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Jan 2016 ver 2.0 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 1 of 6
WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7 thru Win 2012
ENABLE::
1. LOCAL LOG SIZE: Increase the size of your local logs. Don’t
worry you have plenty of disk space, CPU is not an issue
a. Application, System to 250k or larger
b. PowerShell logs to 250k or larger
c. Security Logs to 999,936k (yes this big)
2. LOCAL SECURITY POLICY: Change Security Options –
“Audit: Force audit policy subcategory settings” to
ENABLE. This sets the system to force use of the
“Advanced Audit Policies”
3. GROUP POLICY: All settings mentioned should be set with
Active Directory Group Policy in order to enforce these
settings enterprise wide. There are cases where the Local
Security Policy would be used.
ENABLE::
1. DNS LOGS: Enable DNS Logging. Capture what DNS
queries are happening.
“systemrootSystem32DnsDns.log”
a. Log Packets for debugging
b. Outgoing and incoming
c. UDP and TCP
d. Packet type Request and Response
e. Queries/Transfers and updates
2. DHCP LOGS: Add your DHCP Logs –
“%windir%System32Dhcp.” This will allow you to
detect rogue systems on your network that fall
outside your naming convention.
a. EventID = 10 – New IP address was leased
DEFINITIONS::
ENABLE: Things you must do to enable logging to start collecting and keeping events.
CONFIGURE: Configuration that is needed to refine what events you will collect.
GATHER: Tools/Utilities that you can use locally on the system to set or gather log related information – AuditPol,
WEvtUtil, Find, etc.
HARVEST: Events that you would want to harvest into some centralized Event log management solution like syslog, SIEM,
Splunk, etc.
RESOURCES: Places to get more information
 MalwareArchaeology.com/cheat-sheets for more Windows cheat sheets
 Log-MD.com – The Log Malicious Discovery tool reads security related log events and settings. Use Log-MD to audit
your log settings compared to the “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” and Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks.
It is a standalone tool to help those with and without a log management solution find malicious activity.
 www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/Default.aspx - Better descriptions of Event OD’s
 www.EventID.Net – Most of the Event ID’s
 IIS Error Codes - http://support.microsoft.com/kb/318380 - IIS Error Codes
 http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf - Good Article
 http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd772712(v=ws.10).aspx – MS Adv Security Audit Policy Descriptions
 Google! – But of course
This “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” is intended to help you get started setting up
basic and necessary Windows Audit Policy and Logging. By no means is this list
extensive; but it does include some very common items that should be enabled,
configured, gathered and harvested for any Log Management Program. Start with
these settings and add to it as you understand better what is in your logs and what
you need.
Jan 2016 ver 2.0 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 2 of 6
WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7 thru Win 2012
Windows Audit Policy settings may be set by the Local Security Policy, Group Policy (preferred) or by
command line using ‘AuditPol.exe’. Be sure to select “Configure the following audit events” box on items
that say “No Audit” or the policy will not apply. Any that are left blank will break the GPO and auditing will
not be applied.
CONFIGURE::
1. SYSTEM AUDIT POLICIES: In order to capture what you
want and need the following Advanced Audit Policies
must be set. You may expand these to your specific
needs, but here is a place to start.
