Since August 2014, the US-led air campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has successfully inflicted casualties on ISIS and weakened its oil revenues. However, the same efforts have also accelerated the rise of the Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate, and the near-collapse of nationalist rebel forces.
In "Defeating the Jihadists in Syria: Competition before Confrontation," Faysal Itani of the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East details the unintended consequences of the coalition air campaign and proposes a revised US strategy. He argues that the United States can effectively assist nationalist insurgents to defeat ISIS and the Nusra Front by enabling them to compete with and contain these groups before ultimately confronting them.
Itani writes that the US-led campaign thus far and the train-and-equip initiative set to begin next month undermine and weaken nationalist rebel forces. He criticizes these efforts for failing to provide sufficient support to the rebel forces, while directing them to target ISIS instead of the regime. Meanwhile, the Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations have greater resources and have been effective in targeting the Assad regime. As such, nationalist rebel forces and local populations have increasingly aligned with the Nusra Front and even tolerate ISIS in order to protect themselves against regime violence, criminality, and chaos.
Itani's proposed US strategy offers a practical and workable response to the rise of jihadists groups in Syria; this revised strategy seeks to support rebel forces to compete with the Nusra Front for popular support and to take control of the insurgency, contain ISIS, and build capacity for an eventual offensive against the jihadists. This approach will build on positive results in southern Syria by significantly increasing direct financial and material support and training for vetted nationalist groups that have already shown significant success. Simultaneously, in the north the campaign can provide sufficient material support to nationalist forces while expanding coalition air strikes to target ISIS's frontlines, allowing the nationalist insurgency to defend and govern territory. Only once nationalist insurgent forces have successfully competed with the Nusra Front and contained ISIS can they confront and ultimately defeat the jihadist groups in Syria.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati indicated that an upcoming trilateral meeting between Iran, Iraq, and Syria will strengthen the "resistance front" against the U.S. and its regional allies.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may have growing influence and strength in North Africa, despite recent setbacks in Derna, Libya. ISIS claimed the terrorist attack on a tourist beach resort in Sousse, Tunisia, that killed 38 people. The attack was the deadliest in Tunisia’s history.
3. ISIS is conducting a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign against the al Houthis in Sana’a, Yemen’s capital. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a has claimed credit for three separate VBIED attacks, including four bombings on the first day of Ramadan, June 17, another on June 20, and the third on June 29. The press releases frame these attacks specifically as targeting the “dens” of the al Houthis, which is distinct from how Wilayat Sana’a has laid claim to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
Post assad Geo-strategic Possibilities.Zakir Hussain
The paper deals with the post-Assad geo-strategic possibilities in the the region and the countries supporting or opposing the Assad regime.
The article has been published first at Indian Council of World Affairs.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati indicated that an upcoming trilateral meeting between Iran, Iraq, and Syria will strengthen the "resistance front" against the U.S. and its regional allies.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may have growing influence and strength in North Africa, despite recent setbacks in Derna, Libya. ISIS claimed the terrorist attack on a tourist beach resort in Sousse, Tunisia, that killed 38 people. The attack was the deadliest in Tunisia’s history.
3. ISIS is conducting a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign against the al Houthis in Sana’a, Yemen’s capital. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a has claimed credit for three separate VBIED attacks, including four bombings on the first day of Ramadan, June 17, another on June 20, and the third on June 29. The press releases frame these attacks specifically as targeting the “dens” of the al Houthis, which is distinct from how Wilayat Sana’a has laid claim to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
Post assad Geo-strategic Possibilities.Zakir Hussain
The paper deals with the post-Assad geo-strategic possibilities in the the region and the countries supporting or opposing the Assad regime.
The article has been published first at Indian Council of World Affairs.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is conducting a campaign to seize strategic positions vacated by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in central and southern Somalia. Ethiopian AMISOM forces are withdrawing from Somalia. The forces are probably re-deploying inside Ethiopia to quell spreading anti-government protests by the Oromo and Amhara people. The Tigray minority dominates the Ethiopian government. Al Shabaab’s recapture of key towns is a setback for AMISOM and Somali forces allied against the group and sets conditions for al Shabaab to resurge in central Somalia.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be developing a relationship with a militant group in the Sahel, signaling ISIS’s intent to continue expanding in Africa. A pro-ISIS media outlet disseminated a pledge of bayat (allegiance) from a former al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militant leader, Abu Walid al Sahrawi, to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi on October 30. Al Sahrawi had first pledged bayat to al Baghdadi in 2015 but recently claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in Niger and Burkina Faso that may have earned recognition from the ISIS network. ISIS will continue to expand in Africa despite the loss of its regional hub in Sirte, Libya.
3. The combatants in Yemen’s civil war remain focused on military objectives in order to improve their negotiating positions for a political resolution to the conflict. Both President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance rejected a UN-proposed peace plan after alleging that it favored their rivals. The Hadi government and its backer, the Saudi-led coalition, continued efforts to advance on key frontlines and degrade al Houthi-Saleh leadership and military capabilities. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile toward Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on October 28.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Jamatul Ahrar, a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, conducted a suicide bombing targeting Pakistani Christians at a park in Lahore, Pakistan, on Easter Sunday. The attack killed at least 72 people and wounded more than 300 others. Jamatul Ahrar has expressed leanings in support of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), but has not formally affiliated with the group. It has targeted Christians before and will likely continue to attack non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan.
2. The imposition of the UN-backed Libyan unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA) is widening the divisions between Libya’s factions and hindering both local and international counter-ISIS efforts. Militias aligned with Libya’s self-declared Islamist government in Tripoli prevented the GNA from moving to the capital from its exile in Tunis. Anti-GNA militias suspended flights at Tripoli’s Mitiga airport and fired anti-aircraft munitions in the area as clashes between anti- and pro-GNA groups raged in the city. Armed groups from nearby Misrata pledged support to the GNA, further fracturing the tenuous Tripolitan-Misratan alliance that is instrumental for blocking ISIS’s westward expansion from Sirte. The unity government still lacks support from the internationally recognized parliament and powerful military factions in eastern Libya.
3. The U.S. and the Saudi-led coalition intensified their air campaigns against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Hadramawt, Lahij, and Abyan in Yemen. U.S. airstrikes on March 22 targeted a training camp. Breaking reports indicate AQAP leader Qasim al Raymi, previously the group’s military commander, may have been killed in the airstrike. The air campaigns may limit AQAP’s ability to consolidate new gains, but they are unlikely to expel AQAP from its strongholds. AQAP is exploiting the civil war in Yemen to expand. Planned UN-sponsored talks between the al Houthi-Saleh government and Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government may be more productive than a previous round of talks based on recent direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials. These national-level talks are unlikely to stabilize Yemen, however.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran continues to provide sanctuary to senior al Qaeda operatives. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on three senior al Qaeda members operating from Iran, describing one of the operatives, al Qaeda military committee chief Faisal Jassim Mohammed al Amri al Khalidi, as “part of a new generation of al Qaeda operatives,” in the press release. Yisra Muhammad Ibrahim Bayumi served as a mediator between al Qaeda and Iranian authorities, and Abu Bakr Muhammad Muhammad Ghumayn held financial, communications, and logistical roles in the group. Iran has facilitated al Qaeda activities in the Middle East since 2005 and al Qaeda is able to move money, facilitators, and operatives through Iran.
2. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the emir of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate al Murabitoun, denounced French intervention in Libya and called for Libyan Muslims to fight against the West. The release of the written statement by al Murabitoun’s media arm strengthens CTP’s assessment that Belmokhtar survived the June 2015 U.S. airstrike targeting a meeting of Islamist leaders in Ajdabiya, Libya. France confirmed its military presence in Libya on July 20 after three French soldiers died during a counterterrorism operation in Benghazi. [See CTP’s “Backgrounder: Fighting Forces in Libya” and “GNA-Allied Forces Seize Momentum against ISIS in Sirte” for more.]
3. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted the primary African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping base in Mogadishu on July 26. A militant detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) near the entrance of Halane Base Camp, killing at least 13 security contractors and civilians, before a second suicide bomber attempted to storm the compound. The assessed target was UN and African Union personnel. Al Shabaab attempted an SVBIED attack targeting a gathering of Somali politicians at a Mogadishu hotel on July 14, and Somali security forces disrupted an SVBIED attack on July 24.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing upwards of 22 people. The TTP's spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, refuted the claims that this was a TTP attack, indicating it was probably not directed by TTP leader Fazlullah's faction. The head of the TTP Tariq Geedar faction, Umar Mansoor, claimed this attack. Mansoor also claimed the 2014 Peshawar school attack. The TTP supported the 2014 attack, but was heavily criticized by al Qaeda for killing "non-combatants."
2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread unemployment protests broke out in Tunisia, mirroring the inciting events of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The suicide of a young protester ignited a week of violent clashes between police and demonstrators, accompanied by rioting, looting, and a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest threatens the weak Tunisian state.
3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections in February. While Rouhani strongly criticized the disqualifications in a televised speech, the secretary of the political body responsible for disqualifying candidates asserted that it “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also defended the disqualifications, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) operates cells in Libya that may support external attack networks in Europe. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte city on January 19 that targeted operatives planning attacks in Europe. These operatives may be connected to the ISIS-linked militant who attacked a Christmas market in Berlin on December 19, 2016. The U.S. strikes disrupted ISIS’s efforts to re-establish combat capabilities after the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte in late 2016. Airstrikes alone cannot defeat ISIS in Libya, however. Libyan factions are focused on protecting their interests in the country’s civil war. The resulting security vacuum allows Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to operate throughout the country. ISIS will continue to use Libya as a support zone for external operations as long as the civil war continues.
2. Al Qaeda affiliates are developing more lethal explosive attack capabilities in Mali. Al Murabitoun, an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a military base in Gao city, central Mali, on January 18. The attack, which killed more than 70 people, signals a step-change in al Murabitoun’s bomb-making capabilities. AQIM is attempting to undermine UN-backed peace accords in northern Mali. The January 18 attack targeted a joint base established under the peace accords in an effort to spark conflict between rival factions. AQIM seeks to co-opt local movements that share its short-term goals, including the desire to expel Western influence from the region.
3. The Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to seize territory from the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an effort to reset political negotiations. Hadi government forces, backed by coalition air support, seized Mokha port and attacked two al Houthi-Saleh bases in Taiz governorate on January 23 and 24. These operations aim to disrupt al Houthi-Saleh supply lines into Taiz city and pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction to accept terms that favor the Hadi government and its supporters. The coalition is prioritizing the fight against the al Houthi-Saleh faction in Taiz over operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. AQAP is seizing the opportunity to resurge in its historic safe havens.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. U.S. administration officials have signaled that the U.S. may take a more aggressive stance against the al Houthis in Yemen to counter Iranian influence. An aggressive position against the al Houthi movement, which is not an Iranian proxy, would further isolate the al Houthis and drive them further into Iran’s orbit. U.S. intervention against the al Houthis would strengthen the Saudi-led coalition and its preferred government in Yemen, led by internationally recognized President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The Hadi government has struggled to gain legitimacy even in territory in southern Yemen under its control. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the al Houthis’ current partner, possesses significant political capital, military capabilities, and public support.
2. Al Shabaab may be expanding terrain under its control, using the sanctuary that it retained in south-central Somalia to support operations. Predicted food shortages may make conditions more permissive for al Shabaab. Somalia is suffering from a severe drought that may cause widespread hunger on par with the 2010-2011 famine, which killed more than 250,000 people. The Somali government is ill-prepared to address a crisis of this magnitude. An insufficient aid response from the government would allow al Shabaab to position itself as a legitimate source of relief and governance. External factors, including the likely expulsion of Somali refugees from Kenya before Kenyan general elections, may exacerbate the crisis in Somalia.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may be facilitating the growth of a Salafi-jihadi insurgency within the Fulani ethnic group across borders in the Sahel region. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an ethnically Fulani AQIM-associated group, is challenging the state in central Mali by forcing secular schools to remain closed in Mopti region. Ansar al Islam, a related Salafi-jihadi Fulani group, is pursuing a similar campaign in Burkina Faso. A Fulani insurgency is also challenging the Nigerian state, though Salafi-jihadi organizations have not yet infiltrated this movement. AQIM and other Salafi-jihadi groups may use ties into the Fulani community to expand their area of operations in the Sahel. AQIM has tapped into Tuareg networks to advance its objectives in West Africa in the past.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The death of the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdul Rahman, may inspire retaliatory attacks against U.S. targets. Abdul Rahman, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, died of natural causes in prison in North Carolina on February 18. Al Qaeda’s General Command called for revenge attacks on Americans and U.S. interests and accused the U.S. of killing Abdul Rahman by withholding his medication in prison. The joint statement from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) eulogizing Abdul Rahman and calling for revenge attacks indicates the continued close coordination between the two affiliates. Al Shabaab released a separate statement. Al Qaeda’s al Nafeer bulletin released Abdul Rahman’s will, in which he accused the U.S. of poisoning and abusing him.
2. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu in an effort to disrupt Somalia’s new administration. Al Shabaab militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) in a crowded market in Mogadishu on February 19, killing dozens of people. A senior al Shabaab official threatened a “vicious war” against the new government on February 19. Al Shabaab is also conducting an assassination campaign targeting government officials and elders who supported the electoral process. Former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud ceremonially transferred power to new President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo on February 16 in a ceremony that al Shabaab attempted to disrupt with mortar fire.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit famine conditions in the Lake Chad Basin to increase recruitment and build a local support base. This faction, also known as ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya (West Africa Province), seeks to attack Western targets throughout West Africa. It has built ties to local populations that allow it to access supplies and deliver aid in the midst of widespread food insecurity. A rival Boko Haram faction led by Abubakr Shekau has alienated the local population may lose militants to the better-resourced ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya, which will in turn expand the scope and scale of its operations against regional states.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthis presented a seven-point plan to the UN to resolve the ongoing conflict and have expressed willingness to participate in political negotiations. Both AQAP and ISIS have been able to expand significantly as Yemeni factions fight each other.
2. ISIS-affiliated forces operating out of Sirte, Libya, appear to be positioning themselves to secure Libya’s oil crescent, which would be a step toward securing control of Libyan oil facilities.
3. Senior Iranian officials including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterated calls for fact-finding committees and international management of the Hajj following the September 24 stampede in Mina, Saudi Arabia.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) withdrew from al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt governorate, as coalition-backed Yemeni forces advanced on the port city. AQAP had controlled al Mukalla since April 2015, using the city as a base to support operations against the al Houthi-Saleh forces in western Yemen. AQAP likely seeks to retain its military capabilities and has redeployed forces to support zones in Abyan, Ma’rib, and possibly al Bayda. The loss of al Mukalla is a setback for the group, but AQAP has resurged from similar setbacks previously.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) vehicle in a suburb of Mogadishu. This is the first ISIS-claimed attack in Somalia, though the attack was not listed in the English editions of ISIS’s al Bayan provincial news bulletin and did not kill any AMISOM troops. It is possible that an al Shabaab cell in Mogadishu defected to ISIS. CTP assesses that there is a small pro-ISIS group in northern Somalia and a possible Mogadishu-based cell.
3. ISIS Wilayat Barqa withdrew the majority of its forces from Derna in eastern Libya. This is a significant loss for ISIS, which first established its Libyan affiliate in Derna and has been fighting to reclaim the city since June 2015. ISIS may be preparing to move its military assets to southwestern Libya, where it has been establishing lines of communication in recent weeks, especially as multiple Libyan armed groups and international actors prepare to attack ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte. There is mounting evidence that ISIS is using southwestern Libya to coordinate with Boko Haram, AKA Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyah, and extend its influence in the Sahel region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 “terrorists,” including Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr and al Qaeda members, sparked attacks against the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, consolidation of the Gulf States behind Saudi Arabia, and vows of vengeance from al Qaeda supporters. The January 2 attacks in Iran will likely impair its attempts to strengthen its role in the international community. Senior Iranian officials condemned both the embassy attacks and the execution itself, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warning Saudi politicians that they will face “divine retribution” for the execution.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Wilayat Barqa may be close to success in its campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. The group advanced eastward from its base in Sirte, seizing Bin Jawad and launching suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks on Libya’s two largest oil export ports, al Sidra and Ras Lanuf. If ISIS Wilayat Barqa can effectively consolidate its territorial gains, it will likely continue to advance eastward and seek control of major oil fields.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) public stoning to death of a woman convicted of adultery in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, is an inflection point in how the group is enforcing its interpretation of shari’a law. AQAP has governed al Mukalla since April 2015, but has limited its implementation of shari’a in the city. The group rapidly enforced shari’a judgments in territory it controlled in Abyan in 2011, which fed a popular uprising against the group. The shift may be an indicator of AQAP’s confidence in its control of the population.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s warring factions continued efforts to secure gains on the ground despite Yemeni officials’ announcement of a one- or two-week ceasefire in the country ahead of the next round of UN-led political negotiations. Al Houthi-Saleh forces counter-attacked in western Taiz city, which was recently seized by coalition-backed forces, and Yemeni army units loyal to President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi began an offensive in southern Ma’rib and northwestern Shabwah governorates. The al Houthis reportedly agreed to the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which calls for al Houthi forces to disarm and withdraw from seized territory. The timing and phasing of the al Houthi withdrawal has been a stumbling block for previous attempts at a negotiated settlement.
2. Al Shabaab’s announcement of a new fighting unit bearing the name of its late Kenyan leader, Aboud Rogo, indicates the group’s sustained prioritization of its Kenyan operations. A similar unit named for al Shabaab’s late emir, Abu Zubayr, is prosecuting a campaign of mass-casualty attacks against African Union Mission in Somalia bases in Somalia. This group was probably behind the recent attack against a Somali National Army base outside of Mogadishu that reportedly killed over 70 soldiers. It is likely that the new unit will pursue a similar campaign in Kenya.
3. The al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attack against the In Salah gas plant in central Algeria was probably part of AQIM’s effort to compete with the growing influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the Maghreb region. AQIM described the March 18 rocket attack as a message for the Algerian regime and to Western companies. AQIM likened the attack to the January 2013 In Amenas hostage crisis, but the more recent attack appeared to be less sophisticated and may not have been planned by veteran al Qaeda operative Mokhtar Belmokhtar. AQIM has increased its media production and is directly countering ISIS’s message in the region as ISIS expands in Libya.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The loss of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) stronghold in Sirte may not significantly reduce the group’s threat to European targets. U.S.-backed forces allied with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) seized ISIS’s headquarters in Sirte on August 10. ISIS will survive the loss of Sirte. The group may already have plans to conduct attacks in Italy and ties to a cell in Milan, Italy, according to documents recovered in Sirte. CIA director John Brennan assessed in June 2016 that ISIS in Libya has the capability and intent to attack beyond Libya’s borders, including across the Mediterranean Sea.
2. A U.S.-supported Somali special forces raid may have killed al Shabaab emir Ahmad Umar. The pace of operations to degrade al Shabaab’s leadership may not be rapid enough to disrupt al Shabaab’s activities. The death of Umar, who had suppressed pro-ISIS sentiment in al Shabaab, may facilitate the integration of some al Shabaab factions into ISIS’s network.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) withdrawal from population centers in southern Yemen is a short-term setback that will not weaken the group in the long term. Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition forces drove AQAP from Azzan, Shabwah governorate on August 9 and Zinjibar, Ja’ar, and al Shaqra in Abyan governorate on August 14. AQAP withdrew to preserve its capabilities in Abyan governorate in 2012. The group will again maintain its ties to the local population and set conditions to resurge in the future.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda.
3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S.-backed campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may culminate prematurely. Libyan militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may declare victory over ISIS in Sirte within the coming days, and U.S. air support for GNA-allied militias could end as early as this week. The loss of Sirte has not reduced ISIS’s ability to conduct high-casualty explosive attacks, and the group may be increasingly active in southwestern Libya, according to local security sources. CTP assessed in April 2016 that ISIS would likely withdraw from Sirte and attempt to establish a safe haven in southern Libya. The conditions are set for ISIS to survive and likely resurge in Libya after the U.S. air campaign ends.
2. A political resolution to the civil war in Yemen remains unlikely. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced a revised peace plan on August 25 based on the formation of a national unity government—an al Houthi-Saleh demand excluded from the preliminary stages of prior UN-led negotiations. Secretary Kerry also emphasized the need for al Houthi-Saleh forces to withdraw from Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is unlikely to withdraw from Sana’a, where its recently formed Supreme Political Council has popular support. Al Houthi-Saleh leadership is seeking to legitimize the new governing body as a challenge to the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, which operates from Aden.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called on the Sunni community to unite against American and Iranian intervention. He accused the U.S. and Iran of forming an alliance that aims to exterminate Sunni populations and appealed to Iraqi Sunni, in particular, to fight “occupation” in their country. Zawahiri also called on members of ISIS to renounce their current allegiance and follow in the footsteps of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the late leader of the former al Qaeda in Iraq. Zawahiri’s statements were likely timed to capitalize on ISIS’s recent territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Zawahiri called for the formation of a “shari’a judiciary” in Syria, possibly indicating that al Qaeda will take additional measures to unify Salafi-jihadi groups there.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials such as Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and the Supreme Leader’s Senior Military Advisor and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi voiced their support for Syrian President Bashar al Assad and for Russian involvement in the conflict in Syria.
2. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi returned to the country after six months in exile in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Hadi’s cabinet returned in advance of him and began re-establishing the Hadi-led central government in Aden, in southern Yemen.
3. Malian factions met for the first time in Mali’s capital, Bamako, to improve implementation of a June ceasefire agreement and continued talks. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb-linked Islamist groups have taken advantage of the conflict in Mali and are pushing their area of operations southward.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun confirmed their rumored re-unification, citing their combined November 20 attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali as proof. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of al Murabitoun, split from AQIM in December 2012. This reconciliation of al Qaeda affiliates, which likely stems from their desire to counter ISIS’s influence in the region, increases the security threat to northern Mali as the groups integrate their resources, personal networks, and lines of communication.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) assassinated its first high-profile target in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that killed the Governor of Aden and threatened to launch additional attacks on Yemeni government officials. ISIS will likely attempt to leverage this spectacular attack to drive recruitment in the region, possibly in competition with AQAP elements regenerating in neighboring Abyan governorate. ISIS's growing strength in Aden will threaten the Saudi-led coalition's efforts to secure the city and restore President Hadi's government there.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is likely to close its investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program following the release of its report on December 2. The report assesses that while Iran made a “coordinated effort” to develop a “nuclear explosive device” before the end of 2003, there are no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the IAEA Board of Governors in December.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is conducting a campaign to seize strategic positions vacated by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in central and southern Somalia. Ethiopian AMISOM forces are withdrawing from Somalia. The forces are probably re-deploying inside Ethiopia to quell spreading anti-government protests by the Oromo and Amhara people. The Tigray minority dominates the Ethiopian government. Al Shabaab’s recapture of key towns is a setback for AMISOM and Somali forces allied against the group and sets conditions for al Shabaab to resurge in central Somalia.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be developing a relationship with a militant group in the Sahel, signaling ISIS’s intent to continue expanding in Africa. A pro-ISIS media outlet disseminated a pledge of bayat (allegiance) from a former al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militant leader, Abu Walid al Sahrawi, to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi on October 30. Al Sahrawi had first pledged bayat to al Baghdadi in 2015 but recently claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in Niger and Burkina Faso that may have earned recognition from the ISIS network. ISIS will continue to expand in Africa despite the loss of its regional hub in Sirte, Libya.
3. The combatants in Yemen’s civil war remain focused on military objectives in order to improve their negotiating positions for a political resolution to the conflict. Both President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance rejected a UN-proposed peace plan after alleging that it favored their rivals. The Hadi government and its backer, the Saudi-led coalition, continued efforts to advance on key frontlines and degrade al Houthi-Saleh leadership and military capabilities. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile toward Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on October 28.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Jamatul Ahrar, a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, conducted a suicide bombing targeting Pakistani Christians at a park in Lahore, Pakistan, on Easter Sunday. The attack killed at least 72 people and wounded more than 300 others. Jamatul Ahrar has expressed leanings in support of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), but has not formally affiliated with the group. It has targeted Christians before and will likely continue to attack non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan.
2. The imposition of the UN-backed Libyan unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA) is widening the divisions between Libya’s factions and hindering both local and international counter-ISIS efforts. Militias aligned with Libya’s self-declared Islamist government in Tripoli prevented the GNA from moving to the capital from its exile in Tunis. Anti-GNA militias suspended flights at Tripoli’s Mitiga airport and fired anti-aircraft munitions in the area as clashes between anti- and pro-GNA groups raged in the city. Armed groups from nearby Misrata pledged support to the GNA, further fracturing the tenuous Tripolitan-Misratan alliance that is instrumental for blocking ISIS’s westward expansion from Sirte. The unity government still lacks support from the internationally recognized parliament and powerful military factions in eastern Libya.
