This document proposes a strategy to counter ISIL as a transregional threat. It recommends prioritizing homeland security while also disrupting ISIL's transregional network through airstrikes, raids on leadership, and bolstering stability in regions where ISIL operates. The strategy acknowledges that eradicating violent jihadism requires addressing underlying political issues like poor governance and sectarianism, but notes US leverage is limited. It also stresses balancing support for Kurdish forces with avoiding fueling regional conflicts.
This document provides a comparative analysis of the leadership, operations, and strategies of three terrorist organizations: ISIS, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It discusses the leadership and evolution of each group over time. ISIS emerged stronger in 2013 under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and controls territory in Iraq and Syria. AQAP was formed through a merger in Yemen and Saudi Arabia and is now led by Qasim al-Raymi. AQIM operates in North and West Africa and has expanded beyond Algeria under the leadership of Abdelmalek Droukdel. The document aims to comprehensively understand these
Daesh originated from al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004 and seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate. It controls large areas of Syria and Iraq and has pledged allegiance from other jihadi groups. Daesh's ideology is based on a rigid interpretation of Sharia law and a belief that it must rule based on God's word. While social factors in the Middle East contributed to its rise, Daesh's appeal is primarily driven by its religious ideology and vision of restoring the Islamic caliphate. Understanding Daesh requires examining both its ideological foundations and the environmental factors that influenced its formation and growth.
The document provides a summary and assessment of critical threats from terrorist and militant groups around the world in 3 pages divided into regional sections. Some key events summarized include:
1. A suicide bombing in Lahore, Pakistan claimed by Jamatul Ahrar that killed over 70 people.
2. Pro-GNC militias in Libya preventing the UN-backed unity government from establishing itself in Tripoli.
3. Continued fighting in Yemen between Houthi-Saleh forces and coalition-backed forces with additional fractures appearing as peace talks continue.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati indicated that an upcoming trilateral meeting between Iran, Iraq, and Syria will strengthen the "resistance front" against the U.S. and its regional allies.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may have growing influence and strength in North Africa, despite recent setbacks in Derna, Libya. ISIS claimed the terrorist attack on a tourist beach resort in Sousse, Tunisia, that killed 38 people. The attack was the deadliest in Tunisia’s history.
3. ISIS is conducting a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign against the al Houthis in Sana’a, Yemen’s capital. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a has claimed credit for three separate VBIED attacks, including four bombings on the first day of Ramadan, June 17, another on June 20, and the third on June 29. The press releases frame these attacks specifically as targeting the “dens” of the al Houthis, which is distinct from how Wilayat Sana’a has laid claim to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Key Iranian regime players’ meetings with senior Syrian and Iraqi government officials and the Hezbollah Secretary General may signal Iranian efforts to bring more force to bear in defense of Assad and Baghdad against the growing ISIS threat. The Supreme Leader’s senior foreign policy advisor Ali Akbar Velayati met with Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon before meeting with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus, Syria while Iran’s defense minister IRGC Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan met with Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al Abadi in Baghdad, Iraq. IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani also levied criticism directly against the United States for not stopping ISIS.
2. Al Houthi attacks on Saudi territory will continue to antagonize Saudi Arabia and will decrease the likelihood that warring factions will participate in political negotiations in the near future. The al Houthis fired rockets at populated locations within Saudi Arabia and raided Saudi Arabian border posts over the past week. An al Houthi-affiliated TV channel ran video footage of al Houthis allegedly firing into Saudi Arabia. UN-sponsored talks in Geneva announced last week have been delayed.
3. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate its capability to conduct attacks within Kenya and carried out multiple attacks, including temporarily seizing territory, in northern Kenyan over the week. Al Shabaab militants took control of a mosque in Garissa county in Kenya and spoke to the congregation, which was held hostage, before fleeing ahead of security forces and also briefly held a town close to the border with Somalia. This the first time the group has carried out such activities in Kenya.
Security will stay high on the government’s agenda amid concerns over the rise of ISIL, a Sunni jihadist group that has gained control over large sections of Syria and Iraq. ISIL militants overwhelmed Iraqi military forces following the launch of major offensive in June, and while the advance was largely halted with
Defeating the Jihadists in Syria: Competition before Confrontationatlanticcouncil
Since August 2014, the US-led air campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has successfully inflicted casualties on ISIS and weakened its oil revenues. However, the same efforts have also accelerated the rise of the Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate, and the near-collapse of nationalist rebel forces.