List out the System audit policy
 Command: AuditPol /get /category:*
Category/Subcategory Setting
------------------------------- ------------------------
Account Logon
 Credential Validation Success and Failure
 Kerberos Authentication Service No Auditing
 Kerberos Service Ticket Oper No Auditing
 Other Account Logon Events Success and Failure
Account Management
 Application Group Management Success and Failure
 Computer Account Management Success and Failure
 Distribution Group Management Success and Failure
 Other Acct Management Events Success and Failure
 Security Group Management Success and Failure
 User Account Management Success and Failure
Detailed Tracking
 DPAPI Activity No Auditing
 Process Creation Success and Failure
 Process Termination Success and Failure
 RPC Events Success and Failure
DS Access
 Detailed Directory Service Repl No Auditing
 Directory Service Access No Auditing
 Directory Service Changes Success and Failure
 Directory Service Replication No Auditing
Logon/Logoff
 Account Lockout Success
 IPsec Extended Mode No Auditing
 IPsec Main Mode No Auditing
 IPsec Quick Mode No Auditing
 Logoff Success
 Logon Success and Failure
 Network Policy Server Success and Failure
 Other Logon/Logoff Events Success and Failure
 Special Logon Success and Failure
 User / Device Claims (8/2012) No Auditing
CONFIGURE::
SYSTEM AUDIT POLICIES: Continued
To set an item:
 Auditpol /set /category:"Account Management"
/success:enable /failure:enable
Category/Subcategory Setting
------------------------------- ------------------------
Object Access
 Application Generated Success and Failure
 Certification Services Success and Failure
 Central Policy Staging (8/2012) No Auditing
 Detailed File Share Success
 File Share Success and Failure
 File System Success
 Filtering Platform Connection Success (Win FW)
 Filtering Platform Packet Drop No Auditing
 Handle Manipulation No Auditing
 Kernel Object Success and Failure
 Other Object Access Events No Auditing
 Removable Storage (8/2012) Success and Failure
 Registry Success
 SAM No Auditing
Policy Change
 Audit Policy Change Success and Failure
 Authentication Policy Change Success and Failure
 Authorization Policy Change Success and Failure
 Filtering Platform Policy Change Success (Win FW)
 MPSSVC Rule-Level Policy Change No Auditing
 Other Policy Change Events No Auditing
Privilege Use
 Non Sensitive Privilege Use No Auditing
 Other Privilege Use Events No Auditing
 Sensitive Privilege Use Success and Failure
System
 IPsec Driver Success
 Other System Events Failure
 Security State Change Success and Failure
 Security System Extension Success and Failure
 System Integrity Success and Failure
Global Object Access Auditing – ignore for now
Jan 2016 ver 2.0 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 3 of 6
WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7 thru Win 2012
CONFIGURE::
1. WEvtUtil: Use this utility to configure your log settings
a. WevtUtil gl Security – List settings of the Security Log
b. WevtUtil sl Security /ms:512000000 or /ms: 1024000000 if File & Registry auditing, Windows Firewall and
Process Create are all enabled – Set the Security log size to the number of bytes
c. WevtUtil sl Security /rt:false – Overwrite as needed
2. FILE AUDITING: Configuring auditing of folders and specific files will allow you to catch new file drops in key locations
where commodity and advanced malware often use. To understand what, where and why to audit files and folders,
refer to the “Windows File Auditing Cheat Sheet” for more detailed information.
3. REGISTRY AUDITING: Configuring auditing of registry keys will allow you to catch new keys, values and data in
autorun and other locations where commodity and advanced malware often use. To understand what, where and
why to audit registry keys, refer to the “Windows Registry Auditing Cheat Sheet” for more detailed information.