3. The U.S. and the Saudi-led coalition intensified their air campaigns against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Hadramawt, Lahij, and Abyan in Yemen. U.S. airstrikes on March 22 targeted a training camp. Breaking reports indicate AQAP leader Qasim al Raymi, previously the group’s military commander, may have been killed in the airstrike. The air campaigns may limit AQAP’s ability to consolidate new gains, but they are unlikely to expel AQAP from its strongholds. AQAP is exploiting the civil war in Yemen to expand. Planned UN-sponsored talks between the al Houthi-Saleh government and Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government may be more productive than a previous round of talks based on recent direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials. These national-level talks are unlikely to stabilize Yemen, however.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran continues to provide sanctuary to senior al Qaeda operatives. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on three senior al Qaeda members operating from Iran, describing one of the operatives, al Qaeda military committee chief Faisal Jassim Mohammed al Amri al Khalidi, as “part of a new generation of al Qaeda operatives,” in the press release. Yisra Muhammad Ibrahim Bayumi served as a mediator between al Qaeda and Iranian authorities, and Abu Bakr Muhammad Muhammad Ghumayn held financial, communications, and logistical roles in the group. Iran has facilitated al Qaeda activities in the Middle East since 2005 and al Qaeda is able to move money, facilitators, and operatives through Iran.
2. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the emir of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate al Murabitoun, denounced French intervention in Libya and called for Libyan Muslims to fight against the West. The release of the written statement by al Murabitoun’s media arm strengthens CTP’s assessment that Belmokhtar survived the June 2015 U.S. airstrike targeting a meeting of Islamist leaders in Ajdabiya, Libya. France confirmed its military presence in Libya on July 20 after three French soldiers died during a counterterrorism operation in Benghazi. [See CTP’s “Backgrounder: Fighting Forces in Libya” and “GNA-Allied Forces Seize Momentum against ISIS in Sirte” for more.]
3. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted the primary African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping base in Mogadishu on July 26. A militant detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) near the entrance of Halane Base Camp, killing at least 13 security contractors and civilians, before a second suicide bomber attempted to storm the compound. The assessed target was UN and African Union personnel. Al Shabaab attempted an SVBIED attack targeting a gathering of Somali politicians at a Mogadishu hotel on July 14, and Somali security forces disrupted an SVBIED attack on July 24.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing upwards of 22 people. The TTP's spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, refuted the claims that this was a TTP attack, indicating it was probably not directed by TTP leader Fazlullah's faction. The head of the TTP Tariq Geedar faction, Umar Mansoor, claimed this attack. Mansoor also claimed the 2014 Peshawar school attack. The TTP supported the 2014 attack, but was heavily criticized by al Qaeda for killing "non-combatants."
2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread unemployment protests broke out in Tunisia, mirroring the inciting events of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The suicide of a young protester ignited a week of violent clashes between police and demonstrators, accompanied by rioting, looting, and a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest threatens the weak Tunisian state.
3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections in February. While Rouhani strongly criticized the disqualifications in a televised speech, the secretary of the political body responsible for disqualifying candidates asserted that it “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also defended the disqualifications, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) operates cells in Libya that may support external attack networks in Europe. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte city on January 19 that targeted operatives planning attacks in Europe. These operatives may be connected to the ISIS-linked militant who attacked a Christmas market in Berlin on December 19, 2016. The U.S. strikes disrupted ISIS’s efforts to re-establish combat capabilities after the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte in late 2016. Airstrikes alone cannot defeat ISIS in Libya, however. Libyan factions are focused on protecting their interests in the country’s civil war. The resulting security vacuum allows Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to operate throughout the country. ISIS will continue to use Libya as a support zone for external operations as long as the civil war continues.
2. Al Qaeda affiliates are developing more lethal explosive attack capabilities in Mali. Al Murabitoun, an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a military base in Gao city, central Mali, on January 18. The attack, which killed more than 70 people, signals a step-change in al Murabitoun’s bomb-making capabilities. AQIM is attempting to undermine UN-backed peace accords in northern Mali. The January 18 attack targeted a joint base established under the peace accords in an effort to spark conflict between rival factions. AQIM seeks to co-opt local movements that share its short-term goals, including the desire to expel Western influence from the region.
3. The Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to seize territory from the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an effort to reset political negotiations. Hadi government forces, backed by coalition air support, seized Mokha port and attacked two al Houthi-Saleh bases in Taiz governorate on January 23 and 24. These operations aim to disrupt al Houthi-Saleh supply lines into Taiz city and pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction to accept terms that favor the Hadi government and its supporters. The coalition is prioritizing the fight against the al Houthi-Saleh faction in Taiz over operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. AQAP is seizing the opportunity to resurge in its historic safe havens.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. U.S. administration officials have signaled that the U.S. may take a more aggressive stance against the al Houthis in Yemen to counter Iranian influence. An aggressive position against the al Houthi movement, which is not an Iranian proxy, would further isolate the al Houthis and drive them further into Iran’s orbit. U.S. intervention against the al Houthis would strengthen the Saudi-led coalition and its preferred government in Yemen, led by internationally recognized President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The Hadi government has struggled to gain legitimacy even in territory in southern Yemen under its control. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the al Houthis’ current partner, possesses significant political capital, military capabilities, and public support.
2. Al Shabaab may be expanding terrain under its control, using the sanctuary that it retained in south-central Somalia to support operations. Predicted food shortages may make conditions more permissive for al Shabaab. Somalia is suffering from a severe drought that may cause widespread hunger on par with the 2010-2011 famine, which killed more than 250,000 people. The Somali government is ill-prepared to address a crisis of this magnitude. An insufficient aid response from the government would allow al Shabaab to position itself as a legitimate source of relief and governance. External factors, including the likely expulsion of Somali refugees from Kenya before Kenyan general elections, may exacerbate the crisis in Somalia.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may be facilitating the growth of a Salafi-jihadi insurgency within the Fulani ethnic group across borders in the Sahel region. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an ethnically Fulani AQIM-associated group, is challenging the state in central Mali by forcing secular schools to remain closed in Mopti region. Ansar al Islam, a related Salafi-jihadi Fulani group, is pursuing a similar campaign in Burkina Faso. A Fulani insurgency is also challenging the Nigerian state, though Salafi-jihadi organizations have not yet infiltrated this movement. AQIM and other Salafi-jihadi groups may use ties into the Fulani community to expand their area of operations in the Sahel. AQIM has tapped into Tuareg networks to advance its objectives in West Africa in the past.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The death of the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdul Rahman, may inspire retaliatory attacks against U.S. targets. Abdul Rahman, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, died of natural causes in prison in North Carolina on February 18. Al Qaeda’s General Command called for revenge attacks on Americans and U.S. interests and accused the U.S. of killing Abdul Rahman by withholding his medication in prison. The joint statement from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) eulogizing Abdul Rahman and calling for revenge attacks indicates the continued close coordination between the two affiliates. Al Shabaab released a separate statement. Al Qaeda’s al Nafeer bulletin released Abdul Rahman’s will, in which he accused the U.S. of poisoning and abusing him.
2. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu in an effort to disrupt Somalia’s new administration. Al Shabaab militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) in a crowded market in Mogadishu on February 19, killing dozens of people. A senior al Shabaab official threatened a “vicious war” against the new government on February 19. Al Shabaab is also conducting an assassination campaign targeting government officials and elders who supported the electoral process. Former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud ceremonially transferred power to new President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo on February 16 in a ceremony that al Shabaab attempted to disrupt with mortar fire.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit famine conditions in the Lake Chad Basin to increase recruitment and build a local support base. This faction, also known as ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya (West Africa Province), seeks to attack Western targets throughout West Africa. It has built ties to local populations that allow it to access supplies and deliver aid in the midst of widespread food insecurity. A rival Boko Haram faction led by Abubakr Shekau has alienated the local population may lose militants to the better-resourced ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya, which will in turn expand the scope and scale of its operations against regional states.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthis presented a seven-point plan to the UN to resolve the ongoing conflict and have expressed willingness to participate in political negotiations. Both AQAP and ISIS have been able to expand significantly as Yemeni factions fight each other.
2. ISIS-affiliated forces operating out of Sirte, Libya, appear to be positioning themselves to secure Libya’s oil crescent, which would be a step toward securing control of Libyan oil facilities.
3. Senior Iranian officials including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterated calls for fact-finding committees and international management of the Hajj following the September 24 stampede in Mina, Saudi Arabia.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) withdrew from al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt governorate, as coalition-backed Yemeni forces advanced on the port city. AQAP had controlled al Mukalla since April 2015, using the city as a base to support operations against the al Houthi-Saleh forces in western Yemen. AQAP likely seeks to retain its military capabilities and has redeployed forces to support zones in Abyan, Ma’rib, and possibly al Bayda. The loss of al Mukalla is a setback for the group, but AQAP has resurged from similar setbacks previously.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) vehicle in a suburb of Mogadishu. This is the first ISIS-claimed attack in Somalia, though the attack was not listed in the English editions of ISIS’s al Bayan provincial news bulletin and did not kill any AMISOM troops. It is possible that an al Shabaab cell in Mogadishu defected to ISIS. CTP assesses that there is a small pro-ISIS group in northern Somalia and a possible Mogadishu-based cell.
3. ISIS Wilayat Barqa withdrew the majority of its forces from Derna in eastern Libya. This is a significant loss for ISIS, which first established its Libyan affiliate in Derna and has been fighting to reclaim the city since June 2015. ISIS may be preparing to move its military assets to southwestern Libya, where it has been establishing lines of communication in recent weeks, especially as multiple Libyan armed groups and international actors prepare to attack ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte. There is mounting evidence that ISIS is using southwestern Libya to coordinate with Boko Haram, AKA Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyah, and extend its influence in the Sahel region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 “terrorists,” including Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr and al Qaeda members, sparked attacks against the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, consolidation of the Gulf States behind Saudi Arabia, and vows of vengeance from al Qaeda supporters. The January 2 attacks in Iran will likely impair its attempts to strengthen its role in the international community. Senior Iranian officials condemned both the embassy attacks and the execution itself, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warning Saudi politicians that they will face “divine retribution” for the execution.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Wilayat Barqa may be close to success in its campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. The group advanced eastward from its base in Sirte, seizing Bin Jawad and launching suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks on Libya’s two largest oil export ports, al Sidra and Ras Lanuf. If ISIS Wilayat Barqa can effectively consolidate its territorial gains, it will likely continue to advance eastward and seek control of major oil fields.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) public stoning to death of a woman convicted of adultery in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, is an inflection point in how the group is enforcing its interpretation of shari’a law. AQAP has governed al Mukalla since April 2015, but has limited its implementation of shari’a in the city. The group rapidly enforced shari’a judgments in territory it controlled in Abyan in 2011, which fed a popular uprising against the group. The shift may be an indicator of AQAP’s confidence in its control of the population.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s warring factions continued efforts to secure gains on the ground despite Yemeni officials’ announcement of a one- or two-week ceasefire in the country ahead of the next round of UN-led political negotiations. Al Houthi-Saleh forces counter-attacked in western Taiz city, which was recently seized by coalition-backed forces, and Yemeni army units loyal to President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi began an offensive in southern Ma’rib and northwestern Shabwah governorates. The al Houthis reportedly agreed to the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which calls for al Houthi forces to disarm and withdraw from seized territory. The timing and phasing of the al Houthi withdrawal has been a stumbling block for previous attempts at a negotiated settlement.
2. Al Shabaab’s announcement of a new fighting unit bearing the name of its late Kenyan leader, Aboud Rogo, indicates the group’s sustained prioritization of its Kenyan operations. A similar unit named for al Shabaab’s late emir, Abu Zubayr, is prosecuting a campaign of mass-casualty attacks against African Union Mission in Somalia bases in Somalia. This group was probably behind the recent attack against a Somali National Army base outside of Mogadishu that reportedly killed over 70 soldiers. It is likely that the new unit will pursue a similar campaign in Kenya.
3. The al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attack against the In Salah gas plant in central Algeria was probably part of AQIM’s effort to compete with the growing influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the Maghreb region. AQIM described the March 18 rocket attack as a message for the Algerian regime and to Western companies. AQIM likened the attack to the January 2013 In Amenas hostage crisis, but the more recent attack appeared to be less sophisticated and may not have been planned by veteran al Qaeda operative Mokhtar Belmokhtar. AQIM has increased its media production and is directly countering ISIS’s message in the region as ISIS expands in Libya.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The loss of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) stronghold in Sirte may not significantly reduce the group’s threat to European targets. U.S.-backed forces allied with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) seized ISIS’s headquarters in Sirte on August 10. ISIS will survive the loss of Sirte. The group may already have plans to conduct attacks in Italy and ties to a cell in Milan, Italy, according to documents recovered in Sirte. CIA director John Brennan assessed in June 2016 that ISIS in Libya has the capability and intent to attack beyond Libya’s borders, including across the Mediterranean Sea.
