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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program - An overview and critiqueVikas Sharma
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Historical paper on indian nuclear test 1998Chad Pillai
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Last week, the architect of Pakistan's nuclear program, A Q Khan made an ominous-sounding statement about Pakistan's capability of nuking New Delhi in five minutes from Kahuta. While this veiled threat has stirred up the expected controversy, most experts in India areshrugging it off as mere grandstanding. Despite Khan being a reputed nuclear physicist and a trained metallurgist, military tactics and nuke war strategy are not his forte.
A few months prior to Khan's bragging, reports from two US think tanks predicted an upsurge in the Pak nuclear arsenal -- enough to make its stockpiles the third-largest in the world, after the US and Russia and with India lagging behind. India has followed a no-comment policy on this matter, which is still limited to academic speculation.
As part of our assessment of evolving PRC military capabilities, we have interviewed Rick Fisher, Jr., a leading expert on the PRC military. This brief is an excerpt of two longer briefs by Fisher and accompanies a Second Line of Defense interview.
Considering the necessity of an integral and flexible strategy towards the DPRK’s WMD programs, ant the fact that the proposed end state, to reverse the WMDs programs for 2020, is not achievable for this date, this paper proposes another approach. First, it establishes a realist intermediate end state in 2020 (DPRK accepting the creation of a commission of verification that registers its WMDs capabilities); second, it identifies as the essential precondition - “the main effect,” - to achieve China’s real commitment regarding the coercive measures against North Korea, and the exchange of information about WMDs proliferation with the US; and third, it states some measures intended to achieve the required precondition. For doing so, the actual situation of WMDs in the peninsula is explained, then the challenges for achieving both the end state and the main effect are summarized, and finally, some recommendations for creating the preconditions are asserted.
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The Report of an Independent Task Force
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sector.
The Defense Industrial Base: Issues to be Considered and Recommendations - Dr...GLOBAL HEAVYLIFT HOLDINGS
The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) Vision Working Group is recommending the establishment of a Center for Strategic Analysis and Assesment (CSAA) within the Executive Office of The President (EOP) in the White House. This center will use foresight tools among many others to improve this decision making process in the EOP. The following scenario explores the use of one of those tools, and because of the current climate, we are sharing this with you. An updated version of this scenario to reflect existing technological, operational and geo-political realities will be a part of an upcoming publication soon to be released by the PNSR.
The Vision Working Group leader, Dr. Sheila R. Ronis, wrote this in conjunction with supporting data from public sources. Her latest book "Timelines Into The Future: Strategic Visioning Methods For Government, Business, And Other Organizations" is available through the following link:
http://www.amazon.com/s/?ie=UTF8&url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&tag=flipkartcom-20&field-keywords=timelines+into+the+future+sheila+r+ronis
Future Defense Industry Scenarios’
By Sheila Ronis, Leader of the PNSR Vision Working Group
Wednesday, April 30, 2008; 2:30 PM - 4:00 PM
Hudson Institute, Betsy and Walter Stern Conference Center
1015 15th Street, N.W., 6th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005
Introduction
Future scenarios such as this are designed to unlock the mind from its preconceptions in the hope of revealing undiscovered insights. This process can make some futures appear less plausible that have more or less been taken for granted, and prepare decision-makers to look for signs of likewise unexpected futures. To be clear: the goal is not to predict the future. Rather, it is to think about the future and to be better prepared for it as the future unpredictably unfolds
.
Weaknesses in our defense industrial base supply chain, dependency on third-party vendors, continual disregard for the Berry Amendment, and lack of foresight regarding the interplay between global economy and national security are the root causes of failure in this scenario.
The task is to ensure that the vulnerabilities we highlight are never capitalized on. Doing so will require a shift from hindsight to foresight. Indeed, the necessary prerequisite of creating a better, safer national security environment for tomorrow starts with the ability to envision it. While drawing on lessons from history is certainly important, nowhere in the United States government will you find personnel dedicated exclusively to overarching strategy with a long-term view. It is imperative to remedy this in order to avoid disastrous consequences, and reduce risks – both potential and real.