4. REG.EXE: Use this utility to query what is in a Key or the data within a key or value
a. Query a Key and all values - Reg query "HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun"
b. Query a Key and all values - Reg query "HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce"
c. Query a Key and all values - Reg query "HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun"
d. Query a Key and all values - Reg query "HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce"
e. Query a known value of a Key:
Reg query "HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun" /v malware
CONFIGURE:
5. Command Line Logging: One of the most important logging items that you can collect is what was executed on the
command line when something executes. Microsoft added this capability into the release of Windows 8.1 and
Windows Server 2012 R2. In Feb 2015 a patch was made available to add this feature to all Windows 7 and Windows
2008 Server with the following patch:
 https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3004375 - KB3004375 Patch to add Command Line Logging
A registry key is required to add the “Process Command Line” entry to every event ID 4688 event. The following is the
key, value and data that must be set to collect this crucial information:
 "hklmsoftwaremicrosoftwindowscurrentversionpoliciessystemaudit" – Value =
ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled - REG_DWORD = 1
You can configure it to start collecting with the following command:
 reg add "hklmsoftwaremicrosoftwindowscurrentversionpoliciessystemaudit" /v
ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1
Jan 2016 ver 2.0 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 4 of 6
WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7 thru Win 2012
GATHER::
1. AUDITPOL: Use this utility to view your current log settings
a. List all Policies categories: AuditPol /List /Subcategory:*
b. List what is SET: AuditPol /get /category:*
c. List what is SET for a subcategory:
 AuditPol /get /category:"Object Access”
2. Reg.exe: Use this utility to query the registry
a. Changes to AppInit_Dlls - reg query "HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWindows" /v
AppInit_Dlls
b. Changes to Services Keys - reg query "HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetServices"
c. Changes to Machine Run Key - reg query "HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun”
d. Changes to Machine RunOnce Key - reg query "HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce”
e. Changes to User Run Key - reg query "HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun”
f. Changes to User RunOnce Key - reg query "HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce”
g.
3. SC.exe: Use this utility to query the services (sc /? For help)
a. List all services in any state – sc.exe query state= all (Note: ‘space’ after the = sign)
b. Look for a specific service – sc.exe query state= all | find /I “telnet”
c. After finding the ‘Display_Name’ then look for the ‘Service_Name’ to get the short name
GATHER::
1. WEvtUtil: Use this utility to query your logs
a. WevtUtil qe Security – query the Security Log for events
i. Lots of flags here so read help “WevtUtil -?”
ii. /c:5 = Read 5 events
iii. /rd:true = newest events first
iv. /f:text = format text, also can do XML
b. Success & Failed Logons - WevtUtil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4624 or EventID=4625)]]" /c:5 /rd:true
/f:text >Parsed%computername%_Logon_Events_Win7.log
c. User Account Change - WevtUtil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4738)]]" /c:5 /rd:true /f:text
>ParsedR_%computername%_User_Account_Change_Win7.log
d. New Service Installed - WevtUtil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=7045)]]" /c:5 /rd:true /f:text
>ParsedR_%computername%_New_Service_Installed_Win7.log
e. User Account Changes - wevtutil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4725 or EventID=4722 or EventID=4723 or
EventID=4724 or EventID=4726 or EventID=4767)]]" /c:10 /f:text
2. Filtering Log Results: Use this method to filter lines within the logs
a. Registry Changed – Find entries with ‘Object Name’ - WevtUtil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4657)]]" /c:5
/rd:true /f:text |find /i"Object Name"
b. File or Registry Changed – Find entries with ‘Object Name’ - WevtUtil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4663)]]"
/c:50 /rd:true /f:text |find /i "Object Name"
c. Files – Find new files with ‘Wbem’ - WevtUtil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4663)]]" /c:50 /rd:true /f:text
|find /i "wbem"
Jan 2016 ver 2.0 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 5 of 6
WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7 thru Win 2012
HARVEST::
1. SERVICES: Found in the SYSTEM log
d. 7045 - Message=A service was installed in the system.
e. 7040 - Message=The start type of the XYZ service was changed from auto start to disabled.
f. 7000 - Message=The XYX service failed to start due to the following error: The service did not respond to the start
or control request in a timely fashion.
g. 7022 - Message=The XYZ service hung on starting.
h. 7024 - Message=The XYZ service terminated with service-specific error %%2414.
i. 7031 - Message=The XYZ service terminated unexpectedly. It has done this 1 time(s). The following corrective
action will be taken in 60000 milliseconds: Restart the service.
j. 7034 - Message=The XYZ service terminated unexpectedly. It has done this 1 time(s).
