Detainee is recommended for continued detention due to his involvement with an al-Qaeda linked Algerian Armed Islamic Group cell that was plotting to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. He has an extensive history as an extremist involved in jihad and terrorist activities in Bosnia, Algeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Detainee worked for over two years at an Islamic school in Pakistan with ties to extremism and admits to extensive travel throughout the Middle East. He was arrested in October 2001 along with other members of the cell for the embassy plot and poses a continued threat if released.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a threat. He is assessed as a member of an Algerian extremist group involved in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Bosnia. Detainee served as the Bosnia contact for a senior al-Qaeda facilitator and received advanced training in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He is linked to al-Qaeda's support network and coordinated travel for extremists to Afghanistan. Detainee denies his extremist activities and identities despite corroborating intelligence reporting.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention due to his involvement in a terrorist plot. He was arrested in 2001 as part of an Algerian cell in Bosnia suspected of planning to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee has an extensive history with extremist groups in Algeria, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. He worked with several Islamic non-governmental organizations of concern. While cooperative, he likely withholds full details about personal ties to extremists.
Detainee is assessed to be a high risk threat and of high intelligence value. He is a member of an Algerian armed group involved in an al-Qaeda linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Detainee fought in the Bosnian jihad in the 1990s and worked with several charities associated with terrorism. He also served as an instructor at al-Qaeda training camps. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan after 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia before departing. He denies all allegations.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AG-000175DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on evidence that he was an al-Qaida member who received training at al-Faruq camp and possibly explosives training. He is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US forces as a leader coordinating supplies for al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora, and was possibly selected for training as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. The document recommends his continued detention due to these assessments and his lack of cooperation.
1) The document provides a recommendation to continue detaining a Guantanamo detainee named Sabir Lahmar Manfud due to his involvement with the Armed Islamic Group and ties to terrorist plots and activities in Bosnia.
2) It notes he advocated hostility against US forces, intended to travel to Afghanistan and Iran, and would likely engage in anti-US activities if released.
3) New information since the last review includes reports of his presence at an al-Qaeda guest house in Afghanistan and attempts to meet with al-Qaeda leaders in Iran.
Detainee is an Algerian national assessed to be a member of an al-Qaeda linked GIA cell in Bosnia. He is suspected of participating in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan for jihad following 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia beforehand. While in Bosnia, he threatened to attack international forces and was associated with al-Qaeda linked extremists. Detainee is also reported to have fought in Bosnia and Afghanistan as the chief martial arts instructor for an Islamic militant group. He was employed by several NGOs with ties to terrorism over seven years.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
Detainee served as the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence and had direct access to senior Taliban, al-Qaeda, and anti-coalition militia leadership. He coordinated intelligence activities between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and assisted their operatives in evading capture. Detainee is assessed to still pose a threat and have high intelligence value due to his role in the Taliban government and ties to other Islamic militant groups.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a threat. He is assessed as a member of an Algerian extremist group involved in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Bosnia. Detainee served as the Bosnia contact for a senior al-Qaeda facilitator and received advanced training in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He is linked to al-Qaeda's support network and coordinated travel for extremists to Afghanistan. Detainee denies his extremist activities and identities despite corroborating intelligence reporting.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention due to his involvement in a terrorist plot. He was arrested in 2001 as part of an Algerian cell in Bosnia suspected of planning to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee has an extensive history with extremist groups in Algeria, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. He worked with several Islamic non-governmental organizations of concern. While cooperative, he likely withholds full details about personal ties to extremists.
Detainee is assessed to be a high risk threat and of high intelligence value. He is a member of an Algerian armed group involved in an al-Qaeda linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Detainee fought in the Bosnian jihad in the 1990s and worked with several charities associated with terrorism. He also served as an instructor at al-Qaeda training camps. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan after 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia before departing. He denies all allegations.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AG-000175DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on evidence that he was an al-Qaida member who received training at al-Faruq camp and possibly explosives training. He is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US forces as a leader coordinating supplies for al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora, and was possibly selected for training as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. The document recommends his continued detention due to these assessments and his lack of cooperation.
1) The document provides a recommendation to continue detaining a Guantanamo detainee named Sabir Lahmar Manfud due to his involvement with the Armed Islamic Group and ties to terrorist plots and activities in Bosnia.
2) It notes he advocated hostility against US forces, intended to travel to Afghanistan and Iran, and would likely engage in anti-US activities if released.
3) New information since the last review includes reports of his presence at an al-Qaeda guest house in Afghanistan and attempts to meet with al-Qaeda leaders in Iran.
Detainee is an Algerian national assessed to be a member of an al-Qaeda linked GIA cell in Bosnia. He is suspected of participating in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan for jihad following 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia beforehand. While in Bosnia, he threatened to attack international forces and was associated with al-Qaeda linked extremists. Detainee is also reported to have fought in Bosnia and Afghanistan as the chief martial arts instructor for an Islamic militant group. He was employed by several NGOs with ties to terrorism over seven years.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
Detainee served as the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence and had direct access to senior Taliban, al-Qaeda, and anti-coalition militia leadership. He coordinated intelligence activities between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and assisted their operatives in evading capture. Detainee is assessed to still pose a threat and have high intelligence value due to his role in the Taliban government and ties to other Islamic militant groups.
A memorandum from the Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining a detainee under Department of Defense control. The detainee, captured in Mexico attempting to enter the US, has provided inconsistent stories about his travel and background. He is considered of high intelligence value due to his potential knowledge of smuggling routes and operations. While generally compliant in detention, he has failed polygraph tests regarding combat training and intentions in the US. The task force assesses he poses a medium security risk.
Detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and weapons smuggler associated with senior Taliban officials. He was captured in 2003 with documents and materials indicating ties to the Taliban and extremist networks. Detainee worked closely with the Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister and other senior figures. He denies the full extent of his Taliban activities and affiliations. JTF-GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be detained due to his high-level Taliban connections and potential threat.
Detainee is assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militias (ACM) member suspected of participating in the 27 March 2003 murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) worker in Afghanistan. He was captured with a satellite phone he was using to contact Mullah Haji Satar, an ACM commander suspected of the ICRC murder. Detainee has provided inconsistent accounts and an uncertain identity. He is assessed to present a high risk threat due to his ties to ACM commanders conducting attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces.
- Detainee was a senior al-Qaeda facilitator who swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and personally recruited his bodyguards. He has ties to many high-level al-Qaeda members and operatives involved in the 9/11 attacks.
- After the fall of the Taliban, detainee provided assistance to hundreds of foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan. He was responsible for moving money and fighters into Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban.
- Detainee traveled to Bosnia in the 1990s for jihad and spent a year fighting before returning to Yemen. He is associated with the planner of the 9/11 attacks and 11 of the hijackers.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AG-000533DP. It summarizes the detainee's personal information, travel history, activities in Afghanistan including possible ties to al-Qaeda, and capture in Tora Bora after being injured attempting to flee US bombing. The assessment determines he poses a high risk and high intelligence value, and recommends his continued detention due to concerns he could reengage in extremism if released.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as a high-risk member of al-Qaeda. He is assessed to have been an explosives expert for an IED cell in Khowst subordinate to senior al-Qaeda operative Abu Layth al-Libi. As part of the cell, the detainee directly assisted in planning and implementing attacks against US and Coalition forces. Evidence includes 23 mines found buried at his compound and notebooks with IED assembly instructions. He is reported to have surveyed targets and planted mines to ambush forces, and suggested using a Stinger missile.
Detainee was a senior Taliban official who served as Minister of Interior, Governor of Herat province, and military commander. He was directly associated with al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Following 9/11, detainee represented the Taliban in meetings with Iran seeking support against U.S. forces. He also attended a meeting directed by Osama bin Laden. Detainee was involved in narcotics trafficking and likely used profits to support Taliban interests. The document provides detainee's background and capture information, evaluates his statements, and assesses him as a continued high threat who may have valuable intelligence.