2. A U.S.-supported Somali special forces raid may have killed al Shabaab emir Ahmad Umar. The pace of operations to degrade al Shabaab’s leadership may not be rapid enough to disrupt al Shabaab’s activities. The death of Umar, who had suppressed pro-ISIS sentiment in al Shabaab, may facilitate the integration of some al Shabaab factions into ISIS’s network.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) withdrawal from population centers in southern Yemen is a short-term setback that will not weaken the group in the long term. Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition forces drove AQAP from Azzan, Shabwah governorate on August 9 and Zinjibar, Ja’ar, and al Shaqra in Abyan governorate on August 14. AQAP withdrew to preserve its capabilities in Abyan governorate in 2012. The group will again maintain its ties to the local population and set conditions to resurge in the future.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda.
3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S.-backed campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may culminate prematurely. Libyan militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may declare victory over ISIS in Sirte within the coming days, and U.S. air support for GNA-allied militias could end as early as this week. The loss of Sirte has not reduced ISIS’s ability to conduct high-casualty explosive attacks, and the group may be increasingly active in southwestern Libya, according to local security sources. CTP assessed in April 2016 that ISIS would likely withdraw from Sirte and attempt to establish a safe haven in southern Libya. The conditions are set for ISIS to survive and likely resurge in Libya after the U.S. air campaign ends.
2. A political resolution to the civil war in Yemen remains unlikely. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced a revised peace plan on August 25 based on the formation of a national unity government—an al Houthi-Saleh demand excluded from the preliminary stages of prior UN-led negotiations. Secretary Kerry also emphasized the need for al Houthi-Saleh forces to withdraw from Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is unlikely to withdraw from Sana’a, where its recently formed Supreme Political Council has popular support. Al Houthi-Saleh leadership is seeking to legitimize the new governing body as a challenge to the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, which operates from Aden.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called on the Sunni community to unite against American and Iranian intervention. He accused the U.S. and Iran of forming an alliance that aims to exterminate Sunni populations and appealed to Iraqi Sunni, in particular, to fight “occupation” in their country. Zawahiri also called on members of ISIS to renounce their current allegiance and follow in the footsteps of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the late leader of the former al Qaeda in Iraq. Zawahiri’s statements were likely timed to capitalize on ISIS’s recent territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Zawahiri called for the formation of a “shari’a judiciary” in Syria, possibly indicating that al Qaeda will take additional measures to unify Salafi-jihadi groups there.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials such as Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and the Supreme Leader’s Senior Military Advisor and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi voiced their support for Syrian President Bashar al Assad and for Russian involvement in the conflict in Syria.
2. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi returned to the country after six months in exile in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Hadi’s cabinet returned in advance of him and began re-establishing the Hadi-led central government in Aden, in southern Yemen.
3. Malian factions met for the first time in Mali’s capital, Bamako, to improve implementation of a June ceasefire agreement and continued talks. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb-linked Islamist groups have taken advantage of the conflict in Mali and are pushing their area of operations southward.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun confirmed their rumored re-unification, citing their combined November 20 attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali as proof. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of al Murabitoun, split from AQIM in December 2012. This reconciliation of al Qaeda affiliates, which likely stems from their desire to counter ISIS’s influence in the region, increases the security threat to northern Mali as the groups integrate their resources, personal networks, and lines of communication.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) assassinated its first high-profile target in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that killed the Governor of Aden and threatened to launch additional attacks on Yemeni government officials. ISIS will likely attempt to leverage this spectacular attack to drive recruitment in the region, possibly in competition with AQAP elements regenerating in neighboring Abyan governorate. ISIS's growing strength in Aden will threaten the Saudi-led coalition's efforts to secure the city and restore President Hadi's government there.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is likely to close its investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program following the release of its report on December 2. The report assesses that while Iran made a “coordinated effort” to develop a “nuclear explosive device” before the end of 2003, there are no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the IAEA Board of Governors in December.
Syrian Crisis: Crossing the Red Lines Jorge Comins
Strategic Options Outline #1 - Course "Central Challenges of American National Security, Strategy and the Press: an Introduction". Harvard Kennedy School of Government, September 2013.
Saudi Arabia’s fight Against ISISIslamic State of Iraq and Syr.docxkenjordan97598
Saudi Arabia’s fight Against ISIS
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or rather ISIS can only be understood well if the origin and formation principles are sought. Zack’s article plays a role in showing the formation of the group. ISIS was formed as an extremist group after the war in Iraq started. The article illustrates that The United States, Gulf monarchs such as Saudi Arabia have played a role in the formation of ISIS. The article cites that ISIS is a movement formed by Sunnis who felt oppressed in Iraq after the fall of Saddam. They decided to hit back at Nour-Al Malik who favored Shiites over Sunnis. Al Malik used Saddam’s laws to demonize Sunnis and they had no alternative except joining ISIS. Most Sunnis fear that Al-Malik will not treat them well and he will always give preferential treatment to the majority Shiites. The effect is to frustrate his governance. Over the years, the Sunnis have been denied from demonstrating, going for government positions, openly expressing their democratic rights and even worship. They moved fast and joined efforts to form ISIS as a way of fighting the Iraq government. The article raises the question that the conflict in Iraq and Syria which was propagated by the United States and Gulf monarchs such as Jordan, Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Iraq Sunnis support the ISIS, but the Saudi government is eliciting fears on the entry of the movement into the nation.
Jonathan Broder’s article explains why Saudi Arabia fears ISIS. He offers the rationale behind Saudi Arabia’s urgency and response to eliminate ISIS. Saudi Arabia realized that all is not well when General Ouda al-Behawi, a commander of Saudi forces in the Northern region was killed by ISIS fighters. The article points that ISIS must have received a tip from people close to the General. Broder’s article raises the question on why Saudi Arabians support ISIS. ISIS is supported by Saudi Arabians in lower ranks see the movement as a champion of Sunni’s rights, and will revenge against the corrupt royal family. Broder’s article gives critical information on Saudi’s airstrikes on ISIS strongholds. Senior intelligence officers have gone to Washington to seek information and tactics on countering ISIS. Saudi is also training more than 5000 Syrian rebels to hit on ISIS. The killing of General Oudah sparked Saudi Arabia’s war against ISIS, which involves many efforts such as regional support and talks, fencing, among others, which will be discussed in the paper.
Micah Halpen’s article pinpoints the need for unity in Arab States in the fight against ISIS. Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia must stand in a coalition and fight ISIS. The main role of the article is to show the way shared intelligence is one of the most critical points in eliminating ISIS. Arab nations must act as a block or else ISIS will take up their states and lead with extremism. The article also questions on the role of Iran in fighting ISIS. Iran has always been on the forefront against ISIS giv.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
Damascus is the Syrian regime’s center of gravity -- the struggle for Damascus is existential for the regime as well as the opposition.
Damascus has always been heavily militarized and has hosted a high proportion of the Syrian armed forces throughout the war.
In response to rebel incursions to the capital, the regime escalated operations in late 2012 and consolidated forces from other parts of the country.
Rebels in Damascus worked to improve their organizational structure, and implemented a shift towards targeted attacks on infrastructure and strategic assets.
The regime has augmented its fighting forces with foreign fighters, namely Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi‘a militias, and with pro-regime militias.
This reliance on foreign and irregular forces leaves its military capacity vulnerable to events beyond its control.
The regime has used indiscriminate targeting of civilian areas, including “barrel bombs,” to mimic the effects of chemical weapons.
Renewed rebel campaigns in Damascus suggest that they will survive the winter months, and continue to challenge Assad’s grip on the fortress of Damascus.
The regime is running out of options for a decisive victory, but does not seem at risk of losing their capital seat at the present.
t is clear to anyone with a half brain by now that President Obama has not offered a cohesive strategy for fighting ISIS. Since 2010, his determination to disengage from Iraq and Syria was evident in his refusal to assist the Free Syrian Army and keep U.S. forces in Iraq beyond 2011.
An article by our Corse mate General Hasnain regarding Saudi is important from general knowledge and discussionAs he puts it "One could not have imagined the status of Saudi Arabia as it is today, having been one of the most powerful states in the Middle East. A combination of factors appears to have diluted its power and comparative strategic significance. This needs brief investigation although I am convinced that Saudi Arabia’s geo-strategic location, its energy resources and its ideological bent continues to make it one of the most significant countries in the world."
ICESERVE24: OTGtruth: Russian Moves into Their 'Afghanistan Part II'Lubomir Cech
The world is now aware that Russia is operationally involved in Syria and Russia has signaled that they are in it for the long haul – but could this be another short-sighted engagement to the tune of Afghanistan in 1989? As Syria’s Bashar al-Assad receives his saving grace, ICESERVE24 delves into the factors motivating Russia’s stake in Syria, the key world players in the fight, and the fate of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
Syria policy brief articulating the developing situation in Syria (early August), along with the action steps the US should take in support the Syrian revolution.
www.AllianceForSyria.org
Similar to Defeating the Jihadists in Syria: Competition before Confrontation (20)
On April 4, 2016, the Atlantic Council’s Eurasian Energy Futures Initiative launched a report, Securing Ukraine’s Energy Sector, authored by Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center’s Resident Senior Fellow, Anders Åslund.
It is the core purpose of the Atlantic Council to foster bipartisan support for policies that promote the security of the United States and the transatlantic community. The signatories of this piece have either served in Afghanistan, been involved in the formation of US policy in government, or otherwise devoted considerable time to Afghan affairs. They have come together to register a broad, bipartisan consensus in support of certain principles that they believe should guide policy formation and decision-making on Afghanistan during the remainder of the Obama administration and the first year of a new administration, of whichever party. It is critical that the current administration prepare the path for the next. A new president will come into office facing a wave of instability in the Islamic world and the threat from violent extremism, which stretches from Asia through the Middle East to Africa. This will continue to pose a considerable challenge and danger to American interests abroad, and to the homeland. The signatories support the continued US engagement required to protect American interests and increase the possibilities for Afghan success.
Crude Oil for Natural Gas: Prospects for Iran-Saudi Reconciliationatlanticcouncil
Despite the sectarian barbs traded between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Iran's unique ability to meet the kingdom's fast growing demand for electricity may help spur a reconciliation, according to the Atlantic Council's Jean-François Seznec. In his report Crude Oil for Natural Gas: Prospects for Iran-Saudi Reconciliation, Seznec argues that the two dominant energy producers do not necessarily need to see their energy production as competition.
Saudi Arabia's currently fuels its stunning 8 percent annual rise in demand for electricity with precious crude oil due to little low cost domestic natural dry gas reserves. Iran's vast gas reserves could be used to meet the kingdom's growing needs, but after decades of punishing sanctions its dilapidated gas fields need an estimated $250 billion in repairs. If Saudi Arabia used its investment power or buying power to help revitalize Iran's gas industry, it would both secure the energy it needs to meet its citizens' demands and free up its crude oil for export. While the sectarian rhetoric hurled back and forth may seem unstoppable and the timeline for reconciliation may be long, Seznec contends that both sides are rational at heart and highlights that that the benefit of economic cooperation on energy issues could open up better relations on a range of issues.
The Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, a civil society group comprising the Tunisian General Labor Union; the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts; the Tunisian Human Rights League; and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize on Friday, October 9, 2015 "for its decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia." In a new Atlantic Council Issue Brief, "Tunisia: The Last Arab Spring Country," Atlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East Senior Fellows Mohsin Khan and Karim Mezran survey the successes of Tunisia's consensus-based transition and the challenges that lie ahead.
"The decision to award this year's Nobel Peace Prize to Tunisia's National Dialogue Quartet is an extremely important recognition of the efforts made by Tunisian civil society and Tunisia's political elite to reach a consensus on keeping the country firmly on the path to democratization and transition to a pluralist system," says Mezran. With the overthrow of the authoritarian regime of President Zine El Abedine Ben Ali in 2011, Tunisia embarked on a process of democratization widely regarded as an example for transitions in the region. The National Dialogue Conference facilitated by the Quartet helped Tunisia avert the risk of plunging into civil war and paved the way for a consensus agreement on Tunisia's new constitution, adopted in January 2014.
In the brief, the authors warn that despite political successes, Tunisia is hampered by the absence of economic reforms. Facing the loss of tourism and investment following two terror attacks, Tunisia's economy risks collapse, endangering all of the painstaking political progress gained thus far. Unless the Tunisian government moves rapidly to turn the economy around, Tunisia risks unraveling its fragile transition.
Foreign Policy for an Urban World: Global Governance and the Rise of Citiesatlanticcouncil
In the latest FutureScape issue brief from the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security's Strategic Foresight Initiative, author Peter Engelke discusses the long-term economic, environmental, and policy implications of urbanization. Entitled "Foreign Policy for an Urban World: Global Governance and the Rise of Cities," the brief examines how urbanization is hastening the global diffusion of power and how cities themselves are increasingly important nodes of power in global politics.