k. 7035 – Service sent a request to Stop or Start
l. 7036 – Service was Started or Stopped
HARVEST::
1. LOG CLEAR: Watch for log clear messages
a. 104 – SYSTEM Log – The Application or System log
was cleared
b. 1102 – SECURITY Log – The audit log was cleared
2. TASKS: Watch for a Process to start and call other
processes
a. 4698 – SECURITY Log – New Task Created
3. DRIVER: Watch for an issue with a driver
a. 40 – Issue with Driver
4. OS VERSION: What OS do machines have
a. 6009 – Lists OS version, Service Pack and processor
type
HARVEST::
1. PROCESSES: Watch for a Process to start and call other
processes
a. 4688 – SECURITY Log – New Process Name, look
for Creator Process ID to link what process
launched what
2. INSTALLER: Watch for the Windows Installer activity
a. 1022 – Windows Installer updated the product
b. 1033 – Windows Installer installed the product
c. 1034 – Windows Installer removed the product
3. WINDOWS UPDATE: Watch for the Windows Update
Agent activity.
a. 18 = Ready, 19 = Installed, 20= Failure
4. WINDOWS TIME: Watch for the Windows Service
synchronization. Make sure your sources are what they
are supposed to be.
a. 35 – Time Service sync status and source
5. APPLICATION ERROR: Watch for application crashes.
a. 1000 – (Application Log) Application Fault
HARVEST::
1. ACCOUNTS: Monitor for attempts to change an account
password
a. 4720 – A user account was created
b. 4724 – An attempt was made to reset an accounts PW
c. 4735 – Local Group changed
d. 4738 – User account password changed
HARVEST::
1. APPLOCKER: Watch for triggers to AppLocker events (8000-
8027)
a. 8004 – Filename not allowed to run
2. SRP: Watch for triggers to Software Restriction Policies
b. 866 – Access to <filename> has been restricted
HARVEST::
1. AUDIT POLICY: Watch for changes to the Audit Policy that
are NOT “SYSTEM”
a. 4719 – System audit policy was changed
Jan 2016 ver 2.0 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 6 of 6
WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7 thru Win 2012
HARVEST::
1. NEW FILE ADDED: Watch for the creation of new files.
Requires File auditing of the directory(s) that you want to
monitor
b. 4663 – Accesses: WriteData (or AddFile)
c. GREAT for CryptoWare & Malware drops
HARVEST::
1. REGISTRY: Watch for the creation or modification of new registry keys and values
a. 4657 – Accesses: WriteData (or AddFile)
i. HKLM, HKCU & HKU – SoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersion
1. Run, RunOnce
ii. HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWindows
1. Watch AppInit_Dlls
iii. HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionEMDMgmt
1. Watch Connection time of USB Devices
iv. HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetServices
1. Watch for NEW Services
v. HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetEnumUSBSTOR
1. Watch for NEW USB devices
HARVEST::
2. FIREWALL: Windows Filtering Platform - Watch for
Inbound and Outbound connections – Requires
Windows Firewall to be enabled
a. This is the noisiest of all Events. Generating
easily 9,000 - 10,000 events per hour per system
b. Storage is required to utilize this event
c. 5156 – Message=The Windows Filtering
Platform has permitted a connection. Look for:
i. Direction:, Source Address:, Source
Port:, Destination Address: &
Destination Port:
HARVEST::
1. REGISTRY: Monitor certain Keys for Add, Changes and
Deletes. Setting auditing on the Specific keys is
required.
a. 4657 – A Registry value was modified
HARVEST::
1. EMAIL / VPN: Monitor for failed and successful logins
to your VPN and Webmail application. Consider
emailing user if login is from a new IP not in your
exclude list
a. sc_status=401 – Failed OWA login
b. "reason = Invalid password" – Failed VPN login
- Cisco
HARVEST::
1. LOGON TYPE: Monitor for what type of logons occur
a. 4624 - Message=An account was successfully
logged on.
i. Type 2 – Interactive – GUI
ii. Type 3 – Network – Net Use
iii. Type 4 – Batch
iv. Type 5 – Service
v. Type 7 – Unlock
vi. Type 8 – Network Clear Text
vii. Type 9 – New Credentials (RDP Tools)
viii. Type 10 – Remote Interactive (RDP)
ix. Type 11 – Cached Interactive (laptops)
b. 4625 - Message = An account failed to log on.
