Cloud Computing Security
Topics

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2.
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6.

Why Is "Security" Everywhere
What is Cloud Computing?
The Same Old Security Problems
Virtualization Security
New Security Issues and Threat Model
Data Security

Ohio Information Security Forum

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Why Is "Security" Everywhere
Ohio Information Security Forum
"Cyberinfrastructure Visualized:"
Homomorphic Public-key
A Cloud, With Lots of "Security" References

Encryption

Public-key Crypto with additional procedure: Eval
c*  Evalpk(Π, c1,…,cn)

Encryption of output value
m*=Π(m1,…,mn)

Encryption of inputs m1,
…,mn to Π

Π a Boolean circuit with ADD, MULT mod 2

Homomorphic encryption slides borrowed from
people.csail.mit.edu/shaih/pubs/IHE-S-and-P-day.ppt
Ohio Information Security Forum

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Why Is "Security" Everywhere on That Slide?
 Security is generally perceived as a huge issue for the cloud:

During a keynote speech to the Brookings Institution
policy forum, “Cloud Computing for Business and Society,”
[Microsoft General Counsel Brad] Smith also highlighted data
from a survey commissioned by Microsoft measuring
attitudes on cloud computing among business leaders and
the general population.
The survey found that while 58 percent of the general
population and 86 percent of senior business leaders are
excited about the potential of cloud computing, more than
90 percent of these same people are concerned
about the security, access and privacy of their own
data in
the cloud.
5
Ohio Information Security Forum

http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2010/jan10/1-20BrookingsPR.mspx

5
What is Cloud Computing?
Ohio Information Security Forum
What is Cloud Computing?
“Cloud computing is a model for enabling
convenient, on-demand network access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources
(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and
released with minimal management effort or
service provider interaction.”
NIST definition of Cloud Computing

Ohio Information Security Forum

7
Cloud Service Architectures as Layers

Ohio Information Security Forum

8
Cloud Service Models Abstraction Layers

Ohio Information Security Forum

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Multi-Tenancy

Ohio Information Security Forum

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Cloud Deployment Architectures

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Data Loss
Downtimes
Phishing
Password Cracking
Botnets and Other Malware

Same Old Security Issues
Ohio Information Security Forum
Data Loss
"Regrettably, based on
Microsoft/Danger's latest recovery
assessment of their systems, we
must now inform you that
personal information stored on
your device—such as contacts,
calendar entries, to-do lists or
photos—that is no longer on your
Sidekick almost certainly has
been lost as a result of a server
failure at Microsoft/Danger."

Ohio Information Security Forum

13
Downtimes

Ohio Information Security Forum

14
Phishing
“hey! check out this funny blog about you...”

Ohio Information Security Forum

15
Password Cracking

Ohio Information Security Forum

16
Botnets and Malware

Ohio Information Security Forum

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Features
Isolation
Snapshots

Issues
State Restore
Complexity
Scaling
Transience
Data Lifetime

Virtualization Security
Ohio Information Security Forum

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Virtualization Security Features: Isolation
Using a VM for each application provides isolation
More than running 2 apps on same server.
Less than running on 2 physical servers

Ohio Information Security Forum

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Virtualization Security Features: Snapshot
VMs can record state.
In event of security
incident, revert VM
back to an
uncompromised state.
Must be sure to patch
VM to avoid
recurrence of
compromise.

Ohio Information Security Forum

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State Restore
VMs can be restored to an infected or vulnerable
state using snapshots.
Patching becomes undone.
Worms persist at low level forever due to
reappearance of infected and vulnerable VMs.

Ohio Information Security Forum

21
Complexity
Hypervisor may be simple or not, but
It is often another layer on top of host OS,
adding complexity and vulnerabilities.

Ohio Information Security Forum

22
Hypervisor Security
Vulnerability consequences
 Guest code execution with
privilege
 VM Escape (Host code
execution)

Xen CVE-2008-1943
VBox CVE-2010-3583
Ohio Information Security Forum

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Inter-VM Attacks
 Attack via shared clipboard
 http://www.securiteam.com/securitynews/5GP021FKKO.html

 Use shared folder to alter other VM’s disk image
 CVE-2007-1744

Ohio Information Security Forum

24
Scaling
Growth in physical
machines limited by
budget and setup time.
Adding a VM is easy as
copying a file, leading to
explosive growth in VMs.
Rapid scaling can exceed
capacity of organization’s
security systems.