Cyber 9/12 Student Challenge General Informationatlanticcouncil
In Washington, DC, student teams confront a serious
cybersecurity breach of national and international importance.
Teams will compose policy recommendations
and justify their decision-making process, considering
the role and implications for relevant civilian,
military, law enforcement, and private sector entities
and updating the recommendations as the scenario
evolves.
In Geneva, Switzerland, in
partnership with the Geneva
Centre for Security
Policy (GCSP), students
respond to a major cyberattack
on European networks. Competitors will provide
recommendations balancing individual national
approaches and a collective crisis management response,
considering capabilities, policies, and governance
structures of NATO, EU, and individual nations.
The competition fosters a culture of cooperation and
a better understanding of these organizations and
their member states in responding to cyberattacks.
Toward a Sustainable Peace in the South China Seaatlanticcouncil
The South China Sea (SCS) has been, and remains, an area rife with tension. Disputes among SCS states stem from unresolved issues relating to sovereignty, exclusive economic zones, natural resources, and acceptable uses of the military. In the past two decades, fishing boats have been detained or damaged, fishermen and sailors arrested or killed, and artificial islands constructed for military purposes. These years of strife have led to the current SCS state of play: it is a vitally important region where competition is high and trust is low.
This issue brief argues that SCS countries need to work toward a "mutual confidence" and "mutual dependence" end state. In particular, the paper focuses on sharing meteorological data to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, including search and rescue operations, foreign disaster relief goods delivery, and medical care. A mutual confidence/mutual dependence relationship between two SCS states would help mitigate regional conflicts or disputes, which in turn can help lead to a more peaceful region.
On May 20-21, 2015, European leaders will gather for the Eastern Partnership summit in Riga, Latvia, to discuss the future of Europe’s East. Given the extreme challenges faced by the countries of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) since the last summit, in Vilnius, Lithuania in 2013, and the cooling of EU relations with several of the Eastern Partners, the upcoming meeting will surely pose tough questions for the future of the entire eastern framework.
At the same time, the Riga summit also presents an historic opportunity to put back on track a process that held significant promise at its inception but which has been slow to respond to crises and a low priority on the agenda for EU member states. In A Transatlantic Approach to Europe’s East: Relaunching the Eastern Partnership, Burwell examines the need for a closer and more integrated relationship between the European Union and the key countries of the EaP. Burwell argues that the Riga summit offers a key chance for Europe to both confront the challenges to its East, and to launch a new Transatlantic Partnership for Wider Europe in close cooperation with the United States. Failure to relaunch the EaP framework, by identifying the factors that make these countries vulnerable and designing strategies to overcome these specific weaknesses, will have dire consequences for the prosperity and security of the entire region.
President Barack Obama's summit meeting with Gulf leaders at Camp David on May 14 will end in failure if the administration does not propose a substantial upgrade in US-Gulf security relations that is as bold and strategically significant as the nuclear agreement–and likely formal deal–with Iran.
While the summit will not suddenly eliminate mistrust and resolve all differences, it presents an historic opportunity to put back on track a decades-old US-Gulf partnership that has served both sides and the region well, yet lately has experienced deep turbulence. Failure to strengthen these ties will have consequences, the most dramatic of which could be the acceleration of the regional order's collapse.
In a March 2015 Atlantic Council report entitled Artful Balance: Future US Defense Strategy and Force Posture in the Gulf, we made the case for a mutual defense treaty between the United States and willing Arab Gulf partners. In this issue in focus, we offer a more comprehensive and detailed assessment of the risks, concerns, benefits, and opportunities that would be inherent in such a treaty. We recommend a gradualist approach for significantly upgrading US-Gulf security relations that effectively reduces the risks and maximizes the benefits of more formal US security commitments to willing Arab Gulf states.
The solutions for socioeconomic development are no longer only in the public sector. Latin America has changed dramatically over the last decade, and the private sector can play an increasingly important role in the region’s progress. That’s where social impact investing comes in—a way that investors can make money while doing social good.
The White House has appointed a social innovation czar and the Inter-American Development Bank is doing work every day in this expanding arena. Is social impact investing one of the keys that will finally unlock the region’s intractable inequality?
In this new Latin America Center analysis, released today, Adrienne Arsht Center Senior Non-Resident Fellow Gabriel Zinny dissects how businesses, governments, and multilateral institutions can better provide goods and services to the underserved while making money.
Read this and key recommendations for accelerating the sector here:
• Formalize it. A clear, market-based legal system enforced by a solid judiciary branch is fundamental to attracting impact investments.
• Seed it. Governments should subsidize a measure of the often-lacking venture-stage capital for projects, especially when the entrepreneurs come from less-affluent communities.
• Decentralize it. Local governments should be viewed as public sector partners as they often have more flexibility to spur private social enterprise.
• Read more here…
If ever a turning point seemed inevitable in Pakistan’s militia policy, it was in the aftermath of the Peshawar school massacre in December 2014. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) killed 152 people, 133 of them children, in the bloodiest terrorist attack in Pakistan’s history. The carnage sparked an unprecedented national dialogue about the costs and contradictions of the Pakistani political and military establishment’s reliance on violent proxies, such as the Afghan Taliban (from which the TTP originates), for security.
Why does Pakistan continue to differentiate between “good” and “bad” militias in the face of the Peshawar massacre? What are the costs of playing the good-bad militia game? What can be done to end Pakistan’s dependency on armed nonstate groups? In “Reimagining Pakistan’s Militia Policy,” Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at Skidmore College and US-Pakistan Exchange Program Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, argues that Pakistan’s unwillingness to crack down on all terrorist groups is more a product of cold calculation than ideological shortsightedness. Understanding Pakistan’s close relationship with militias requires recognizing the strategic logic through which many states outsource violence.
The Atlantic Council, in partnership with NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), held the 4th annual Young Professionals Day (YP Day) in Washington, DC, on March 24. The event featured a full-day, outcome-oriented, strategic design thinking exercise with sixty young professionals representing twenty-four of NATO's twenty-eight member nations. Delegates collaborated to produce a list of creative solutions to pressing challenges NATO faces, ranging from how to address hybrid warfare and threats on NATO's southern flank, to how NATO can encourage innovation and deliver on the promises from the 2014 Wales Summit.
The NATO Young Professionals Day Report includes detailed descriptions of the top fifteen recommendations produced by delegates. Delegates' recommendations included creative and out-of-the box concepts, such as the creation of an "Innovation CEO" position within NATO with substantial powers to experiment with new policies. The group also suggested developing a dramatized HBO style series about the history of NATO to increase public awareness and improve the alliance's public approval; fostering partnerships with venture capital and the defense industry to develop new technologies and create common standards; and the deployment of an elite, rapid response force in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region that includes personnel from NATO partner countries in the south, to leverage local expertise. Details on these recommendations and more can be found in the full report available online here:
Dynamic Stability: US Strategy for a World in Transitionatlanticcouncil
We have entered a new era in world history, a post-post-Cold War era that holds both great promise and great peril for the United States, its allies, and everyone else. We now can call this a "Westphalian-Plus" world, in which nation-states will have to engage on two distinct levels: dealing with other nation-states as before, and dealing with a vast array of important nonstate actors. This era calls for a new approach to national strategy called "dynamic stability."
The authors of this paper—Atlantic Council Vice President and Scowcroft Center Director Barry Pavel and Senior Fellow Peter Engelke, with the help of Assistant Director Alex Ward—kick off the Atlantic Council Strategy Paper series by telling the United States to seek stability while leveraging dynamic trends at the same time. The central task facing America is "to harness change in order to save the system," meaning the preservation of the rules-based international order that has benefited billions around the world, including Americans themselves, since 1945. Within its pages, the paper outlines the components of strategy in a swiftly-changing world.
Setting the Stage for Peace in Syria: The Case for a Syrian National Stabiliz...atlanticcouncil
In Setting the Stage for Peace in Syria: The Case for a Syrian National Stabilization Force, Frederic C. Hof of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Bassma Kodmani of the Arab Reform Initiative, and Jeffrey White of the Washington Institute, present a new way forward—a sort of train-and-equip on steroids—the Syrian National Stabilization Force (SNSF).
Mexico's historic energy reforms continue to hold exciting promise for the country, achieving the requisite constitutional and implementing legislation over the last fifteen months. The global oil price climate, however, has prompted a few mid-course corrections to the rollout of the reforms. For Mexico to continue to attract excitement for its energy sector, the government will need to maintain a degree of flexibility while holding true to the principles of the reforms.
Places like Singapore, Boston, Bangalore, Pittsburgh, Silicon Valley, and others are known as leaders in innovation, but when it comes to building the knowledge economy, the Gulf has become one of the most ambitious regions in the world.
A decade ago, the consensus from outside the region was that Middle Eastern countries, including those in the Gulf, were a long way from developing knowledge economies— defined as economies that combine advanced research and development, entrepreneurialism, and creative thinking into innovative, wealth-generating enterprises. Fast-forward to 2015, and many Arab Gulf countries have become well known for their attempts at building knowledge economies, for instance through innovation clusters such as Abu Dhabi's Masdar City, Dubai's TechnoPark, Qatar's Science and Technology Park, and Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah University of Science and Technology. Through these and other efforts, Gulf countries have invested billions of dollars in dozens of initiatives to co-locate the sources of innovation—research labs, venture capital, entrepreneurs, high-technology companies, and educational institutions, in hopes of building globally renowned knowledge economies.
In Brainstorming the Gulf: Innovation and the Knowledge Economy in the GCC, the report's author, Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow for the Strategic Foresight Initiative in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, highlights the successes that Gulf states have enjoyed to date and addresses the major hurdles to sustaining and expanding these successes. While all signs point to the staying power of Arab Gulf leadership's long-term commitment to the knowledge economy, the harder part will be sustaining the knowledge economy's soft infrastructure—the dimension of entrepreneurial culture involving creativity, expression, inclusion, disruption, and borrowing from global cultural flows. If talented people are at the core of the innovation process, government policy in the Gulf ought to focus as much on the creation of dynamic and livable places in order to attract and retain the best talent from all over the world. As Arab Gulf states have already discovered, this pathway is disruptive, bringing with it significant social consequences.
This report is the result of a series of brainstorming sessions that took place between the summer of 2013 and the winter of 2014-2015, and between American, Russian, and European experts. The teams were led by Ellen Tauscher, the Vice Chair of the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security and the former US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and Igor Ivanov, the president of Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and former Foreign Minister of Russia, in an effort to keep the dialogue open and frank at a challenging time for European security. Not surprisingly, as events in Ukraine unravelled the post-Cold War security order, it proved impossible to narrow the differences and develop a common, action-oriented approach to the challenge of rebuilding the European security order. The report, a project of the Atlantic Council, the European Leadership Network (ELN), and RIAC is focused instead on the necessary first step of listening to each other and reflecting on the significant differences in the Western and Russian approaches. Discussions focused on gaining clarity on the interests at stake, from the US, European, and Russian perspectives, in order to better define whether and where common interests may still lie and how best to advance them. The report clearly points to the fact that managing the differences in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis will continue to require significant efforts on the part of decision-makers, experts, officials, international organizations, and will take time and strategic patience.
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Working with data is a challenge for many organizations. Nonprofits in particular may need to collect and analyze sensitive, incomplete, and/or biased historical data about people. In this talk, Dr. Cori Faklaris of UNC Charlotte provides an overview of current AI capabilities and weaknesses to consider when integrating current AI technologies into the data workflow. The talk is organized around three takeaways: (1) For better or sometimes worse, AI provides you with “infinite interns.” (2) Give people permission & guardrails to learn what works with these “interns” and what doesn’t. (3) Create a roadmap for adding in more AI to assist nonprofit work, along with strategies for bias mitigation.
Monitoring Health for the SDGs - Global Health Statistics 2024 - WHOChristina Parmionova
The 2024 World Health Statistics edition reviews more than 50 health-related indicators from the Sustainable Development Goals and WHO’s Thirteenth General Programme of Work. It also highlights the findings from the Global health estimates 2021, notably the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on life expectancy and healthy life expectancy.
About Potato, The scientific name of the plant is Solanum tuberosum (L).Christina Parmionova
The potato is a starchy root vegetable native to the Americas that is consumed as a staple food in many parts of the world. Potatoes are tubers of the plant Solanum tuberosum, a perennial in the nightshade family Solanaceae. Wild potato species can be found from the southern United States to southern Chile
Synopsis (short abstract) In December 2023, the UN General Assembly proclaimed 30 May as the International Day of Potato.
RFP for Reno's Community Assistance CenterThis Is Reno
Property appraisals completed in May for downtown Reno’s Community Assistance and Triage Centers (CAC) reveal that repairing the buildings to bring them back into service would cost an estimated $10.1 million—nearly four times the amount previously reported by city staff.