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida associated passport forger and key travel facilitator supporting senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), and the Global Jihad Support Network. Detainee has additional ties to the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Detainee is also a suspected bomb maker and former commander of a special al-Qaida training camp, and he was identified as a front line
This document provides a detainee assessment for an individual currently held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It recommends continued detention based on the detainee's history with militant groups and assessed likelihood to reengage in hostilities if released. Specifically:
- The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and likely to pose a threat due to his prior role as an intelligence officer for the Taliban and reported ties to other extremist groups.
- He is a member of an anti-coalition militia group with ties to the Haqqani Network and planned and executed rocket attacks against U.S. forces.
- Since his detention, his brother has engaged in insurgent activities, increasing the risk the deta
The document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000987DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee was the former Security Commander for Shinwar District in Afghanistan and was arrested in 2003 following the discovery of an improvised explosive device production facility near his compound. He was found with letters linking him to senior Taliban officials. While cooperative, his veracity is questionable and he is assessed to pose a medium risk. The document recommends his transfer for further interrogation on topics including local politics, the narcotics trade, and his associates.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000832DP. It summarizes that the detainee was a senior Taliban official who served in multiple leadership roles and had strong ties to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other anti-coalition militant groups. The detainee admitted serving in Taliban leadership positions and was involved in attacks against US and Coalition forces. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his past positions and ongoing ties to active militant groups that pose a threat to the US.
Bismulah is an Afghan national detained at Guantanamo Bay since June 2002. He claims he was conscripted by the Taliban and forced to stand guard at a checkpoint for 17 days. After fleeing, he was captured by a Northern Alliance militia and eventually transferred to US forces. Based on interrogations, Bismulah is assessed to have low intelligence value and pose a medium threat. He is recommended for release or transfer to another government's control for continued detention.
Detainee was a senior Taliban commander who led troops against US and Coalition forces in northern Afghanistan in late 2001. He commanded forces near Mazar-e-Sharif and is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his senior Taliban role and associations with other extremist groups and leaders that pose a threat to US interests.
Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan under the influence of his older brothers, one of whom was a senior al-Qaida member. Detainee received training at al-Qaida camps and guesthouses and worked closely with senior al-Qaida operatives, including having advance knowledge of attack plots. He was captured in 2002 during a raid on an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi with other detainees. The document provides details of detainee's travels, training, associates, and activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The crash of a US drone in Iran has revealed the intense US spying efforts taking place in Iran, where the US has no official presence. While the drone is believed to have crashed due to a malfunction rather than being shot down, Iran displayed the largely intact drone on television. US surveillance of Iran through drones and other means has been ongoing for years to gain intelligence on activities inside Iran's borders. However, the recent drone crash has unmasked these secret intelligence operations.
(S//NF) Detainee was a senior Taliban official who held multiple high-level positions including Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army. He commanded thousands of Taliban troops and had close ties to al-Qaeda members. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes and would likely rejoin militant groups and target US forces if released. He poses a high security risk and has high intelligence value.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation on detainee ISN US9AF-000457DP. It recommends the detainee be released or transferred to another country's control based on the following: the detainee is assessed to pose a low threat; he is unlikely to be a member of al-Qaeda or Taliban; careful review found no new derogatory information; and other detainees captured with him provided no damaging information. The detainee may have general knowledge about air strikes in his village and Jalaluddin Haqqani's activities, but is assessed to have low intelligence value.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000899DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on his admitted membership in Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, ties to anti-coalition militias, possible ties to al-Qaeda and Iranian extremists, and participation in attacks against US and coalition forces. Materials found in his possession at capture included an al-Qaeda training manual. The detainee is uncooperative and continues to support anti-US elements, so continued detention is advised for risk of reengagement if released.
Munitions dealers arrested for conspiracy to export military aircraft parts t...muculetz
Jeff Bush, Department of Justice, ICE Agent Sammy Cruzcoriano, Jeffrey H. Sloman, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Michael Johnson, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement, Anthony V. Mangione, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Investigations, and Amie R. Tanchak, Resident Agent in Charge, U.S. Department of Defense, Government Conspiracy,Defense Criminal Investigative Service, R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, Michael Johnson, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement, Anthony V. Mangione, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Investigations, and Christopher Amato, Special Agent in Charge of the Pentagon's Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Southeast Field Office, Revolution in Romania,R. Alexander Acosta, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida; David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Michael Johnson, Special Agentin Charge, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement; Anthony V. Mangione, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Investigations; and Amie R. Tanchak, Resident Agent in Charge, U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Judge Patrick A. White, Judge Patricia A. Seitz, Judge John M. O’Sullivan, Attorney Mark Eiglarsh, Attorney Michael Cohen,C.I.A.,Defende Intelligence Agency,National Intelligence Agency,Department of State,Department of Navy,Interpol,F.B.I., National Security Agency, FBI Special Agent in Charge, Michael Johnson,Traian Bujduveanu,Revolution in Iran,Attorney Robert G. Amsel
This document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed as a senior-level Taliban member who organized networks and disrupted coalition operations. He facilitated operations that likely resulted in US casualties. The detainee poses a high risk and can provide intelligence on extremist activities, drug trafficking, and Taliban networks. The Joint Task Force recommends continued detention.
The document provides an assessment and recommendation for transferring Guantanamo detainee Zahir Shah, ISN US9AF-00101ODP, to the control of another country with conditions. It summarizes that Zahir Shah is assessed to be the deputy commander of a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) cell in Afghanistan and affiliated with al-Qaeda. He is assessed to pose a medium risk. The document recommends his transfer subject to an acceptable agreement while noting he may have intelligence value on HIG operations, weapons caches, and al-Qaeda affiliations.
A memorandum from the Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining a detainee under Department of Defense control. The detainee, captured in Mexico attempting to enter the US, has provided inconsistent stories about his travel and background. He is considered of high intelligence value due to his potential knowledge of smuggling routes and operations. While generally compliant in detention, he has failed polygraph tests regarding combat training and intentions in the US. The task force assesses he poses a medium security risk.
Detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and weapons smuggler associated with senior Taliban officials. He was captured in 2003 with documents and materials indicating ties to the Taliban and extremist networks. Detainee worked closely with the Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister and other senior figures. He denies the full extent of his Taliban activities and affiliations. JTF-GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be detained due to his high-level Taliban connections and potential threat.
Detainee is assessed to be an Anti-Coalition Militias (ACM) member suspected of participating in the 27 March 2003 murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) worker in Afghanistan. He was captured with a satellite phone he was using to contact Mullah Haji Satar, an ACM commander suspected of the ICRC murder. Detainee has provided inconsistent accounts and an uncertain identity. He is assessed to present a high risk threat due to his ties to ACM commanders conducting attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces.
- Detainee was a senior al-Qaeda facilitator who swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and personally recruited his bodyguards. He has ties to many high-level al-Qaeda members and operatives involved in the 9/11 attacks.
- After the fall of the Taliban, detainee provided assistance to hundreds of foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan. He was responsible for moving money and fighters into Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban.
- Detainee traveled to Bosnia in the 1990s for jihad and spent a year fighting before returning to Yemen. He is associated with the planner of the 9/11 attacks and 11 of the hijackers.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AG-000533DP. It summarizes the detainee's personal information, travel history, activities in Afghanistan including possible ties to al-Qaeda, and capture in Tora Bora after being injured attempting to flee US bombing. The assessment determines he poses a high risk and high intelligence value, and recommends his continued detention due to concerns he could reengage in extremism if released.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as a high-risk member of al-Qaeda. He is assessed to have been an explosives expert for an IED cell in Khowst subordinate to senior al-Qaeda operative Abu Layth al-Libi. As part of the cell, the detainee directly assisted in planning and implementing attacks against US and Coalition forces. Evidence includes 23 mines found buried at his compound and notebooks with IED assembly instructions. He is reported to have surveyed targets and planted mines to ambush forces, and suggested using a Stinger missile.
Detainee was a senior Taliban official who served as Minister of Interior, Governor of Herat province, and military commander. He was directly associated with al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Following 9/11, detainee represented the Taliban in meetings with Iran seeking support against U.S. forces. He also attended a meeting directed by Osama bin Laden. Detainee was involved in narcotics trafficking and likely used profits to support Taliban interests. The document provides detainee's background and capture information, evaluates his statements, and assesses him as a continued high threat who may have valuable intelligence.
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida associated passport forger and key travel facilitator supporting senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), and the Global Jihad Support Network. Detainee has additional ties to the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Detainee is also a suspected bomb maker and former commander of a special al-Qaida training camp, and he was identified as a front line
This document provides a detainee assessment for an individual currently held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It recommends continued detention based on the detainee's history with militant groups and assessed likelihood to reengage in hostilities if released. Specifically:
- The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and likely to pose a threat due to his prior role as an intelligence officer for the Taliban and reported ties to other extremist groups.
- He is a member of an anti-coalition militia group with ties to the Haqqani Network and planned and executed rocket attacks against U.S. forces.
- Since his detention, his brother has engaged in insurgent activities, increasing the risk the deta
The document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000987DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. The detainee was the former Security Commander for Shinwar District in Afghanistan and was arrested in 2003 following the discovery of an improvised explosive device production facility near his compound. He was found with letters linking him to senior Taliban officials. While cooperative, his veracity is questionable and he is assessed to pose a medium risk. The document recommends his transfer for further interrogation on topics including local politics, the narcotics trade, and his associates.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000832DP. It summarizes that the detainee was a senior Taliban official who served in multiple leadership roles and had strong ties to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other anti-coalition militant groups. The detainee admitted serving in Taliban leadership positions and was involved in attacks against US and Coalition forces. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his past positions and ongoing ties to active militant groups that pose a threat to the US.
Bismulah is an Afghan national detained at Guantanamo Bay since June 2002. He claims he was conscripted by the Taliban and forced to stand guard at a checkpoint for 17 days. After fleeing, he was captured by a Northern Alliance militia and eventually transferred to US forces. Based on interrogations, Bismulah is assessed to have low intelligence value and pose a medium threat. He is recommended for release or transfer to another government's control for continued detention.
Detainee was a senior Taliban commander who led troops against US and Coalition forces in northern Afghanistan in late 2001. He commanded forces near Mazar-e-Sharif and is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention due to his senior Taliban role and associations with other extremist groups and leaders that pose a threat to US interests.
Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan under the influence of his older brothers, one of whom was a senior al-Qaida member. Detainee received training at al-Qaida camps and guesthouses and worked closely with senior al-Qaida operatives, including having advance knowledge of attack plots. He was captured in 2002 during a raid on an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi with other detainees. The document provides details of detainee's travels, training, associates, and activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The crash of a US drone in Iran has revealed the intense US spying efforts taking place in Iran, where the US has no official presence. While the drone is believed to have crashed due to a malfunction rather than being shot down, Iran displayed the largely intact drone on television. US surveillance of Iran through drones and other means has been ongoing for years to gain intelligence on activities inside Iran's borders. However, the recent drone crash has unmasked these secret intelligence operations.
(S//NF) Detainee was a senior Taliban official who held multiple high-level positions including Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army. He commanded thousands of Taliban troops and had close ties to al-Qaeda members. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes and would likely rejoin militant groups and target US forces if released. He poses a high security risk and has high intelligence value.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation on detainee ISN US9AF-000457DP. It recommends the detainee be released or transferred to another country's control based on the following: the detainee is assessed to pose a low threat; he is unlikely to be a member of al-Qaeda or Taliban; careful review found no new derogatory information; and other detainees captured with him provided no damaging information. The detainee may have general knowledge about air strikes in his village and Jalaluddin Haqqani's activities, but is assessed to have low intelligence value.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000899DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on his admitted membership in Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, ties to anti-coalition militias, possible ties to al-Qaeda and Iranian extremists, and participation in attacks against US and coalition forces. Materials found in his possession at capture included an al-Qaeda training manual. The detainee is uncooperative and continues to support anti-US elements, so continued detention is advised for risk of reengagement if released.
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Jeff Bush, Department of Justice, ICE Agent Sammy Cruzcoriano, Jeffrey H. Sloman, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Michael Johnson, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement, Anthony V. Mangione, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Investigations, and Amie R. Tanchak, Resident Agent in Charge, U.S. Department of Defense, Government Conspiracy,Defense Criminal Investigative Service, R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, Michael Johnson, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement, Anthony V. Mangione, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Investigations, and Christopher Amato, Special Agent in Charge of the Pentagon's Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Southeast Field Office, Revolution in Romania,R. Alexander Acosta, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida; David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Michael Johnson, Special Agentin Charge, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement; Anthony V. Mangione, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Investigations; and Amie R. Tanchak, Resident Agent in Charge, U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Judge Patrick A. White, Judge Patricia A. Seitz, Judge John M. O’Sullivan, Attorney Mark Eiglarsh, Attorney Michael Cohen,C.I.A.,Defende Intelligence Agency,National Intelligence Agency,Department of State,Department of Navy,Interpol,F.B.I., National Security Agency, FBI Special Agent in Charge, Michael Johnson,Traian Bujduveanu,Revolution in Iran,Attorney Robert G. Amsel
This document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee is assessed as a senior-level Taliban member who organized networks and disrupted coalition operations. He facilitated operations that likely resulted in US casualties. The detainee poses a high risk and can provide intelligence on extremist activities, drug trafficking, and Taliban networks. The Joint Task Force recommends continued detention.
The document provides an assessment and recommendation for transferring Guantanamo detainee Zahir Shah, ISN US9AF-00101ODP, to the control of another country with conditions. It summarizes that Zahir Shah is assessed to be the deputy commander of a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) cell in Afghanistan and affiliated with al-Qaeda. He is assessed to pose a medium risk. The document recommends his transfer subject to an acceptable agreement while noting he may have intelligence value on HIG operations, weapons caches, and al-Qaeda affiliations.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay to another facility. It summarizes the detainee's personal information and assesses him as a probable member of al-Qaeda's support network who likely received improvised explosive device training. The detainee is believed to have traveled from France to Afghanistan via the UK and Pakistan, staying at guesthouses associated with extremist groups. He is assessed to pose a medium risk and high intelligence value.
The document provides a recommendation to retain a detainee, ISN:US9AF-000953DP, under Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee was the president of Ariana Airlines in Afghanistan, which is alleged to have provided logistical support to Al-Qaeda. As the airline's president, it is assessed that the detainee has knowledge of key financial and transportation networks. The detainee is determined to be of high intelligence value and continues to pose a high threat risk.
Detainee Naswar Khan Sawat Khan is recommended for transfer to the control of another country for continued detention. He was the second-in-command of the Union of Mujahadin (UOM) and subordinate to Malem Jan, the leader of the UOM who was also subordinate to Jalaluddin Haqqani and his Haqqani network. Detainee is assessed as having been a commander for both the UOM and likely the Haqqani network as well. Documents found list detainee as the number two leader of the UOM and as having personnel assigned to him, indicating his direct involvement in the organization. He has been deceptive and refused to discuss his true relationship with the Haqqani
Detainee Mohammed Mussa Yakubi is assessed as a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia in Afghanistan with connections to a global terrorist network. He is believed to have helped engineer IED and mortar attacks against US forces. Detainee was arrested after weapons were found in his compound, including an AK-47, mortar tubes, and ammunition. He is assessed as a HIGH risk and having MEDIUM intelligence value regarding the Gardez cell, planned attacks, and connections to other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. JTF GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be held in DoD custody.
Dni nato cyber panel via the interceptBaddddBoyyyy
Russia and China pose the greatest cyber threats to NATO computer networks. Russia is considered the most strategic threat due to its capabilities and intent to target and disrupt NATO infrastructures. China's cyber espionage operations against military networks have expanded dramatically and NATO information is likely a target. While hacktivist groups get media attention, nation-states like Russia pose a greater threat through proxy operations. Classified NATO networks remain at risk from insider threats and vulnerabilities like infected thumb drives. Prioritizing the most critical data and networks could help allocate resources to address gaps and develop response plans.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-001075DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be of medium intelligence value and a medium threat risk. He was captured in Afghanistan in possession of weapons and has ties to anti-coalition militant groups in the Gardez region. While the detainee denies involvement, he has knowledge about a bombing in Gardez. The task force recommends his transfer to allow another country to take over his continued detention.
Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-Qaida who received terrorist training in Afghanistan. He reportedly attended training at al-Qaida affiliated camps, associated with known al-Qaida operatives, and resided in al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee likely participated in action against U.S. and coalition forces. He is assessed as a medium risk and threat, and of medium intelligence value.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN: US9AF-000943DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of an Anti-Coalition Militia group in Afghanistan and a medium risk, who may have been recruited by Abdul Rahim to fight against U.S. and Coalition forces. While the detainee claims he was just a student in Pakistan, information indicates he assisted Rahim and participated in recruiting others to conduct jihad. The document recommends transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda operative and leader of an improvised explosive devices (IED) cell in Khowst, Afghanistan. He worked directly for senior al-Qaeda member Ali Ammar Ashur al-Raqiai, planning IED attacks against US and Coalition forces. Multiple sources reported that detainee's cell received instructions from al-Raqiai to make IEDs for attacks against US forces. Detainee recruited others to his al-Qaeda cell and provided explosives training. He is assessed to be a continued threat and is recommended for continued detention.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000900DP, to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who willingly participated in training and then traveled with a group to Kabul to carry out attacks against US forces. He was captured in the grenade attack on US Special Forces on December 17, 2002 in Kabul. While the detainee is assessed as a high risk and threat to the US, its interests, and allies, he has been compliant in detention and is assessed to be of low intelligence value.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative with ties to senior leaders. He has admitted to affiliations with terrorist groups including GIA and HIG. Detainee trained at militant camps, fought Soviets in Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban Foreign and Intelligence Ministries. He was captured in Pakistan and transferred to Guantanamo for suspected involvement in terrorist plots and attacks. Detainee has omitted details of his activities prior to capture, making his threat level and intelligence value difficult to assess fully.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
Detainee is an Afghan national captured in 2002 for suspected involvement with al-Qaida. He worked closely with al-Qaida commander IZ-10026 for approximately 5 years, serving as his assistant, facilitator, translator, and distributing funds on his behalf. Detainee admitted participating in hostilities against US forces and operating al-Qaida guesthouses. He is assessed to still pose a threat and would likely reengage in extremist activities if released. The document recommends the detainee remain in detention.
Detainee is a 52-year old Algerian national assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and the North African Extremist Network who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and received small arms training at an al-Qaida camp. He is assessed to be a high risk and threat to the US due to his extremist connections and admitted associations with known terrorists. The document recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention, preferably Algeria, if a satisfactory agreement can be reached. If not, he should remain in DoD custody due to contradictions in his story and suspected deception during interrogations.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AF-000560DP. It summarizes that the detainee has been compliant in detention but is assessed to be a high risk if released due to his prior role as a primary financial manager for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He facilitated large money transfers and the procurement of weapons for terrorist attacks. The detainee is reported to have strong ties to the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, and Jamaat Tablighi and to have been involved in narcotics trafficking. The document recommends the detainee remain in DoD custody due to concerns he could reengage in extremist support activities if released.
Haji Sahib Rohullah Wakil is assessedto pose a high risk threat. He is a 45-year-old Afghan citizen and important politician from Konar Province who provided operational support to al-Qaida. Detainee assisted Arabs associated with al-Qaida to infiltrate and exfiltrate from Afghanistan and Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban regime. He also worked with anti-Afghan government factions and Pakistani intelligence to destabilize the interim Afghan administration. Detainee remains a threat due to his past involvement with al-Qaida, support for insurgent groups, and efforts to undermine the Afghan government.
The document provides a Detainee Assessment Board (DAB) assessment of a Guantanamo detainee. The DAB assessment finds the detainee to be a high risk and of high intelligence value. Specifically:
- The detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaeda in East Africa who served as a courier and facilitator between that group and al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan.
- The detainee has numerous associations with individuals involved in extremist activities and traveled extensively in areas connected to al-Qaeda.
- The document outlines the detainee's account of his involvement with the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Ittihad al-Islami group in Somalia and time spent working
Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaida'sGlobal Jihad SupportNetwork who attendedtraining in Afghanistan andresidedin guesthousesoperatedby al-Qaidamembers.He occupiedpositionsin the Tora Bora Mountainsandparticipatedin hostilities againstUS andcoalition forces. JTF-GTMO previouslyassessedhim asa ContinuedDetentionrisk but now recommendshis TransferOut of DoD Controlbasedon his MEDIUM intelligencevalueandthreatlevel.
Detaineeis assessedto be a veteranjihadist who fled with othermujahideento Tora Bora, AF, wherehe participatedin armedhostilities againstUS andcoalitionforces. Detaineewascapturedwith senioral-QaidamemberIbn Sheikhal-Libi's, ISN US9LY-000212DP(LY-212),group, who fled theToraBora Mountainsinto Pakistan.JTF-GTMO determinedthis detaineeto be a MEDIUM risk, a HIGH threatfrom a detentionperspective,andof MEDIUM intelligencevalue.
Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
The document is a memorandum recommending the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AF-000934DP. It finds that he poses a high security risk, as he was likely a member of a Taliban militia unit and involved in rocket attacks against U.S. forces. If released, it assesses he would reconnect with extremists and resume hostile activities. The detainee has been inconsistent about his involvement and maintains contact with Taliban members, posing a threat to the U.S. and allies.
This document provides a detainee assessment and recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000562DP, to another country for continued detention. Key details include:
- The detainee is a 25-year-old Afghan national who was captured in 2002 and may have worked briefly as a clerk for an individual linked to the Taliban.
- He has been diagnosed with a dissociative disorder and poses a medium risk, though he claims to have no terrorist affiliations or training.
- The assessment recommends transferring the detainee to his country of citizenship for further psychiatric care due to his deteriorating mental state.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000976DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes the detainee's background, including his association with an al-Qaeda bomb maker for over five years. It also details evidence linking the detainee and others to anti-tank mine operations against U.S. forces in 2002. Based on this information, the detainee is assessed as a medium risk and a probable member of an insurgent group that specialized in explosive devices. The document recommends his transfer for these reasons.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AF-000831DP to the control of another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who provided support to extremist groups including Al-Qaida. He has ties to other detainees involved in moving Al-Qaida members and conducting attacks. While the detainee claims not to be involved, evidence links him to supporting a bomb-making cell and safe houses used by terrorists. He is assessed to have intelligence value and still poses a medium risk.
Abdul Hanan is a 44-year-old Afghan national detained at Guantanamo Bay who traveled to Afghanistan to search for his forcibly conscripted brother. After spending two weeks unsuccessfully asking about his brother in Konduz, he was detained by Northern Alliance forces and transferred to U.S. custody. While initially detained for possible knowledge of al-Qaeda, interrogations found him unknowledgeable and not a future threat. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay now recommends his transfer or release from custody.
This document provides a summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is believed to have worked for a known member of the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group and traveled between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for over a decade. Concerns were raised about inconsistencies in his story and links to anti-coalition militant groups. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining him in the Department of Defense's control due to these associations and assessed intelligence value.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-001003DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is an admitted member of the Taliban who was the Director of Security for Sheberghan, Afghanistan. While some documents allege he was responsible for killing hundreds of civilians, extensive research has not substantiated these claims. The detainee has been deceptive during interrogations but has not participated in anti-coalition activities. He poses a medium risk and may threaten US interests if released. The Joint Task Force and Criminal Investigative Task Force agree he should be transferred for continued detention.
Detaineeis assessedas a memberof the Taliban and Al-Qaida terrorist network. He served in a 40-man Taliban unit that provided security for Usama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida leaders. The unit also conducted assassinations, kidnappings and bombings against US forces. Detainee admits connections to senior Taliban commanders and fighting against US troops. He poses a high security risk and likely would rejoin insurgent operations if released.
Detainee Ahmed Bin Saleh Bel Bachao is assessed as a probable member of al-Qaida who received weapons training in Afghanistan. He traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 after being influenced by extremist lectures at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London. In Afghanistan, he stayed at an Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad known to facilitate foreign fighters, where he received small arms training. He fled to Tora Bora during US attacks and was later captured with a large group of fighters. It is assessed he poses a medium risk and may have participated in hostilities against US forces.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AG-000284DP to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and al-Qaeda's global terrorist network. He has been identified as receiving terrorist training, but does not appear to be a senior leader. While sometimes cooperative, he has also been uncooperative and obstinate during interrogations. The Joint Task Force assesses he poses a medium risk but defers to the Criminal Investigative Task Force's assessment that he poses a high risk.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for detainee ISN US9AG-000070DP held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is a 24-year old Algerian man with a history of significant head trauma resulting in blindness in one eye and brain injuries causing difficulties with speech, understanding, and controlling behaviors. Due to his medical condition, he requires long-term custodial care. While previously assessed as medium intelligence value, he now poses a low risk. The Joint Task Force recommends releasing or transferring the detainee to another country for continued detention based on his health status and low risk level.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
Detainee Mohammed Shah is assessed as a probable member of al Qaeda who has ties to terrorist political parties in Iran. He is assessed to be a medium risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The document recommends transferring the detainee to another country with conditions, subject to an acceptable transfer agreement. It provides details of the detainee's background, including fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, working as a doctor in Iran, and traveling between Afghanistan and Iran with large sums of money to support terrorist activities. The detainee is considered of medium intelligence value and may be able to provide information on Taliban commanders, couriers, and training camps in Iran with links to terrorist groups.
This memorandum recommends releasing or transferring a Guantanamo detainee. The detainee was likely falsely accused of participating in an ambush by Afghan forces seeking to cover up their own involvement. Records indicate the detainee poses a low risk and likely has no valuable intelligence. While the Criminal Investigation Task Force assesses the detainee as medium risk, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo recommends release or transfer based on the fraudulent circumstances of his capture.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a Guantanamo detainee, ISN: US9AF-001100DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was involved in anti-coalition militia operations and planned an attack on US forces in Afghanistan. He has direct ties to senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. The document assesses the detainee as a medium risk and recommends his transfer based on derogatory information obtained since his previous assessment.
DetaineeMohammedAmin is recommendedfor transferto the control of anothercountry for continueddetention.He is assessedto be a memberof Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddinwho attendedplanningmeetingswhereattacksagainstUS-ledcoalitionforcesandtheAfghangovernmentwere discussed.Detaineehasassociationswith TalibanandAl-Qaedafiguresandmay haveknowledgeof futureplannedattacksdue to his involvementwith Anti-Coalitionforcesin Afghanistan.While in custody,hehasbeengenerallycompliantbut remainsan enemycombatant.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo Bay detainee, ISN US9AF-001045DP, in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee (1) is assessed to be a key member of anti-coalition militant groups who has participated in weapons trafficking, explosives training, and attacks against US and coalition forces; (2) has admitted ties to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations; and (3) poses a high risk and is likely to provide intelligence on terrorist networks, operations, and leaders if retained in DoD control.
This memorandum recommends retaining a detainee, ISN US9AF-001043DP, under Department of Defense control at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who possesses intelligence on terrorist operations and personnel. He was formerly the Taliban Minister of Commerce and deputy to a senior Taliban commander. New information indicates he was involved in the killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross employee in 2003. The detainee poses a high risk and should continue to be detained.
Detainee ISN US9AF-001037DP is assessed to be a high-ranking commander in the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group. He was captured along with another high-ranking HIG commander, ISN 1036, during a raid on a HIG safe house. Detainee and ISN 1036 have provided conflicting statements about their roles in HIG and how long they have known each other. Detainee is assessed to pose a high risk as he likely would threaten U.S. interests. JTF GTMO assesses the detainee to be of high intelligence value and recommends he continue to be detained in DoD custody.
Detainee Akhtiar Mohammad is assessed to be a high-level commander in the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group who has extensive knowledge of anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan. He is assessed to pose a high risk if released. Detainee was captured in 2003 at a suspected HIG compound during a raid. He has been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2004 and continues to be assessed as an enemy combatant with high intelligence value due to his connections and knowledge of HIG activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for transferring detainee ISN US9AF-001035DP to another country with conditions. The detainee is assessed as a probable former Taliban commander from Afghanistan who is currently in good health. He is assessed as a MEDIUM risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The detainee was captured with documents indicating ties to the Taliban and admitted being a member of an anti-coalition group. He provided information on weapon caches and personalities within the Taliban and Konar province government that expanded US intelligence. Based on this information, JTF-GTMO now recommends the detainee for transfer with conditions subject to an acceptable agreement between countries.
This document provides a recommendation to continue detaining detainee US9AF-001021DP based on a JTF GTMO assessment. The detainee is assessed to be a high-ranking member of the Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) with ties to Al-Qaida and its global terrorism network. He was implicated in a plot to kill Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan by placing bombs at the Presidential Palace and US Embassy. Consistent reporting indicates the detainee remains committed to the HIG and its goals. It is assessed that he poses a high risk and is likely to pose a threat to the US and its allies.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN:US9AF-001019DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is an Afghan national who fought with the mujahideen and Taliban. He is assessed to have been a corrupt government official in Zabol province who associated with known terrorists like Hamidullah. While somewhat cooperative, he has been evasive about his full role. He poses a medium security risk and may have intelligence value. The Joint Task Force recommends his transfer for continued detention based on these assessments.
1. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330401
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
JTF-GTMO-CDR 1 April 2008
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment
1. (S) Personal Information:
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Lakhdar Boumediene
2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.
3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention
Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 28 September 2007.
b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a member of the Algerian Armed Islamic
Group (GIA) and al-Qaida who was detained for his involvement with a GIA cell in Bosnia
(BK), suspected of plotting an attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo, BK1
. Detainee has an
1
Analyst Note: The GIA is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 3
target. Priority 3 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats other senior policymakers and IC managers
believe must receive attention from the IC that are not already identified as Priorities 1 or 2. These include
terrorist/extremist groups involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and the capability to attack
U.S. persons and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less threat than Priority 2 groups, or terrorist/extremist
Current/True Name and Aliases: Lakhdar Boumediene,
Ahmed, al-Muntasir
Place of Birth: Ain Soltgane Saeda, Algeria (AG)
Date of Birth: 27 April 1966
Citizenship: Algeria
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US4AG-010005DP
2. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)
2
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
for
extensive history as an extremist active in jihad and suspected terrorist activities in Bosnia,
Algeria, Pakistan (PK), and Afghanistan (AF). Detainee admits extensive travels throughout
the Greater Middle East. Detainee has long standing ties with non-governmental
organizations (NGO) tied to extremism. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:
A HIGH risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
A HIGH threat from a detention perspective
Of MEDIUM intelligence value
c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s
assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be
annotated by ¡ next to the footnote.)
Added a report indicating detainee was an Afghan war veteran and fought as part of
the Muslim Brigade in BK.
Added reports citing detainee’s admission of being approached to participate in a
terrorist plot in Jordan and being asked to join the jihad while working at the Hira
Institute.
Included a report indicating detainee was a member of al-Qaida and the GIA.
4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events:
The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account.
These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee studied at the Techweed al-Meckanie Trade School in
Saeda, AG, from 1984 to 1985 to become a mechanic. After completing trade school,
detainee served as a border guard in the Algerian Army from 1985 to 1987. Upon
completion of his military service, detainee spent 1987 to 1988 living with his parents while
seeking employment. From 1988 to 1990, detainee gained employment with the Drywall and
Cement Company in Saeda, working as a machinery mechanic. Detainee decided to look for
another job when his co-workers informed him the job was bad for his health.2
b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In November 1990, detainee learned that a former
co-worker and friend named Samahi Abdallah, aka (Saryah), aka (Abu Mustafa Ahmed), was
groups that have demonstrated intention to attack U.S. persons and interests and are taking action to develop or
acquire WMD capability.
2
IIR 6 034 0204 02
3. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)
3
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
for
working in Pakistan.3
He was told by others that Samahi’s job allowed him to send money
home to his family and yet still live comfortably. Detainee called Samahi and asked him
about traveling to Pakistan for work. Samahi told detainee to make arrangements, obtain a
visa, and travel to Peshawar. Detainee flew via Tunisia (TS), Russia (RS), and Karachi, PK,
to Peshawar where he met Samahi.4
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee stayed with Samahi for approximately six
months, during which time he obtained a job at a madrassa (Islamic religious school) known
as the Islamic Hira Institute in Babi, PK. In approximately December 1993, detainee
traveled to Sanaa, Yemen (YM), and became a member of the French Cultural Center.
Unable to find favorable employment and after speaking with his old neighbor from Algeria,
Akrish Moamer, detainee went to Tirana, Albania (AL), in July 1994. Detainee obtained a
job working at the Abu Dhabi Welfare Organization, which later became the United Arab
Emirates (AE) Red Crescent Society. Later, in 1995, detainee married an Algerian woman in
Albania. In April 1997, detainee asked the Red Crescent Society for a transfer to Sarajevo,
BK. Detainee’s close friend, Mohamed Nechle, ISN US4AG-010003DP (AG-10003), had
already moved to Bosnia with his wife and children. Detainee left Tirana and traveled to
Sarajevo via Istanbul, Turkey (TU), with his wife and daughter, arriving in Sarajevo on 16
April 1997. Detainee purchased Bosnian citizenship credentials in September 1998 through
illegal means for 5,000 Deutsche marks.5
On 28 December 1999, detainee returned to
Algeria with his daughter and wife, who was about to give birth to their second child.
Algerian authorities arrested detainee because his Algerian passport had expired and his
passport contained a Pakistani visa. The Algerian police proceeded to question detainee
about Afghanistan (AF). Detainee told police he had only been to Pakistan, not Afghanistan,
and was subsequently released when the Algerian government issued a blanket pardon to
Algerians previously involved with al-Jabha al-Islamyah Lil Inkaz, aka (Islamic Salvation
Front), aka (FIS).6
On 16 February 2000, detainee departed Algeria, leaving behind his wife
and children, and returned to Bosnia. In March 2000, detainee obtained a visa and traveled
to the hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA), via Istanbul and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (SA).
Approximately 20 days later, detainee returned to Sarajevo and continued working with the
3
Analyst Note: Detainee identified Abu Mustafa Ahmed and Saryah as aliases for Samahi Abdallah. Samahi
advised detainee that it was not a good idea to use his real name in Pakistan. For additional information see IIR 6
034 0203 02, IIR 6 034 0372 02.
4
IIR 6 034 0204 02
5
Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $2,860 US.
6
Analyst Note: FIS was an opposition party that was banned by the Algerian government in 1991, prompting the
Algerian Civil War of 1991-2002. FIS supporters factionalized, spawning several armed splinter groups including
the GIA and GSPC, and fought a bloody ten-year insurgency. In 1999, the Algerian government issued a blanket
amnesty to former FIS members and began a national reconciliation campaign that ultimately contributed to the
defeat of the violent insurgency in 2002.
4. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)
4
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
for
Red Crescent Society as an orphan relief manager. In July 2000, detainee traveled to
Istanbul to meet his wife and children, and returned with them to Sarajevo.7
5. (U) Capture Information:
a. (S//NF) In October 2001, a US intelligence source identified a group of men who were
reportedly planning to bomb the US Embassy in Sarajevo. After the source’s information
was corroborated, Bosnian authorities, at the behest of the US government, captured eight
individuals suspected in the plot in a series of mid-October arrests in the Zenica, BK area.
Detainee was among the eight and was arrested on or about 15 October 2001.8
The two non-
Algerian suspects were deported to their home countries. Bosnian authorities held detainee
and the other five Algerian suspects in custody until they could no longer be legally detained.
When the Algerian government refused to accept custody of the “Algerian Six,” Bosnian
authorities transferred them to US custody on 18 January 2002.9
b. (S) Property Held:
Casio Watch
Scrap of paper listing three phone numbers attributed to “Ambasade D’Algerie en
Italif” (Algerian Embassy in Italy)
Money:10
170 Deutsche marks
23 Bahraini dinar
Though not held at JTF-GTMO, the following items were reported to have been in
detainee’s possession at time of capture.11
Identity Documents: Algerian Passport Number 0705513, Bosnian Passport
Number 3817760, Bosnian Passport Number 0801081, and a French Identity
Document.
Arabic language documents with the letterhead for Lajnat al-Dawa al-Islamiah
(LDI), aka (Society of Social Reform); Arabic language document with the letterhead
for Abu Dhabi Welfare Organization; and an Arabic language document with the
letterhead for the AE Red Crescent Society.
7
IIR 6 034 0372 02, IIR 6 034 0203 02
8
IIR 6 034 0205 02, IIR 7 130 1022 02, DCS-G2 Special Assessment-Algerian Six 18-FEB-2004; Analyst Note:
Detainee was reportedly arrested on the evening of 20 October 2001 in Bihac, BK. For additional information see
TD-314/39634-01. Multiple dates are reported for detainee’s capture, ranging from 15th-20th October 2002.
9
IIR 6 034 0207 02 (Paragraph 12), AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 29-DEC-2006, 010003 PROFILE1 23-AUG-2002
Paragraph 4C
10
Analyst Note: Approximately $183 US based on conversion date of 15 October 2001.
11
TD-314/41396-01
5. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)
5
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
for
Photocopies of two articles written in Serbo-Croatian.
A Bosnian newspaper article detailing a youth camp organized by
the AE charity.
An article from the Croatian paper Globus, detailing an attack
against the United States Information Service office in Pristina,
Kosovo, in August 1998.
c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 20 January 2002
d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the
following:
¡ The Red Crescent Society NGO in Bosnia
¡ Employees in the Bosnian NGO office
¡ Banks used by the Red Crescent NGO in Bosnia
¡ Peshawar-based NGOs
¡ LDI NGO in the Babi, PK
6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Detainee has provided partially truthful, yet
incomplete accounts of his history and timeline. Detainee has consistently denied involvement
in terrorist organizations or plots of any kind against the US. He has denied membership in the
GIA and affiliation with Bosnian mujahideen despite reports indicating the contrary. Detainee
maintains he never met or barely knew the other members of the “Algerian Six,” which has been
proven false based on subsequent reports. Detainee has provided dates of travel and places of
occupation which have been corroborated; however, he is unable to account for phone numbers
captured in his pocket litter tied to extremists. Detainee has been uncooperative with
interrogators since approximately 2003 and his story contains multiple gaps requiring further
exploitation.
7. (U) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he may pose a threat to the
US, its interests, and allies.
b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention in DoD Control: Detainee is a member of
an Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) cell involved in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the
US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee has an extensive history as an extremist, active in jihad
and suspected terrorist activities in Bosnia, Algeria, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and admits
extensive travels throughout the Greater Middle East. He worked for more than two years
for the Hira Institute, an NGO in Pakistan.
6. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)
6
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
for
S//NF) Detainee is a member of a GIA cell in Bosnia, assessed to have been involved
in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee possibly has
additional information regarding other terrorist plots.
(S/NF) On 8 October 2001, the Bosnian Federal Ministry of Interior Police
(FMUP), in cooperation with US forces in Bosnia, apprehended suspected al-Qaida
facilitator Bensayah Belkacem, ISN US4AG-010001DP (AG-10001), after an
investigation into threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Bosnian authorities
also directed the investigation toward seven other individuals, including detainee,
who were suspected of involvement in the threats, which also led to their subsequent
apprehension.12
¡ (S//NF) Over the next two weeks, detainee, along with Saber Mahfouz
Lahmar, ISN US4AG-010002DP (AG-10002), AG-10003, Mustapha Ait Idir,
ISN US4AG-010004DP (AG-10004), and Al-Haj Omar Boudellaa, ISN US4AG-
010006DP (AG-10006) were arrested for false attestation of information and
suspected involvement in the threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo.13
This
group became known as the “Algerian Six.”
¡ (S//NF) The two other individuals arrested were identified as Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG) member Khaled al-Arbed and Atif Munassur, aka (Abu
Nasar), a suspected facilitator for the Salafist Group for Call and Combat
(GSPC).14
(S//NF) The Bosnian Federation Supreme Court stated that this group attempted
to attack the facility and the employees of the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Documents
identified those arrested as an organized terrorist group, whose activities constituted
an act of international terrorism. The group is suspected of conducting surveillance
of the embassy and its personnel, and coordinating with GZ-10016.15
¡ According to 2004 open source reporting, Bosnian prosecutors and police
formally exonerated the six Algerians of any criminal charges. No terrorism
charges were levied against them.16
¡ (S//NF) AG-10001 possessed the phone number of a Bosnian locksmith
employed at the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Further investigation by embassy
authorities revealed the individual was AG-10002’s father-in-law. The employee
was detained and subsequently failed a polygraph test given by US authorities.17
12
IIR 6 933 0021 02
13
IIR 6 933 0021 02
14
TD-314/11070-05, IIR 6 933 0021 02, 010001 Mantis ealin26398 21-Nov-2001, Analyst Note: LIFG is an NIPF
Priority 1 CT target.
15
TD-314/02606-02, BIH Court Doc BB-014 30-OCT-2001, DCS-G2 Special Assessment- Algerian Six 18-FEB-
2004
16
Washington Post Foreign Service 21 August 2006
17
IIR 7 130 1022 02,IIR 4 201 2111 06
7. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)
7
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
for
(Analyst Note: AG-10002’s father-in-law could have provided physical access to
the embassy for the purpose of the attack.)
(S//NF) Despite claims that they were not associated with each other, contacts
between the members of the group known as the “Algerian Six” demonstrated a close
association between them.
(S//NF) Detainee admitted the first apartment he stayed at in Sarajevo was
with AG-10006. Detainee stated he met with Muhammad Khalili, an official from
the Algerian government, as well as AG-10003, AG-10004, and AG-10006 in
December 1998 or January 1999.18
(S//NF) AG-10003 described detainee as his closest friend in Albania and
Bosnia. AG-10003 stated detainee used to assist AG-10001 and AG-10002 with
various charity activities. Detainee’s wife introduced AG-10003 to his wife while
they resided in Albania.19
AG-10003’s phone records indicate he maintained
consistent contact with detainee.20
(S//NF) Detainee stated he has known AG-10004 since they met in Bosnia
two or three years before their arrest, and AG-10004 worked for the Taibah NGO
in the Vogoca area of Bosnia where AG-10004 lived.21
(S//NF) Other reporting confirms the rest of the “Algerian Six” maintained
contacts with each other in Bosnia.
¡ (C//REL TO USA, SFOR) Detainee’s phone number is listed among AG-
10001’s phone number contacts. Additionally, another phone number on the
list was for “Abu Zubayda,” believed to be a reference to GZ-10016.22
¡ (S//NF) FMUP investigation found items confiscated during AG-10004’s
arrest listing detainee’s phone number.23
¡ (S//NF) AG-10002’s mobile phone number and his landline number are
listed among AG-10001’s contacts.24
AG-10001 stated that AG-10002,
whom he met in January 2001, was his only acquaintance while in Bosnia.25
(S//NF) Detainee admitted knowing, providing aid to, and obtaining a lawyer for
AG-10001. Detainee claimed he hired a lawyer without knowing the charges against
AG-10001.26
(S//NF) During an Algerian delegation visit in 2006, detainee engaged the
delegation with his biography information and his contact with a Jordanian who
18
IIR 6 034 0205 02
19
IIR 6 034 0208 02; IIR 6 034 0372 02(b)
20
TD-314/41670-01
21
IIR 6 034 0205 02(b), Analyst Note: Taibah is a NIPF Priority 2A CT target.
22
010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001
23
TD-314/39904-01
24
010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001, IIR 6 933 0021 02
25
IIR 6 034 0196 02, IIR 6 034 0896 02
26
IIR 6 034 0205 02(b)
8. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)
8
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
for
wanted him to bomb a target within Jordan.27
(Analyst Note: The bombing in Jordan
may have been referencing one of the millennium plots thwarted by Jordanian
security. GZ-10016, who’s phone number was found among the pocket litter of the
Algerian Six; has admitted prior involvement in the Jordanian millennium plot.)
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of the GIA and a probable member of
al-Qaida.
(S//NF) In September 2001, detainee, Abd al-Qadr al-Mukhtari, aka (Abu Maali);
AG-10003, and AG-10006, were included on an Algerian government list of
Algerians residing in Bosnia who were suspected of having terrorist ties to the GIA
and al-Qaida.28
¡ (S//NF) Abd al-Qadr al-Mukhtari was the head of the “al-Mujahid” Brigade
during the war in Bosnia (1992 to 1995). In the early 1990s, the Muslim Bosniac
government invited foreign mujahedeen to come to Bosnia to fight on its behalf.29
The “al-Mujahid Brigade” later transformed into the Bedr Bosna Corporation,
owned and managed by al-Mukhtari. Al-Qaida is reported to have provided
financial support to the Bedr Bosna Corporation, which serves as a cover for
terrorist activities such as providing financial support for its members, hiding
funds transfers, and providing facilities to support operations.30
(S//NF) Detainee’s name was one of 25 names on a Bosnian government list of
Algerians suspected of involvement with terrorist organizations abroad or involved
with humanitarian organizations suspected of providing logistical support to terrorist
groups.31
¡ (S//NF) Detainee was first arrested in Algeria on 28 December 1999 during
the Algerian Civil War. Detainee was arrested with an expired Algerian passport
which contained a Pakistani visa. Detainee was questioned by the Algerian
Military Police, the Algerian Civilian Police, and the Algerian National Police,
and taken into custody under suspicion of involvement with Algerian rebel
factions training in Afghanistan. Detainee was later released under a blanket
pardon for FIS members.32
(Analyst Note: Shortly before detainee’s arrest, FIS
claimed responsibility for an airline hijacking that took place in India on 25
December 1999.33
)
27
¢VARIOUS ISNS MFR 27-APR-2007, 010005 SIR 17-MAR-2006
28
¢010003 PROFILE 23-AUG-2002, TD-314/42368-01, IIR 2 199 0022 02
29
ACIC INTSUM 04-Apr-2002,Analyst Note: Many of these fighters later traveled to Afghanistan for jihad, as
detainee and the rest of the “Algerian Six” attempted to do, and as Ahmad Zayid Salim al-Zuhayri, aka (Handala),
US9SA-000669DP (SA-669), who was also a member of the al-Mujahid Brigade, succeeded in doing. SA-669 was
also convicted of involvement in a 1997 car bombing in Mostar.
