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CNIT 152:
Incident
Response
10 Enterprise Services
Updated 10-14-2021
Network Infrastructure
Services:


DHCP & DNS
DHCP
• Dynamic Host Con
fi
guration Protoco
l

• Assigns IP addresses to devices (with subnet
mask and gateway address
)

• Can also con
fi
gure DNS server addres
s

• Uses UDP port 67 and 68
DHCP Lease
• An IP address may change every time the
device reboot
s

• So DHCP logs are essential to identify devices
from IP addresses
DHCP Searches
• Search a date for an IP addres
s

• To
fi
nd which system had that address when
an alert happene
d

• Search all dates for a MAC addres
s

• Gets all the IP addresses that system had over
time
Microsoft's DHCP Logs
• DHCP Server Role is part of Windows
Serve
r

• By default, located at 

%windir%System32Dhc
p

• A plain comma-delimited text
fi
l
e

• ID, Date, Time, Description, IP Address,
Host Name, MAC Addres
s

• Links Ch 10a, 10b
Issues with Microsoft DHCP
• Note: "Time" is local time, not UT
C

• Logs only retained for one week
by default
ISC DHCP
• Most common on Unix/Linux system
s

• Free and open-sourc
e

• Logs go to syslog local
7

• (Facility Number 23, a way to categorize
syslog messages
)

• Link Ch 10c
ISC DHCP Log Example
[root@proxy log]# tail -f dhcpd.lo
g

Jan 15 13:49:59 proxy dhcpd: DHCPACK on 192.168.0.23 to
00:80:ad:01:7e:12 (programming) via eth
1

Jan 15 13:54:45 proxy dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from
192.168.0.13 via eth1: not authoritative for subnet
192.168.0.
0

• Link Ch 10d
ISC DHCP Log Examples
• Link Ch 10e
DNS
• Domain Name Syste
m

• Resolves domain names like ccsf.edu to IP
addresses like 147.144.1.212
• DNS logs show every domain visited, the IP
visiting it, and the tim
e

• Malicious servers change IP addresses
frequently
ISC BIND
• Berkeley Internet Name Domai
n

• Logging is off by default; turn it on in
named.conf.loca
l

• Link Ch 10f
Microsoft DNS
• Logging is off by
defaul
t

• Restarting DNS server
erases old log
Network-Level DNS Logging
• Any packet capture utility can do it, such as
tcpdum
p

• DNSCAP is specialized for DNS capturin
g

• Can log queries, and/or save a PCAP
fi
l
e

• Link Ch 10g
Ch 10a
Enterprise Management
Applications:


LANDesk &


Symantec Altiris
LANDesk's Software
Management Suite
• Software License Monitoring (SLM
)

• Tracks execution history of every
applicatio
n

• Date and time the application ra
n

• File attributes of the executabl
e

• User account that ran i
t

• Link Ch 10h
Attackers
• Attackers often copy hacking tools like
password hash dumpers to a system, run it, and
then delete i
t

• LANDesk will record this in the SLM monitor
logs (in the Registry, see next slide)
,

• Even if the binary has been deleted
Registry Keys
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWARELANDeskMa
nagementSuite

WinClientSoftwareMonitoringMonitorLog
]

• Each application has a separate key, like 

C:/Program Files/Microsoft Of
fi
ce/OFFICE11/
EXCEL.EX
E

• Subkeys contain
:

• Current Duration, Current User, First Started,
Last Duration, Last Started, Total Duration, Total
Runs
Parsing the Registry Keys
• SLM Browse
r

• Doesn't work on exported registry hive
s

• RegRipper doe
s

• Links Ch 10l, 10m, 10n, 10o
What to Look For
• Low "Total Runs
"

• Attackers often run a tool once and then
delete i
t

• Suspicious paths of executio
n

• Many tools run from the same director
y

• Anything running from the Recycle Bin
What to Look For
• Timeline Analysi
s

• Look for rarely used utilities running within a
short time perio
d

• Such as net.exe, net1.exe, cmd.exe, at.ex
e

• (net1 is a Microsoft product to address Y2K
)

• May indicate lateral movement
What to Look For
• Suspicious usernames in Current Use
r

• User accounts with a low number of
application run
s

• Accounts that shouldn't normally access this
syste
m

• Accounts with elevated privileges, such as
domain administrators
What to Look For
• Executables that have been delete
d