Ohio Information Security Forum

25
Transience
Users often have specialized VMs.
Testing
Different app versions
Demos
Sandbox

that are not always up, preventing network from
converging to a known state.
Infected machines appear, attack, then disappear
from the network before can be detected.
Vulnerable systems likewise appear too briefly to be
detected and patched.
Ohio Information Security Forum

26
Data Lifetime
Although data was
correctly sanitized from
VM disk and/or memory,
snapshots can retain
multiple copies of both
VM memory and disk
data.

Ohio Information Security Forum

27
Accountability
No Security Perimeter
Larger Attack Surface
New Side Channels
Lack of Auditability
Regulatory Compliance
Data Security
New Security Issues
Ohio Information Security Forum
Accountability

Ohio Information Security Forum

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No Security Perimeter
Little control over physical or network location of
cloud instance VMs
Network access must be controlled on a host by
host basis.

Ohio Information Security Forum

30
Larger Attack Surface

Cloud Provider

Your Network

Ohio Information Security Forum

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New Side Channels
You don’t know whose VMs are sharing the
physical machine with you.
Attackers can place their VMs on your machine.

Shared physical resources include
CPU data cache
CPU branch prediction
CPU instruction cache

In single OS environment, people can extract
cryptographic keys with these attacks.

Ohio Information Security Forum

32
Lack of Auditability
Only cloud provider has access to full network
traffic, hypervisor logs, physical machine data.
Need mutual auditability
Ability of cloud provider to audit potentially malicious
or infected client VMs.
Ability of cloud customer to audit cloud provider
environment.

Ohio Information Security Forum

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Regulatory Compliance

Ohio Information Security Forum

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Certifications

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Data in Transit
Data at Rest
Data in Processing
Data Remanence
Homomorphic Encryption

Data Security
Ohio Information Security Forum
Data Security
Confidentiality

Integrity

Availability
Storage

Processing

Transmission

Plus data remanence.
Ohio Information Security Forum

37
Public Key Cryptography

Ohio Information Security Forum

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An Analogy: Alice’s Jewelry Store
Alice’s workers need to assemble raw materials
into jewelry
But Alice is worried about theft
How can the workers process the raw materials
without having access to them?

Ohio Information Security Forum

39
An Analogy: Alice’s Jewelry Store
Alice puts materials in locked glove box
For which only she has the key

Workers assemble jewelry in the box
Alice unlocks box to get “results”