Preliminary findings _OECD field visits to ten regions in the TSI EU mining r...OECDregions
Preliminary findings from OECD field visits for the project: Enhancing EU Mining Regional Ecosystems to Support the Green Transition and Secure Mineral Raw Materials Supply.
Donate to charity during this holiday seasonSERUDS INDIA
For people who have money and are philanthropic, there are infinite opportunities to gift a needy person or child a Merry Christmas. Even if you are living on a shoestring budget, you will be surprised at how much you can do.
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-to-donate-to-charity-during-this-holiday-season/
#charityforchildren, #donateforchildren, #donateclothesforchildren, #donatebooksforchildren, #donatetoysforchildren, #sponsorforchildren, #sponsorclothesforchildren, #sponsorbooksforchildren, #sponsortoysforchildren, #seruds, #kurnool
State crafting: Changes and challenges for managing the public finances
Defeating the Jihadists in Syria: Competition before Confrontation
1. In Syria, a US-led coalition air campaign against the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has yielded
limited, short-term gains, such as inflicting casualties
on ISIS and cutting its oil revenues. Unfortunately, the
campaign may well be harming more critical, longer-
term US interests in Syria. These include the stated US
goal of degrading and ultimately destroying ISIS and,
just as importantly, preventing its replacement by the
Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate. For the campaign to
succeed, the United States and its allies must account
for local realities and work to strengthen, rather than
undermine, the Syrian nationalist opposition.
Most worryingly, the coalition air campaign has
accelerated the near-collapse of nationalist rebel
forces—groups formed to oppose the Syrian regime but
with a record of successfully fighting ISIS in northern
Syria.1
The Nusra Front is capitalizing on that campaign’s
damage to its insurgent rivals in order to strengthen its
presence within the north and beyond, including Syria’s
demographic and economic center—a chain of cities and
key roads that run through central Syria. Meanwhile, ISIS
retains control of the core territories of the “caliphate”
in northern and eastern Syria, where it faces no serious
challengers. If these trends continue, northern, central,
and eastern Syria will effectively be divided among
jihadist groups, various Shia and Alawite militias, and
the rump regime state. Such an outcome would continue
to destabilize Syria’s neighbors, indefinitely prolong its
refugee crisis, and attract local and foreign fighters to
extremist ideology.
1 These groups are often referred to as ‘’moderate” to distinguish them from
jihadist groups such as the Nusra Front and ISIS. This is a loaded, subjective
term, and the author will use the somewhat more rigorous term
“nationalist” for insurgent groups that define their goals in terms of
national liberation rather than a transnational, jihadist agenda, and with
whom the United States could conceivably have a working relationship now
and in a postwar Syria.
The United States still has feasible options against the
jihadists in Syria. Although these options are
complicated and imperfect, they are also logical and
practical because they align US and local Syrian
interests. Specifically, they require that the United
States enable nationalist insurgents to compete with,
contain, and finally confront jihadist groups.
Circumstances in southern Syria, in particular, present
an opportunity to work with capable nationalists to
both weaken jihadist groups and encourage a political
settlement to the broader conflict that gave rise to
them. The situation in northern Syria is less promising,
but the United States can help prevent jihadist groups
from capturing all of it and lay the groundwork for a
locally led anti-jihadist ground offensive. Effective
strategies in the north and south would be mutually
reinforcing, establishing conditions to defeat and
replace the jihadists.
The Nusra Front and ISIS must not only be defeated but
replaced with a legitimate Syrian nationalist
alternative capable of securing and governing the
population, including Sunnis from which these groups
draw their recruits. Crucially, although jihadists
threaten their Sunni coreligionists and minorities alike,
it is the former who must take the lead in fighting them.
Relying exclusively on Alawite militias, Shia jihadists,
or other non-Sunni forces to fight Sunni groups merely
reinforces a sectarian narrative of Sunni oppression at
Defeating the Jihadists in Syria:
Competition before Confrontation
BY FAYSAL ITANI
Atlantic Council
RAFIK HARIRI CENTER
FOR THE MIDDLE EAST
ISSUE IN FOCUS
Faysal Itani is a Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.
Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East
The Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at
the Atlantic Council studies political transitions
and economic conditions in Arab countries
and recommends US and European policies to
encourage constructive change.
APRIL 2015
2. 2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
the hands of minorities—creating an effective
recruitment tool for both ISIS and the Nusra Front.
Limited Victories against ISIS in Syria
The US-led campaign against ISIS in Syria has damaged
the group’s hydrocarbons infrastructure and prevented
it from capturing Kobani, a Kurdish enclave on the
Turkish border otherwise surrounded by hostile ISIS
territory, while inflicting several hundred jihadist
casualties in the process.2
The destruction of ISIS-held oil refineries and
stockpiles has drastically diminished the group’s oil
revenues. By the latest estimates, as of December 2014
daily oil output in ISIS-controlled territory had
diminished from seventy thousand to twenty thousand
barrels, while daily oil revenues dropped from
2 “U.S.-led Air Strikes Have Hit 3,222 Islamic State Targets: Pentagon,”
Reuters, January 7, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/07/
us-mideast-crisis-strikes-damage-idUSKBN0KG1ZM20150107.
$2-3 million to $600,000.3
Because the concept and
economic infrastructure of statehood are critical to
ISIS’s appeal, confidence, and staying power, these are
significant losses. Coalition air strikes have also
targeted ISIS weapons caches, bunkers, and other
military assets.4
In Kobani, US-led air strikes and close air support for
Kurdish fighters saved the city from jihadist capture—
albeit only after significant, prolonged US efforts and
support from nationalist insurgent groups. Kobani’s
military value is limited, but it is important because
ISIS chose to make it so, committing and subsequently
losing hundreds of fighters. Besides these losses, ISIS
3 Mona Alami, “ISIS’s Governance Crisis (Part I): Economic Governance,”
MENASource (blog), Atlantic Council, December 19, 2014, http://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/isis-s-governance-crisis-part-i-
economic-governance.
4 “U.S.-Led Air Strikes Have Hit 3,222 Islamic State Targets: Pentagon,”
Reuters, January 7, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/07/
us-mideast-crisis-strikes-damage-idUSKBN0KG1ZM20150107.
DERAA
LATAKIA
IDLIB
HASAKA
DAMASCUS
TARTOUS
RAQQA
HAMA DEIR EZZOR
SWEIDA
QUNEITERA
HOMS
ALEPPO
Damascus
I R A Q
J O R D A N
L E B A N O N
T U R K E Y
Regime/LoyalistsKEY
Nationalist Rebels
Mixed Nationalist
and Jihadist Rebels
Kurds
ISIS
Based on research from Thomas van Linge (@arabthomness)
Figure 1. Syria: Areas of Control
3. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3
incurred reputational costs from the Kobani fight,
temporarily weakening allies’ and rivals’ perceptions
of its unstoppable momentum. This has practical
implications, since fighters might be less inclined to
join a fallible, beatable ISIS.5
Kobani also showed that
sustained US air power combined with well-armed and
motivated local ground forces could stop ISIS, but it
also demonstrated ISIS’s resilience and determination
in the face of overwhelming firepower.
Shortcomings of the Coalition Campaign
in Syria
Weakening ISIS’s oil infrastructure and defeating its
forces in Kobani are significant achievements, but they
are neither decisive nor sufficient to seriously degrade,
much less destroy, ISIS. The air campaign itself has
flaws: so far, coalition air strikes have focused on ISIS
targets away from the frontlines between ISIS and the
nationalist insurgency in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and
Damascus provinces. Instead, air strikes have
concentrated on Raqqa province, where ISIS faces little
competition, and on Deir Ezzor province, where the
party most likely to benefit is the regime, at the expense
of the population currently living under ISIS.
The US tendency to steer clear of areas where ISIS is
fighting the nationalist insurgency has proven costly.
From the start of coalition air strikes in August 2014
until ISIS’s January 2015 defeat in Kobani, ISIS expanded
its control in Syria, gaining ground in Hasaka, Aleppo,
Hama, Homs, Damascus, and Deraa provinces. According
5 Western governments are probably capable of disrupting foreign fighter
flows to Syria somewhat, though ISIS can continue to draw on Arab and
Syrian recruits.
to some US intelligence sources, ISIS is able to recruit
fighters at a sufficient rate to offset casualties from air
strikes—though the data are unreliable, given the
difficulty of determining casualties with few partners on
the ground.6
ISIS now appears positioned to attempt to make gains in
Hasaka, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus, and Deraa
provinces and may try to recapture territory lost to
nationalists in early 2014. This will force the United
States to decide whether to risk allowing ISIS to expand
or resist it, in cooperation with (and to the benefit of)
either the regime or its rivals. Although the Obama
administration has repeatedly ruled out partnering
with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad against ISIS, how
the air campaign is fought inevitably affects the fortunes
and calculus of the nationalists, jihadists, and regime,
not necessarily to the benefit of the United States.
The current coalition strategy does not address what or
who would replace ISIS if indeed it is degraded and
defeated. A lasting solution to the jihadist problem
would require building national alternatives with broad,
cross-sectarian support—including Syrian Sunnis,
whose politics and grievances ISIS and the Nusra Front
have hijacked. These forces would need to safeguard the
population against both jihadists and the radicalizing
effects of regime violence. Presently, a US train-and-
equip program aims to recruit several thousand Syrians
to fight ISIS but apparently not the regime.7
Thus
constrained, these fighters are more likely to be seen as
American mercenaries than champions of the Syrian
people, even if they somehow manage to defeat ISIS
while taking heavy regime fire.
Finally, whatever its victories against ISIS thus far, a
coalition strategy that weakens ISIS only to empower
other, equally unsavory groups would be unwise.
Therefore, it is worrying that, even as it forces ISIS to
adapt to new constraints, the US-led campaign has set
off a series of local developments that are inadvertently
empowering the Nusra Front at the expense of its
nationalist rivals.
Drawback of the Campaign: Empowering
the Nusra Front
In November 2014, nationalist groups suffered a serious
defeat in Idlib province in northern Syria, an area they
previously dominated. The Nusra Front captured several
key towns from the Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SRF)
6 Eli Lake and Josh Rogin, “U.S. Exaggerates Islamic State Casualties,”
Bloomberg View, March 13, 2015, http://www.bloombergview.com/
articles/2015-03-13/did-kerry-exaggerate-islamic-state-casualties-.
7 “Turkey Says it’s Reached Accord with U.S. on Training Syrian rebels, but
Not on Who Enemy Is,” McClatchy, February 17, 2015, http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/2015/02/17/256930/turkey-says-its-reached-accord.
html.
PRESENTLY, A US TRAIN-
AND-EQUIP PROGRAM
AIMS TO RECRUIT SEVERAL
THOUSAND SYRIANS TO
FIGHT ISIS BUT APPARENTLY
NOT THE REGIME. THUS
CONSTRAINED, THESE
FIGHTERS ARE MORE LIKELY
TO BE SEEN AS AMERICAN
MERCENARIES THAN
CHAMPIONS OF THE SYRIAN
PEOPLE.
4. 4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
and US-backed Harakat Hazm. Some fighters defected to
the Nusra Front, which is now increasingly powerful in
Idlib. The SRF and other nationalist brigades played a
key role in driving ISIS out of Idlib and much of Aleppo
province in early 2014. The Nusra Front’s Idlib offensive
therefore constituted a major blow to ISIS’s nationalist
rivals in northern Syria. The former is now applying
pressure on nationalists in Aleppo province while
consolidating its presence in Idlib. The Nusra Front now
commands at least six thousand fighters against an
estimated twenty to thirty thousand ISIS fighters.8
The Nusra Front’s recent assertiveness and success are
rooted in the interplay between the coalition air
campaign and local political and military realities. These
relate to the local population, the Nusra Front’s reading
of US and US-aligned nationalists’ intentions, and the
local balance of power between fighting groups. Those
living in liberated areas generally consider the regime
the major threat to their safety and interests.9
While
many Syrians likely oppose or are ambivalent toward
the Nusra Front’s jihadist ideology, most care mainly
about protecting themselves from regime violence and
the depredations of undisciplined local militia and
criminals. In this context, they tolerate the Nusra Front
as a potent regime rival and a capable guarantor of
local order.10
Against this backdrop, while the official US goal in Syria
is a political transition based on mutual consent
between the regime and opposition (which would
8 Brian Michael Jenkins, The Dynamics of Syria’s Civil War (RAND Corporation,
January 2014), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
perspectives/PE100/PE115/RAND_PE115.pdf; Department of Defense
Press Briefing by Rear Adm. John Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” US
Department of Defense, January 23, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/
Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5575.
9 Regime violence continues to account for the vast majority of civilian
casualties in Syria.