The 9-11 Commission Report concluded that the devastating attacks in September 2001 were due primarily to a failure of imagination and to leaders who did not fully understand the gravity of the threat we faced. One of the most compelling aspects about the following case study is that although it takes place in the future, it relies very little on imagination. This scenario is not about fantasy or prediction but practical reasoning and logical deduction. To be sure, the framework required for disaster in this scenario to unfold is largely set.
Creating an Opportunity
During the course of the last 30 years, the Chinese have infiltrated critical elements of the U.S. industrial base, which is, of course, inseparable from the defense industrial base. In addition to targeting automotive, aerospace and specialty metals, they have paid particular attention to the electronics industry. Through mergers, joint ventures, outright acquisition and industrial espionage, they have gained access and control to sensitive technologies.
This is especially true in the area of electronic connectors, which are connective devices used to join electrical circuits together, and are absolutely critical to everything using power. For
The Defense Industrial Base:Issues to be Considered and Recommendations - Dr....GLOBAL HEAVYLIFT HOLDINGS
The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) Vision Working Group is recommending the establishment of a Center for Strategic Analysis and Assesment (CSAA) within the Executive Office of The President (EOP) in the White House. This center will use foresight tools among many others to improve this decision making process in the EOP. The following scenario explores the use of one of those tools, and because of the current climate, we are sharing this with you. An updated version of this scenario to reflect existing technological, operational and geo-political realities will be a part of an upcoming publication soon to be released by the PNSR.
The Vision Working Group leader, Dr. Sheila R. Ronis, wrote this in conjunction with supporting data from public sources. Her latest book "Timelines Into The Future: Strategic Visioning Methods For Government, Business, And Other Organizations" is available through the following link:
http://www.amazon.com/s/?ie=UTF8&url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&tag=flipkartcom-20&field-keywords=timelines+into+the+future+sheila+r+ronis
Future Defense Industry Scenarios’
By Sheila Ronis, Leader of the PNSR Vision Working Group
Wednesday, April 30, 2008; 2:30 PM - 4:00 PM
Hudson Institute, Betsy and Walter Stern Conference Center
1015 15th Street, N.W., 6th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005
Introduction
Future scenarios such as this are designed to unlock the mind from its preconceptions in the hope of revealing undiscovered insights. This process can make some futures appear less plausible that have more or less been taken for granted, and prepare decision-makers to look for signs of likewise unexpected futures. To be clear: the goal is not to predict the future. Rather, it is to think about the future and to be better prepared for it as the future unpredictably unfolds
.
Weaknesses in our defense industrial base supply chain, dependency on third-party vendors, continual disregard for the Berry Amendment, and lack of foresight regarding the interplay between global economy and national security are the root causes of failure in this scenario.
The task is to ensure that the vulnerabilities we highlight are never capitalized on. Doing so will require a shift from hindsight to foresight. Indeed, the necessary prerequisite of creating a better, safer national security environment for tomorrow starts with the ability to envision it. While drawing on lessons from history is certainly important, nowhere in the United States government will you find personnel dedicated exclusively to overarching strategy with a long-term view. It is imperative to remedy this in order to avoid disastrous consequences, and reduce risks – both potential and real.
The 9-11 Commission Report concluded that the devastating attacks in September 2001 were due primarily to a failure of imagination and to leaders who did not fully understand the gravity of the threat we faced. One of the most compelling aspects about the following case study is that although it takes place in the future, it relies very little on imagination. This scenario is not about fantasy or prediction but practical reasoning and logical deduction. To be sure, the framework required for disaster in this scenario to unfold is largely set.
