buildings.com/article-details/articleid/13274/title/10-strategies-to- prevent-tailgating