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Kerberos Authentication
Kerberos (protocol) 
◦ Kerberos is a computer network authentication protocol 
◦ Works on the basis of 'tickets' to allow nodes communicating over a non-secure network 
◦ Prove their identity to one another in a secure manner 
◦ Aimed primarily at a client–server model and it provides mutual authentication 
◦ Protected against eavesdropping and replay attacks 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
Microsoft Windows, UNIX & Kerberos 
◦ Windows 2000 and later uses Kerberos as its default authentication method 
◦ Documentation: 
◦ RFC 3244 "Microsoft Windows 2000 Kerberos Change Password and Set Password Protocols" 
◦ RFC 4757 documents Microsoft's use of the RC4 cipher 
◦ Include software for Kerberos authentication of users or services 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
Components 
Principal Realm 
KDC 
AS TGS 
Client Server 
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Mechanism 
• Client authenticates itself to the Authentication 
Server (AS) which forwards the username to a Key 
distribution center (KDC) 
• KDC issues a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT), which is 
time stamped 
• Encrypts it using the user's password and returns the 
encrypted result to the user's workstation 
• TGT remains valid until it expires, though may be 
transparently renewed by the user's session manager 
while they are logged in 
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Mechanism 
When the client needs to communicate with 
another node 
• Client sends the TGT to the Ticket Granting 
Service (TGS) 
• After verifying the TGT is valid and the user is 
permitted to access the requested service 
• TGS issues a Ticket and session keys, which are 
returned to the client 
• Client then sends the Ticket to the service 
server (SS) along with its service request 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
User Client-based Logon 
◦ User enters a username and password on the client machines 
◦ Client transforms the password into the key of a symmetric cipher 
◦ Either uses the built in key scheduling or a one-way hash depending the cipher-suite used 
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Client Authentication 
◦ Client sends a clear text message of the user ID to the AS requesting services on behalf of the 
user 
◦ AS generates the secret key by hashing the password of the user found at the database 
◦ AS checks to see if the client is in its database 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
Client Authentication 
◦ If it is, the AS sends back the 
following two messages to the 
client: 
◦ Message A: Client/TGS Session Key 
encrypted using the secret key of the 
client/user. 
◦ Message B: Ticket-Granting-Ticket 
(which includes the client ID, client 
network address, ticket validity period, 
and the client/TGS session key) 
encrypted using the secret key of the 
TGS. 
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Client Service Authorization 
◦ Client attempts to decrypt message A with the secret key generated from the password 
entered by the user 
◦ If the password does not match the password in the AS database, the client's secret key will 
be different and thus unable to decrypt message A 
◦ With a valid password and secret key the client decrypts message A to obtain the Client/TGS 
Session Key 
◦ Session key is used for further communications with the TGS 
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Client Service Authorization 
When requesting services, the client sends 
the following two messages to the TGS 
◦ Message C: Composed of the TGT from 
message B and the ID of the requested 
service. 
◦ Message D: Authenticator (which is 
composed of the client ID and the 
timestamp), encrypted using the Client/TGS 
Session Key. 
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Client Service Authorization 
◦ Upon receiving messages C and D, the TGS retrieves message B out of message C 
◦ Decrypts message B using the TGS secret key 
◦ Gives it the "client/TGS session key“ 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
Client Service Authorization 
Using this "client/TGS session key“, the TGS 
decrypts message D 
Sends the following two messages to the 
client: 
◦ Message E: Client-to-server ticket (which 
includes the client ID, client network address, 
validity period and Client/Server Session Key) 
encrypted using the service's secret key. 
◦ Message F: Client/Server Session Key encrypted 
with the Client/TGS Session Key. 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
Client Service Request 
Upon receiving messages E and F from TGS 
◦ Client has enough information to authenticate 
itself to the SS 
◦ Client connects to the SS and sends the following 
two messages 
◦ Message E from the previous step (the client-to-server ticket, 
encrypted using service's secret key). 
◦ Message G: a new Authenticator, which includes the client 
ID, timestamp and is encrypted using Client/Server Session 
Key. 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
Client Service Request 
◦ SS decrypts the ticket using its own secret key to retrieve the Client/Server 
Session Key 
◦ SS decrypts the Authenticator and sends the following message to the client 
to confirm its true identity and willingness to serve the client 
◦ Message H: the timestamp found in client's Authenticator plus 1, encrypted using the Client/Server 
Session Key. 