Creating an Opportunity
During the course of the last 30 years, the Chinese have infiltrated critical elements of the U.S. industrial base, which is, of course, inseparable from the defense industrial base. In addition to targeting automotive, aerospace and specialty metals, they have paid particular attention to the electronics industry. Through mergers, joint ventures, outright acquisition and industrial espionage, they have gained access and control to sensitive technologies.
This is especially true in the area of electronic connectors, which are connective devices used to join electrical circuits together, and are absolutely critical to everything using power. For reasons u
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11.dangers of missile race in south asia an india pakistan perspective
1. International Affairs and Global Strategy www.iiste.org
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online)
Vol 2, 2011
Dangers of Missile Race in South Asia: an India-Pakistan
Perspective
Suresh Dhanda
Department of Political Science, S.A.Jain College, Ambala City (Haryana) INDIA.
E-mail id:dhandasuresh@gmail.com
Abstract
Both India and Pakistan have various operational missiles in their inventories. The expanding
capabilities, marked by significant improvements in payload, range, reliability and accuracy, are not
only threatening to push the region towards a debilitating arms race, but also have the potential to bring
the nuclear armed adversaries a step closer towards the deployment of their strategic arsenals. At
regional level, the inventory and types of missiles increase an escalation of tension between the
relations of India and Pakistan on the one hand, and between India and China on the other. At global
level, the developments in the South Asia have serious rather negative implications on the non-
proliferation regime, and encouraging the other states to pursue nuclear and missile programmes. The
present paper is a moderate attempt to investigate the various security implications of missile
developments by India and Pakistan on global level in general and on South Asian region in particular.
Keywords: Ballistic Missiles, Missile Defence System, Non-Proliferation, Early Warning System,
Arms Race, Security Implications, Delivery Systems, Missile Technology Control
Regime.
1. Introduction
After crossing the nuclear rubicon in May 1998, India and Pakistan, the two countries of
South Asia, have been embarking on a journey that can only bring greater insecurity, tension, arms race
and mal-development to the region. 1 Since then, both the countries have been continuously engaging
themselves in revising their plans and developing their nuclear systems and delivery means, and little
real progress has been made to reduce the danger. Threat making, provocative military maneuvers,
display of offensive force capabilities and large military exercises on borders have been common in
the region. Missile flight tests have further raised the concerns of nuclear security and stability more
seriously. Though, the fragmentary information about India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear forces, operational
capacity and elements of command and control have emerged but the numbers, readiness status, and
employment plans for these nuclear delivery capabilities remain murky in many respects. Currently one
can assume that India has stockpiles of 80-100 nuclear bombs while Pakistan has 90-110.2 Besides
having various aircrafts, India and Pakistan have developed numerous nuclear capable ballistic missiles
as delivery systems.
2. Missile Programmes of India and Pakistan
India has an extensive, largely indigenous ballistic missile programme, including
infrastructure for both solid and liquid fuelled missiles. 3 India’s existing missiles for mission against
Pakistan are of Prithvi and Agni series. India has Prithvi-I with a range of 150 km capable of having
payload of 1000kg, Prithvi-II with a range of 250 km capable of having a payload of 500 kg and
Prithvi-III with a range of 350 km. India’s second family of ballistic missiles is the Agni-I, II and III.
The Agni missiles are designed to extend the reach of Indian nuclear capabilities, particularly to China.
However, one more variant of Agni, now officially referred to as Agni-I, is specifically designed for
missions against Pakistan and was tested with a capacity of 1000 kg payload to a range of 700 km. 4
India reportedly intends to retrofit its Brahmos adaptation of Russian supplied Yakhont anti-ship, cruise
missile so that it can be fired either from naval ships or from SU-30 MKI attack aircraft.5 This cruise
missile apparently could be used as a standoff system with either conventional or nuclear weapons.