In "Defeating the Jihadists in Syria: Competition before Confrontation," Faysal Itani of the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East details the unintended consequences of the coalition air campaign and proposes a revised US strategy. He argues that the United States can effectively assist nationalist insurgents to defeat ISIS and the Nusra Front by enabling them to compete with and contain these groups before ultimately confronting them.
Itani writes that the US-led campaign thus far and the train-and-equip initiative set to begin next month undermine and weaken nationalist rebel forces. He criticizes these efforts for failing to provide sufficient support to the rebel forces, while directing them to target ISIS instead of the regime. Meanwhile, the Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations have greater resources and have been effective in targeting the Assad regime. As such, nationalist rebel forces and local populations have increasingly aligned with the Nusra Front and even tolerate ISIS in order to protect themselves against regime violence, criminality, and chaos.
Itani's proposed US strategy offers a practical and workable response to the rise of jihadists groups in Syria; this revised strategy seeks to support rebel forces to compete with the Nusra Front for popular support and to take control of the insurgency, contain ISIS, and build capacity for an eventual offensive against the jihadists. This approach will build on positive results in southern Syria by significantly increasing direct financial and material support and training for vetted nationalist groups that have already shown significant success. Simultaneously, in the north the campaign can provide sufficient material support to nationalist forces while expanding coalition air strikes to target ISIS's frontlines, allowing the nationalist insurgency to defend and govern territory. Only once nationalist insurgent forces have successfully competed with the Nusra Front and contained ISIS can they confront and ultimately defeat the jihadist groups in Syria.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) Wilayat Sana’a may have begun a Ramadan vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign targeting the al Houthis in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The group claimed credit for four simultaneous bombings on the first day of Ramadan and has continued VBIED attacks in the capital that ISIS has framed as part of a campaign in its messaging. ISIS is probably seeking to inflame sectarian tensions in Yemen and elicit an overreaction from the al Houthis.
2. The Iranian regime continued to stress that it has not compromised on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s nuclear redlines ahead of the June 30 deadline to reach a final deal with the P5+1. Khamenei highlighted four key red lines for a final nuclear agreement in a June 23 speech: Iran will not accept a “long-term limitation [on enrichment] of 10-12 years;” there will be no limitations “on [nuclear] research, development, and construction” during the period limiting enrichment; the UN Security Council, Congress, and U.S. government economic sanctions must be removed “immediately after the signing of the agreement;” and there will be no inspections of military sites, interviews with Iranian scientists, or other “unconventional” inspections.
3. Al Qaeda-linked groups in West Africa may be attempting to coordinate against the threat of ISIS. There are reports of a recent rapprochement of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun leadership. Al Murabitoun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who is reported to have survived the U.S. airstrike targeting him, initially broke from AQIM in 2012 over disagreements as to the direction of AQIM. Additionally, AQIM’s religious scholars have issued statements chastising ISIS.
This document provides a comparative analysis of the leadership, operations, and strategies of three terrorist organizations: ISIS, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It discusses the leadership and evolution of each group over time. ISIS emerged stronger in 2013 under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and controls territory in Iraq and Syria. AQAP was formed through a merger in Yemen and Saudi Arabia and is now led by Qasim al-Raymi. AQIM operates in North and West Africa and has expanded beyond Algeria under the leadership of Abdelmalek Droukdel. The document aims to comprehensively understand these
Daesh originated from al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004 and seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate. It controls large areas of Syria and Iraq and has pledged allegiance from other jihadi groups. Daesh's ideology is based on a rigid interpretation of Sharia law and a belief that it must rule based on God's word. While social factors in the Middle East contributed to its rise, Daesh's appeal is primarily driven by its religious ideology and vision of restoring the Islamic caliphate. Understanding Daesh requires examining both its ideological foundations and the environmental factors that influenced its formation and growth.