◦ Client decrypts the confirmation using the Client/Server Session Key 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
Client Service Request 
◦ Checks whether the timestamp is correctly updated 
◦ Client can trust the server and can start issuing service requests to the server 
◦ Server provides the requested services to the client 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
Kerberos Authentication Process ( Cross 
Domain) 
◦ Client in Domain 1 wishes to access a network resource in remote Domain 2 
◦ The client has already been authenticated to KDC in Domain 1 and has received TGT 
◦ The client presents TGT to KDC in Domain 1 and request a TGS to access the remote resources 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
Kerberos Authentication Process ( Cross 
Domain) 
◦ The KDC in Domain 1 cannot provide TGS to network resource in Domain 2. Instead, KDC in 
Domain 1 respond to the client with TGT for Domain 2 
◦ The client presents the new TGT to KDC in domain 2 
◦ The KDC in Domain 2 responds with TGS fro the network resource 
◦ The client accesses the Network resource in Domain 2 using the new TGS 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
Drawbacks and Limitations 
Single point of failure 
Kerberos has strict time requirements 
Administration protocol is not standardized 
All authentications are controlled by a centralized KDC 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
Drawbacks and Limitations 
Each network service which requires a different host name 
Requires user accounts, user clients and the services on the 
server to all have a trusted relationship to the Kerberos token 
server 
Required client trust makes creating staged environments 
difficult 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
Weakness in Kerberos Protocol 
Susceptible to offline password cracks 
Password cracking tools : “l0phtcrack” able to demonstrate the vulnerability 
If TGT stolen, the attacker can access n/w until the session expires 
Severe effects if KDC is compromised 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
References 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_%28protocol%29 
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb742516.aspx 
http://www.kerberos.info 
Symbiosis students 
◦ Deepak Aggarwal 
◦ Rohit Khadke 
◦ Sonali Solanki 
◦ Vineela Kanapala 
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India

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Kerberos protocol

  • 2. Kerberos (protocol) ◦ Kerberos is a computer network authentication protocol ◦ Works on the basis of 'tickets' to allow nodes communicating over a non-secure network ◦ Prove their identity to one another in a secure manner ◦ Aimed primarily at a client–server model and it provides mutual authentication ◦ Protected against eavesdropping and replay attacks http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 3. Microsoft Windows, UNIX & Kerberos ◦ Windows 2000 and later uses Kerberos as its default authentication method ◦ Documentation: ◦ RFC 3244 "Microsoft Windows 2000 Kerberos Change Password and Set Password Protocols" ◦ RFC 4757 documents Microsoft's use of the RC4 cipher ◦ Include software for Kerberos authentication of users or services http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 4. Components Principal Realm KDC AS TGS Client Server http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 5. Mechanism • Client authenticates itself to the Authentication Server (AS) which forwards the username to a Key distribution center (KDC) • KDC issues a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT), which is time stamped • Encrypts it using the user's password and returns the encrypted result to the user's workstation • TGT remains valid until it expires, though may be transparently renewed by the user's session manager while they are logged in http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 6. Mechanism When the client needs to communicate with another node • Client sends the TGT to the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) • After verifying the TGT is valid and the user is permitted to access the requested service • TGS issues a Ticket and session keys, which are returned to the client • Client then sends the Ticket to the service server (SS) along with its service request http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 7. User Client-based Logon ◦ User enters a username and password on the client machines ◦ Client transforms the password into the key of a symmetric cipher ◦ Either uses the built in key scheduling or a one-way hash depending the cipher-suite used http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 8. Client Authentication ◦ Client sends a clear text message of the user ID to the AS requesting services on behalf of the user ◦ AS generates the secret key by hashing the password of the user found at the database ◦ AS checks to see if the client is in its database http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 9. Client Authentication ◦ If it is, the AS sends back the following two messages to the client: ◦ Message A: Client/TGS Session Key encrypted using the secret key of the client/user. ◦ Message B: Ticket-Granting-Ticket (which includes the client ID, client network address, ticket validity period, and the client/TGS session key) encrypted using the secret key of the TGS. http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 10. Client Service Authorization ◦ Client attempts to decrypt message A with the secret key generated from the password entered by the user ◦ If the password does not match the password in the AS database, the client's secret key will be different and thus unable to decrypt message A ◦ With a valid password and secret key the client decrypts message A to obtain the Client/TGS Session Key ◦ Session key is used for further communications with the