Pakistan also has an active missile acquisition and development program since the early
19
2. International Affairs and Global Strategy www.iiste.org
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online)
Vol 2, 2011
1980s. This includes indigenous missile development (based in part on foreign design) as well as the
reported purchase of M-11 missiles from China in the early 1990s, although, Pakistan and China denied
these reports. Pakistan has several types of road mobile, nuclear capable ballistic missiles with shorter
and longer ranges, solid and liquid fueled. The Hatf-I is an indigenous single stage solid propellant
missile with a range of 60 to 80 km carrying a 500 kg payload. Then there are Hatf-II (Abdali), single
stage solid fueled missile with a range of 280-300 km and Hatf-III (Ghazani) single stage solid fueled
(300 km) and Hatf-IV(Shaheen) single stage solid fueled with a range of 600 km. Pakistan’s longer
range Ghauri-I, single stage with 1000-1500 km range and Ghauri-II, two stage with 2500 km range
(still in development testing) are liquid fueled missiles that are believed to be based on the North
Korean “No-Dong” and “Taepo-Dong” missiles, derived originally from Soviet scud technology.
3. Security Implications
These missile developments in South Asia have serious security implications on regional as
well as global level. At regional level, the inventory and types of missiles increase an escalation of
tension between the relations of India and Pakistan on the one hand, and between India and China on
the other. At global level, the developments in the South Asia have serious rather negative implications
on the non-proliferation regime, and encouraging the other states to pursue nuclear and missile
programmes. Mobility of Missiles during the period of crisis in South Asia also faces various potential
operational problems which may prompt escalation. The command system requires timely and accurate
information. At present, the capacity to collect this information is limited. India and Pakistan rely on
remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), human and electronic intelligence. In the absence of comprehensive
and accurate intelligence, there is a significant chance that an adversary will misread passive dispersal
and initiate its own deployment as a result. During a crisis, India and Pakistan could enter into a spiral
of escalation. One side could interpret the defensive moves by the other as threatening. Steps taken to
counter the perceived threat would be matched in turn by the other, resulting in further escalation.
During a condition of heightened tensions, the intelligence organizations in both countries will likely
have a tendency to report the first indications of activity even if not confirmed.
Though wide and flexible dispersal is within the capability of both countries, but if exercised,
it will underscore the problem of control. Dispersal of missiles during a crisis is understandable within
the context of preserving survivability. The foremost dilemma facing the command authority will be
retaining centralized control. Assertive negative control is desirable for stability but will undermine the
effectiveness of the missile system to rapidly respond if required. Pre-delegation, on the other hand,
will increase the risk of inadvertence. The command system will thus be under extreme stress if
dispersal or deployment ever takes place. The principal decision-making problem is how to make an
optimum trade-off between battle effectiveness and safety. The evolving national command systems
will have to find an answer to this problem, which was not easily solved even during the Cold war.
However, both countries have sufficient territorial space and variety of terrain for dispersal
and concealment but the road network is not well developed in both countries. Conditions for mobility
are harsh and compounded by generally hostile weather. Physical security of the weapons is not up to
the mark. There are multiple modes for missile deployment each having its own unique problems of
safety in movement. The variety of missiles available may further compound the safety issues of
mating them with the warhead – both conventional and nuclear. Greater instability results when the
potential operational problems of missiles just described are linked with the deployment of nuclear
weapons. At least four major considerations will play into decisions by India and Pakistan to undertake
nuclear deployment.
3.1 Problem of Political and Technical Control
Firstly, there is problem regarding political and technical control. The imperative for political
control is critical and deployment will pose a major control challenge. To ensure survivability, there
will be a tendency to deploy a large rather than a small proportion of the national nuclear arsenal. The
command and control requirements are fundamentally the same for any number of deployed nuclear
weapons. Dispersal may involve different configurations ranging from prepared nuclear weapons
integrated with their delivery means to separated nuclear weapon components moving independently
from delivery systems. Pressure on the command system to pre-delegate authority will rise as a crisis
spirals. The political release to fire nuclear weapons could be technically controlled by incorporating
20
3. International Affairs and Global Strategy www.iiste.org
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online)
Vol 2, 2011
permissive action links (PALs) in weapons. A PAL is a coded switch that controls the arming of the
weapon. PALs require the entry of a code in order to open circuits that arm the weapon. Even if PALs
are used, the decision to delegate authority and release warheads to military units in the field will be
excruciatingly difficult for both India and Pakistan.