HARVEST::
1. SYSTEM INTEGRITY: Watch for files with page images with
bad hashes
a. 6281 – Failed – “page hashes of an image file are
not valid”

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  • 1. Jan 2016 ver 2.0 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 1 of 6 WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7 thru Win 2012 ENABLE:: 1. LOCAL LOG SIZE: Increase the size of your local logs. Don’t worry you have plenty of disk space, CPU is not an issue a. Application, System to 250k or larger b. PowerShell logs to 250k or larger c. Security Logs to 999,936k (yes this big) 2. LOCAL SECURITY POLICY: Change Security Options – “Audit: Force audit policy subcategory settings” to ENABLE. This sets the system to force use of the “Advanced Audit Policies” 3. GROUP POLICY: All settings mentioned should be set with Active Directory Group Policy in order to enforce these settings enterprise wide. There are cases where the Local Security Policy would be used. ENABLE:: 1. DNS LOGS: Enable DNS Logging. Capture what DNS queries are happening. “systemrootSystem32DnsDns.log” a. Log Packets for debugging b. Outgoing and incoming c. UDP and TCP d. Packet type Request and Response e. Queries/Transfers and updates 2. DHCP LOGS: Add your DHCP Logs – “%windir%System32Dhcp.” This will allow you to detect rogue systems on your network that fall outside your naming convention. a. EventID = 10 – New IP address was leased DEFINITIONS:: ENABLE: Things you must do to enable logging to start collecting and keeping events. CONFIGURE: Configuration that is needed to refine what events you will collect. GATHER: Tools/Utilities that you can use locally on the system to set or gather log related information – AuditPol, WEvtUtil, Find, etc. HARVEST: Events that you would want to harvest into some centralized Event log management solution like syslog, SIEM, Splunk, etc. RESOURCES: Places to get more information  MalwareArchaeology.com/cheat-sheets for more Windows cheat sheets  Log-MD.com – The Log Malicious Discovery tool reads security related log events and settings. Use Log-MD to audit your log settings compared to the “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” and Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks. It is a standalone tool to help those with and without a log management solution find malicious activity.  www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/Default.aspx - Better descriptions of Event OD’s  www.EventID.Net – Most of the Event ID’s  IIS Error Codes - http://support.microsoft.com/kb/318380 - IIS Error Codes  http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf - Good Article  http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd772712(v=ws.10).aspx – MS Adv Security Audit Policy Descriptions  Google! – But of course This “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” is intended to help you get started setting up basic and necessary Windows Audit Policy and Logging. By no means is this list extensive; but it does include some very common items that should be enabled, configured, gathered and harvested for any Log Management Program. Start with these settings and add to it as you understand better what is in your logs and what you need.