The document provides a summary and assessment of critical threats from terrorist and militant groups around the world in 3 pages divided into regional sections. Some key events summarized include:
1. A suicide bombing in Lahore, Pakistan claimed by Jamatul Ahrar that killed over 70 people.
2. Pro-GNC militias in Libya preventing the UN-backed unity government from establishing itself in Tripoli.
3. Continued fighting in Yemen between Houthi-Saleh forces and coalition-backed forces with additional fractures appearing as peace talks continue.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati indicated that an upcoming trilateral meeting between Iran, Iraq, and Syria will strengthen the "resistance front" against the U.S. and its regional allies.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may have growing influence and strength in North Africa, despite recent setbacks in Derna, Libya. ISIS claimed the terrorist attack on a tourist beach resort in Sousse, Tunisia, that killed 38 people. The attack was the deadliest in Tunisia’s history.
3. ISIS is conducting a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign against the al Houthis in Sana’a, Yemen’s capital. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a has claimed credit for three separate VBIED attacks, including four bombings on the first day of Ramadan, June 17, another on June 20, and the third on June 29. The press releases frame these attacks specifically as targeting the “dens” of the al Houthis, which is distinct from how Wilayat Sana’a has laid claim to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Key Iranian regime players’ meetings with senior Syrian and Iraqi government officials and the Hezbollah Secretary General may signal Iranian efforts to bring more force to bear in defense of Assad and Baghdad against the growing ISIS threat. The Supreme Leader’s senior foreign policy advisor Ali Akbar Velayati met with Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon before meeting with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus, Syria while Iran’s defense minister IRGC Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan met with Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al Abadi in Baghdad, Iraq. IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani also levied criticism directly against the United States for not stopping ISIS.
2. Al Houthi attacks on Saudi territory will continue to antagonize Saudi Arabia and will decrease the likelihood that warring factions will participate in political negotiations in the near future. The al Houthis fired rockets at populated locations within Saudi Arabia and raided Saudi Arabian border posts over the past week. An al Houthi-affiliated TV channel ran video footage of al Houthis allegedly firing into Saudi Arabia. UN-sponsored talks in Geneva announced last week have been delayed.
3. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate its capability to conduct attacks within Kenya and carried out multiple attacks, including temporarily seizing territory, in northern Kenyan over the week. Al Shabaab militants took control of a mosque in Garissa county in Kenya and spoke to the congregation, which was held hostage, before fleeing ahead of security forces and also briefly held a town close to the border with Somalia. This the first time the group has carried out such activities in Kenya.
Security will stay high on the government’s agenda amid concerns over the rise of ISIL, a Sunni jihadist group that has gained control over large sections of Syria and Iraq. ISIL militants overwhelmed Iraqi military forces following the launch of major offensive in June, and while the advance was largely halted with
Defeating the Jihadists in Syria: Competition before Confrontationatlanticcouncil
Since August 2014, the US-led air campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has successfully inflicted casualties on ISIS and weakened its oil revenues. However, the same efforts have also accelerated the rise of the Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate, and the near-collapse of nationalist rebel forces.
In "Defeating the Jihadists in Syria: Competition before Confrontation," Faysal Itani of the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East details the unintended consequences of the coalition air campaign and proposes a revised US strategy. He argues that the United States can effectively assist nationalist insurgents to defeat ISIS and the Nusra Front by enabling them to compete with and contain these groups before ultimately confronting them.
Itani writes that the US-led campaign thus far and the train-and-equip initiative set to begin next month undermine and weaken nationalist rebel forces. He criticizes these efforts for failing to provide sufficient support to the rebel forces, while directing them to target ISIS instead of the regime. Meanwhile, the Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations have greater resources and have been effective in targeting the Assad regime. As such, nationalist rebel forces and local populations have increasingly aligned with the Nusra Front and even tolerate ISIS in order to protect themselves against regime violence, criminality, and chaos.