3.2 Problem of Communication
Secondly, there is problem regarding communication. The essence of command and control is
to have several layers of redundant communication to ensure effective assertive control. The absence of
assured redundancy and secure communication will remain a prime concern. Overcoming electronic
jamming in a conventional war, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects in the event of outbreak of a
nuclear war, will be other critical needs.
3.4 Challenge of Physical Security of Nuclear Weapons
Thirdly, there is a Need for Physical Security of nuclear weapons. Though the possibility of
nuclear weapons being stolen is remote, as multiple tiers of security will always be present, but
concerns about safety and security will certainly grow during deployment. Deployment will increase
the importance of physical control by the command system even if the use of control systems such as
PALs is incorporated.
3.4 International Criticism
Fourthly, India and Pakistan will face international opprobrium if they opt to deploy nuclear
weapons. Although the international community may have reluctantly accepted their possession of
nuclear weapons, the transition to operational deployments will likely lead to sanctions and isolation.
This factor is unique to South Asia and constrains the implementation of deterrence strategies by
Pakistan and India. For example, during the Kargil conflict, reports that both countries had activated
and deployed their nuclear missile forces triggered intense international pressure on both countries. 6
National actions, such as signaling, that play a role in deterrence strategy may thus be constrained by
international pressure. In contrast, offensive conventional force deployments do not seem to engender
the same level of concern in the international community.
4. Technical Problems
Beside the above said operational problems in South Asia, missiles themselves pose serious
security problems due to their peculiar characteristics.
4.1 Geographical Constraints
Ballistic missiles represent the fastest means for delivery of weapons of mass destruction from
one country to another. In a matter of few minutes, a missile can cover a distance of hundreds of
kilometers (see table 1). Hence, these delivery systems themselves could become a source of tension
and could by their nature and disposition increase the incentive to attack first in a crisis.7
In case of South Asia, short range missiles can attack on national capitals of adversaries even
less than five minutes leaving little time for warning and protective measures due to the close
geographical proximity. Since geography is fixed, flight times only change as the targets and launch
points change. There is some potential for relatively long-range missiles to be used against short-range
targets by flying in a depressed trajectory mode and decreases the typical time of flight by 2 or 3
minutes.8 The countries, India and Pakistan, share a nearly 3000 km land boundary, and cities such as
Lahore and Amritsar are only tens of kilometers from the border. Islamabad is less than 100 km from
the border and New Delhi is also less than 400 km from the border. Missile flight time is short, even
reduced to less than five minutes to reach the destinations. Warning times are even less due to the time
required for sensors to detect the missile during flight. Response times are further reduced because of
delays in communicating to decision makers, assessing information, making decisions, and finally
giving orders on how to respond. It is likely that this process might not be completed before a
threatening missile has reached its target. It also may result in a launch-on-warning posture in which
countries respond prematurely before having time to fully assess the warning information received.
Though India has declared a no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons but Pakistan has not adopted such
a policy due to perceived conventional military asymmetries. While there is an asymmetry in strategic
depth between India and Pakistan, the fact that each country has critical assets near the border means
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that they both face potentially short response times in the case of missile attacks which may prompt any
side to take a quick but wrong decision which may escalate the war.
4.2 Autonomy after Launch
Autonomy after launch of a missile is another problem which has a negative impact on
stability factor in the region. Once launched missiles are fully autonomous and cannot be recalled or
diverted. The lack of control once a missile is launched means that the reliability of command and
control system is crucial. In contrast, there are cases of manned aircraft being recalled or diverted to
other targets during flight. During period of tension, an authorized or accidental launch might
precipitate a conflict and hence has a negative effect on the stability of the region.