TGS http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 11. Client Service Authorization When requesting services, the client sends the following two messages to the TGS ◦ Message C: Composed of the TGT from message B and the ID of the requested service. ◦ Message D: Authenticator (which is composed of the client ID and the timestamp), encrypted using the Client/TGS Session Key. http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 12. Client Service Authorization ◦ Upon receiving messages C and D, the TGS retrieves message B out of message C ◦ Decrypts message B using the TGS secret key ◦ Gives it the "client/TGS session key“ http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 13. Client Service Authorization Using this "client/TGS session key“, the TGS decrypts message D Sends the following two messages to the client: ◦ Message E: Client-to-server ticket (which includes the client ID, client network address, validity period and Client/Server Session Key) encrypted using the service's secret key. ◦ Message F: Client/Server Session Key encrypted with the Client/TGS Session Key. http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 14. Client Service Request Upon receiving messages E and F from TGS ◦ Client has enough information to authenticate itself to the SS ◦ Client connects to the SS and sends the following two messages ◦ Message E from the previous step (the client-to-server ticket, encrypted using service's secret key). ◦ Message G: a new Authenticator, which includes the client ID, timestamp and is encrypted using Client/Server Session Key. http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 15. Client Service Request ◦ SS decrypts the ticket using its own secret key to retrieve the Client/Server Session Key ◦ SS decrypts the Authenticator and sends the following message to the client to confirm its true identity and willingness to serve the client ◦ Message H: the timestamp found in client's Authenticator plus 1, encrypted using the Client/Server Session Key. ◦ Client decrypts the confirmation using the Client/Server Session Key http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 16. Client Service Request ◦ Checks whether the timestamp is correctly updated ◦ Client can trust the server and can start issuing service requests to the server ◦ Server provides the requested services to the client http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 17. Kerberos Authentication Process ( Cross Domain) ◦ Client in Domain 1 wishes to access a network resource in remote Domain 2 ◦ The client has already been authenticated to KDC in Domain 1 and has received TGT ◦ The client presents TGT to KDC in Domain 1 and request a TGS to access the remote resources http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 18. Kerberos Authentication Process ( Cross Domain) ◦ The KDC in Domain 1 cannot provide TGS to network resource in Domain 2. Instead, KDC in Domain 1 respond to the client with TGT for Domain 2 ◦ The client presents the new TGT to KDC in domain 2 ◦ The KDC in Domain 2 responds with TGS fro the network resource ◦ The client accesses the Network resource in Domain 2 using the new TGS http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 19. Drawbacks and Limitations Single point of failure Kerberos has strict time requirements Administration protocol is not standardized All authentications are controlled by a centralized KDC http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 20. Drawbacks and Limitations Each network service which requires a different host name Requires user accounts, user clients and the services on the server to all have a trusted relationship to the Kerberos token server Required client trust makes creating staged environments difficult http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 21. Weakness in Kerberos Protocol Susceptible to offline password cracks Password cracking tools : “l0phtcrack” able to demonstrate the vulnerability If TGT stolen, the attacker can access n/w until the session expires Severe effects if KDC is compromised http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India
  • 22. References http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_%28protocol%29 http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb742516.aspx http://www.kerberos.info Symbiosis students ◦ Deepak Aggarwal ◦ Rohit Khadke ◦ Sonali Solanki ◦ Vineela Kanapala http://www.ifour-consultancy.com Offshore software development company India

Editor's Notes

  1. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  2. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  3. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  4. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  5. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  6. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  7. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  8. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  9. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  10. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  11. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  12. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  13. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  14. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  15. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  16. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  17. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  18. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  19. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  20. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  21. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  22. Offshore software development company India – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com
  23. Offshore software development company india – http://www.ifour-consultancy.com