  • 2. Jan 2016 ver 2.0 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 2 of 6 WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7 thru Win 2012 Windows Audit Policy settings may be set by the Local Security Policy, Group Policy (preferred) or by command line using ‘AuditPol.exe’. Be sure to select “Configure the following audit events” box on items that say “No Audit” or the policy will not apply. Any that are left blank will break the GPO and auditing will not be applied. CONFIGURE:: 1. SYSTEM AUDIT POLICIES: In order to capture what you want and need the following Advanced Audit Policies must be set. You may expand these to your specific needs, but here is a place to start. List out the System audit policy  Command: AuditPol /get /category:* Category/Subcategory Setting ------------------------------- ------------------------ Account Logon  Credential Validation Success and Failure  Kerberos Authentication Service No Auditing  Kerberos Service Ticket Oper No Auditing  Other Account Logon Events Success and Failure Account Management  Application Group Management Success and Failure  Computer Account Management Success and Failure  Distribution Group Management Success and Failure  Other Acct Management Events Success and Failure  Security Group Management Success and Failure  User Account Management Success and Failure Detailed Tracking  DPAPI Activity No Auditing  Process Creation Success and Failure  Process Termination Success and Failure  RPC Events Success and Failure DS Access  Detailed Directory Service Repl No Auditing  Directory Service Access No Auditing  Directory Service Changes Success and Failure  Directory Service Replication No Auditing Logon/Logoff  Account Lockout Success  IPsec Extended Mode No Auditing  IPsec Main Mode No Auditing  IPsec Quick Mode No Auditing  Logoff Success  Logon Success and Failure  Network Policy Server Success and Failure  Other Logon/Logoff Events Success and Failure  Special Logon Success and Failure  User / Device Claims (8/2012) No Auditing CONFIGURE:: SYSTEM AUDIT POLICIES: Continued To set an item:  Auditpol /set /category:"Account Management" /success:enable /failure:enable Category/Subcategory Setting ------------------------------- ------------------------ Object Access  Application Generated Success and Failure  Certification Services Success and Failure  Central Policy Staging (8/2012) No Auditing  Detailed File Share Success  File Share Success and Failure  File System Success  Filtering Platform Connection Success (Win FW)  Filtering Platform Packet Drop No Auditing  Handle Manipulation No Auditing  Kernel Object Success and Failure  Other Object Access Events No Auditing  Removable Storage (8/2012) Success and Failure  Registry Success  SAM No Auditing Policy Change  Audit Policy Change Success and Failure  Authentication Policy Change Success and Failure  Authorization Policy Change Success and Failure  Filtering Platform Policy Change Success (Win FW)  MPSSVC Rule-Level Policy Change No Auditing  Other Policy Change Events No Auditing Privilege Use  Non Sensitive Privilege Use No Auditing  Other Privilege Use Events No Auditing  Sensitive Privilege Use Success and Failure System  IPsec Driver Success  Other System Events Failure  Security State Change Success and Failure  Security System Extension Success and Failure  System Integrity Success and Failure Global Object Access Auditing – ignore for now
  • 3. Jan 2016 ver 2.0 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 3 of 6 WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7 thru Win 2012 CONFIGURE:: 1. WEvtUtil: Use this utility to configure your log settings a. WevtUtil gl Security – List settings of the Security Log b. WevtUtil sl Security /ms:512000000 or /ms: 1024000000 if File & Registry auditing, Windows Firewall and Process Create are all enabled – Set the Security log size to the number of bytes c. WevtUtil sl Security /rt:false – Overwrite as needed 2. FILE AUDITING: Configuring auditing of folders and specific files will allow you to catch new file drops in key locations where commodity and advanced malware often use. To understand what, where and why to audit files and folders, refer to the “Windows File Auditing Cheat Sheet” for more detailed information. 3. REGISTRY AUDITING: Configuring auditing of registry keys will allow you to catch new keys, values and data in autorun and other locations where commodity and advanced malware often use. To understand what, where and why to audit registry keys, refer to the “Windows Registry Auditing Cheat Sheet” for more detailed information. 