Ambiguity regarding type of warhead mounted on a missile launched also creates the
confusion among decision makers because government statements frequently describe a missile system
as nuclear capable. This has resulted in the perception that ballistic missiles in the inventories of India
and Pakistan have both conventional and nuclear warheads. Even if this is not the reality, the
assumption on the receiving end will likely be that any missile launched against it must be carrying a
nuclear warhead. 9 Aircrafts have been used in a conventional role in South Asia during wars
historically while ballistic missiles have never been used in any role. Thus aircraft, even if capable of
carrying a nuclear warhead do not carry the same danger of misperception once detected. Ambiguity
regarding the nature of the warhead is exacerbated by the operational requirement for opaqueness
regarding the number and location of missiles. Short-range, conventionally armed, ballistic missiles
could quite conceivably be used within the context of limited war. A dual nuclear-conventional capable
system is therefore quite destabilizing because the opposing command systems will likely have little
reliable information about its mission or nature of its warhead. Therefore, ambiguity about the type of a
missile warhead strongly decreases the stability.
4.3 Poor Early Warning System
Due to the lack of sophisticated and up-to-date early warning systems the missile launch data
can be misinterpreted and may result in nuclear escalation accidentally. Concerns over
misinterpretation of missile launch data are real. During the cold war there were a number of incidents
involving accidents and misinterpretations related to nuclear weapons and delivery systems. 10 While
there was a sufficient time in the context of longer range ICBM missile threats of USA and former
USSR but such time would not be available with the short flight times associated with the Indian and
Pakistani missiles. Moreover, there is evidence that neither India nor Pakistan has focused sufficiently
on the danger that a missile test launch during a crisis could be misperceived as the start of a nuclear
attack. Though, there is an agreement as part of the Lahore accords in January 1999, to provide missile
test launch advance notification, but even such an agreement is not a fool-proof solution. Moreover,
both Pakistan and India appear to be planning to use their missile test facilities for actual nuclear
weapons launches during war which further increases the confusion regarding the missile test perceived
as real attack.
5. Missile Defence
Apart from these technical issues, introduction of ballistic missile defence (BMD) in the
region will pose certain other negative implications for the region. An Indian BMD system, whatever
its shape and size, whatever its operational shortcomings, will have a major political and psychological
impact on both Pakistan and China. Both Pakistan and China would respond to an Indian BMD by
bringing quantitative and qualitative changes in their nuclear forces, deployment postures, and perhaps
go for missile defence of their own. India would, in turn, be affected by a buildup of offensive weapons
and technologies by Pakistan and China, and would have to enhance its own capabilities in response.
This action-reaction spiral is likely to give rise to a regional arms race.
China, India and Pakistan are enmeshed in a complex three-cornered interaction with great
potential for instability. China and India fought over their disputed boundaries in 1962, and India and
Pakistan have gone to war three times, in 1948, 1965 and 1971 and a limited war in 1999. All three
states share “lines of actual control” apart from the international borders. In this scenario, the
introduction of missile defence will play a destabilizing role by disturbing existing patterns of
deterrence. Although all three states pledge to minimum deterrence, leaders in all three capitals have
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also said that deterrence is not a static concept; the requirements of each state would, therefore, depend
on what the others are doing or might seek to do.11
The pursuit of missile defence system by India would increase the chances of conflict between
India and Pakistan. The deployment of missile defence system, irrespective of whether it is effective or
not, could create a false sense of security among political and military leadership of India and can
invite military adventurism or even a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan particularly. India and
Pakistan have already fought over the issue of Kashmir. In a region, where incidents like a terrorist
attack on the Indian parliament in 2001 can become the reason for a massive buildup on Pakistani
borders, introduction of missile defence would increase India’s inclination towards a more aggressive
posture with possible disastrous consequences for the security and stability of the region. Missile
defence would also put Pakistan at a disadvantage in a conventional conflict, while surveillance and
radar components of missile defence systems would put India at an advantage. 12 Thus, missile defence
would also accentuate the conventional imbalance between India and Pakistan.