Itani's proposed US strategy offers a practical and workable response to the rise of jihadists groups in Syria; this revised strategy seeks to support rebel forces to compete with the Nusra Front for popular support and to take control of the insurgency, contain ISIS, and build capacity for an eventual offensive against the jihadists. This approach will build on positive results in southern Syria by significantly increasing direct financial and material support and training for vetted nationalist groups that have already shown significant success. Simultaneously, in the north the campaign can provide sufficient material support to nationalist forces while expanding coalition air strikes to target ISIS's frontlines, allowing the nationalist insurgency to defend and govern territory. Only once nationalist insurgent forces have successfully competed with the Nusra Front and contained ISIS can they confront and ultimately defeat the jihadist groups in Syria.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) Wilayat Sana’a may have begun a Ramadan vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign targeting the al Houthis in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The group claimed credit for four simultaneous bombings on the first day of Ramadan and has continued VBIED attacks in the capital that ISIS has framed as part of a campaign in its messaging. ISIS is probably seeking to inflame sectarian tensions in Yemen and elicit an overreaction from the al Houthis.
2. The Iranian regime continued to stress that it has not compromised on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s nuclear redlines ahead of the June 30 deadline to reach a final deal with the P5+1. Khamenei highlighted four key red lines for a final nuclear agreement in a June 23 speech: Iran will not accept a “long-term limitation [on enrichment] of 10-12 years;” there will be no limitations “on [nuclear] research, development, and construction” during the period limiting enrichment; the UN Security Council, Congress, and U.S. government economic sanctions must be removed “immediately after the signing of the agreement;” and there will be no inspections of military sites, interviews with Iranian scientists, or other “unconventional” inspections.
3. Al Qaeda-linked groups in West Africa may be attempting to coordinate against the threat of ISIS. There are reports of a recent rapprochement of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun leadership. Al Murabitoun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who is reported to have survived the U.S. airstrike targeting him, initially broke from AQIM in 2012 over disagreements as to the direction of AQIM. Additionally, AQIM’s religious scholars have issued statements chastising ISIS.
This document summarizes key information about the terrorist group ISIS and lessons that can be learned from historical analysis of terrorism. It describes ISIS's capabilities, including its demonstrated ability to fight and control territory in Iraq and Syria, establish governance structures, and generate funding through oil sales and taxation. The document also notes ISIS's willingness to commit atrocities like beheadings. It argues that ISIS represents a unique threat due to its state-building ambitions and that combating the group will test the US's ability to address future asymmetric threats that control territory and populations. The document concludes by outlining lessons from history that could inform how the US responds to ISIS, such as providing long-term military support to local forces and addressing
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) withdrew from al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt governorate, as coalition-backed Yemeni forces advanced on the port city. AQAP had controlled al Mukalla since April 2015, using the city as a base to support operations against the al Houthi-Saleh forces in western Yemen. AQAP likely seeks to retain its military capabilities and has redeployed forces to support zones in Abyan, Ma’rib, and possibly al Bayda. The loss of al Mukalla is a setback for the group, but AQAP has resurged from similar setbacks previously.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) vehicle in a suburb of Mogadishu. This is the first ISIS-claimed attack in Somalia, though the attack was not listed in the English editions of ISIS’s al Bayan provincial news bulletin and did not kill any AMISOM troops. It is possible that an al Shabaab cell in Mogadishu defected to ISIS. CTP assesses that there is a small pro-ISIS group in northern Somalia and a possible Mogadishu-based cell.
3. ISIS Wilayat Barqa withdrew the majority of its forces from Derna in eastern Libya. This is a significant loss for ISIS, which first established its Libyan affiliate in Derna and has been fighting to reclaim the city since June 2015. ISIS may be preparing to move its military assets to southwestern Libya, where it has been establishing lines of communication in recent weeks, especially as multiple Libyan armed groups and international actors prepare to attack ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte. There is mounting evidence that ISIS is using southwestern Libya to coordinate with Boko Haram, AKA Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyah, and extend its influence in the Sahel region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) controls the populated areas along the main road from Aden to al Mukalla, Hadramawt. It is reconstituting control over the territory it held in 2011 and 2012 and is further consolidating control in al Mukalla. AQAP seized Azzan city in Shabwah governorate, which served as one of its primary bases of operation in 2011-2012, and stoned a man to death in al Mukalla.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is increasing its territorial control along the central Libyan coast as Western forces prepare to launch airstrikes and possibly special operations to curb the group’s expansion. ISIS seized a village to the west of its stronghold in Sirte and continues to contest control of key infrastructure in the central Libyan oil crescent. The U.S., Britain, France, Italy, and Germany are preparing to target ISIS in Libya. Current discussions about military action in Libya do not include targeting al Qaeda-linked groups also active in the country.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is threatening to kill a Swiss nun taken hostage if demands for the release of AQIM members were not met. Among those AQIM lists is Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi, in the custody of the International Criminal Court. AQIM has successfully negotiated previous prisoner exchanges and those who have been released return to operations.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
The document provides an assessment and updates on critical threats from various regions around the world from January 19, 2016. It discusses developments in several areas including:
- Iran implementing its commitments under the nuclear deal and freeing prisoners in exchange for Iranians held in the US.