10 The Nusra Front faces sporadic, hostile protests in its territories, indicating
that it is not always popular as such, but tolerated and/or feared.
presumably exclude Assad), a growing number of
Syrians see US intentions differently.
They observe:
• The United States failing to respond to large-scale
regime violence, including alleged chemical weapon
attacks and constant bombardment of population
zones.11
• The White House reportedly assuring Iran’s Supreme
Leader that US military operations will not target the
Syrian regime, even as the United States and Iran fight
the same enemy, ISIS, in Iraq.12
• The US President publicly deriding the nationalist
insurgency, while also insisting it is receiving US
support.13
• The United States launching air strikes, some of which
have killed Syrian civilians, on ISIS and the Nusra Front’s
Khorasan cell but not against the regime.14
• Senior US officials demanding that rebels prioritize
fighting US enemies (the jihadists) but not their own (the
regime), while failing to give nationalists enough
support to do so effectively.15
Thus, a growing number of Syrians appear to be learning
to live with ISIS and the Nusra Front, at least while
regime violence continues unabated. They are also
losing faith in or turning against the United States. This
has, by association, tainted US-aligned nationalist
groups in many Syrians’ eyes, some of whom are
increasingly seen as US agents and mercenaries rather
than liberators and protectors. The US-led train-and-
equip program, apparently aimed at supporting a Syrian
force to fight jihadists rather than the regime, might be
11 A United Nations investigation did not accuse the Syrian government,
claiming the evidence was not conclusive, but a Human Rights Watch report
later indicated that the evidence “strongly [suggested] regime complicity,” a
conclusion supported by various foreign intelligence agencies. See UN
Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the
Syrian Arab Republic, Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the
Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013 (Hague: September 13, 2013);
Human Rights Watch, Attacks on Ghouta: Analysis of Alleged Use of Chemical
Weapons in Syria (September 10, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2013/09/10/attacks-ghouta.
12 Parisa Hafezi, Louis Charbonneau, and Arshad Mohammed, “Exclusive: U.S.
Told Iran of Intent to Strike Islamic State in Syria—Source,” Reuters,
September 23, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/23/
us-syria-crisis-usa-iran-idUSKCN0HI2F220140923.
13 Nick Gass, “Barack Obama Rebukes Syrian ‘Fantasy,’” Politico, August 10,
2014, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/08/barack-obama-rebukes-
syrian-fantasy-109890.html.
14 “U.S. Airstrikes Target al-Qaeda Faction in Syria,” Washington Post,
November 6, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2014/11/06/
d860ef47-40fa-4f85-8753-0d9de0a6830b_story.html.
15 “Syrian Rebels: We’ll Use U.S. Weapons to Fight Assad, Whether Obama
Likes It or Not,” Daily Beast, September 12, 2014, http://www.
thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/11/syrian-rebels-we-ll-use-u-s-
weapons-to-fight-assad-whether-obama-likes-it-or-not.html.
A GROWING NUMBER OF
SYRIANS APPEAR TO BE
LEARNING TO LIVE WITH
ISIS AND THE NUSRA FRONT,
AT LEAST WHILE REGIME
VIOLENCE CONTINUES
UNABATED.
5. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 5
seen similarly, and participants may struggle to gain
local support or even acceptance.
The coalition air campaign, amid broader Syrian
disappointments in US policy, has also demoralized and
alienated nationalist groups that hoped to be US
partners in the anti-ISIS effort but found themselves
marginalized at strategic, tactical, and operational
levels. These groups also claim, not unreasonably, that
US failure to pressure Assad, and repeated public
assurances that the United States seeks no conflict with
him, are encouraging regime violence. Groups such as
Harakat Hazm, once aligned closely with the United
States, recognized that their standing among the local
population had suffered considerably.16
Harakat Hazm
eventually disbanded and its nationalist fighters were
absorbed by an Islamist coalition.17
Increasingly, nationalist fighters in northern Syria have
come to regret their decision to align with the United
16 To be sure, Harakat Hazm and several other nationalist brigades have also
been accused by locals of corruption, warlordism, and profiteering—
pathologies that fragmented, incoherent foreign funding flows into
northern Syria have greatly enabled.
17 “U.S.-Backed Rebel Group in Syria Disbands,” Wall Street Journal, March 1,
2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/usbacked-rebel-group-in-syria-
disbands-1425253180.
States. Some are dropping out of the insurgency. Others
are defecting to the Nusra Front to take advantage of its
military prowess, sense of purpose and confidence,
higher salaries, and better resources—and many will
embrace its ideology as well. This has accelerated a
perverse, vicious cycle that undermines US interests: the
US strategy inadvertently weakens nationalist
insurgents, who are either defeated or defect to the
Nusra Front. This, in turn, deepens US distrust toward
the nationalist insurgents, leading to further reductions
in US support and the weakening of nationalists, and so
on.
As a result of US actions, threats, and public
pronouncements about its plans for the insurgency, and
judging from its recent offensive against nationalists in
Idlib province, the Nusra Front has apparently concluded
that US pressure on rebel groups to confront it—coupled
with direct US attacks on the Khorasan cell—pose a
potential local threat. The Nusra Front also recognizes
that these under-resourced, US-aligned rebel groups are
not yet in a position to challenge it, but worries this
might change as the US train-and-equip program comes
online. Thus, the al-Qaeda affiliate had calculated that
the sooner it attacked its rivals in Idlib, the better. One
US-aligned nationalist fighter explained, “We walk
A Nusra Front fighter searches a boy at the Karaj al-Hajez crossing, a passageway separating Aleppo’s Bustan al-Qasr
neighborhood, which is under the rebels’ control, and al-Masharqa neighborhood, an area controlled by the regime,
November 2013. Photo credit: Reuters/Molhem Barakat.
6. 6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
around Syria with a huge American flag planted on our
backs, but we don’t have enough AK-47s in our hands to
protect ourselves.”18
The Nusra Front has effectively capitalized on popular
and rebel disillusionment with the United States and its
local allies, building influence with the insurgency and
population, and facilitating its jihadist project. It has
been less brutal with the local population than ISIS,
and, unlike ISIS, it sustains working relationships with
many insurgent groups. The Nusra Front has embedded
itself within, rather than come out in outright
opposition to, much of the insurgency and population.
Its strategy is more subtle and sophisticated than that
of ISIS, which could make it more sustainable, with
negative implications for US security.
Shaping a New Strategy: Competing with
the Nusra Front, Containing ISIS
The United States is rightly concerned about ISIS and
the Nusra Front, but, as currently conceived and
executed, the US-led anti-jihadist strategy in Syria
cannot achieve its goals because it does not adequately
account for local realities. Its main weakness is an
apparent disconnect between US and Syrian priorities,
and here the United States faces a conundrum. The
Nusra Front and ISIS are a more immediate threat to US
18 Adam Entous, “Covert CIA Mission to Arm Syrian Rebels Goes Awry,” Wall
Street Journal, January 26, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/covert-cia-
mission-to-arm-syrian-rebels-goes-awry-1422329582.
security than is the Assad regime, which is too weak
and focused on survival to threaten the United States.
On the other hand, only a local ground force accepted
by Sunni Syrians can defeat and replace the jihadists,
and for the Sunni-led insurgency, the more immediate
threat is the regime, not the jihadists. For the
population writ large, the salient question is not “What
is a particular group’s ideology?” but “Can it protect
us?” or, more simply, “Can we live with it?”19
The nationalist insurgents’ assessment of their current
situation vis-à-vis the Nusra Front is correct: the group
ultimately threatens them, but it is neither as powerful
nor as hostile as the regime. In any case, the
nationalists cannot defeat the Nusra Front while
simultaneously fighting ISIS and the regime, unless
they receive a dramatic (and thus far absent) increase
in international support. Rather than push nationalist
insurgents to confront American enemies and ignore
their own, against unrealistic odds, the United States
would benefit more from helping the nationalists
compete with the Nusra Front for control of the
insurgency and popular support, contain ISIS, and build
capacity for an eventual offensive against the jihadists.
Until nationalists are better placed to confront the
Nusra Front, heavy US pressure on them to do so only
discredits and isolates them, provoking a fight they
cannot win—as do US air strikes on the Nusra Front in
the absence of a meaningful strategy for addressing
regime violence. Until its nationalist rivals are better
placed to defeat the Assad regime, the best way to
weaken the Nusra Front in Syria is not through direct
or proxy confrontation, but by enabling nationalists to
compete effectively with it. In doing so, the nationalist
insurgents would improve their military position,
popular standing, and appeal to disillusioned fighters
who would otherwise join the Nusra Front.
ISIS presents a different challenge. It shares the Nusra
Front’s ideology but not its priorities. The Nusra Front
sees the caliphate as a long-term project, best served
by a short-term emphasis on fighting the regime, and
alternately cooperating and competing with insurgent
groups. ISIS’s immediate and long-term priorities are
one and the same: to establish and expand the caliphate
by controlling territory and eliminating opposition.
Through co-option, bribery, patronage, and violence,
ISIS has all but ended organized resistance in its core
territory in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa provinces.
It is tempting to think that ISIS’s ideology and behavior
will doom it to failure, but these are less important
19 That does not, of course, preclude that a generation growing up under
jihadist rule will not increasingly internalize ISIS’s or the Nusra Front’s
ideology.
RATHER THAN PUSH
NATIONALIST INSURGENTS
TO CONFRONT AMERICAN
ENEMIES AND IGNORE THEIR
OWN, AGAINST UNREALISTIC
ODDS, THE UNITED STATES
WOULD BENEFIT MORE FROM
HELPING THE NATIONALISTS
COMPETE WITH THE NUSRA
FRONT FOR CONTROL OF THE
INSURGENCY AND POPULAR
SUPPORT, CONTAIN ISIS,
AND BUILD CAPACITY FOR
AN EVENTUAL OFFENSIVE
AGAINST THE JIHADISTS.
7. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 7
than the conquered populations’ perception of their
own interests. Syrians who submit to ISIS benefit from
protection and order. Those who resist are killed, or
find they have traded ISIS’s violence for that of the
regime. Thus, while sporadic guerilla attacks on ISIS
fighters continue, as long as local populations calculate
that rebellion is unlikely to improve their lives, they
have no incentive to confront ISIS.
Insurgent competition with ISIS in its core geography is
therefore unrealistic in the short term. Focusing on
containing ISIS, disrupting its lines of communication
where possible, and preventing it from expanding in
other key provinces including Aleppo, Hama, Homs,
Damascus, and Deraa is more realistic, at least until
nationalist insurgents are better placed to apply
pressure on ISIS strongholds. That in turn would strain
ISIS resources, and help change the calculus of the
population it controls. Local resistance would then
become a rational choice because it would have a chance
of succeeding, and because Syrians would no longer be
forced to choose between ISIS and the regime.
A Two-Pronged, Local Approach
It is difficult to generalize about the geography of
Syria’s civil war or the balance of power between
various fighting groups. It is possible and useful,
however, to map out the war’s distinct trends and
trajectories in different parts of Syria. This can inform
an anti-jihadist strategy that accounts for the
strengths, weaknesses, and incentives of fighting
groups and populations, enabling local competition
with the Nusra Front and containment of ISIS, and
establishing conditions for eventually confronting
and defeating both.
Building on Results in the South
Presently, southern Syria offers the circumstances
most favorable to establishing an effective, legitimate,
and sustainable alternative to ISIS and the Nusra Front.
In Damascus, Quneitera, and Deraa provinces,
insurgents have made substantial territorial gains
against the regime, largely kept ISIS out, and competed
strongly with the Nusra Front, thanks in part to a
well-conceived covert US support program for
nationalist groups. By tightly controlling weapons and
funding flows, establishing direct contact with vetted
insurgent commanders, and providing guidance on
military strategy and tactics, the covert program has
helped the insurgency avoid the fragmentation and
dysfunction that plagued the rebellion and indirectly
empowered ISIS and the Nusra Front in northern Syria.
More generally, the southern insurgency’s qualified
successes offer lessons and opportunities for building
effective, legitimate, long-term counterparts to the
Nusra Front and ISIS, in which the United States can
play a valuable role.
In southern Syria, the United States can take
advantage of:
• The valuable experience of the Jordanian-based,
US-led covert Military Operations Command (MOC),
which has helped the United States build a deeper
understanding of and influence over the insurgent
landscape in southern Syria.
• Proximity to a competent and generally dependable
ally, Jordan, which shares the US interest in defeating
the jihadists, and has extensive outreach to and
knowledge of local fighting groups.
• A border that is easier to control than the Turkish-
Syrian border, and an ally that appears more
committed to controlling it, which has helped restrict
foreign jihadist fighter flows in southern Syria.