Moreover, possible changes in the deployment posture of China and an actual deployment of
Pakistani nuclear arsenal would decrease the nuclear threshold between the three nuclear powers in the
region. With less escalation ladders and even less decision making time, the chances of miscalculation
and accidental nuclear war would increase. The chances of a calculated nuclear exchange would also
increase. Missile defence system will also have a negative impact on arms control efforts. Transfer of
BMD technologies from Washington to New Delhi or from Tel Aviv to New Delhi would violate
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) provisions. 13 Missile defence would undermine regional
and global nuclear arms control initiatives and reverse the process of reducing the number of Multiple
Independently Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads in nuclear stockpiles. It would generally weaken
China’s support for the CTBT, the MTCR, and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
negotiations. India and Pakistan would also reconsider their support for FMCT in their pursuit of
increased number of nuclear weapons. Improvement of warhead designs by Pakistan might necessitate
nuclear testing, disturbing the nuclear test ban between India and Pakistan, and would also lessen the
chances of either India or Pakistan supporting the CTBT.14 China’s efforts to develop MIRV warheads
would also require testing. The net effect would be to weaken the support for non-proliferation efforts
in the region.
The effect of these developments would be to fuel an arms race between the three nuclear
powers in the region. Perhaps not an arms race in the real sense of the word, but it would mean having
definitely more offensive arms and technologies in the region. Moreover, New Delhi’s deployment of
missile defence technology is likely to jeopardize improved relations between India and China. It
would also have a negative impact on the peace process between India and Pakistan. India’s move to
counter Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent could also make the resolution of the Kashmir dispute more remote
and greatly increase the chances of conflict over the issue.
The social and economic development of the region would also be affected. A region that has
high rate of poverty and is underdeveloped, increased spending on offensive and defensive weapons
would further retard development and increase poverty. In addition, India’s social and economic
development might be adversely affected if funding for missile defence is added to military
expenditures. Pakistan would also have to increase its defence expenditure to compensate for
qualitative and quantitative changes in its nuclear arsenal and forces. This would amount to
unnecessary burden on economies of both the countries with diversion of resources from much-needed
development. Hence, it can be said finally that missile progammes in South Asia have serious security
implications both at regional and global level.
6. Conclusion
The proliferation of numerous missiles and related technologies in South Asia is a growing
concern for world community. These missiles have brought more insecurity and tension to the region
instead of positive claims by proliferation optimists. India and Pakistan, the two countries of the region,
are seriously engaged in revising and refining these delivery systems. Even the public support in these
both countries has been increasing in favour of accelerating the development of ballistic and cruise
missiles. But these systems pose a serious risk for safety and security of the region. Lack of advanced
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Vol 2, 2011
early warning systems and geographical proximity of these to rivals are the main sources of security
threats in the region. Problem of political and technical controls of missiles during launch, physical
security of nuclear weapons, maintenance of communication during launch of missiles and missile test
flights during the period of strained relations are some other challenges which need to be addressed.
Introduction of ballistic missile defence systems in the region by India will further aggravate the
situation in a negative sense. Moreover, the social and economic development of the region would also
be affected by this costly arms race. Finally, as responsible nuclear neighbors, India and Pakistan need
to carefully evaluate the impact of their growing ballistic missile capabilities and their missile
management practices. In addition, both countries would be wise to consider establishing a ballistic
missile restraint regime in the region. Restraint measures could improve national and regional security,
while retaining the deterrent value of nuclear arsenals.
End Notes and References:
1
For details see, Bidwai, Praful and Vanaik, Achin (2002). South Asia On A Short Fuse. New Delhi:
Oxford University Press.