4. REG.EXE: Use this utility to query what is in a Key or the data within a key or value a. Query a Key and all values - Reg query "HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun" b. Query a Key and all values - Reg query "HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce" c. Query a Key and all values - Reg query "HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun" d. Query a Key and all values - Reg query "HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce" e. Query a known value of a Key: Reg query "HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun" /v malware CONFIGURE: 5. Command Line Logging: One of the most important logging items that you can collect is what was executed on the command line when something executes. Microsoft added this capability into the release of Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2. In Feb 2015 a patch was made available to add this feature to all Windows 7 and Windows 2008 Server with the following patch:  https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3004375 - KB3004375 Patch to add Command Line Logging A registry key is required to add the “Process Command Line” entry to every event ID 4688 event. The following is the key, value and data that must be set to collect this crucial information:  "hklmsoftwaremicrosoftwindowscurrentversionpoliciessystemaudit" – Value = ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled - REG_DWORD = 1 You can configure it to start collecting with the following command:  reg add "hklmsoftwaremicrosoftwindowscurrentversionpoliciessystemaudit" /v ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1
  • 4. Jan 2016 ver 2.0 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 4 of 6 WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7 thru Win 2012 GATHER:: 1. AUDITPOL: Use this utility to view your current log settings a. List all Policies categories: AuditPol /List /Subcategory:* b. List what is SET: AuditPol /get /category:* c. List what is SET for a subcategory:  AuditPol /get /category:"Object Access” 2. Reg.exe: Use this utility to query the registry a. Changes to AppInit_Dlls - reg query "HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWindows" /v AppInit_Dlls b. Changes to Services Keys - reg query "HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetServices" c. Changes to Machine Run Key - reg query "HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun” d. Changes to Machine RunOnce Key - reg query "HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce” e. Changes to User Run Key - reg query "HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun” f. Changes to User RunOnce Key - reg query "HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce” g. 3. SC.exe: Use this utility to query the services (sc /? For help) a. List all services in any state – sc.exe query state= all (Note: ‘space’ after the = sign) b. Look for a specific service – sc.exe query state= all | find /I “telnet” c. After finding the ‘Display_Name’ then look for the ‘Service_Name’ to get the short name GATHER:: 1. WEvtUtil: Use this utility to query your logs a. WevtUtil qe Security – query the Security Log for events i. Lots of flags here so read help “WevtUtil -?” ii. /c:5 = Read 5 events iii. /rd:true = newest events first iv. /f:text = format text, also can do XML b. Success & Failed Logons - WevtUtil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4624 or EventID=4625)]]" /c:5 /rd:true /f:text >Parsed%computername%_Logon_Events_Win7.log c. User Account Change - WevtUtil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4738)]]" /c:5 /rd:true /f:text >ParsedR_%computername%_User_Account_Change_Win7.log d. New Service Installed - WevtUtil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=7045)]]" /c:5 /rd:true /f:text >ParsedR_%computername%_New_Service_Installed_Win7.log e. User Account Changes - wevtutil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4725 or EventID=4722 or EventID=4723 or EventID=4724 or EventID=4726 or EventID=4767)]]" /c:10 /f:text 2. Filtering Log Results: Use this method to filter lines within the logs a. Registry Changed – Find entries with ‘Object Name’ - WevtUtil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4657)]]" /c:5 /rd:true /f:text |find /i"Object Name" b. File or Registry Changed – Find entries with ‘Object Name’ - WevtUtil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4663)]]" /c:50 /rd:true /f:text |find /i "Object Name" c. Files – Find new files with ‘Wbem’ - WevtUtil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4663)]]" /c:50 /rd:true /f:text |find /i "wbem"