• This is normal for installer
s

• Other executables are more suspicious
Symantec's Altiris Client
Management Suite
• Optional component for application meterin
g

• Records execution history of applications run
on a syste
m

• Link Ch 10p, 10q
Altiris Application Metering
Logs
• Saved as a plain text
fi
le, including this
information
:

• Manufacturer, version, use
r

• Discovered (date of
fi
rst execution
)

• And date of last executio
n

• Run Count and Total Run Time
What to Look For
• Executables without version informatio
n

• Malware authors often strip this data to hide
from signature-based antiviru
s

• Identify suspicious executables by
fi
le siz
e

• Malware is usually small; < 1 M
B

• Attacker may use the same backdoor on
multiple systems, changing only the name, so
the size is the same
Antivirus Software:


Symantec Endpoint Protection


McAfee VirusScan


Trend Micro Of
fi
ceScan
General Features
• Antivirus doesn't usually detect all program
s

• Only the ones recognized as maliciou
s

• Common administrative tools won't be
detecte
d

• Also some malicious tools lack a signature,
and won't be detecte
d

• Antivirus logs are useful, but give an incomplete
picture of attacker activities
Antivirus Quarantine
• AV encodes malicious
fi
les & moves them to a
Quarantine folde
r

• Files can no longer execut
e

• Preserves
fi
les for incident responder
s

• Make sure antivirus is set to quarantine
fi
les,
not delete them
About Archives
• Attackers often use password-protected archive
fi
le
s

• Antivirus can't open them to scan the
m

• Often AV will log errors about the
m

• This is a clue about attacker activity
Symantec Endpoint
Protection
• Stores extensive log
fi
les, in plaintex
t

• Also generates events in the Event Log
Strange Timestamps
• This is Nov. 19, 2002,
8:01:34 Am UTC
Quarantine Files
• File extension of .vb
n

• Two VBN
fi
les for each
fi
le quarantine
d

• First: metadata about quarantined
fi
l
e

• Second: Encoded copy of original
fi
le
Symantec's Encoding
• Older versions: XOR with 0x5
A

• Newer versions: XOR with 0xA5 and insert
additional 5-byte sequences throughout the
encoded
fi
l
e

• Symantec's QExtract.exe can extract
fi
les from
quarantin
e

• But only on the system that quarantined the
fi
le
To Extract Quarantined Files
• Obtain the correct version of QExtrac
t

• Boot up a forensic image of the affected
syste
m

• OR use pyextract.py (link Ch 10r
)

• But it sometimes fails to reconstruct the
fi
le
correctly
McAfee VirusScan
• Link Ch 10s
McAfee Logs
• Stored
locally on
the host
Most Useful
• OnAccessScanLog.txt and
OnDemandScanLog.tx
t

• Shows
fi
les that were quarantined or delete
d

• With name of the detected threa
t

• Also creates events in Event Log
McAfee Quarantined Files
• .bup extension, a
fi
le with two part
s

• "Details" contains metadat
a

• File-o: The actual quarantined
fi
l
e

• XORed with 0x6A and compressed into OLE
forma
t

• To extract, use 7-Zip
Example of
metadata for
PWDUMP
hacking too
l

Shows
detection
time and
original
name of
fi
le
Trend Micro Of
fi
ceScan
• Stores logs locally on the hos
t

• Plaintext, with date, signature name, what action
the AV took, and path to
fi
le
Trend Quarantine Files
• Can be decoded with VSEncode.ex
e

• Create a con
fi
guration_
fi
le with the full path to
the quarantined
fi
les
Ch 10b
Web Servers:


Apache &


IIS
Background
• Browsers send HTTP (Hypertext Transfer
Protocol) request
s

• GE
T

• To retrieve a page, image, etc
.