- The IRGC detaining and releasing US Navy sailors who entered Iranian waters, calling it a show of strength.
- Al Qaeda and al-Shabaab conducting attacks in Somalia, Yemen, and the Sahel region of Africa.
- Islamic State expanding its presence in Libya through attacks on oil infrastructure and consolidating control over territory.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Libyan counter-ISIS campaign will likely become a prolonged siege of city. Armed factions that support the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) are advancing on Sirte from the east and west. Some of these forces are shaping their offensive to cut off ISIS’s access to southwest Libya, the most likely route by which ISIS would attempt a tactical withdrawal should holding Sirte become untenable. ISIS is calling for reinforcements and dedicating significant resources to hardening the city’s defenses and delaying its enemies’ advance. The current Libyan forces lack the capability to take Sirte without support, and continued competition between rival Libyan militias and political powerbrokers will likely impede efforts to oust ISIS from its urban stronghold.
2. Al Shabaab attacks against Somali government and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) targets will likely surge during Ramadan month. Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on Mogadishu’s Ambassador Hotel on June 1 that killed at least 16 people, including two members of the Somali Parliament, following warnings that the group plans to increase its attacks during the Ramadan season. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate resiliency and attack capabilities despite a U.S.-backed campaign targeting its leadership. A U.S. airstrike killed senior al Shabaab military commander and intelligence chief Abdullahi Haji Da’ud on May 27, and U.S. advisers supported a raid that killed senior commander Mohamed Mohamud Kuno, who masterminded the April 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University, on May 31.
3. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) echoed guidance that had been issued by senior al Qaeda leadership. The group’s leader and its spokesman both issued statements that warned against killing Muslim civilians in attacks. AQIS emir Asim Umar encouraged fighters instead to attack “the head of the serpent,” and engage in the far war. AQIS spokesman Usama Mahmoud condemned the January 2016 Bacha Khan University and December 2015 Pakistan National Database and Registration Authority attacks.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
The document summarizes security developments in Yemen, Somalia, Libya, the Maghreb, and the Sahel region over the past month based on intelligence reports. It notes increased Iranian support for Houthi rebels in Yemen and clashes between militant groups in Libya, Somalia, and Mali. Contact information is also provided for analysts from AEI's Critical Threats Project who study security issues in these regions.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Kenyan intelligence reports that al Shabaab's Lower Jubba regional commander, Mohamed Mohamud Kuno “Dulyadeyn,” defected to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in late November, bringing with him approximately 1,200 militants. If true, Dulyadeyn’s defection is a significant inflection for al Qaeda-ISIS competition in East Africa, as well as a major internal schism for al Shabaab. He is an ethnic Kenyan with connections to radical pro-ISIS figures in that country, so his defection would likely lead to an uptick in pro-ISIS militant activity in Kenya.
2. The Saudi-led coalition initiated a seven-day ceasefire in support of UN-led peace talks that aim to end hostilities in Yemen. The ceasefire remains tenuous following an al Houthi-Saleh Tochka (SS-21) rocket attack on a coalition base that killed the commander of Saudi Special Forces in Yemen. Pro-coalition media have accused al Houthi forces of violating the truce in several locations, and the coalition may choose to respond to alleged violations by resuming military operations in Yemen.