• Local tribal structures in Deraa province which lend
themselves to organized collective action, are
responsive to financial patronage, and can be
incentivized to fight the jihadists.
• A large, cohesive Druze population that would be
open to alliances that secure the community’s, rather
than the regime’s, interests.20
• A weak ISIS presence.
• The MOC’s centralized decision-making over funding
and supply streams to insurgent groups, discouraging
the infighting that seriously weakened rebel groups in
northern Syria.
• Local insurgent groups’ apparent willingness and
ability to cooperate with, and cede governance
authority to, local coordination committees.
• Proximity to Damascus, the regime’s center of gravity
and a useful pressure point for enabling a political
settlement to the Syrian conflict and its radicalizing
effects.
Southern Syria also presents challenges that the US
strategy must consider, including:
• The Nusra Front’s sophisticated outreach to, and
coexistence with, local insurgent groups.
• Unopposed regime air and artillery bombardment that
weakens potential allies against the jihadists.
20 There are indications that Druze-regime tensions are increasing, in part
due to aggressive regime conscription efforts among the population,
though so far the Druze have shown little inclination to confront the
regime.
8. 8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
• The Nusra Front’s superior funding, allowing it to pay
fighters several hundred dollars a month, compared
with the nationalist insurgent groups’ reported $50-100
per month.21
• ISIS’s apparent attempts to infiltrate southern Syria,
particularly Damascus, and the possibility that the
Syrian regime would facilitate this to weaken the
nationalist opposition.
These opportunities and threats suggest US interests
would be best served by:
• Substantially increasing direct financial support for
vetted nationalist groups in the south, allowing them to
offer fighters competitive salaries and benefits, provide
for the local population, and cooperate effectively with
local civilian institutions.
• Technical and parts support and training to nationalist
rebels, enabling them to fully utilize captured regime
and jihadist material.
• Adjusting strategy from merely helping nationalist
groups hold territory to enabling them to expand it. The
21 This is according to Syrians in close contact with southern insurgent
groups.
alternative is ceding this terrain to either the regime—
thereby undermining the insurgency’s position to the
ultimate benefit of the jihadists—or to the Nusra Front
and ISIS themselves.
• Helping allied insurgents apply military pressure on
the capital, which would make a political settlement
that marginalizes the jihadists more likely.
• Establishing an air exclusion zone over insurgent-
controlled territory in the south, and/or providing
anti-aircraft weapons to vetted nationalist groups,
with technical provisions in place that limit risks from
more sophisticated weapons such as man-portable air
defense systems (MANPADS) from falling into hostile
hands.22
Even simple anti-aircraft artillery, which poses
fewer proliferation risks, would complicate regime air
operations, helping local allies protect and thereby
increase their standing among the population, and
build military capability against the jihadists.
22 John Reed, “Tracking Chips and Kill Switches for MANPADS,” The Complex
(blog), Foreign Policy, October 19, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2012/10/19/tracking-chips-and-kill-switches-for-manpads/; Anthony
Cordesman, “Syria, U.S. Power Projection, and the Search for an ‘Equalizer,’”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 9, 2012, http://csis.
org/publication/syria-us-power-projection-and-search-equalizer.
Members of the Nusra Front pose for a picture at a checkpoint at the Karaj al-Hajez crossing, November 2013. Photo credit:
Reuters/Molhem Barakat.
9. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 9
• Aggressively reaching out, politically and financially,
to Druze communities in Sweida province. These
patronage networks, if combined with demonstrations
of military success and staying power by nationalist
insurgent groups, offer a potential incentive for Sunni-
Druze cooperation.
• In keeping with a “competition before confrontation”
approach to the Nusra Front, ceasing to condition
support for nationalists on their immediately taking
the offensive against the group. A pushback against the
Nusra Front can follow once nationalist insurgents are
able to successfully defend and govern territory.
Neither the southern insurgents themselves nor the
MOC’s strategy are perfect, but they present an
opportunity for a strategically sound policy against
ISIS and the Nusra Front. The results thus far, despite
the limited scale of MOC support and objectives,
contradict the belief among some policymakers that the
United States cannot play a useful role or secure its
interests in Syria.
Parallel Efforts in the North
The north’s political and military landscape differs
from that in the south, but the two regions’ futures
are intertwined and will shape the environment in
Syria’s central, demographic heartland and cities.
Despite having the regime as their common enemy,
the jihadists and the nationalist insurgency are
ultimately in a zero-sum struggle for control of Syria.
That common fight complicates matters, but both ISIS’s
“caliphate” and the Nusra Front’s “emirate” exist and
expand at the nationalists’ expense.
The jihadists’ relative success—and the nationalists’
losses—in northern Syria obviously bode ill for the
balance of power in Syria writ large, including in the
south and in major cities. If the Nusra Front and ISIS
grow stronger in Hasaka, Aleppo, Idlib, or Hama
provinces, they would be able to project power more
effectively elsewhere, driving recruitment by (and
fighters’ defection to) the jihadists. What is needed is
not a “‘south first’ strategy” but a parallel north-south
effort that accounts for local differences.
The north presents the United States with the following
options against ISIS and the Nusra Front:
• Provide sufficient material support, in cooperation
with Turkey where suitable, to prevent the collapse of
nationalist forces in Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. The
current balance of power in the north is such that, if
these groups are defeated, many of their fighters,
resources, and territory would very likely be absorbed
by a combination of the Nusra Front, ISIS, and the
regime and its militias.
• Expand coalition air strikes to target ISIS’s frontlines
with the nationalist insurgency, helping the latter block
ISIS advances. This would likely require excluding
regime aircraft from northwestern Syria.
• Use US financial and material support to promote
cooperation among Kurds, Sunni Arab rebels, and
Sunni Arab tribes against jihadists. Kurdish-Arab
cooperation is a potentially valuable tool, albeit one
hamstrung by the Kurds’ parochial agenda, resistance
from Turkey, and many Arab tribes’ historically fraught
relationship with Syrian Kurds.
Compared to the south, northern Syria offers fewer
“raw materials” that the United States can deploy
against the jihadists. The nationalist insurgency there
has been seriously weakened over the last six months,
but it has not been destroyed. Most likely, the
insurgency can survive long enough to expand and
consolidate rebel gains in other areas of Syria, apply
serious external pressure on ISIS and the Nusra Front,
and offer locals a means of protecting themselves that
does not require them to join or depend on the
jihadists.
Conclusion
The current US-led coalition campaign in Syria cannot
destroy ISIS without effective, legitimate Syrian
ground forces. The campaign, which targets jihadists,
ignores the regime, and marginalizes potential local
partners, constrains but does not existentially threaten
ISIS. Meanwhile, it is inadvertently radicalizing Syrians
and empowering the Nusra Front. Even as the US-led
air strikes kill ISIS fighters and weaken the group’s
economic infrastructure, on its current path the
campaign’s most likely outcomes are an entrenched
ISIS and a strengthened Nusra Front.
An effective counter-jihadist strategy in Syria must
instead center on working with capable local partners
A PUSHBACK AGAINST
THE NUSRA FRONT CAN
FOLLOW ONCE NATIONALIST
INSURGENTS ARE ABLE TO
SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND AND
GOVERN TERRITORY.
10. 10 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
to both destroy and replace ISIS and the Nusra Front. In
the south, US-aided rebels have made important gains
that the United States can build on, at the Nusra Front’s
expense. Further north, nationalist insurgent groups
should not be left to collapse, as this would
substantially benefit both ISIS and the Nusra Front and
deprive the United States of much-needed partners
against them. With greater US support, the nationalist
insurgency in Syria can eventually go on the offensive
against the jihadists—but pushing for this prematurely
would destroy any prospect of success.
A locally driven approach to fighting the jihadists
would also have positive implications for the broader
Syrian conflict, and its radicalizing effects. By helping
establish legitimate, capable opposition forces in Syria,
the United States would also fulfill a key requirement
for any political settlement to the Syrian conflict that
gave rise to the jihadists: the existence of strong local
partners able to fight and negotiate on behalf of Syria’s
opposition. These partners will have their flaws, but
they will hardly be worse than the current US partners
against ISIS in Iraq, and they are preferable to a Syria
controlled by ISIS, the regime, Hezbollah, and the
Nusra Front.
11. Atlantic Council Board of Directors
CHAIRMAN
*Jon M. Huntsman, Jr.
CHAIRMAN,
INTERNATIONAL
ADVISORY BOARD
Brent Scowcroft
PRESIDENT AND CEO
*Frederick Kempe
EXECUTIVE
VICE CHAIRS
*Adrienne Arsht
*Stephen J. Hadley
VICE CHAIRS
*Robert J. Abernethy
*Richard Edelman
*C. Boyden Gray
*George Lund
*Virginia A. Mulberger
*W. DeVier Pierson
*John Studzinski
TREASURER
*Brian C. McK. Henderson
SECRETARY
*Walter B. Slocombe
DIRECTORS
Stephane Abrial
Odeh Aburdene
Peter Ackerman
Timothy D. Adams
John Allen
Michael Andersson
Michael Ansari
Richard L. Armitage
David D. Aufhauser
Elizabeth F. Bagley
Peter Bass
*Rafic Bizri
*Thomas L. Blair
Francis Bouchard
Myron Brilliant
Esther Brimmer
*R. Nicholas Burns
*Richard R. Burt
Michael Calvey
James E. Cartwright
John E. Chapoton
Ahmed Charai
Sandra Charles
George Chopivsky
Wesley K. Clark
David W. Craig
*Ralph D. Crosby, Jr.
Nelson Cunningham
Ivo H. Daalder
Gregory R. Dahlberg
*Paula J. Dobriansky
Christopher J. Dodd
Conrado Dornier
Patrick J. Durkin
Thomas J. Edelman
Thomas J. Egan, Jr.
*Stuart E. Eizenstat
Thomas R. Eldridge
Julie Finley
Lawrence P. Fisher, II
Alan H. Fleischmann
Michèle Flournoy
*Ronald M. Freeman
Laurie Fulton
*Robert S. Gelbard Thomas
Glocer
*Sherri W. Goodman
Mikael Hagström
Ian Hague
John D. Harris II
Frank Haun
Michael V. Hayden
Annette Heuser
*Karl Hopkins
Robert Hormats
*Mary L. Howell
Robert E. Hunter
Wolfgang Ischinger
Reuben Jeffery, III
Robert Jeffrey
*James L. Jones, Jr.
George A. Joulwan
Lawrence S. Kanarek
Stephen R. Kappes
Maria Pica Karp
Francis J. Kelly, Jr.
Zalmay M. Khalilzad
Robert M. Kimmitt
Henry A. Kissinger
Franklin D. Kramer
Philip Lader
*Richard L. Lawson
*Jan M. Lodal
Jane Holl Lute
William J. Lynn
Izzat Majeed
Wendy W. Makins
Mian M. Mansha
William E. Mayer
Allan McArtor
Eric D.K. Melby
Franklin C. Miller
James N. Miller
*Judith A. Miller
*Alexander V. Mirtchev
Obie L. Moore
*George E. Moose
Georgette Mosbacher
Steve C. Nicandros
Thomas R. Nides
Franco Nuschese
Joseph S. Nye
Sean O’Keefe
Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg
Ahmet Oren
*Ana Palacio
Carlos Pascual
Thomas R. Pickering
Daniel B. Poneman
Daniel M. Price
*Andrew Prozes
Arnold L. Punaro
*Kirk A. Radke
Teresa M. Ressel
Charles O. Rossotti
Stanley O. Roth
Robert Rowland
Harry Sachinis
William O. Schmieder
John P. Schmitz
Brent Scowcroft
Alan J. Spence
James Stavridis
Richard J.A. Steele
*Paula Stern
Robert J. Stevens
John S. Tanner
Peter J. Tanous
*Ellen O. Tauscher
Karen Tramontano
Clyde C. Tuggle
Paul Twomey
Melanne Verveer
Enzo Viscusi
Charles F. Wald
Jay Walker
Michael F. Walsh
Mark R. Warner
David A. Wilson
Maciej Witucki
Mary C. Yates
Dov S. Zakheim
HONORARY DIRECTORS
David C. Acheson
Madeleine K. Albright
James A. Baker, III
Harold Brown
Frank C. Carlucci, III
Robert M. Gates
Michael G. Mullen
Leon E. Panetta
William J. Perry
Colin L. Powell
Condoleezza Rice
Edward L. Rowny
George P. Shultz
John W. Warner
William H. Webster
HARIRI CENTER
ADVISORY COUNCIL
^Bahaa Hariri
Hanan Ashrawi
^Shaukat Aziz
Fredrick Kempe
^Alexander Kwasniewski
Javier Solana
James D. Wolfensohn
*Executive Committee Members
^International Advisory Board
Members
List as of April 15, 2015