  • 5. Jan 2016 ver 2.0 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 5 of 6 WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7 thru Win 2012 HARVEST:: 1. SERVICES: Found in the SYSTEM log d. 7045 - Message=A service was installed in the system. e. 7040 - Message=The start type of the XYZ service was changed from auto start to disabled. f. 7000 - Message=The XYX service failed to start due to the following error: The service did not respond to the start or control request in a timely fashion. g. 7022 - Message=The XYZ service hung on starting. h. 7024 - Message=The XYZ service terminated with service-specific error %%2414. i. 7031 - Message=The XYZ service terminated unexpectedly. It has done this 1 time(s). The following corrective action will be taken in 60000 milliseconds: Restart the service. j. 7034 - Message=The XYZ service terminated unexpectedly. It has done this 1 time(s). k. 7035 – Service sent a request to Stop or Start l. 7036 – Service was Started or Stopped HARVEST:: 1. LOG CLEAR: Watch for log clear messages a. 104 – SYSTEM Log – The Application or System log was cleared b. 1102 – SECURITY Log – The audit log was cleared 2. TASKS: Watch for a Process to start and call other processes a. 4698 – SECURITY Log – New Task Created 3. DRIVER: Watch for an issue with a driver a. 40 – Issue with Driver 4. OS VERSION: What OS do machines have a. 6009 – Lists OS version, Service Pack and processor type HARVEST:: 1. PROCESSES: Watch for a Process to start and call other processes a. 4688 – SECURITY Log – New Process Name, look for Creator Process ID to link what process launched what 2. INSTALLER: Watch for the Windows Installer activity a. 1022 – Windows Installer updated the product b. 1033 – Windows Installer installed the product c. 1034 – Windows Installer removed the product 3. WINDOWS UPDATE: Watch for the Windows Update Agent activity. a. 18 = Ready, 19 = Installed, 20= Failure 4. WINDOWS TIME: Watch for the Windows Service synchronization. Make sure your sources are what they are supposed to be. a. 35 – Time Service sync status and source 5. APPLICATION ERROR: Watch for application crashes. a. 1000 – (Application Log) Application Fault HARVEST:: 1. ACCOUNTS: Monitor for attempts to change an account password a. 4720 – A user account was created b. 4724 – An attempt was made to reset an accounts PW c. 4735 – Local Group changed d. 4738 – User account password changed HARVEST:: 1. APPLOCKER: Watch for triggers to AppLocker events (8000- 8027) a. 8004 – Filename not allowed to run 2. SRP: Watch for triggers to Software Restriction Policies b. 866 – Access to <filename> has been restricted HARVEST:: 1. AUDIT POLICY: Watch for changes to the Audit Policy that are NOT “SYSTEM” a. 4719 – System audit policy was changed
  • 6. Jan 2016 ver 2.0 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 6 of 6 WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7 thru Win 2012 HARVEST:: 1. NEW FILE ADDED: Watch for the creation of new files. Requires File auditing of the directory(s) that you want to monitor b. 4663 – Accesses: WriteData (or AddFile) c. GREAT for CryptoWare & Malware drops HARVEST:: 1. REGISTRY: Watch for the creation or modification of new registry keys and values a. 4657 – Accesses: WriteData (or AddFile) i. HKLM, HKCU & HKU – SoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersion 1. Run, RunOnce ii. HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWindows 1. Watch AppInit_Dlls iii. HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionEMDMgmt 1. Watch Connection time of USB Devices iv. HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetServices 1. Watch for NEW Services v. HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetEnumUSBSTOR 1. Watch for NEW USB devices HARVEST:: 2. FIREWALL: Windows Filtering Platform - Watch for Inbound and Outbound connections – Requires Windows Firewall to be enabled a. This is the noisiest of all Events. Generating easily 9,000 - 10,000 events per hour per system b. Storage is required to utilize this event c. 5156 – Message=The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection. Look for: i. Direction:, Source Address:, Source Port:, Destination Address: & Destination Port: HARVEST:: 1. REGISTRY: Monitor certain Keys for Add, Changes and Deletes. Setting auditing on the Specific keys is required. a. 4657 – A Registry value was modified HARVEST:: 1. EMAIL / VPN: Monitor for failed and successful logins to your VPN and Webmail application. Consider emailing user if login is from a new IP not in your exclude list a. sc_status=401 – Failed OWA login b. "reason = Invalid password" – Failed VPN login - Cisco HARVEST:: 1. LOGON TYPE: Monitor for what type of logons occur a. 4624 - Message=An account was successfully logged on. i. Type 2 – Interactive – GUI ii. Type 3 – Network – Net Use iii. Type 4 – Batch iv. Type 5 – Service v. Type 7 – Unlock vi. Type 8 – Network Clear Text vii. Type 9 – New Credentials (RDP Tools) viii. Type 10 – Remote Interactive (RDP) ix. Type 11 – Cached Interactive (laptops) b. 4625 - Message = An account failed to log on. HARVEST:: 1. SYSTEM INTEGRITY: Watch for files with page images with bad hashes a. 6281 – Failed – “page hashes of an image file are not valid”