2
Shannon, N, Kile et, al. (2011). World Nuclear Forces, January 2011, SIPRI Year Book, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 320.
3
For a detailed information about missile development programmes of India and Pakistan see,
Dhanda, Suresh (2010). Nuclear Politics in South Asia. New Delhi: Regal Publications.
4
The Agni missiles have been developed, reportedly with distant China as well as nearby Pakistan in
mind, and have been tested in three versions, with a forth, intended to be of longer range,
underdevelopment. The Military Balance 2003-04. London: IISS, 2003, 131.
5
Dhanda, Suresh (2009). India’s Nuclear Weapons Programme: Retrospect and Prospects. Indian
Foreign Affairs Journal. 4, 1, 90.
6
It has been reported that the Pakistani military had prepared their nuclear tipped missiles to fight back
a possible Indian attack during the Kargil crises. The then US President Bill Clinton had conveyed this
news to the then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during a meeting of both the leaders. It is
quoted by Hussain Haqqani in his book titled “Pakistan Between Mosque and Military” through Bruce
Riedel, a special assistant to Clinton and a senior director of “ Near East and South Asian Affairs” at
the National Security Council during Clinton’s tenure, who was present in the meeting of July 4, 1999
between the two leaders. Reidel recalls that during the meeting Clinton asked Sharif, “Did he order
Pakistani nuclear missile force to prepare for action? Did he realize how crazy that was? You have put
me in middle today, set the US fail and I won’t let it happen. Pakistan is messing with nuclear war?” At
the end of the meeting, Sharif agreed to announce a Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil and restoration
of the sanctity of LOC in return for Clinton taking a personal interest in resumption of the Indo-Pak
dialogue. Times of India, 21 June 2005. Also see, Ahmad, Samina and Cotright, David (2001). South
Asia at Nuclear Crossroad, Fourth Freedom Forum, Joan B Kroach Institute for International Peace
Studies, Managing the project at Harvard University.
7
Talbott, Strobe (1998). U.S. Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report,.U.S. Department of State
Dispatch.
8
The missile trajectory can be 'depressed' to a lower apogee, which shortens the range and reduces the
flight time. This can be used to fly below a defensive system and reduce the warning time provided by
ground-based radars. The depressed trajectory has a flatter re-entry angle and the highest re-entry
speed. Ramana, M.V., et.al. (2004). Nuclear Early Warning Issues in South Asia: Problems and Issues.
Economic and Political Weekly. 17 January.
9
Salik, Ahmad Naeem, (2002). Missile Issues in South Asia. The Nonproliferation Review. 9, 2, 47-
48.
10
For details see, Sagan, D. Scott (1993). The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear
Weapons. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
11
Krepon, Michael (2002). Missile Defence and Asian Security, Report 45, presented to the
Stimson/CAN NMD-China Project.
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ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online)
Vol 2, 2011
12
Dhanda, Suresh (2009). Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: An Assessment of Second-Strike
Capability. World Affairs. 13, 4, 108.
13
Quinlan, Michael South Asia Nuclear Briefs: available at http://www.iiss.org/newsite/
showpage.php?
14
Both India and Pakistan declared unilateral nuclear test moratoria in the aftermath of the May 1998
nuclear tests. This was formally recognized in the February 1999 Lahore declaration, and both parties
agreed to continue the moratorium.
Table 1: Estimated Time Duration of Some Possible Missile Flights in South Asia
Launch Point Target Distance (km) Estimated Total Flight
times (minutes)
Airbase Near Karachi Thiruvanatpuram 2000 13
Sargodha Airbase Mumbai 1470 11
Agra Airbase Karachi 1128 10
Agra Airbase Lahore 608 8
Sargodha Airbase New Delhi 581 8
Depressed Trajectory 600 5
Flight
Source: Zia Mian, R Rajaraman and M V Ramana, “Early Warning in South Asia : Constraints and
Implications,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 11, 2003, pp.109-150
25
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