Ohio Information Security Forum

40

Cloud Security

  • 1.
  • 2.
    Topics 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Why Is "Security"Everywhere What is Cloud Computing? The Same Old Security Problems Virtualization Security New Security Issues and Threat Model Data Security Ohio Information Security Forum 2
  • 3.
    Why Is "Security"Everywhere Ohio Information Security Forum
  • 4.
    "Cyberinfrastructure Visualized:" Homomorphic Public-key ACloud, With Lots of "Security" References Encryption Public-key Crypto with additional procedure: Eval c*  Evalpk(Π, c1,…,cn) Encryption of output value m*=Π(m1,…,mn) Encryption of inputs m1, …,mn to Π Π a Boolean circuit with ADD, MULT mod 2 Homomorphic encryption slides borrowed from people.csail.mit.edu/shaih/pubs/IHE-S-and-P-day.ppt Ohio Information Security Forum 4
  • 5.
    Why Is "Security"Everywhere on That Slide?  Security is generally perceived as a huge issue for the cloud: During a keynote speech to the Brookings Institution policy forum, “Cloud Computing for Business and Society,” [Microsoft General Counsel Brad] Smith also highlighted data from a survey commissioned by Microsoft measuring attitudes on cloud computing among business leaders and the general population. The survey found that while 58 percent of the general population and 86 percent of senior business leaders are excited about the potential of cloud computing, more than 90 percent of these same people are concerned about the security, access and privacy of their own data in the cloud. 5 Ohio Information Security Forum http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2010/jan10/1-20BrookingsPR.mspx 5
  • 6.
    What is CloudComputing? Ohio Information Security Forum
  • 7.
    What is CloudComputing? “Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” NIST definition of Cloud Computing Ohio Information Security Forum 7
  • 8.
    Cloud Service Architecturesas Layers Ohio Information Security Forum 8
  • 9.
    Cloud Service ModelsAbstraction Layers Ohio Information Security Forum 9
  • 10.
  • 11.
    Cloud Deployment Architectures OhioInformation Security Forum 11
  • 12.
    Data Loss Downtimes Phishing Password Cracking Botnetsand Other Malware Same Old Security Issues Ohio Information Security Forum
  • 13.
    Data Loss "Regrettably, basedon Microsoft/Danger's latest recovery assessment of their systems, we must now inform you that personal information stored on your device—such as contacts, calendar entries, to-do lists or photos—that is no longer on your Sidekick almost certainly has been lost as a result of a server failure at Microsoft/Danger." Ohio Information Security Forum 13
  • 14.
  • 15.
    Phishing “hey! check outthis funny blog about you...” Ohio Information Security Forum 15
  • 16.
  • 17.
    Botnets and Malware OhioInformation Security Forum 17
  • 18.
  • 19.
    Virtualization Security Features:Isolation Using a VM for each application provides isolation More than running 2 apps on same server. Less than running on 2 physical servers Ohio Information Security Forum 19
  • 20.
    Virtualization Security Features:Snapshot VMs can record state. In event of security incident, revert VM back to an uncompromised state. Must be sure to patch VM to avoid recurrence of compromise. Ohio Information Security Forum 20
  • 21.
    State Restore VMs canbe restored to an infected or vulnerable state using snapshots. Patching becomes undone. Worms persist at low level forever due to reappearance of infected and vulnerable VMs. Ohio Information Security Forum 21
  • 22.
    Complexity Hypervisor may besimple or not, but It is often another layer on top of host OS, adding complexity and vulnerabilities. Ohio Information Security Forum 22
  • 23.
    Hypervisor Security Vulnerability consequences Guest code execution with privilege  VM Escape (Host code execution) Xen CVE-2008-1943 VBox CVE-2010-3583 Ohio Information Security Forum 23
  • 24.
    Inter-VM Attacks  Attackvia shared clipboard  http://www.securiteam.com/securitynews/5GP021FKKO.html  Use shared folder to alter other VM’s disk image  CVE-2007-1744 Ohio Information Security Forum 24
  • 25.
    Scaling Growth in physical machineslimited by budget and setup time. Adding a VM is easy as copying a file, leading to explosive growth in VMs. Rapid scaling can exceed capacity of organization’s security systems. Ohio Information Security Forum 25
  • 26.
    Transience Users often havespecialized VMs. Testing Different app versions Demos Sandbox that are not always up, preventing network from converging to a known state. Infected machines appear, attack, then disappear from the network before can be detected. Vulnerable systems likewise appear too briefly to be detected and patched. Ohio Information Security Forum 26
  • 27.
    Data Lifetime Although datawas correctly sanitized from VM disk and/or memory, snapshots can retain multiple copies of both VM memory and disk data. Ohio Information Security Forum 27
  • 28.
    Accountability No Security Perimeter LargerAttack Surface New Side Channels Lack of Auditability Regulatory Compliance Data Security New Security Issues Ohio Information Security Forum
  • 29.
  • 30.
    No Security Perimeter Littlecontrol over physical or network location of cloud instance VMs Network access must be controlled on a host by host basis. Ohio Information Security Forum 30
  • 31.
    Larger Attack Surface CloudProvider Your Network Ohio Information Security Forum 31
  • 32.
    New Side Channels Youdon’t know whose VMs are sharing the physical machine with you. Attackers can place their VMs on your machine. Shared physical resources include CPU data cache CPU branch prediction CPU instruction cache In single OS environment, people can extract cryptographic keys with these attacks. Ohio Information Security Forum 32
  • 33.
    Lack of Auditability Onlycloud provider has access to full network traffic, hypervisor logs, physical machine data. Need mutual auditability Ability of cloud provider to audit potentially malicious or infected client VMs. Ability of cloud customer to audit cloud provider environment. Ohio Information Security Forum 33
  • 34.
  • 35.
  • 36.
    Data in Transit Dataat Rest Data in Processing Data Remanence Homomorphic Encryption Data Security Ohio Information Security Forum
  • 37.
  • 38.
    Public Key Cryptography OhioInformation Security Forum 38
  • 39.
    An Analogy: Alice’sJewelry Store Alice’s workers need to assemble raw materials into jewelry But Alice is worried about theft How can the workers process the raw materials without having access to them? Ohio Information Security Forum 39
  • 40.
    An Analogy: Alice’sJewelry Store Alice puts materials in locked glove box For which only she has the key Workers assemble jewelry in the box Alice unlocks box to get “results” Ohio Information Security Forum 40

Editor's Notes

  • #9 http://onsaas.net/2008/06/03/defining-saas-paas-iaas-etc/
  • #14 http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2009/10/t-mobile-microsoftdanger-data-loss-is-bad-for-the-cloud.ars
  • #16 http://news.cnet.com/twitter-phishing-scam-may-be-spreading/
  • #18 http://community.ca.com/blogs/securityadvisor/archive/2009/12/09/zeus-in-the-cloud.aspx
  • #20 http://www1.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-09/ftp/vmsec/index.html
  • #22 http://www1.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-09/ftp/vmsec/index.html
  • #25 http://www1.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-09/ftp/vmsec/index.html
  • #39 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography