The document provides a Detainee Assessment Board (DAB) assessment of a Guantanamo detainee. The DAB assessment finds the detainee to be a high risk and of high intelligence value. Specifically:
- The detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaeda in East Africa who served as a courier and facilitator between that group and al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan.
- The detainee has numerous associations with individuals involved in extremist activities and traveled extensively in areas connected to al-Qaeda.
- The document outlines the detainee's account of his involvement with the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Ittihad al-Islami group in Somalia and time spent working
The summary of the threat update document is:
1. Iran and Russia are expanding military coordination, including potential use of an Iranian air base by Russian bombers.
2. The incapacitation of an LNA commander in Libya creates a power vacuum that could lead to conflict and allow terrorist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda to rebuild.
3. The Gulf crisis caused the ending of a military cooperation agreement between Somalia and the UAE, weakening counterterrorism efforts against al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. UN-led Yemeni peace talks collapsed as both sides continued to take offensive actions on the ground. Coalition-aligned forces seized key territory in northern Yemen and al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a Tochka missile at a coalition camp in Taiz, killing a Saudi officer.
2. The December 17 signing Libyan Government of National Accord agreement and establishment of a new unity government is unlikely to unite factions on the ground and will probably further fracture the state. Delegates from Libya’s two rival governments, the Tripoli-based General National Congress and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, signed the accord, but did not represent their constituencies. Some Libyan armed groups may re-align themselves with the new government in order to increase their legitimacy among international observers.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) media arm countered the emergence of an Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham presence in Algeria with propaganda showing AQIM militants proselytizing to locals. Al Qaeda affiliates continue to build a base within populations through local outreach campaigns.
Hillary blumenthal drumheller original documents hrc memo libya_new_president...AnonDownload
1. Mustafa Abdel Jalil, president of the Libyan National Transitional Council, held meetings with Mohammed Yussef Magariaf, leader of the newly elected General National Congress, to discuss the transition of power. They agreed that Magariaf would become Libya's interim president and focus on disarming militias and restoring stability.
2. Jalil and Magariaf believe that increased economic cooperation with Egypt and Tunisia will benefit Libya, and that Libya should maintain control over its natural resources while welcoming foreign investment.
3. Jalil views Magariaf favorably as interim president because he is not tied to any faction, fought against Gaddafi in 1981, and has good relationships in the West
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Kenyan intelligence reports that al Shabaab's Lower Jubba regional commander, Mohamed Mohamud Kuno “Dulyadeyn,” defected to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in late November, bringing with him approximately 1,200 militants. If true, Dulyadeyn’s defection is a significant inflection for al Qaeda-ISIS competition in East Africa, as well as a major internal schism for al Shabaab. He is an ethnic Kenyan with connections to radical pro-ISIS figures in that country, so his defection would likely lead to an uptick in pro-ISIS militant activity in Kenya.
2. The Saudi-led coalition initiated a seven-day ceasefire in support of UN-led peace talks that aim to end hostilities in Yemen. The ceasefire remains tenuous following an al Houthi-Saleh Tochka (SS-21) rocket attack on a coalition base that killed the commander of Saudi Special Forces in Yemen. Pro-coalition media have accused al Houthi forces of violating the truce in several locations, and the coalition may choose to respond to alleged violations by resuming military operations in Yemen.
3. Iranian officials condemned the clashes between the Nigerian army and Shia Muslims in northern Nigeria. The Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Nigerian chargé d'affaires on December 14 after soldiers besieged the house of Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), a pro-Iranian opposition group. The Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy (NSFP) Commission also released a statement claiming that “Iran considers it its duty to defend the people of Nigeria and that country’s Muslim scholars, particularly Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky.” Tehran will likely use these clashes as an opportunity to champion its role as the defender of the global Shia population.
Detainee is an Algerian national assessed to be a member of an al-Qaeda linked GIA cell in Bosnia. He is suspected of participating in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan for jihad following 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia beforehand. While in Bosnia, he threatened to attack international forces and was associated with al-Qaeda linked extremists. Detainee is also reported to have fought in Bosnia and Afghanistan as the chief martial arts instructor for an Islamic militant group. He was employed by several NGOs with ties to terrorism over seven years.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative with ties to senior leaders. He has admitted to affiliations with terrorist groups including GIA and HIG. Detainee trained at militant camps, fought Soviets in Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban Foreign and Intelligence Ministries. He was captured in Pakistan and transferred to Guantanamo for suspected involvement in terrorist plots and attacks. Detainee has omitted details of his activities prior to capture, making his threat level and intelligence value difficult to assess fully.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
The summary of the threat update document is:
1. Iran and Russia are expanding military coordination, including potential use of an Iranian air base by Russian bombers.
2. The incapacitation of an LNA commander in Libya creates a power vacuum that could lead to conflict and allow terrorist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda to rebuild.
3. The Gulf crisis caused the ending of a military cooperation agreement between Somalia and the UAE, weakening counterterrorism efforts against al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. UN-led Yemeni peace talks collapsed as both sides continued to take offensive actions on the ground. Coalition-aligned forces seized key territory in northern Yemen and al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a Tochka missile at a coalition camp in Taiz, killing a Saudi officer.
2. The December 17 signing Libyan Government of National Accord agreement and establishment of a new unity government is unlikely to unite factions on the ground and will probably further fracture the state. Delegates from Libya’s two rival governments, the Tripoli-based General National Congress and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, signed the accord, but did not represent their constituencies. Some Libyan armed groups may re-align themselves with the new government in order to increase their legitimacy among international observers.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) media arm countered the emergence of an Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham presence in Algeria with propaganda showing AQIM militants proselytizing to locals. Al Qaeda affiliates continue to build a base within populations through local outreach campaigns.
Hillary blumenthal drumheller original documents hrc memo libya_new_president...AnonDownload
1. Mustafa Abdel Jalil, president of the Libyan National Transitional Council, held meetings with Mohammed Yussef Magariaf, leader of the newly elected General National Congress, to discuss the transition of power. They agreed that Magariaf would become Libya's interim president and focus on disarming militias and restoring stability.
2. Jalil and Magariaf believe that increased economic cooperation with Egypt and Tunisia will benefit Libya, and that Libya should maintain control over its natural resources while welcoming foreign investment.
3. Jalil views Magariaf favorably as interim president because he is not tied to any faction, fought against Gaddafi in 1981, and has good relationships in the West
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Kenyan intelligence reports that al Shabaab's Lower Jubba regional commander, Mohamed Mohamud Kuno “Dulyadeyn,” defected to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in late November, bringing with him approximately 1,200 militants. If true, Dulyadeyn’s defection is a significant inflection for al Qaeda-ISIS competition in East Africa, as well as a major internal schism for al Shabaab. He is an ethnic Kenyan with connections to radical pro-ISIS figures in that country, so his defection would likely lead to an uptick in pro-ISIS militant activity in Kenya.
2. The Saudi-led coalition initiated a seven-day ceasefire in support of UN-led peace talks that aim to end hostilities in Yemen. The ceasefire remains tenuous following an al Houthi-Saleh Tochka (SS-21) rocket attack on a coalition base that killed the commander of Saudi Special Forces in Yemen. Pro-coalition media have accused al Houthi forces of violating the truce in several locations, and the coalition may choose to respond to alleged violations by resuming military operations in Yemen.
3. Iranian officials condemned the clashes between the Nigerian army and Shia Muslims in northern Nigeria. The Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Nigerian chargé d'affaires on December 14 after soldiers besieged the house of Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), a pro-Iranian opposition group. The Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy (NSFP) Commission also released a statement claiming that “Iran considers it its duty to defend the people of Nigeria and that country’s Muslim scholars, particularly Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky.” Tehran will likely use these clashes as an opportunity to champion its role as the defender of the global Shia population.
Detainee is an Algerian national assessed to be a member of an al-Qaeda linked GIA cell in Bosnia. He is suspected of participating in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan for jihad following 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia beforehand. While in Bosnia, he threatened to attack international forces and was associated with al-Qaeda linked extremists. Detainee is also reported to have fought in Bosnia and Afghanistan as the chief martial arts instructor for an Islamic militant group. He was employed by several NGOs with ties to terrorism over seven years.
Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative with ties to senior leaders. He has admitted to affiliations with terrorist groups including GIA and HIG. Detainee trained at militant camps, fought Soviets in Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban Foreign and Intelligence Ministries. He was captured in Pakistan and transferred to Guantanamo for suspected involvement in terrorist plots and attacks. Detainee has omitted details of his activities prior to capture, making his threat level and intelligence value difficult to assess fully.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a high risk. He is a HIG sub-commander with close familial ties to HIG and Taliban leadership. Detainee was directly involved in planning and executing anti-coalition attacks in Afghanistan. He has extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and infiltration routes. Detainee denies his HIG membership despite evidence to the contrary.
The document is a writing sample from Marques Guntz about his research paper on the Boko Haram terrorist organization. It includes an introduction summarizing two major Boko Haram attacks, and a background section covering the history of Nigeria, the origins of Boko Haram, and its original leader Muhammad Ali. The introduction analyzes Boko Haram's kidnapping of 276 girls in Chibok and a 2011 suicide bombing in Abuja. The background details Nigeria's colonial history, ethnic and religious divisions, and how Boko Haram formed to promote strict Sharia law before confronting police in 2003, killing Ali.
Bin Laden founded al-Qaeda in the late 1980s to support the mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviets. After the Soviets withdrew, he established training camps and recruited fighters from around the world. Following conflicts with the Saudi royal family over allowing US troops in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden was exiled. He led al-Qaeda from Sudan and Afghanistan, overseeing numerous terrorist attacks against US targets. After 9/11, the US invaded Afghanistan, forcing al-Qaeda to decentralize. While bin Laden was killed in 2011, al-Qaeda affiliates have continued operating in places like Syria, Yemen, Africa and elsewhere by infiltrating local insurgencies and militias.
Its detailed presentation on the topic"TERRORISM".
Spacialy helpful for Pakistani students because it have a detailed information about terrorism in Pakistan
Its updated in december 2016 and have detail till 2015
Indian Newspapers In English-First India|Rajasthan-13 January 2020 editionfirst_india
- Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot of Rajasthan praised migrant Rajasthanis for their entrepreneurship and devotion to the nation while speaking at an event in Mumbai.
- Gehlot felicitated Dr. Gulab Kothari, the Chief Editor of Patrika Group, with a lifetime achievement award at the event.
- Gehlot then left for Delhi to meet with senior AICC leaders and possibly Sonia Gandhi to discuss various matters.
What is iran doing in iraq how important is iran in the ground war against isismmangusta
Iran is playing a major role in fighting ISIS in Iraq by supporting Shiite militias and working directly with Iraqi security forces. It is seeking to prevent ISIS and other Sunni extremist groups from taking power in Iraq, maintain Shiite political dominance, and demonstrate its importance in the region. While both the US and Iran want to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and defeat ISIS, they have different goals in Syria and approaches to addressing Sunni grievances that complicate their strategies.
The document provides information on terrorism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. It discusses the geography of FATA, major militant groups operating there like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Islam and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, military operations against these groups, and root causes of militancy such as weak governance and proximity to conflict in Afghanistan.
Source: Looking Glass Publications
By Linda Lavender, Writer / Robin Barnett, Editor
Understanding the past proxies is relevant to the recent unrest in the Middle East, which is often mischaracterized as a purely sectarian conflict. While clearly there is a sectarian component to ongoing unrest in the region, the conflicts, both latent and manifest within Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen are often reported as a struggle between opposing religious sects - Sunnis and Shiites. However, according to F. Gregory Gause of the Brookings Institution, the best way to understand regional politics and the current unrest in the Middle East is through a Cold War framework between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Iran where the central issue is that of regional hegemony.
Hillary blumenthal drumheller original documents hrc memo magariaf,_attack_on...AnonDownload
Magariaf was shaken by attacks on US missions in Libya and gave permission for security forces to open fire to break up crowds. A senior security officer told Magariaf the attacks were inspired by a sacrilegious video and the attack in Egypt. However, Magariaf noted the atmosphere fostering the attacks was due to publicity around Western intelligence cooperation with Qaddafi from 2004-2010. Magariaf's opponents are trying to exploit his suspected CIA links at a time when Western intelligence is under scrutiny in Libya. He is working with Islamist groups to defuse tensions as he tries to organize the government and disarm militias amid religious conflicts that grew after Qaddafi.
This document discusses Pakistan's role in combating terrorism. It outlines several factors that contribute to terrorism in Pakistan, including its geographical location bordering countries experiencing conflicts, economic and political instability within Pakistan, and involvement of external powers seeking to destabilize the region. The document examines Pakistan's weaknesses in combating terrorism, such as societal divisions and poverty, as well as its strengths, including national unity around the vision of an independent Pakistan and resilience of the Pakistani people. It provides recommendations for addressing the root causes of terrorism by promoting economic development, justice and hope. Combating terrorism requires a long-term, global approach rather than short-term military solutions alone.
Collind D'Souza is an IT professional with over 16 years of experience in areas such as IT infrastructure management, project management, technical services, and application support. He has worked for organizations in Qatar, Afghanistan, Iraq, UAE, and India, taking on roles like IT Manager and Technical Support Analyst. His skills include technologies like Windows, Oracle, networking, and he has professional experience delivering IT solutions on time and within budget.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive functioning. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms for those who already suffer from conditions like anxiety and depression.
Dharmendra Sarvaiya has over 15 years of experience in electrical engineering projects for oil, gas, and petrochemical refineries. He is currently a Lead Electrical Engineer at Reliance Industries working on expansion projects at their Jamnagar refinery site. Previously he has worked on installation, testing, and commissioning of electrical systems for other companies. He has skills in project management, engineering, commissioning, and maintenance of electrical equipment and systems.
This document provides classification guidance for information related to Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and NOBLE EAGLE. It establishes minimum classification levels, identifies original classification decisions, and references other classification guides. The guidance classifies specific unit deployment details and identities for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM confidentially until announced or deployment completes. Geographic locations of deployed units are generally unclassified, except for Special Operations Forces which are classified up to Secret. The document directs users to appendices for more detailed guidance on each operation and defines terms and responsible offices.
The document summarizes an Excel training program provided to Alstom Transport India Ltd employees by Raja C S N from GLOBALedge Management Services over two days. It includes an overview of Alstom Transport as a company that manufactures trains, a summary of the advanced MS Excel topics covered in training, ratings of the training between 4-5 out of 5 from 20 participants, and feedback praising the usefulness of topics like VLOOKUP, charts, pivot tables, and shortcuts but requesting additional time and topics like macros.
Terrorist groups in Mali are likely to receive increased funding from ISIL in the next year due to several factors: ISIL's strong financial network will likely expand to Mali; ISIL and Malian operatives are training together in Libya; and a Parisian terrorist responsible for attacks was a Malian who pledged allegiance to ISIL. ISIL's five-year plan includes conquering the Muslim world, so partnering with Malian groups is logical. The increased cooperation is concerning as it could strengthen both organizations.
This document provides a business plan for expanding the inpatient dialysis unit at Alamance Regional Medical Center in Burlington, North Carolina. It finds that the need for inpatient dialysis services in the local area has grown significantly in recent years and is projected to continue growing. It recommends that ARMC expand its three-bay dialysis unit by adding one additional bay. It also recommends that ARMC terminate its contract with DaVita to outsource operations and instead operate the expanded unit with its own nurses and equipment. The financial analysis projects that this in-housing strategy will save ARMC around $1 million over five years compared to continuing to outsource operations after expanding.
- Detainee was a senior al-Qaeda facilitator who swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and personally recruited his bodyguards. He has ties to many high-level al-Qaeda members and operatives involved in the 9/11 attacks.
- After the fall of the Taliban, detainee provided assistance to hundreds of foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan. He was responsible for moving money and fighters into Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban.
- Detainee traveled to Bosnia in the 1990s for jihad and spent a year fighting before returning to Yemen. He is associated with the planner of the 9/11 attacks and 11 of the hijackers.
1) The document provides a recommendation to continue detaining a Guantanamo detainee named Sabir Lahmar Manfud due to his involvement with the Armed Islamic Group and ties to terrorist plots and activities in Bosnia.
2) It notes he advocated hostility against US forces, intended to travel to Afghanistan and Iran, and would likely engage in anti-US activities if released.
3) New information since the last review includes reports of his presence at an al-Qaeda guest house in Afghanistan and attempts to meet with al-Qaeda leaders in Iran.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention due to his involvement with an al-Qaeda linked Algerian Armed Islamic Group cell that was plotting to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. He has an extensive history as an extremist involved in jihad and terrorist activities in Bosnia, Algeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Detainee worked for over two years at an Islamic school in Pakistan with ties to extremism and admits to extensive travel throughout the Middle East. He was arrested in October 2001 along with other members of the cell for the embassy plot and poses a continued threat if released.
The Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, seeks to establish a global caliphate and impose its extreme version of Sharia law worldwide. It was founded in Iraq in 1999 and is now the most powerful and well-funded terrorist group in the world, controlling large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. Led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS commits horrific acts of violence such as mass executions, beheadings, and burning people alive in an effort to terrorize its enemies and attract new followers to its cause. It poses a major threat through both its territorial control and its calls for "lone wolf" attacks in Western countries.
The document is a writing sample from Marques Guntz about his research paper on the Boko Haram terrorist organization. It includes an introduction summarizing two major Boko Haram attacks, and a background section covering the history of Nigeria, the origins of Boko Haram, and its original leader Muhammad Ali. The introduction analyzes Boko Haram's kidnapping of 276 girls in Chibok and a 2011 suicide bombing in Abuja. The background details Nigeria's colonial history, ethnic and religious divisions, and how Boko Haram formed to promote strict Sharia law before confronting police in 2003, killing Ali.
Bin Laden founded al-Qaeda in the late 1980s to support the mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviets. After the Soviets withdrew, he established training camps and recruited fighters from around the world. Following conflicts with the Saudi royal family over allowing US troops in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden was exiled. He led al-Qaeda from Sudan and Afghanistan, overseeing numerous terrorist attacks against US targets. After 9/11, the US invaded Afghanistan, forcing al-Qaeda to decentralize. While bin Laden was killed in 2011, al-Qaeda affiliates have continued operating in places like Syria, Yemen, Africa and elsewhere by infiltrating local insurgencies and militias.
Its detailed presentation on the topic"TERRORISM".
Spacialy helpful for Pakistani students because it have a detailed information about terrorism in Pakistan
Its updated in december 2016 and have detail till 2015
Indian Newspapers In English-First India|Rajasthan-13 January 2020 editionfirst_india
- Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot of Rajasthan praised migrant Rajasthanis for their entrepreneurship and devotion to the nation while speaking at an event in Mumbai.
- Gehlot felicitated Dr. Gulab Kothari, the Chief Editor of Patrika Group, with a lifetime achievement award at the event.
- Gehlot then left for Delhi to meet with senior AICC leaders and possibly Sonia Gandhi to discuss various matters.
What is iran doing in iraq how important is iran in the ground war against isismmangusta
Iran is playing a major role in fighting ISIS in Iraq by supporting Shiite militias and working directly with Iraqi security forces. It is seeking to prevent ISIS and other Sunni extremist groups from taking power in Iraq, maintain Shiite political dominance, and demonstrate its importance in the region. While both the US and Iran want to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and defeat ISIS, they have different goals in Syria and approaches to addressing Sunni grievances that complicate their strategies.
The document provides information on terrorism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. It discusses the geography of FATA, major militant groups operating there like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Islam and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, military operations against these groups, and root causes of militancy such as weak governance and proximity to conflict in Afghanistan.
Source: Looking Glass Publications
By Linda Lavender, Writer / Robin Barnett, Editor
Understanding the past proxies is relevant to the recent unrest in the Middle East, which is often mischaracterized as a purely sectarian conflict. While clearly there is a sectarian component to ongoing unrest in the region, the conflicts, both latent and manifest within Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen are often reported as a struggle between opposing religious sects - Sunnis and Shiites. However, according to F. Gregory Gause of the Brookings Institution, the best way to understand regional politics and the current unrest in the Middle East is through a Cold War framework between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Iran where the central issue is that of regional hegemony.
Hillary blumenthal drumheller original documents hrc memo magariaf,_attack_on...AnonDownload
Magariaf was shaken by attacks on US missions in Libya and gave permission for security forces to open fire to break up crowds. A senior security officer told Magariaf the attacks were inspired by a sacrilegious video and the attack in Egypt. However, Magariaf noted the atmosphere fostering the attacks was due to publicity around Western intelligence cooperation with Qaddafi from 2004-2010. Magariaf's opponents are trying to exploit his suspected CIA links at a time when Western intelligence is under scrutiny in Libya. He is working with Islamist groups to defuse tensions as he tries to organize the government and disarm militias amid religious conflicts that grew after Qaddafi.
This document discusses Pakistan's role in combating terrorism. It outlines several factors that contribute to terrorism in Pakistan, including its geographical location bordering countries experiencing conflicts, economic and political instability within Pakistan, and involvement of external powers seeking to destabilize the region. The document examines Pakistan's weaknesses in combating terrorism, such as societal divisions and poverty, as well as its strengths, including national unity around the vision of an independent Pakistan and resilience of the Pakistani people. It provides recommendations for addressing the root causes of terrorism by promoting economic development, justice and hope. Combating terrorism requires a long-term, global approach rather than short-term military solutions alone.
Collind D'Souza is an IT professional with over 16 years of experience in areas such as IT infrastructure management, project management, technical services, and application support. He has worked for organizations in Qatar, Afghanistan, Iraq, UAE, and India, taking on roles like IT Manager and Technical Support Analyst. His skills include technologies like Windows, Oracle, networking, and he has professional experience delivering IT solutions on time and within budget.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive functioning. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms for those who already suffer from conditions like anxiety and depression.
Dharmendra Sarvaiya has over 15 years of experience in electrical engineering projects for oil, gas, and petrochemical refineries. He is currently a Lead Electrical Engineer at Reliance Industries working on expansion projects at their Jamnagar refinery site. Previously he has worked on installation, testing, and commissioning of electrical systems for other companies. He has skills in project management, engineering, commissioning, and maintenance of electrical equipment and systems.
This document provides classification guidance for information related to Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and NOBLE EAGLE. It establishes minimum classification levels, identifies original classification decisions, and references other classification guides. The guidance classifies specific unit deployment details and identities for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM confidentially until announced or deployment completes. Geographic locations of deployed units are generally unclassified, except for Special Operations Forces which are classified up to Secret. The document directs users to appendices for more detailed guidance on each operation and defines terms and responsible offices.
The document summarizes an Excel training program provided to Alstom Transport India Ltd employees by Raja C S N from GLOBALedge Management Services over two days. It includes an overview of Alstom Transport as a company that manufactures trains, a summary of the advanced MS Excel topics covered in training, ratings of the training between 4-5 out of 5 from 20 participants, and feedback praising the usefulness of topics like VLOOKUP, charts, pivot tables, and shortcuts but requesting additional time and topics like macros.
Terrorist groups in Mali are likely to receive increased funding from ISIL in the next year due to several factors: ISIL's strong financial network will likely expand to Mali; ISIL and Malian operatives are training together in Libya; and a Parisian terrorist responsible for attacks was a Malian who pledged allegiance to ISIL. ISIL's five-year plan includes conquering the Muslim world, so partnering with Malian groups is logical. The increased cooperation is concerning as it could strengthen both organizations.
This document provides a business plan for expanding the inpatient dialysis unit at Alamance Regional Medical Center in Burlington, North Carolina. It finds that the need for inpatient dialysis services in the local area has grown significantly in recent years and is projected to continue growing. It recommends that ARMC expand its three-bay dialysis unit by adding one additional bay. It also recommends that ARMC terminate its contract with DaVita to outsource operations and instead operate the expanded unit with its own nurses and equipment. The financial analysis projects that this in-housing strategy will save ARMC around $1 million over five years compared to continuing to outsource operations after expanding.
- Detainee was a senior al-Qaeda facilitator who swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and personally recruited his bodyguards. He has ties to many high-level al-Qaeda members and operatives involved in the 9/11 attacks.
- After the fall of the Taliban, detainee provided assistance to hundreds of foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan. He was responsible for moving money and fighters into Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban.
- Detainee traveled to Bosnia in the 1990s for jihad and spent a year fighting before returning to Yemen. He is associated with the planner of the 9/11 attacks and 11 of the hijackers.
1) The document provides a recommendation to continue detaining a Guantanamo detainee named Sabir Lahmar Manfud due to his involvement with the Armed Islamic Group and ties to terrorist plots and activities in Bosnia.
2) It notes he advocated hostility against US forces, intended to travel to Afghanistan and Iran, and would likely engage in anti-US activities if released.
3) New information since the last review includes reports of his presence at an al-Qaeda guest house in Afghanistan and attempts to meet with al-Qaeda leaders in Iran.
Detainee assessment brief for ISN US9AG-000310DP held at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaeda and Armed Islamic Group fighter from Algeria who traveled extensively through Europe and Canada using false documents. He received militant training in Afghanistan and resided in al-Qaeda guesthouses. He fled Tora Bora with a large group of al-Qaeda fighters led by a senior member. The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and of medium intelligence value based on his militant training and facilitation network connections.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention due to his involvement with an al-Qaeda linked Algerian Armed Islamic Group cell that was plotting to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. He has an extensive history as an extremist involved in jihad and terrorist activities in Bosnia, Algeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Detainee worked for over two years at an Islamic school in Pakistan with ties to extremism and admits to extensive travel throughout the Middle East. He was arrested in October 2001 along with other members of the cell for the embassy plot and poses a continued threat if released.
The Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, seeks to establish a global caliphate and impose its extreme version of Sharia law worldwide. It was founded in Iraq in 1999 and is now the most powerful and well-funded terrorist group in the world, controlling large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. Led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS commits horrific acts of violence such as mass executions, beheadings, and burning people alive in an effort to terrorize its enemies and attract new followers to its cause. It poses a major threat through both its territorial control and its calls for "lone wolf" attacks in Western countries.
Detainee is recommended for continued detention as he poses a threat. He is assessed as a member of an Algerian extremist group involved in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Bosnia. Detainee served as the Bosnia contact for a senior al-Qaeda facilitator and received advanced training in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He is linked to al-Qaeda's support network and coordinated travel for extremists to Afghanistan. Detainee denies his extremist activities and identities despite corroborating intelligence reporting.
Detainee is assessed to be a high risk threat and of high intelligence value. He is a member of an Algerian armed group involved in an al-Qaeda linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Detainee fought in the Bosnian jihad in the 1990s and worked with several charities associated with terrorism. He also served as an instructor at al-Qaeda training camps. Detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan after 9/11 but was arrested in Bosnia before departing. He denies all allegations.
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida associated passport forger and key travel facilitator supporting senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), and the Global Jihad Support Network. Detainee has additional ties to the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Detainee is also a suspected bomb maker and former commander of a special al-Qaida training camp, and he was identified as a front line
Osama bin Laden was a terrorist leader who founded al-Qaeda. He earned a degree in civil engineering but later joined mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion. Bin Laden formed al-Qaeda and believed in restoring sharia law through violent jihad. He was involved in numerous terrorist attacks against American and other Western targets from the 1990s until being killed by U.S. special forces in 2011.
ISIS, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, is a Sunni jihadist group that follows an extremist interpretation of Islam. It controls large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria and seeks to establish a caliphate and implement Sharia law. ISIS uses extreme violence including beheadings and mass executions to expand its territory and influence while attracting new members through social media and promises of living in an Islamic utopia under strict Sharia law. The group's violent actions and declaration of a caliphate have been criticized by Muslim scholars and governments around the world.
This document provides a detainee assessment for an individual currently held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It recommends continued detention based on the detainee's history with militant groups and assessed likelihood to reengage in hostilities if released. Specifically:
- The detainee is assessed to be a high risk and likely to pose a threat due to his prior role as an intelligence officer for the Taliban and reported ties to other extremist groups.
- He is a member of an anti-coalition militia group with ties to the Haqqani Network and planned and executed rocket attacks against U.S. forces.
- Since his detention, his brother has engaged in insurgent activities, increasing the risk the deta
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-000976DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes the detainee's background, including his association with an al-Qaeda bomb maker for over five years. It also details evidence linking the detainee and others to anti-tank mine operations against U.S. forces in 2002. Based on this information, the detainee is assessed as a medium risk and a probable member of an insurgent group that specialized in explosive devices. The document recommends his transfer for these reasons.
There are a variety of reasons that people decide to join the Islamic State. Through its propaganda and recruitment process, IS targets those who are outcasts in their community or minorities in their country or who have been discriminated against in a Western context. This presentation is built to combat the kind of misinformation that IS uses to gain recruits.
This document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of detainee ISN US9AG-000533DP. It summarizes the detainee's personal information, travel history, activities in Afghanistan including possible ties to al-Qaeda, and capture in Tora Bora after being injured attempting to flee US bombing. The assessment determines he poses a high risk and high intelligence value, and recommends his continued detention due to concerns he could reengage in extremism if released.
the ppt is about the rise of islamic state and the current situation of coalition forces... the economy of the group and the measures to curbe the group
Detainee is assessed as a HIGH risk and member of Al-Qaida's North African Extremist Network with ties to London and Afghanistan. He trained at the Al-Farouq camp and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is recommended he remain in DoD custody. Detainee has been deceptive and noncompliant, but may have information on terrorist operations in Algeria, the UK, and Afghanistan as well as advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
This document provides a summary of key political figures and leadership positions in Libya. It outlines that Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has led Libya since 1969 as the "Leader of the Revolution" and "Brother Leader" through a combination of playing off interest groups and brutal suppression of dissent. It also introduces Prime Minister Shukri Ghanem, who favors economic reforms but has limited power, and Foreign Minister Abd el-Rahman Shalgam, who is close to Gaddafi and instrumental in negotiations that reduced Libya's international isolation. Additionally, it briefly describes Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son being groomed to succeed his father who is influential but faces rivalry from his brother Saadi.
The document discusses the alliance formed in Sudan in the early 1990s between Iran, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda, facilitated by Sudan's Islamic regime. Osama bin Laden met with Iranian leadership, and they agreed that Hezbollah would provide explosives training to Al Qaeda recruits. This alliance carried out several terrorist attacks, including 9/11. However, the alliance is partial and opportunistic given the Sunni-Shia divide between Al Qaeda and Iran's backers. The document also describes Hezbollah and Iranian operations in Latin America, including drug and weapons trafficking networks extending to Mexico and the United States.
The Influence of the Islamic State on Israel’s Arab Citizens and on Palestini...aviad mendelbaum
1. The rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq has inspired some Arab citizens of Israel and Palestinians to support or join the Islamic State. Over 40 Israeli Arabs have been arrested for attempting to join ISIS in the last year.
2. ISIS has more influence among Palestinians in Gaza, where Salafi jihadist groups have operated for years but have recently clashed with the ruling Hamas group. A former Hamas member now with ISIS threatened to bring the fight to Gaza.
3. However, ISIS has refused to recognize new pro-ISIS Palestinian groups in Gaza as an official province due to issues like sectarianism and inability to establish sharia law autonomy or effectively fight Israel.
Mr. Doe, a refugee from Sudan, was arrested and detained for 123 days in Sudan where he was tortured, raped, and forced into human trafficking and organ removal surgery in Egypt. He continues to face threats and harassment in Egypt from Sudanese traffickers. He qualifies for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention due to the imputed political opinions of his father and his Nuba ethnicity, as well as being a victim of human trafficking. He also qualifies under the 1969 OAU Convention as serious public disturbances make return intolerable due to ongoing violence against the Nuba people by the Sudanese government.
Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-Qaida who received terrorist training in Afghanistan. He reportedly attended training at al-Qaida affiliated camps, associated with known al-Qaida operatives, and resided in al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee likely participated in action against U.S. and coalition forces. He is assessed as a medium risk and threat, and of medium intelligence value.
Detainee is a 52-year old Algerian national assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and the North African Extremist Network who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and received small arms training at an al-Qaida camp. He is assessed to be a high risk and threat to the US due to his extremist connections and admitted associations with known terrorists. The document recommends he be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention, preferably Algeria, if a satisfactory agreement can be reached. If not, he should remain in DoD custody due to contradictions in his story and suspected deception during interrogations.
Detainee Ahmed Bin Saleh Bel Bachao is assessed as a probable member of al-Qaida who received weapons training in Afghanistan. He traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 after being influenced by extremist lectures at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London. In Afghanistan, he stayed at an Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad known to facilitate foreign fighters, where he received small arms training. He fled to Tora Bora during US attacks and was later captured with a large group of fighters. It is assessed he poses a medium risk and may have participated in hostilities against US forces.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay to another facility. It summarizes the detainee's personal information and assesses him as a probable member of al-Qaeda's support network who likely received improvised explosive device training. The detainee is believed to have traveled from France to Afghanistan via the UK and Pakistan, staying at guesthouses associated with extremist groups. He is assessed to pose a medium risk and high intelligence value.
This memorandum recommends transferring detainee ISN US9AG-000284DP to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and al-Qaeda's global terrorist network. He has been identified as receiving terrorist training, but does not appear to be a senior leader. While sometimes cooperative, he has also been uncooperative and obstinate during interrogations. The Joint Task Force assesses he poses a medium risk but defers to the Criminal Investigative Task Force's assessment that he poses a high risk.
Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaida'sGlobal Jihad SupportNetwork who attendedtraining in Afghanistan andresidedin guesthousesoperatedby al-Qaidamembers.He occupiedpositionsin the Tora Bora Mountainsandparticipatedin hostilities againstUS andcoalition forces. JTF-GTMO previouslyassessedhim asa ContinuedDetentionrisk but now recommendshis TransferOut of DoD Controlbasedon his MEDIUM intelligencevalueandthreatlevel.
The document provides a recommendation for the continued detention of Guantanamo detainee ISN US9AG-000175DP. It finds the detainee to be a high risk threat based on evidence that he was an al-Qaida member who received training at al-Faruq camp and possibly explosives training. He is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US forces as a leader coordinating supplies for al-Qaida fighters in Tora Bora, and was possibly selected for training as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. The document recommends his continued detention due to these assessments and his lack of cooperation.
This memorandum provides an update recommendation for detainee ISN US9AG-000070DP held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is a 24-year old Algerian man with a history of significant head trauma resulting in blindness in one eye and brain injuries causing difficulties with speech, understanding, and controlling behaviors. Due to his medical condition, he requires long-term custodial care. While previously assessed as medium intelligence value, he now poses a low risk. The Joint Task Force recommends releasing or transferring the detainee to another country for continued detention based on his health status and low risk level.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
Detainee Mohammed Mussa Yakubi is assessed as a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia in Afghanistan with connections to a global terrorist network. He is believed to have helped engineer IED and mortar attacks against US forces. Detainee was arrested after weapons were found in his compound, including an AK-47, mortar tubes, and ammunition. He is assessed as a HIGH risk and having MEDIUM intelligence value regarding the Gardez cell, planned attacks, and connections to other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. JTF GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be held in DoD custody.
This document provides a summary of a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is believed to have worked for a known member of the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group and traveled between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for over a decade. Concerns were raised about inconsistencies in his story and links to anti-coalition militant groups. The Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay recommends retaining him in the Department of Defense's control due to these associations and assessed intelligence value.
Detainee Mohammed Shah is assessed as a probable member of al Qaeda who has ties to terrorist political parties in Iran. He is assessed to be a medium risk and may pose a threat to the US and its allies. The document recommends transferring the detainee to another country with conditions, subject to an acceptable transfer agreement. It provides details of the detainee's background, including fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, working as a doctor in Iran, and traveling between Afghanistan and Iran with large sums of money to support terrorist activities. The detainee is considered of medium intelligence value and may be able to provide information on Taliban commanders, couriers, and training camps in Iran with links to terrorist groups.
This memorandum recommends releasing or transferring a Guantanamo detainee. The detainee was likely falsely accused of participating in an ambush by Afghan forces seeking to cover up their own involvement. Records indicate the detainee poses a low risk and likely has no valuable intelligence. While the Criminal Investigation Task Force assesses the detainee as medium risk, the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo recommends release or transfer based on the fraudulent circumstances of his capture.
Detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and weapons smuggler associated with senior Taliban officials. He was captured in 2003 with documents and materials indicating ties to the Taliban and extremist networks. Detainee worked closely with the Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister and other senior figures. He denies the full extent of his Taliban activities and affiliations. JTF-GTMO recommends the detainee continue to be detained due to his high-level Taliban connections and potential threat.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a Guantanamo detainee, ISN: US9AF-001100DP, to the control of another country for continued detention. It summarizes that the detainee was involved in anti-coalition militia operations and planned an attack on US forces in Afghanistan. He has direct ties to senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. The document assesses the detainee as a medium risk and recommends his transfer based on derogatory information obtained since his previous assessment.
This document provides a recommendation to transfer a detainee, ISN US9AF-001075DP, to another country for continued detention. The detainee is assessed to be of medium intelligence value and a medium threat risk. He was captured in Afghanistan in possession of weapons and has ties to anti-coalition militant groups in the Gardez region. While the detainee denies involvement, he has knowledge about a bombing in Gardez. The task force recommends his transfer to allow another country to take over his continued detention.
DetaineeMohammedAmin is recommendedfor transferto the control of anothercountry for continueddetention.He is assessedto be a memberof Hezb-e-IslamiGulbuddinwho attendedplanningmeetingswhereattacksagainstUS-ledcoalitionforcesandtheAfghangovernmentwere discussed.Detaineehasassociationswith TalibanandAl-Qaedafiguresandmay haveknowledgeof futureplannedattacksdue to his involvementwith Anti-Coalitionforcesin Afghanistan.While in custody,hehasbeengenerallycompliantbut remainsan enemycombatant.
This document provides a recommendation to retain a Guantanamo Bay detainee, ISN US9AF-001045DP, in Department of Defense control. It summarizes that the detainee (1) is assessed to be a key member of anti-coalition militant groups who has participated in weapons trafficking, explosives training, and attacks against US and coalition forces; (2) has admitted ties to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations; and (3) poses a high risk and is likely to provide intelligence on terrorist networks, operations, and leaders if retained in DoD control.
This memorandum recommends retaining a detainee, ISN US9AF-001043DP, under Department of Defense control at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee is assessed to be a high-level member of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who possesses intelligence on terrorist operations and personnel. He was formerly the Taliban Minister of Commerce and deputy to a senior Taliban commander. New information indicates he was involved in the killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross employee in 2003. The detainee poses a high risk and should continue to be detained.
Detainee ISN US9AF-001037DP is assessed to be a high-ranking commander in the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group. He was captured along with another high-ranking HIG commander, ISN 1036, during a raid on a HIG safe house. Detainee and ISN 1036 have provided conflicting statements about their roles in HIG and how long they have known each other. Detainee is assessed to pose a high risk as he likely would threaten U.S. interests. JTF GTMO assesses the detainee to be of high intelligence value and recommends he continue to be detained in DoD custody.
1. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20320806
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20320806
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20320806
6 August 2007
SUBJECT: DAB Assessment of Guantanamo Detainee, ISN DJ9SO-010027DP (S)
Detainee Assessment
1. (S//NF) Personal Information:
2. (U) DAB Assessment:
a. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of the East Africa
al-Qaida (EAAQ) organization.1
Detainee served as a courier and facilitator between EAAQ
and al-Qaida operatives in Pakistan (PK). Detainee is associated with numerous individuals
involved in extremist activities. DAB has determined this detainee to be:
A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies
Of HIGH intelligence value
3. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events:
1
Analyst Note: EAAQ is also referred to as al-Qaida in East Africa (AQEA). EAAQ is a Priority 1A National
Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) target due to its assessed association with the al-
Qaida Network. Priority 1A targets are defined as terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that
have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests.
This includes those preparing to employ weapons of mass destruction.
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abdullahi Sudi Arale
Aliases and Current/True Name: Abdullahi Sudi Arale,
Ismail Arale, Mohamud Samatar Bachir, Shuayb, Ali Omar
Mohamed
Place of Birth: Mogadishu, Somalia (SO)
Date of Birth: 1964
Citizenship: Somalia
Internment Serial Number (ISN): DJ9SO-010027DP
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The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account.
These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee was born in Mogadishu but moved to Hargeysa, SO,
when the Siad Barre government collapsed in January 1991. Before leaving Mogadishu,
detainee worked as a translator for the Chinese Embassy, translating documents from Somali
into English. Detainee started the first newspaper in Hargeysa, The Voice of Hargeysa, and
also worked as an English teacher at the Puntland School from 1992 to 1996. In 1996, he
became involved in the Habr Yunis political group, where he first made contact with
Islamists. He was appointed to the school’s committee, a position he held until 1999.
Detainee also owned a library. Detainee wanted to study abroad, and he traveled to Syria in
1999. Detainee was unable to get a scholarship in Syria, but by the end of the year was
admitted to the Islamic University in Islamabad, PK. Detainee began at the Islamic
University in 2001, and he stayed at the Kuwaiti Hostel from 2001-2002. Detainee received
a bachelor’s degree in Islamic studies and English literature from the Islamic University.2
b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In 2001, prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks, 17
people from Somalia, including Ibrahim Hajj Jama3
and Aden Ayrow,4
came to Islamabad to
meet with the Somali community there. Some members like Jama traveled openly. Ayrow
and other members of the group traveled secretly and later moved on to Afghanistan without
detainee. After 11 September 2001, due to detainee’s tribal links to Jama, Jama established
contact with detainee from Somalia. Jama passed the contact information to Nabil, who was
sent from Faisalabad to link-up with detainee to find Abd al-Rashid. In 2002, detainee
returned to Somalia when his mother died and then returned to Pakistan with his immediate
family. When he returned to Pakistan, detainee met Abd al-Rashid, who worked for the
Dahabshiil Hawala and the al-Haramayn organization. Abd al-Rashid helped detainee get a
house and establish himself in the Somali community in Pakistan.5
During this time detainee
worked as a travel agent for the now-defunct Damal Airways.
2
TIR SO-10027 018-07
3
Analyst Note: Ibrahim Hajj Jama, aka (Ibrahim Afghani), was an al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) military commander
known for his religious knowledge as well as loyalty and support for al-Qaida and the Taliban and for his continuing
links to Afghanistan. Jama was one of the first founders of al-Qaida affiliated AIAI cells and one of the instigators
of terrorist attacks in Somaliland (see TD-314/40749-06).
4
Analyst Note: Aden Ayrow was an Afghan veteran who trained in Afghanistan and became the head bodyguard
for AIAI top military commander Hassan Dahir Aweys. As of late May 2006, Ayrow was a radical militant and
jihadist and leader of al-Qaida affiliated AIAI cells. Ayrow was the leader, coordinator, and initiator of attacks
against foreigners in Somaliland, including attacks on Western interests (see TD-314/40749-06).
5
Analyst Note: The al-Haramayn International Foundation is a NIPF priority 1B Terrorist Support Entity (TSE).
Priority 1B TSEs have demonstrated sustained and active financial support for terrorist organizations willing to
attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1B terrorist groups.
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In 2006, detainee returned to Mogadishu.7
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee arrived in Mogadishu after the Somali
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) captured the city.8
Ahmed Abdi Aw Muhammad, aka
(Ahmad Awe Abdi Godene), invited detainee to join the CIC. Detainee met with CIC
chairman Shaykh Shariff Shaykh Ahmed and Abdi following their return from a conference
in Sudan, and they offered detainee a position on the executive council, but detainee felt he
had to build his reputation before he could hold the position. They discussed the need for
building a strong coalition. Shariff was afraid of the internal conflict within the CIC, much
of it caused by EAAQ. For example, when Indha Adde jailed the killer of a non-Muslim
woman in Somalia, Abu Ibrahim9
put out fliers and posters saying that Indha Adde was a
non-Muslim and should be killed for jailing the killer of a non-Muslim.10
Detainee set up
Bayt Wahida (House of One), which was located near Shaykh Shariff’s office. At this site,
detainee was part of the CIC power-sharing committee, which worked to bring the various
groups into the CIC and reach a consensus. In early October 2006, Hassan al-Turki
conspired with Abu Ibrahim to use the CIC to capture Kismayo and then abandon the CIC.
Ahmed Medobe and CIC military leaders left to go capture Kismayo. In mid-October,
detainee and a group of administrators were dispatched by air to establish the CIC
administration in Kismayo. Detainee felt that the Kismayo administration should be locally
run and based upon local ideas. Detainee stayed in Kismayo from approximately 15 October
to 15 November 2006. Detainee returned to Mogadishu, but left the city after Ethiopian
forces took over.
7
TIR SO-10027 018-07
8
Analyst Note: CIC is also often referred to as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).
9
Analyst Note: As of 2003, Abu Ibrahim, aka (Abu Talha al-Sudani), aka (Tariq Muhammad Nur), was al-Qaida’s
point man for handling al-Qaida’s remaining business interests in Sudan. Al-Sudani’s expertise was in facilitation
and business management, and that he was also involved in the support of al-Qaida families living in Sudan (see
TD-314/31574-03).
10
Analyst Note: Yusif Indha Adde, formerly one of AIAI senior military commanders, commanded his own jihadist
fighting group and had close links to Mogadishu-based al-Qaida members. Adde and his group served as a
reinforcement fighting unit working with other Somali jihad groups to protect al-Qaida cells in Mogadishu (see TD-
314/40749-06).
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(S//NF) On 23 May 2007, detainee arrived in Djibouti (DJ) from Burao, Somaliland.11
Detainee was en route to Asmara, Eritrea, at the invitation of Shaykh Shariff, who had since
been deposed from his position as CIC chairman. Detainee intended to attend an Eritrean-
sponsored conference for the deposed CIC in late May 2007, to be followed by a separate
conference in Qatar in June 2007. Detainee was traveling on a Somali passport using the
alias Bachir Mohamed Samatar. Upon arrival in Djibouti City, DJ, per instructions from
Shaykh Shariff, detainee went directly to a public telephone center and placed a call to
deposed CIC Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Khalif Mahamoud Warsama, aka
(Mohamed Ali Omar). Khalif instructed detainee to come to the Hotel Dar Es Salaam.
Detainee took a taxi to the hotel, met with Khalif, and was assigned to a room. On 26 May
2007, Khalif went to a Djiboutian money transfer service to retrieve $15,000 US which
detainee’s brother, Ali Mahamud Mohamed, had sent from Burao. The funds, originally
provided by the Eritreans and given to Shaykh Shariff to cover travel expenses for the group,
had been wired by Shariff to Khalif in Mogadishu and then on to detainee in Burao. Rather
than traveling from Burao to Djibouti with this large sum, detainee instructed his brother Ali
to forward the money to Djibouti. Once in Djibouti, Khalif was instructed to retrieve the
money and distribute it among the group as needed. On 27 May 2007, Abu Muslim took
detainee’s passport to the Eritrean Embassy in Djibouti for processing. The Eritreans were
sponsoring the onward travel of the seven individuals attending the conference, which
included the issuance of visas and the purchase of airline tickets. Abu Muslim and detainee
traveled to the Eritrean Embassy at approximately 1400 hrs to obtain detainee’s visa. When
given the passport, Eritrean second secretary Omar Mohamed Omar, the main Eritrean point
of contact for the group, noticed that detainee’s name was not on the list of invitees sent by
Shaykh Shariff and thus no preparations had yet been made. Detainee called Shaykh Shariff,
who was already in Asmara, to resolve the problem. Later in the day, although too late to
make the scheduled 27 May 2007 flight, detainee’s name was added to the list and Shaykh
Shariff instructed him to travel on the 31 May 2007 flight to Asmara. As a result of
detainee’s travel delay, the rest of the group decided to delay their travel to Asmara as well.12
4. (U) Capture Information:
a. (S//NF) At 1000 hrs on 31 May 2007, Abu Muslim went to the Eritrean Embassy and
retrieved the passports with visas and Eritrean airlines tickets to Asmara. That evening, the
group began moving to the airport with Omar, who facilitated the departure of the group,
including personally completing mandatory exit documents. While passing through
11
Analyst Note: Somaliland is an area in northern Somalia that has functioned as an independent nation since 1991,
although it has not been recognized as such and is technically still part of Somalia.
12
TD-314/44270-07
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Djiboutian passport control, Djiboutian authorities arrested detainee for passport fraud.13
Detainee was transferred to US control at Camp Lemonier, DJ, on about 3 June 2007.14
b. (U) Property Held: None.
c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 5 June 2007
5. (U) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat
to the US, its interests and allies.
b. (S//NF) Threat Indicators: Detainee is assessed to be a member of EAAQ. Detainee
functioned as a courier and facilitator between EAAQ and al-Qaida in Pakistan. Detainee
was a leader in the Somali Islami Courts Union. Detainee is associated with numerous
members of EAAQ, the al-Qaida leadership in Pakistan, and various other East African
extremist groups.
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of EAAQ, and served as a courier and
facilitator between EAAQ and al-Qaida in Pakistan.
(S//NF) Ahmed Abdi was an al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) mid-level
commander. Ahmed Abdi was previously an Afghan veteran who trained in
Afghanistan and had been actively linked to al-Qaida since the mid-1990s. He
had close relations with al-Qaida networks in Pakistan and Afghanistan until
2004, and was considered by AIAI members to be the “caretaker” of al-Qaida
cells in Mogadishu and in the Horn of Africa. Ahmed Abdi was the leader,
coordinator, and initiator of attacks on foreigners in Somaliland.17
13
TD-314/44270-07
14
DMO Manifest May 2007
17
Analyst Note: AIAI is an NIPF CT Priority 2A target. Priority 2A targets are defined to include:
terrorist/extremist groups that have demonstrated both the intention and the capability to attack US persons and
interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less of a threat to US interests around the world than Priority 1B
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SUBJECT: DAB Assessment of Guantanamo Detainee, ISN DJ9SO-010027DP (S)
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○ (S//NF) Salim Awadh Salim, in the custody of the Ethiopian National
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), reported that detainee operated a facility in
Mogadishu called the Bayt Wahida. This house was used to bring together Somalis
of different tribes to demonstrate that they could all live together. Salim said Harun
Fazul visited the house to train the Somalis, and that foreigners also moved into the
house. Salim described detainee as a CIC official and al-Qaida courier, and stated
detainee was responsible for putting Fazul in touch with al-Qaida in Pakistan.18
(S//NF) Salim described detainee as an associate of Fazul.19
In a January
2007 conversation with Salim about al-Qaida’s operational priorities, Fazul stated
that in late 2006, he had asked an al-Qaida operative located in Pakistan to reach
out to senior al-Qaida leadership, including UBL, and ask them to provide Fazul
with operational advice. According to Salim, Fazul stated that UBL had
responded to Fazul’s request for advice and had told Fazul that he wanted al-
Qaida’s East Africa cell to focus on operations outside Somalia.20
(S//NF) Al-Qaida affiliate Ahmed Madobe, also detained by the NISS,
reported that detainee had ties to Fazul.21
(Analyst Note: Ahmed Madobe, the
top AIAI military commander in the Ras Kambooni, was a close associate of
radical AIAI commander Hassan al-Turki.22
)
(S//NF) Senior al-Qaida facilitator Abu Bakr Muhammad Bulghiti described
Fazul as handling operational issues for the African al-Qaida network.23
Fazul
reportedly owned a house in Mogadishu which he used to train operatives from
the United Kingdom (UK).24
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, ISN US9TZ-010012DP
(TZ-10012), knew Fazul from both Kenya and Afghanistan, and described him as
probably the best document forger in Afghanistan.25
(S//NF) Fazul was indicted in the Southern District of New York for his
alleged involvement in the 7 August 1998 bombings of the United States
Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya (KE).26
○ (S//NF) Mohamed Ali Isay, an AIAI operative, reported that detainee, whom Isay
described as an al-Qaida member, came to Mogadishu for five days in May 2004 to
talk to Ahmed Abdi’s group. Detainee’s focus was on sending AIAI members to
Pakistan, Qatar, and Bahrain to hold discussions with al-Qaida cells there.27
groups; or terrorist/extremist that have demonstrated intention to attack US persons and interests and are taking
action to develop or acquire WMD capability
18
TD-314/17541-07
19
TD-314/26639-07
20
TD-314/15657-07
21
TD-314/38906-07
22
TD-314/40749-06
23
TD-314/31574-03
24
TD-314/45155-07
25
TD-314/55876-04
26
FBI MOST WANTED TERRORISTS – FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED
27
TD-314/59429-04
7. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20320806
SUBJECT: DAB Assessment of Guantanamo Detainee, ISN DJ9SO-010027DP (S)
7
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20320806
○ (S//NF) Abdirashid Aidid Samatar, aka (Abdirashid Aidid Ahmed), an al-Qaida
courier, reported that detainee returned from Mogadishu to Pakistan in May 2004 and
informed Samatar that he wanted to obtain Somali passports so that Ahmed Abdi or
other leaders could travel to Pakistan to meet with al-Qaida leadership and discuss
cooperation with al-Qaida.28
(S//NF) Samatar recounted a meeting in May 2004 between LY-10017,
Samatar, and detainee in Islamabad. During this meeting LY-10017 commented
that Somalia offered the best operational conditions for mujahideen, better than
anywhere else. Samatar said that while al-Qaida lacked confidence in AIAI, al-
Qaida enjoyed the support of the new jihadist group led by Ahmed Abdi and
Aden Hashi Ayrow. Samatar commented that Somalia’s seaside access, the
availability of weapons, and the ease of smuggling weapons and explosives
throughout the country also increased al-Qaida’s attraction to Somalia, making it,
in Samatar’s opinion, the entry point for al-Qaida into Africa.29
○ (S//NF) Detainee was present when Samatar and al-Qaida operative Marwan al-
Jabbur discussed Somalis living in the US. Samatar speculated that al-Qaida was
interested in recruiting Somalis living in the US to conduct terrorist operations, and
possibly act as couriers. Samatar explained that Somalis living the US were attractive
to al-Qaida because they could easily travel to Pakistan to meet with al-Qaida
members, and could be used to carry messages to al-Qaida members worldwide with
little difficulty given their US travel documents.30
○ (S//NF) In late 2006, detainee was part of a five-man delegation dispatched by
CIC chairman Shaykh Shariff to mediate a dispute between Ahmad Madobe and his
associate Abdufatah Mohamed Ali. Detainee had worked in the CIC office in
Mogadishu for Shaykh Shariff and had served as an al-Qaida courier ferrying
messages and money from Pakistan to Somalia in 2003 and 2004.31
(S//NF) Detainee was a leader in the CIC.32
○ (S//NF) Abdul Malik Bujabu, ISN US9KE-010025DP (KE-10025), identified
detainee as an administrative leader in the CIC. KE-10025 also reported detainee as
associated with Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan and Bashir Mohammed Mahmoud.33
(Analyst Note: Bashir Mohammed Mahmoud was one of Abu-Talha al-Sudani’s
Mogadishu-based representatives.34
Saleh Nabhan was reportedly involved in
consultations with members of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group to agree upon possible
strategies for attacking common targets, including those in Somalia.35
28
TD-314/37096-06
29
TD-314/63898-04
30
TD-314/63664-04
31
TD-314/45153-07
32
Analyst Note: CICThe Islamic Courts Union is also known as the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC).
33
010025 SIR 04-APR-2007
34
TD-314/45156-07, IIR 6 034 0265 07
35
IIR 6 034 0265 07, ACIC Terrorism Summary 9-MAR-05
8. S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20320806
SUBJECT: DAB Assessment of Guantanamo Detainee, ISN DJ9SO-010027DP (S)
8
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20320806
○ (S//NF) Detainee is described as a leader of the Italian Cemetery Group, aka
Salah ul-Din Group, an offshoot of al-Shabaab al-Islamiya, aka (al-Shabaab), the
“youth” wing of the CIC. Aden Ayrow was in overall command of al-Shabaab, with
other leaders including detainee, Ibrahim Afghani, Ahmed Abdi, Khalif Mahamoud
Warsama, and Mahad Karate,.36
(S//NF) Mahad Karate was security and intelligence chief for al-Shabaab.
One of Mahad’s principle duties was to formulate a “death list.”37
(S//NF) Issa Osman Issa served as a mobile commander for al-Shabaab forces
and had commanded forces on the Idale front southwest of Baidoa, SO, as well as
in Mogadishu in April 2007. Issa was involved in the 1998 US Embassy bombing
in Nairobi, and the 2002 Mombasa, KE, bombings.38
In May 2007, Issa returned
to the Raas Kaambooni triangle area of Somalia to organize forces there.39
○ (S//NF) During the Ethiopian National Defense Force campaign to oust the CIC
and reestablish the Somali TFG in early 2007, detainee was reportedly in Mogadishu
attempting to organize the reconstitution of the CIC and facilitate strikes against TFG
senior leadership.40
36
TD-314/51358-07
37
TD-314/51358-07
38
IIR 6 854 0069 03
39
TD-314/51358-07
40
IIR 6 105 4131 07