3. Iranian officials condemned the clashes between the Nigerian army and Shia Muslims in northern Nigeria. The Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Nigerian chargé d'affaires on December 14 after soldiers besieged the house of Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), a pro-Iranian opposition group. The Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy (NSFP) Commission also released a statement claiming that “Iran considers it its duty to defend the people of Nigeria and that country’s Muslim scholars, particularly Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky.” Tehran will likely use these clashes as an opportunity to champion its role as the defender of the global Shia population.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing upwards of 22 people. The TTP's spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, refuted the claims that this was a TTP attack, indicating it was probably not directed by TTP leader Fazlullah's faction. The head of the TTP Tariq Geedar faction, Umar Mansoor, claimed this attack. Mansoor also claimed the 2014 Peshawar school attack. The TTP supported the 2014 attack, but was heavily criticized by al Qaeda for killing "non-combatants."
2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread unemployment protests broke out in Tunisia, mirroring the inciting events of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The suicide of a young protester ignited a week of violent clashes between police and demonstrators, accompanied by rioting, looting, and a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest threatens the weak Tunisian state.
3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections in February. While Rouhani strongly criticized the disqualifications in a televised speech, the secretary of the political body responsible for disqualifying candidates asserted that it “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also defended the disqualifications, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections.
The document summarizes the current US policy and alternatives for addressing the Islamic State (ISIS) militant group. The US is leading a coalition to degrade and destroy ISIS through military airstrikes against ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria, training and equipping Iraqi and Kurdish forces, and disrupting ISIS's financing. However, the Obama administration refuses to coordinate with the Syrian regime. The US has conducted over 2,000 airstrikes and deployed 3,100 military personnel to train Iraqi forces. It is also providing weapons and aid to Kurdish peshmerga forces. The goal is to support local forces in retaking ISIS-controlled territory and limiting the group's resources and ability to operate
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda issued a call for Muslims to mobilize to fight in
al Sham. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri urged Muslims to fight in Syria and for the factions in Syria to unify. Zawahiri described the Syrian uprising as the only one from the Arab Spring to have continued along the right path. He sought for Muslims to defend the gains made in Syria against other actors like Russia, Iran, and the West, and stated the objective of a governing entity establishing itself in the territory. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, echoed the call for mobilization. He also called on Muslims to unify in Iraq and Syria and for those who cannot travel to conduct lone-wolf attacks.
2. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cell attempted to weaponize anthrax and plan a mass-casualty attack similar to the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, according to Kenyan and Ugandan authorities. The cell’s ringleader may have communicated with ISIS militants in Libya and Syria, indicating an expansion of ISIS’s influence in East Africa. Governments seeking counterterrorism funding may also exaggerate ISIS’s presence, however.
3. ISIS resumed a territorial growth strategy in Libya after planned offensives on its stronghold in Sirte stalled. ISIS militants seized strategically located towns from Misratan militias to the west of Sirte as part of efforts to expand its contiguous zone of control in central Libya. ISIS is also bolstered by the support of tribal leaders and elders, representing factions of a large tribal federation that has suffered since the fall of Qaddafi. These tribal leaders are aligning with ISIS against opponents in both the Libyan National Army bloc in the east and the Misratan bloc in the west in order to protect their political and economic interests.
This document is a thesis submitted by Ali R. Malik for a master's degree in global affairs from New York University. It analyzes the spread of ISIS and its potential expansion into Pakistan. The thesis notes ISIS controls significant territory across 10-12 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. While Pakistan is currently absent from maps of ISIS influence, the document argues factors like radical madrassas and historical issues with security forces make Pakistan vulnerable to an ISIS invasion or expansion.
The summary provides the key takeaways from the document in 3 sentences:
The warring factions in Yemen continued fighting despite a ceasefire announcement ahead of UN negotiations. Al Shabaab announced a new fighting unit focused on Kenyan operations, indicating continued prioritization of attacks in Kenya. An AQIM attack on a gas plant in Algeria was likely part of its efforts to compete with growing ISIS influence in the Maghreb region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Iranian officials censured President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing the IRGC’s arrests of individuals suspected of promoting foreign influence, indicating that disagreements over how to block foreign influence will continue alongside greater crackdowns.
2. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya are high due to border disputes and allegations that Kenyan military figures participated in al Shabaab’s illegal smuggling operations. The Somali parliament passed a motion to expel both regular Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) units and the KDF’s African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent from Somalia. A breakdown in cooperation among security forces will provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand.