• POS
T

• To send data, like username and password
Ports
• HTTP uses TCP port 80 (by default
)

• HTTPS uses TCP port 443 (by default)
Virtual Hosts
• Many websites running on the same serve
r

• If one is compromised, they may all be affected
Log Files on Web Servers
• Stored in plain tex
t

• Summary of each reques
t

• IP of clien
t

• URL requeste
d

• HTTP metho
d

• Result (status code)
Common Searches to
Perform
Load Balancing
• Sends requests to a pool of server
s

• Web server logs will have the IP of the load
balancer, not the clien
t

• You need to correlate load balancer logs with
Web server logs
 

• OR: con
fi
gure the load balancer to "pass
through" some details about the clien
t

• X-Forwarder-For header
fi
el
d

• Con
fi
gure Web server to log that header
Web Content
• Attackers often alter
fi
les on a Web serve
r

• Or upload
fi
les, such as webshells and
hacking tool
s

• They may be plaintext or obfuscated
Example of Obfuscated PHP
• Link Ch 10t
Apache
• Free, open-sourc
e

• Usually running on Linu
x

• Con
fi
guration
fi
le
s

• httpd.conf, apache.conf, apache2.con
f

• Some directives in .htaccess
fi
les
Apache Log Files
• access.log and error.log (plain text
)

• In a subdirectory of /var/lo
g

• To log X-Forwarder-For headers, add this to
con
fi
guration
fi
le
:

%{X-Forwarded-For}i
Content Locations
• /var/www or /var/www/html by defaul
t

• Often change
d

• Search for ServerRoot and DocumentRoot
directives in con
fi
guration
fi
les
Microsoft's IIS
• Internet Information Service
s

• Included in Server versions of Window
s

• Con
fi
gured through Control Pane
l

• Most relevant settings are stored in an XML
fi
le
named applicationHost.con
fi
g
IIS Con
fi
g File
• ID number appears at end of log directory nam
e

• %SystemDrive%
inetpublogsLogFilesW3SVC1
IIS Log Files
• Filenames contain date in YYMMDD forma
t

• u_ex140220.log --logs from Feb. 20, 201
4

• Advanced Logging places logs in a different
director
y

• Logs are plaintext but are encoded with UTF-8
and may include unicode characters
Example Log File
• Link Ch 10u
#Software: Microsoft Internet Information Services 7.
5

#Version: 1.
0

#Date: 2011-04-13 19:02:3
4

#Fields: date time s-ip cs-method cs-uri-stem cs-uri-
query s-port cs-username c-ip cs(User-Agent) sc-status
sc-substatus sc-win32-status time-taken
2012-07-02 15:15:37 XXX.XX.XX.XXX POST /
AjaxWebMethods.aspx/TestWebMethod - 443 -
XXX.XX.XX.XX
 

Mozilla/5.0+(Windows+NT+5.1;+rv:13.0)+Gecko/
20100101+Firefox/13.0.1 405 0 0 218
Database Servers:


Microsoft SQL


MySQL


Oracle
DB Evidence
• Client connection log
s

• Attacker's IP addres
s

• Error log
s

• Malformed queries; brute force attack
s

• Query log
s

• Often not enabled, but would show what the
attacker was trying to access
DB Storage
• Data stored in many
fi
le
s

• Sometimes "raw" storag
e

• Proprietary methods to manage one or
more storage devices at the physical leve
l

• Work with database administrator to deal with
customized database
s

• Don't work on a live D
B

• You might modify data or even cause a
crash
Microsoft SQL
• Free version: SQL Server Expres
s

• Con
fi
gured with Microsoft SQL Server
Management Studio (SSMS
)

• MSSQL does not log client connections by
defaul
t

• Only failed connections
ERRORLOG
• This example logs
fi
rst an unsuccessful, then a
successful, connection attemp
t

• Both go into ERRORLOG
Query Logging
• MSSQL does not log queries by defaul
t

• You can turn on a "server-side-trace
"

• But it incurs large processing overhead
Preserving DB Evidence
• Forensic image of the drives containing the D
B

• Good, but requires taking down the DB
serve
r

• Copying DB
fi
les: .mdf & .ld
f

• Locked; must take down DB to copy the
m

• Use SMSS to backup or export dat
a

• Alters some evidence, like other live images
MySQL
• Free, open-source, common on Linu
x

• After Oracle bought it, the open-source fork mariadb
became popula
r

• Con
fi
guration
fi
le is my.cnf or my.conf
MySQL Logs
• Commonly in /var/log/mysq
l

• Only error log enabled by defaul
t

• General log is more useful for us, but causes
high logging overhead
Example
• General lo
g

• User "root" connected from 192.168.200.
2

• Executed this quer
y

• select * from cc_data limit 1
Acquiring MySQL Data
• Can use a number of database
fi
le storage format
s

• Ideal way
:

