![Summary
Many nice ideas in this brief
Caveat: I’m new to much of the terminologies used...
Political preference for redistribution depends on
[Redistribution] Altruism for poor
[Insurance] Belief you may be poor in the future
Changing economy generates more insecurity
Union jobs -> Temp workers
But, increasing segmentation has prevented support for redistribution
Two forces counter-act to prevent redistribution (A+B=0)
Nice empirical evidence...but omitted variable bias?
Second line of argument: gov’t institutions / coalitions determine
support for redistribution
Endogenous cycles? Less investment in public education -> lower
outcomes for vulnerable groups -> greater segmentation? -> less
support for redistribution?
Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard and NBER) Discussion March, 2016 2 / 7]()
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HLEG thematic workshop on Economic Insecurity, Nathan Hendren, discussant
- 1. Discussion of “Redistribution in the Knowledge Economy” Nathaniel Hendren Harvard and NBER March, 2016 Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard and NBER) Discussion March, 2016 1 / 7
- 2. Summary Many nice ideas in this brief Caveat: I’m new to much of the terminologies used... Political preference for redistribution depends on [Redistribution] Altruism for poor [Insurance] Belief you may be poor in the future Changing economy generates more insecurity Union jobs -> Temp workers But, increasing segmentation has prevented support for redistribution Two forces counter-act to prevent redistribution (A+B=0) Nice empirical evidence...but omitted variable bias? Second line of argument: gov’t institutions / coalitions determine support for redistribution Endogenous cycles? Less investment in public education -> lower outcomes for vulnerable groups -> greater segmentation? -> less support for redistribution? Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard and NBER) Discussion March, 2016 2 / 7
- 3. Some Thoughts Some thoughts with the U.S. experience in mind Question the background: If inequality increased, why not more support for redistribution? Two types of increasing inequality Top 1% 90/10 Is segmentation about 90/10 inequality? Political influence of top prevents redistribution at the top? Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard and NBER) Discussion March, 2016 3 / 7
- 4. Role of Intergenerational mobility Alternative story in my mind: What if redistributive preferences are more governed by intergenerational concerns? Redistribution as intergenerational insurance... Maybe value of this insurance hasn’t changed? Low mobility in US (Chetty et al. 2014a), but stable over time (Chetty et al. 2014b) Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard and NBER) Discussion March, 2016 4 / 7
- 5. 00.20.40.60.8 Rank-RankSlope 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 Child's Birth Cohort Intergenerational Mobility Estimates for the 1971-1993 Birth Cohorts Forecast Based on Age 26 Income and College Attendance Income Rank-Rank (Child Age 30; SOI Sample) College-Income Gradient (Child Age 19; Pop. Sample) Income Rank-Rank (Child Age 26; Pop. Sample)
- 6. 0%10%20%30%40% 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 Child's Birth Cohort Parent Quintile Probability of Reaching Top Quintile by Birth Cohort Q1 Q3 Q5 ProbabilityChildinTopFifthofIncomeDistribution
- 7. Final thoughts... Copula is stable over time Expectation and variance of child’s income rank is same now as 30 years ago If families care about child’s location in income distribution, can this explain why no massive change in support for redistribution? In short, great set of ideas and interesting evidence of increasing segmentation and its important political implications; am curious on thoughts from an intergenerational perspective. Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard and NBER) Discussion March, 2016 7 / 7