30
ACIC INTSUM 04-Apr-2002
31
TD-314/07724-02 (see item D)
32
IIR 6 034 0372 02
33
¢OSC- FTS19991225000162
9. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)
9
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
for
(S//NF) A US State Department report describing background information on the
Algerian Six, listed detainee as an Afghan war veteran who also served in the El-
Mujahidin Brigade during the Bosnian conflict.34
(Analyst Note: This is the only
report directly tying detainee to prior conflicts.)
(S//NF) Detainee stated during the first six months he was in Peshawar during
1990, he lived with Abu Handala. While living with Abu Handala he heard
conversations about going to the “House of the Martyrs” and the “House of the
Mujahideen.”35
(S//NF) Detainee reportedly planned to travel to Afghanistan along with the other
Algerians, at the urging of AG-10001. Detainee and the others planned to travel as
soon as AG-10001 arrived in Afghanistan to make receiving arrangements.36
(S//NF) AG-10001 encouraged his Algerian associates to participate in jihad.
AG-10001 applied for an Iranian visa in Sarajevo for onward travel to
Afghanistan on 1 October 2001. He planned to provide travel assistance to help
the other Algerians join jihadist elements in Afghanistan, in anticipation of the US
campaign following the 11 September 2001 attacks. AG-10001 received financial
support from Shaykh Nasar al-Said, the director of the Saudi High Commission
for Relief (SHCR), for his travel to Afghanistan.37
(S//NF) A US intelligence assessment identified AG-10001 as the primary al-
Qaida facilitator in Bosnia, with ties to GZ-10016. AG-10001 possessed numerous
phone numbers linking him to UBL’s operational network in Afghanistan and the
global Sunni extremist network.38
(Analyst Note: Above information indicates AG-
10001’s relationship to al-Qaida and detainee’s subordination to AG-10001.)
(C//REL TO USA, NATO, SFOR) Shortly after detainee’s transfer to JTF-
GTMO, he was represented by a Bosnian lawyer Fahrija Karkin. Fahrija Karkin
is reported to be closely linked to extremist groups, Algerian groups, and known
criminals. (Analyst Note: Detainee was the only one of the six represented by
Karkin.)39
¡ (S//NF) Detainee worked at the Hira Institute, a Pakistan-based NGO that had direct
ties to al-Qaida’s external operations chief, Khalid Shaykh Muhammed, aka (KSM), aka
(Mukhtar), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024).
34
¢CIR 316/00277-02; Analyst Note: A variant of El-Mujahidin Brigade is al-Mujahid Brigade.
35
IIR 6 034 0204 02
36
TD-314/35452-01
37
TD-314/35452-01, IIR 6 933 0021 02, TD-314/14059-02, Analyst Note: SHCR is an NIPF Priority 2B TSE,
which includes organizations that have available resources and are in a position to provide financial support to
terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2B
terrorist groups.
38
TD-314/14059-02; IIR 7 130 1022 02, Paragraph 1; IIR 6 933 0021 02; DCS-G2 Special Assessment- Algerian
Six 18-FEB-2004
39
Kirikin Receives Security from GAMA 15-OCT-2002
10. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)
10
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
for
(S//NF) Detainee claimed he spent two and a half years working for the Hira
Institute in the village of Babi, approximately 40 km from Islamabad, PK. Muhamed
Hussein Abdallah, ISN US9SO-000704DP (SO-704), reported that the Hira Institute
in Peshawar received its funding from the Kuwaiti-based Lajnat al-Dawa al-Islamiya
(LDI).40
(S//NF) Detainee stated while working at the Hira Institute he knew a Sudanese
man named Abu Tujana, who was the accountant for the school.41
Abu Tujana is
assessed to be the alias of long time extremist and LDI employee Adel Hassan Hamid
Abdul al-Mutlib, ISN US9SU-000940DP (SU-940, transferred), whom, when asked
about detainee, claimed detainee worked with him at the refugee camp and left a good
mark in his heart.42
(S//NF) SU-940 worked for LDI in the Jelazee refugee camp for 10 years
from 1986 to 1996 as a teacher for the orphans in the refugee camp. SU-940
identified LDI as an organization that promoted Islamic solidarity. There was an
education center in the camp sponsored by Khalid Shaykh Muhammed, aka
(KSM), aka (Mukhtar), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024). This camp
provided Islamic indoctrination for young men 18-30 years old, including
showing jihadist videos. KU-10024 occasionally went to the camp to recruit new
fighters for jihad.43
(S) An Afghan national stated LDI vehicles and warehouses were used to
store and transfer weapons and supplies to the Taliban front lines and mujahideen
from Peshawar during the late 1990s.44
c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention
perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and
staff. He currently has 92 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most
recent occurring on 10 March 2008, when he spat on the guard force. He has 32 Reports of
Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 10 March 2008, when he
spat on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include failure to
follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, damage to
government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and
possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 18 Reports of
Disciplinary Infraction and 15 so far in 2008.
40
IIR 6 034 0372 02, IIR 6 034 0089 04
41
¡IIR 6 034 0204(b)
42
¡000940 SIR 03-NOV-2005; Analyst Note: Mammar Ameur, US9AG-000939DP (AG-939, designated for
transfer) also identified detainee, AG-10003, and AG-10006 as individuals who supported NGO’s in Peshawar
between 1992 and 1993. For additional information reference IIR 6 034 0903 03.
43
IIR 6 034 1523 03
44
IIR 7 724 0060 02
11. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)
11
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401
for
8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee’s
most recent interrogation session occurred on 12 December 2007.
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Since the 1990s, detainee has worked for NGOs
known to support terrorist activities. Detainee has visited numerous countries in this
capacity. As a result, detainee associated with individuals who held high level positions in
various NGOs with ties to extremist activities. Detainee spent over two years working for
the Hira Institute and worked for LDI. Detainee was captured with a group suspected of
planning attacks against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee maintained strong personal
relationships with these individuals, who are assessed to be members of the GIA and have
links with the al-Qaida network.
c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Given detainee’s extensive involvement and
associations to terrorist-linked NGOs, he possesses first-hand information about the
organizations and their members. However, detainee has maintained his cover story that he
was never associated with the extremist activities or any extremist groups. Detainee gives
only cursory information pertaining to his duties with these organizations. Detainee has
substantial information about other “Algerian Six” detainees. Detainee continues to deny the
full extent of his relationships with these individuals. Detainee’s links and associations
indicate a deeper involvement in extremist activity, which have yet to be exposed.
Detainee’s travel and his links to extremist individuals and groups require additional
exploration.
d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:
Planned attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo
NGO support to extremist groups
GIA
Terrorist travel facilitators
Radicalization factors of terrorism
Terrorist biographical and psychological information
Detainee’s intentions after release from US custody
12. S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O33O4OI
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN US4AG-O10005DP(S)
9. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon I October2004,and
he remainsan enemycombatant.
t
vllt,
. | .t/)'/z/2. ,1// /<
y'//.d.z^/-/4/
2MARK H.BUZBY
RearAdmiral,USNavy
Commanding
.
Definitions for intelligenceterms usedin the assessmentcanbe found in the Joint Military Intelligence College
October2001 guideIntelligence l|arning Terminologt.
1 2
SE C RE T // NOFORNI I 2O33O4OI