• Shut down server gracefully, image hard dis
k

• On a running syste
m

• Stop the MySQL service and copy all the
fi
les in
the datadir, o
r

• Backup with mysqldump command without
stopping the service
Oracle
• Runs on Windows or Linu
x

• Expensiv
e

• listener.log
 

• Logs details about each client connectio
n

• On by defaul
t

• log.xm
l

• Alerts -- records traces and dumps
Example listener.log
• Successful connection to an Oracle D
B

• "Bob" is username on remote syste
m

• Does not indicate success or failur
e

• Unless auditing is enabled (high performance
impact)
Ch 10c

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CNIT 152 10 Enterprise Service

  • 1. CNIT 152: Incident Response 10 Enterprise Services Updated 10-14-2021
  • 3. DHCP • Dynamic Host Con fi guration Protoco l • Assigns IP addresses to devices (with subnet mask and gateway address ) • Can also con fi gure DNS server addres s • Uses UDP port 67 and 68
  • 4. DHCP Lease • An IP address may change every time the device reboot s • So DHCP logs are essential to identify devices from IP addresses
  • 5. DHCP Searches • Search a date for an IP addres s • To fi nd which system had that address when an alert happene d • Search all dates for a MAC addres s • Gets all the IP addresses that system had over time
  • 6. Microsoft's DHCP Logs • DHCP Server Role is part of Windows Serve r • By default, located at 
 %windir%System32Dhc p • A plain comma-delimited text fi l e • ID, Date, Time, Description, IP Address, Host Name, MAC Addres s • Links Ch 10a, 10b
  • 7. Issues with Microsoft DHCP • Note: "Time" is local time, not UT C • Logs only retained for one week by default
  • 8. ISC DHCP • Most common on Unix/Linux system s • Free and open-sourc e • Logs go to syslog local 7 • (Facility Number 23, a way to categorize syslog messages ) • Link Ch 10c
  • 9. ISC DHCP Log Example [root@proxy log]# tail -f dhcpd.lo g Jan 15 13:49:59 proxy dhcpd: DHCPACK on 192.168.0.23 to 00:80:ad:01:7e:12 (programming) via eth 1 Jan 15 13:54:45 proxy dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 192.168.0.13 via eth1: not authoritative for subnet 192.168.0. 0 • Link Ch 10d
  • 10. ISC DHCP Log Examples • Link Ch 10e
  • 11. DNS • Domain Name Syste m • Resolves domain names like ccsf.edu to IP addresses like 147.144.1.212 • DNS logs show every domain visited, the IP visiting it, and the tim e • Malicious servers change IP addresses frequently
  • 12. ISC BIND • Berkeley Internet Name Domai n • Logging is off by default; turn it on in named.conf.loca l • Link Ch 10f
  • 13. Microsoft DNS • Logging is off by defaul t • Restarting DNS server erases old log
  • 14. Network-Level DNS Logging • Any packet capture utility can do it, such as tcpdum p • DNSCAP is specialized for DNS capturin g • Can log queries, and/or save a PCAP fi l e • Link Ch 10g
  • 17. LANDesk's Software Management Suite • Software License Monitoring (SLM ) • Tracks execution history of every applicatio n • Date and time the application ra n • File attributes of the executabl e • User account that ran i t • Link Ch 10h
  • 18. Attackers • Attackers often copy hacking tools like password hash dumpers to a system, run it, and then delete i t • LANDesk will record this in the SLM monitor logs (in the Registry, see next slide) , • Even if the binary has been deleted
  • 19. Registry Keys [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWARELANDeskMa nagementSuite
 WinClientSoftwareMonitoringMonitorLog ] • Each application has a separate key, like 
 C:/Program Files/Microsoft Of fi ce/OFFICE11/ EXCEL.EX E • Subkeys contain : • Current Duration, Current User, First Started, Last Duration, Last Started, Total Duration, Total Runs
  • 20. Parsing the Registry Keys • SLM Browse r • Doesn't work on exported registry hive s • RegRipper doe s • Links Ch 10l, 10m, 10n, 10o
  • 21. What to Look For • Low "Total Runs " • Attackers often run a tool once and then delete i t • Suspicious paths of executio n • Many tools run from the same director y • Anything running from the Recycle Bin
  • 22. What to Look For • Timeline Analysi s • Look for rarely used utilities running within a short time perio d • Such as net.exe, net1.exe, cmd.exe, at.ex e • (net1 is a Microsoft product to address Y2K ) • May indicate lateral movement
