The document discusses the relationship between democracy and economic development, emphasizing the complexities and variances in their interactions. Key points include debates on whether democracies consistently outperform non-democracies in economic growth, the impact of elections on the stability of democracies, and the challenges in measuring democracy's effects on development. Ultimately, the findings suggest that while democracies may not always grow faster, they tend to survive longer in financially stable environments.

1. Democracy and Economic Development
ERF 21st Annual Conference
Gammarth, Tunisia
March 20-22, 2015

2. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Democracy, Elections, and Development
Adam Przeworski
New York University
March 20, 2015

3. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Plan
Democracy and Development

4. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Plan
Democracy and Development
Development and Democracy

5. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Plan
Democracy and Development
Development and Democracy
elections and democracy

6. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Plan
Democracy and Development
Development and Democracy
elections and democracy
Back to democracy and development

7. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Democracy and Development:
Introduction
What to believe, with what certainty?

8. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Democracy and Development:
Introduction
What to believe, with what certainty?
Many brilliant ideas, few rejected by data

9. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Democracy and Development:
Introduction
What to believe, with what certainty?
Many brilliant ideas, few rejected by data
What do I believe?

10. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Democracy and Development:
Introduction
What to believe, with what certainty?
Many brilliant ideas, few rejected by data
What do I believe?
On average, non-democracies certainly do not grow faster
than democracies

11. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Democracy and Development:
Introduction
What to believe, with what certainty?
Many brilliant ideas, few rejected by data
What do I believe?
On average, non-democracies certainly do not grow faster
than democracies
Possibly democracies grow faster, but hard to tell

12. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Sources of di¤erent results
Measures of democracy

13. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Sources of di¤erent results
Measures of democracy
Dependent variable: levels or growth rates, total GDP or
per capita

14. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Sources of di¤erent results
Measures of democracy
Dependent variable: levels or growth rates, total GDP or
per capita
Channels: speci…cations

15. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Sources of di¤erent results
Measures of democracy
Dependent variable: levels or growth rates, total GDP or
per capita
Channels: speci…cations
Treatment of endogeneity

16. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Sources of di¤erent results
Measures of democracy
Dependent variable: levels or growth rates, total GDP or
per capita
Channels: speci…cations
Treatment of endogeneity
Organization of data: annual, 5-year average, accumulated
experience, focus on transitions

17. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Sources of di¤erent results
Measures of democracy
Dependent variable: levels or growth rates, total GDP or
per capita
Channels: speci…cations
Treatment of endogeneity
Organization of data: annual, 5-year average, accumulated
experience, focus on transitions
Estimators: …xed e¤ects?

18. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Sources of di¤erent results
Measures of democracy
Dependent variable: levels or growth rates, total GDP or
per capita
Channels: speci…cations
Treatment of endogeneity
Organization of data: annual, 5-year average, accumulated
experience, focus on transitions
Estimators: …xed e¤ects?
Data sources: di¤erent versions of PWT, Maddison (levels
correlate highly, growth rates less so)

19. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Sources of di¤erent results
Measures of democracy
Dependent variable: levels or growth rates, total GDP or
per capita
Channels: speci…cations
Treatment of endogeneity
Organization of data: annual, 5-year average, accumulated
experience, focus on transitions
Estimators: …xed e¤ects?
Data sources: di¤erent versions of PWT, Maddison (levels
correlate highly, growth rates less so)
Samples: periods and coverage (inclusion of communist
countries)

20. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Measures of democracy
Conceptual di¤erences: competitive elections (ACLP, Boix
et al) versus constraints on chief executive (Polity) versus
"freedom" (Freedom House)

21. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Measures of democracy
Conceptual di¤erences: competitive elections (ACLP, Boix
et al) versus constraints on chief executive (Polity) versus
"freedom" (Freedom House)
Dichotomous versus multinomial versus continuous (but
always limited, calling for non-linear models)

22. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Measures of democracy
Conceptual di¤erences: competitive elections (ACLP, Boix
et al) versus constraints on chief executive (Polity) versus
"freedom" (Freedom House)
Dichotomous versus multinomial versus continuous (but
always limited, calling for non-linear models)
Reproducible versus subjective

23. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Measures of democracy
Conceptual di¤erences: competitive elections (ACLP, Boix
et al) versus constraints on chief executive (Polity) versus
"freedom" (Freedom House)
Dichotomous versus multinomial versus continuous (but
always limited, calling for non-linear models)
Reproducible versus subjective
Some di¤erences subtle: my own 2000 results biased
against young democracies by requiring alternation to have
actually occurred (Knutsen and Wig 2015)

24. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Per capita income
Normatively relevant but

25. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Per capita income
Normatively relevant but
Growth of per capita income = Growth of total income -
growth of population

26. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Per capita income
Normatively relevant but
Growth of per capita income = Growth of total income -
growth of population
Di¤erent processes, to some extent independent

27. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Per capita income
Normatively relevant but
Growth of per capita income = Growth of total income -
growth of population
Di¤erent processes, to some extent independent
Population growth slower under democracy

28. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Per capita income
Normatively relevant but
Growth of per capita income = Growth of total income -
growth of population
Di¤erent processes, to some extent independent
Population growth slower under democracy
Replicating positive results shows all the action is in
population growth

29. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Endogeneity
90% of 483 estimates summarized by D&U take
democracy as exogenous

30. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Endogeneity
90% of 483 estimates summarized by D&U take
democracy as exogenous
Democracy grows faster because it is a democracy or
because of conditions that generate democracy?

31. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Endogeneity
90% of 483 estimates summarized by D&U take
democracy as exogenous
Democracy grows faster because it is a democracy or
because of conditions that generate democracy?
Democracies survive in developed countries and no income
matches for developed democracies

32. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Endogeneity
90% of 483 estimates summarized by D&U take
democracy as exogenous
Democracy grows faster because it is a democracy or
because of conditions that generate democracy?
Democracies survive in developed countries and no income
matches for developed democracies
Selection bias

33. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Endogeneity
90% of 483 estimates summarized by D&U take
democracy as exogenous
Democracy grows faster because it is a democracy or
because of conditions that generate democracy?
Democracies survive in developed countries and no income
matches for developed democracies
Selection bias
In my experience Heckman and matching generate similar
results but di¤ering from IV

34. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Channels
Democracy -> X (investment, education, ...) -> growth,
or

35. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Channels
Democracy -> X (investment, education, ...) -> growth,
or
Democracy -> growth, given X?

36. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Channels
Democracy -> X (investment, education, ...) -> growth,
or
Democracy -> growth, given X?
Post-treatment bias (King and Zeng): possible to change
one without another?

37. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Conclusions
The rest is too detailed to be summarized, but matters

38. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Conclusions
The rest is too detailed to be summarized, but matters
To my best knowledge:

39. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Conclusions
The rest is too detailed to be summarized, but matters
To my best knowledge:
No post-1980 study shows that non-democracies grow
faster (by per capita income)

40. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Conclusions
The rest is too detailed to be summarized, but matters
To my best knowledge:
No post-1980 study shows that non-democracies grow
faster (by per capita income)
Results are all over the place whether democracies grow
faster

41. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Conclusions
The rest is too detailed to be summarized, but matters
To my best knowledge:
No post-1980 study shows that non-democracies grow
faster (by per capita income)
Results are all over the place whether democracies grow
faster
Final word? I no longer believe it is possible.

42. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Conclusions
The rest is too detailed to be summarized, but matters
To my best knowledge:
No post-1980 study shows that non-democracies grow
faster (by per capita income)
Results are all over the place whether democracies grow
faster
Final word? I no longer believe it is possible.
E¤ect of transitions: may depend on when

43. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Development and Democracy:
Introduction
No doubt that once established, democracies survive in
higher income countries

44. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Development and Democracy:
Introduction
No doubt that once established, democracies survive in
higher income countries
Argentina 1976

45. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Development and Democracy:
Introduction
No doubt that once established, democracies survive in
higher income countries
Argentina 1976
Again, endless controversies about the impact of
development on establishing democracy

46. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Development and Democracy:
Introduction
No doubt that once established, democracies survive in
higher income countries
Argentina 1976
Again, endless controversies about the impact of
development on establishing democracy
Will not summarize, instead focus on elections

47. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
How do democracies stabilize?
Suppose a regime breaks down: coup, civil war, mass
events, other major irregularities resulted in change of
government

48. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
How do democracies stabilize?
Suppose a regime breaks down: coup, civil war, mass
events, other major irregularities resulted in change of
government
Typically rush to hold an election: 58 percent within 30
months

49. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
How do democracies stabilize?
Suppose a regime breaks down: coup, civil war, mass
events, other major irregularities resulted in change of
government
Typically rush to hold an election: 58 percent within 30
months
Elections make the new regime last longer:

50. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
How do democracies stabilize?
Suppose a regime breaks down: coup, civil war, mass
events, other major irregularities resulted in change of
government
Typically rush to hold an election: 58 percent within 30
months
Elections make the new regime last longer:
without an election expected life is 20 years

51. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
How do democracies stabilize?
Suppose a regime breaks down: coup, civil war, mass
events, other major irregularities resulted in change of
government
Typically rush to hold an election: 58 percent within 30
months
Elections make the new regime last longer:
without an election expected life is 20 years
with election without opposition 25 years

52. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
How do democracies stabilize?
Suppose a regime breaks down: coup, civil war, mass
events, other major irregularities resulted in change of
government
Typically rush to hold an election: 58 percent within 30
months
Elections make the new regime last longer:
without an election expected life is 20 years
with election without opposition 25 years
with contested election 46 years

53. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
How do democracies stabilize?
Suppose a regime breaks down: coup, civil war, mass
events, other major irregularities resulted in change of
government
Typically rush to hold an election: 58 percent within 30
months
Elections make the new regime last longer:
without an election expected life is 20 years
with election without opposition 25 years
with contested election 46 years
and following an alternation 87 years

54. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Alternations
Partisan alternations in o¢ ce resulting from elections

55. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Alternations
Partisan alternations in o¢ ce resulting from elections
First di¢ cult: as of 2009, 68 countries, including China
and Russia never experienced one

56. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Alternations
Partisan alternations in o¢ ce resulting from elections
First di¢ cult: as of 2009, 68 countries, including China
and Russia never experienced one
Di¢ cult because the stakes are unknown and may be high:

57. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Alternations
Partisan alternations in o¢ ce resulting from elections
First di¢ cult: as of 2009, 68 countries, including China
and Russia never experienced one
Di¢ cult because the stakes are unknown and may be high:
What will the winners do to the losers? Just send them to
legal opposition or freedom, exile, fortune, life?

58. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Alternations
Partisan alternations in o¢ ce resulting from elections
First di¢ cult: as of 2009, 68 countries, including China
and Russia never experienced one
Di¢ cult because the stakes are unknown and may be high:
What will the winners do to the losers? Just send them to
legal opposition or freedom, exile, fortune, life?
Defeat or destroy? (US in 1800, Putin today)

59. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Alternations
Partisan alternations in o¢ ce resulting from elections
First di¢ cult: as of 2009, 68 countries, including China
and Russia never experienced one
Di¢ cult because the stakes are unknown and may be high:
What will the winners do to the losers? Just send them to
legal opposition or freedom, exile, fortune, life?
Defeat or destroy? (US in 1800, Putin today)
Once one occurs,

60. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Alternations
Partisan alternations in o¢ ce resulting from elections
First di¢ cult: as of 2009, 68 countries, including China
and Russia never experienced one
Di¢ cult because the stakes are unknown and may be high:
What will the winners do to the losers? Just send them to
legal opposition or freedom, exile, fortune, life?
Defeat or destroy? (US in 1800, Putin today)
Once one occurs,
subsequent alternations likely

61. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Alternations
Partisan alternations in o¢ ce resulting from elections
First di¢ cult: as of 2009, 68 countries, including China
and Russia never experienced one
Di¢ cult because the stakes are unknown and may be high:
What will the winners do to the losers? Just send them to
legal opposition or freedom, exile, fortune, life?
Defeat or destroy? (US in 1800, Putin today)
Once one occurs,
subsequent alternations likely
moreover, regime breakdown unlikely

62. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Outcomes of subsequent elections given the number of past
alternations within an electoral spell
Past Number of Pr(lost) Pr(obeyjlost) Pr(alternation)
alt elections
0 1221 0.14 0.83 0.12
1 353 0.33 0.88 0.30
2 162 0.47 0.95 0.45
3 102 0.44 0.93 0.42
>3 413 0.41 1.00 0.41
Total 2251 0.24 0.91 0.22

63. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
The probability of regime breakdown given the number of past
alternations within a spell
Past Alt Spells Censored Broke Pr(broke) Pr(morejunc)
0 423 53 214 0.51 0.42
1 156 27 26 0.18 0.79
2 102 17 13 0.13 0.85
3 72 25 5 0.07 0.89
4 42 10 4 0.09 0.88
5 28 4 1 0.04 0.96
6 23 4 1 0.04 0.95
>6 18 18 0 0.00 1.00

64. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Competitive elections are
self-institutionalizing
Breakdowns less likely at higher incomes

65. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Competitive elections are
self-institutionalizing
Breakdowns less likely at higher incomes
but income growth seems not to matter (endogeneity
problems perhaps irresolvable)

66. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Competitive elections are
self-institutionalizing
Breakdowns less likely at higher incomes
but income growth seems not to matter (endogeneity
problems perhaps irresolvable)
Yet, careful, unemployment may matter

67. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Competitive elections are
self-institutionalizing
Breakdowns less likely at higher incomes
but income growth seems not to matter (endogeneity
problems perhaps irresolvable)
Yet, careful, unemployment may matter
Poland 1989-1993.

68. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Variance of growth rates
On any list, almost all tigers are autocracies and all
disasters are autocracies

69. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Variance of growth rates
On any list, almost all tigers are autocracies and all
disasters are autocracies
Variance of growth rates 3 times higher under
non-democracies

70. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Variance of growth rates
On any list, almost all tigers are autocracies and all
disasters are autocracies
Variance of growth rates 3 times higher under
non-democracies
Not because of classi…cation:

71. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Variance of growth rates
On any list, almost all tigers are autocracies and all
disasters are autocracies
Variance of growth rates 3 times higher under
non-democracies
Not because of classi…cation:
Still twice as large when distinguishing democratic and
non-democratic spells

72. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Variance of growth rates
On any list, almost all tigers are autocracies and all
disasters are autocracies
Variance of growth rates 3 times higher under
non-democracies
Not because of classi…cation:
Still twice as large when distinguishing democratic and
non-democratic spells
Still 1.6 larger when distinguishing spells under the same
leader

73. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Variance of growth rates
On any list, almost all tigers are autocracies and all
disasters are autocracies
Variance of growth rates 3 times higher under
non-democracies
Not because of classi…cation:
Still twice as large when distinguishing democratic and
non-democratic spells
Still 1.6 larger when distinguishing spells under the same
leader
Explanations:

74. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Variance of growth rates
On any list, almost all tigers are autocracies and all
disasters are autocracies
Variance of growth rates 3 times higher under
non-democracies
Not because of classi…cation:
Still twice as large when distinguishing democratic and
non-democratic spells
Still 1.6 larger when distinguishing spells under the same
leader
Explanations:
Fire alarm (Sen)

75. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Variance of growth rates
On any list, almost all tigers are autocracies and all
disasters are autocracies
Variance of growth rates 3 times higher under
non-democracies
Not because of classi…cation:
Still twice as large when distinguishing democratic and
non-democratic spells
Still 1.6 larger when distinguishing spells under the same
leader
Explanations:
Fire alarm (Sen)
Diversi…cation of projects to build coalitions

76. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Variance of growth rates
On any list, almost all tigers are autocracies and all
disasters are autocracies
Variance of growth rates 3 times higher under
non-democracies
Not because of classi…cation:
Still twice as large when distinguishing democratic and
non-democratic spells
Still 1.6 larger when distinguishing spells under the same
leader
Explanations:
Fire alarm (Sen)
Diversi…cation of projects to build coalitions
Shadow of force

77. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Variance of growth rates
On any list, almost all tigers are autocracies and all
disasters are autocracies
Variance of growth rates 3 times higher under
non-democracies
Not because of classi…cation:
Still twice as large when distinguishing democratic and
non-democratic spells
Still 1.6 larger when distinguishing spells under the same
leader
Explanations:
Fire alarm (Sen)
Diversi…cation of projects to build coalitions
Shadow of force
Elections are competitive and peaceful if their outcomes
may some di¤erence but not too much di¤erence

78. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Variance of growth rates
On any list, almost all tigers are autocracies and all
disasters are autocracies
Variance of growth rates 3 times higher under
non-democracies
Not because of classi…cation:
Still twice as large when distinguishing democratic and
non-democratic spells
Still 1.6 larger when distinguishing spells under the same
leader
Explanations:
Fire alarm (Sen)
Diversi…cation of projects to build coalitions
Shadow of force
Elections are competitive and peaceful if their outcomes
may some di¤erence but not too much di¤erence
Whatever, democracies pucker along at a steady rate
(even if sometimes punctuated by crises) while
non-democracies are volatile

79. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Political "instability" and growth
Lots of literature but startling that

80. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Political "instability" and growth
Lots of literature but startling that
many events –changes of chief executives, mass
demonstrations, general strikes –that cause economic
crises under autocracies do not a¤ect growth under
democracies

81. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Political "instability" and growth
Lots of literature but startling that
many events –changes of chief executives, mass
demonstrations, general strikes –that cause economic
crises under autocracies do not a¤ect growth under
democracies
Regular and expected under democracy, a sign of regime
weakness under autocracy

82. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Conclusion: upbeat
Even if average rates are the same,

83. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Conclusion: upbeat
Even if average rates are the same,
democracies enable people to plan their lives (with all
kinds of consequences, including fertility)

84. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Conclusion: upbeat
Even if average rates are the same,
democracies enable people to plan their lives (with all
kinds of consequences, including fertility)
democracies enable people to express their political views
without a threat to the regime and to growth

85. Democracy,
Elections, and
Development
Adam
Przeworski
Introduction
Democracy
and
Development
Development
and
Democracy
Democracy
and
Development:
Variance
Conclusion
Conclusion: upbeat
Even if average rates are the same,
democracies enable people to plan their lives (with all
kinds of consequences, including fertility)
democracies enable people to express their political views
without a threat to the regime and to growth
The only mechanism we know that processes con‡icts in
peace and (some) freedom

86. Democracy and Economic Development
ERF 21st Annual Conference
Gammarth, Tunisia
March 20-22, 2015