  • 23. What to Look For • Suspicious usernames in Current Use r • User accounts with a low number of application run s • Accounts that shouldn't normally access this syste m • Accounts with elevated privileges, such as domain administrators
  • 24. What to Look For • Executables that have been delete d • This is normal for installer s • Other executables are more suspicious
  • 25. Symantec's Altiris Client Management Suite • Optional component for application meterin g • Records execution history of applications run on a syste m • Link Ch 10p, 10q
  • 26. Altiris Application Metering Logs • Saved as a plain text fi le, including this information : • Manufacturer, version, use r • Discovered (date of fi rst execution ) • And date of last executio n • Run Count and Total Run Time
  • 27. What to Look For • Executables without version informatio n • Malware authors often strip this data to hide from signature-based antiviru s • Identify suspicious executables by fi le siz e • Malware is usually small; < 1 M B • Attacker may use the same backdoor on multiple systems, changing only the name, so the size is the same
  • 28. Antivirus Software: Symantec Endpoint Protection McAfee VirusScan Trend Micro Of fi ceScan
  • 29. General Features • Antivirus doesn't usually detect all program s • Only the ones recognized as maliciou s • Common administrative tools won't be detecte d • Also some malicious tools lack a signature, and won't be detecte d • Antivirus logs are useful, but give an incomplete picture of attacker activities
  • 30. Antivirus Quarantine • AV encodes malicious fi les & moves them to a Quarantine folde r • Files can no longer execut e • Preserves fi les for incident responder s • Make sure antivirus is set to quarantine fi les, not delete them
  • 31. About Archives • Attackers often use password-protected archive fi le s • Antivirus can't open them to scan the m • Often AV will log errors about the m • This is a clue about attacker activity
  • 32. Symantec Endpoint Protection • Stores extensive log fi les, in plaintex t • Also generates events in the Event Log
  • 33. Strange Timestamps • This is Nov. 19, 2002, 8:01:34 Am UTC
  • 34. Quarantine Files • File extension of .vb n • Two VBN fi les for each fi le quarantine d • First: metadata about quarantined fi l e • Second: Encoded copy of original fi le
  • 35. Symantec's Encoding • Older versions: XOR with 0x5 A • Newer versions: XOR with 0xA5 and insert additional 5-byte sequences throughout the encoded fi l e • Symantec's QExtract.exe can extract fi les from quarantin e • But only on the system that quarantined the fi le
  • 36. To Extract Quarantined Files • Obtain the correct version of QExtrac t • Boot up a forensic image of the affected syste m • OR use pyextract.py (link Ch 10r ) • But it sometimes fails to reconstruct the fi le correctly
  • 39. Most Useful • OnAccessScanLog.txt and OnDemandScanLog.tx t • Shows fi les that were quarantined or delete d • With name of the detected threa t • Also creates events in Event Log
  • 40. McAfee Quarantined Files • .bup extension, a fi le with two part s • "Details" contains metadat a • File-o: The actual quarantined fi l e • XORed with 0x6A and compressed into OLE forma t • To extract, use 7-Zip
  • 41. Example of metadata for PWDUMP hacking too l Shows detection time and original name of fi le
  • 42. Trend Micro Of fi ceScan • Stores logs locally on the hos t • Plaintext, with date, signature name, what action the AV took, and path to fi le
  • 43. Trend Quarantine Files • Can be decoded with VSEncode.ex e • Create a con fi guration_ fi le with the full path to the quarantined fi les
  • 46. Background • Browsers send HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) request s • GE T • To retrieve a page, image, etc . • POS T • To send data, like username and password
  • 47. Ports • HTTP uses TCP port 80 (by default ) • HTTPS uses TCP port 443 (by default)
  • 48. Virtual Hosts • Many websites running on the same serve r • If one is compromised, they may all be affected
  • 49. Log Files on Web Servers • Stored in plain tex t • Summary of each reques t • IP of clien t • URL requeste d • HTTP metho d • Result (status code)
  • 51. Load Balancing • Sends requests to a pool of server s • Web server logs will have the IP of the load balancer, not the clien t • You need to correlate load balancer logs with Web server logs • OR: con fi gure the load balancer to "pass through" some details about the clien t • X-Forwarder-For header fi el d • Con fi gure Web server to log that header
  • 52. Web Content • Attackers often alter fi les on a Web serve r • Or upload fi les, such as webshells and hacking tool s • They may be plaintext or obfuscated
  • 53. Example of Obfuscated PHP • Link Ch 10t
  • 54. Apache • Free, open-sourc e • Usually running on Linu x • Con fi guration fi le s • httpd.conf, apache.conf, apache2.con f • Some directives in .htaccess fi les
  • 55. Apache Log Files • access.log and error.log (plain text ) • In a subdirectory of /var/lo g • To log X-Forwarder-For headers, add this to con fi guration fi le : %{X-Forwarded-For}i
  • 56. Content Locations • /var/www or /var/www/html by defaul t • Often change d • Search for ServerRoot and DocumentRoot directives in con fi guration fi les
  • 57. Microsoft's IIS • Internet Information Service s • Included in Server versions of Window s • Con fi gured through Control Pane l • Most relevant settings are stored in an XML fi le named applicationHost.con fi g
  • 58. IIS Con fi g File • ID number appears at end of log directory nam e • %SystemDrive% inetpublogsLogFilesW3SVC1
  • 59. IIS Log Files • Filenames contain date in YYMMDD forma t • u_ex140220.log --logs from Feb. 20, 201 4 • Advanced Logging places logs in a different director y • Logs are plaintext but are encoded with UTF-8 and may include unicode characters
  • 60. Example Log File • Link Ch 10u #Software: Microsoft Internet Information Services 7. 5 #Version: 1. 0 #Date: 2011-04-13 19:02:3 4 #Fields: date time s-ip cs-method cs-uri-stem cs-uri- query s-port cs-username c-ip cs(User-Agent) sc-status sc-substatus sc-win32-status time-taken 2012-07-02 15:15:37 XXX.XX.XX.XXX POST / AjaxWebMethods.aspx/TestWebMethod - 443 - XXX.XX.XX.XX Mozilla/5.0+(Windows+NT+5.1;+rv:13.0)+Gecko/ 20100101+Firefox/13.0.1 405 0 0 218
  • 62. DB Evidence • Client connection log s • Attacker's IP addres s • Error log s • Malformed queries; brute force attack s • Query log s • Often not enabled, but would show what the attacker was trying to access
  • 63. DB Storage • Data stored in many fi le s • Sometimes "raw" storag e • Proprietary methods to manage one or more storage devices at the physical leve l • Work with database administrator to deal with customized database s • Don't work on a live D B • You might modify data or even cause a crash
  • 64. Microsoft SQL • Free version: SQL Server Expres s • Con fi gured with Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio (SSMS ) • MSSQL does not log client connections by defaul t • Only failed connections
  • 65. ERRORLOG • This example logs fi rst an unsuccessful, then a successful, connection attemp t • Both go into ERRORLOG
  • 66. Query Logging • MSSQL does not log queries by defaul t • You can turn on a "server-side-trace " • But it incurs large processing overhead
  • 67. Preserving DB Evidence • Forensic image of the drives containing the D B • Good, but requires taking down the DB serve r • Copying DB fi les: .mdf & .ld f • Locked; must take down DB to copy the m • Use SMSS to backup or export dat a • Alters some evidence, like other live images
  • 68. MySQL • Free, open-source, common on Linu x • After Oracle bought it, the open-source fork mariadb became popula r • Con fi guration fi le is my.cnf or my.conf
  • 69. MySQL Logs • Commonly in /var/log/mysq l • Only error log enabled by defaul t • General log is more useful for us, but causes high logging overhead
  • 70. Example • General lo g • User "root" connected from 192.168.200. 2 • Executed this quer y • select * from cc_data limit 1
  • 71. Acquiring MySQL Data • Can use a number of database fi le storage format s • Ideal way : • Shut down server gracefully, image hard dis k • On a running syste m • Stop the MySQL service and copy all the fi les in the datadir, o r • Backup with mysqldump command without stopping the service
  • 72. Oracle • Runs on Windows or Linu x • Expensiv e • listener.log • Logs details about each client connectio n • On by defaul t • log.xm l • Alerts -- records traces and dumps
  • 73. Example listener.log • Successful connection to an Oracle D B • "Bob" is username on remote syste m • Does not indicate success or failur e • Unless auditing is enabled (high performance impact)