3. Malian forces under Operation Seno conducted successful clearing operations in central Mali, with particular success against the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), associated with the AQIM-affiliated Ansar al Din. The MLF will continue to retaliate against Malian and UN security forces.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 “terrorists,” including Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr and al Qaeda members, sparked attacks against the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, consolidation of the Gulf States behind Saudi Arabia, and vows of vengeance from al Qaeda supporters. The January 2 attacks in Iran will likely impair its attempts to strengthen its role in the international community. Senior Iranian officials condemned both the embassy attacks and the execution itself, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warning Saudi politicians that they will face “divine retribution” for the execution.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Wilayat Barqa may be close to success in its campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. The group advanced eastward from its base in Sirte, seizing Bin Jawad and launching suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks on Libya’s two largest oil export ports, al Sidra and Ras Lanuf. If ISIS Wilayat Barqa can effectively consolidate its territorial gains, it will likely continue to advance eastward and seek control of major oil fields.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) public stoning to death of a woman convicted of adultery in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, is an inflection point in how the group is enforcing its interpretation of shari’a law. AQAP has governed al Mukalla since April 2015, but has limited its implementation of shari’a in the city. The group rapidly enforced shari’a judgments in territory it controlled in Abyan in 2011, which fed a popular uprising against the group. The shift may be an indicator of AQAP’s confidence in its control of the population.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun confirmed their rumored re-unification, citing their combined November 20 attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali as proof. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of al Murabitoun, split from AQIM in December 2012. This reconciliation of al Qaeda affiliates, which likely stems from their desire to counter ISIS’s influence in the region, increases the security threat to northern Mali as the groups integrate their resources, personal networks, and lines of communication.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) assassinated its first high-profile target in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that killed the Governor of Aden and threatened to launch additional attacks on Yemeni government officials. ISIS will likely attempt to leverage this spectacular attack to drive recruitment in the region, possibly in competition with AQAP elements regenerating in neighboring Abyan governorate. ISIS's growing strength in Aden will threaten the Saudi-led coalition's efforts to secure the city and restore President Hadi's government there.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is likely to close its investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program following the release of its report on December 2. The report assesses that while Iran made a “coordinated effort” to develop a “nuclear explosive device” before the end of 2003, there are no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the IAEA Board of Governors in December.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. UN-led Yemeni peace talks collapsed as both sides continued to take offensive actions on the ground. Coalition-aligned forces seized key territory in northern Yemen and al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a Tochka missile at a coalition camp in Taiz, killing a Saudi officer.
2. The December 17 signing Libyan Government of National Accord agreement and establishment of a new unity government is unlikely to unite factions on the ground and will probably further fracture the state. Delegates from Libya’s two rival governments, the Tripoli-based General National Congress and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, signed the accord, but did not represent their constituencies. Some Libyan armed groups may re-align themselves with the new government in order to increase their legitimacy among international observers.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) media arm countered the emergence of an Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham presence in Algeria with propaganda showing AQIM militants proselytizing to locals. Al Qaeda affiliates continue to build a base within populations through local outreach campaigns.
The Islamic State, also known as ISIS, controls territory in Iraq and Syria and seeks to establish a caliphate governed by its extreme interpretation of Sharia law. It has grown into a well-funded military organization with over 17,000 fighters and controls key infrastructure. The international community has responded by forming a coalition to counter ISIS through airstrikes, supporting local forces, cutting off financing, and addressing the humanitarian crisis.
The document discusses the long term survival of ISIS and the threat it poses to the United States. It finds that ISIS will remain a security concern for at least 5 years due to its access to recruits worldwide, including in the US and Europe. ISIS also has significant revenue sources from oil sales and extortion that will allow it to maintain influence. Additionally, instability in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen provides safe havens for ISIS operations and recruits. The biggest threat to the US is the potential for lone wolf attacks inspired by ISIS propaganda. The document recommends supporting Kurdish forces against ISIS, disrupting ISIS communications networks, and monitoring potential domestic threats.
This document summarizes key information about the terrorist group ISIS and lessons that can be learned from historical analysis of terrorism. It describes ISIS's capabilities, including its demonstrated ability to fight and control territory in Iraq and Syria, establish governance structures, and generate funding through oil sales and taxation. The document also notes ISIS's willingness to commit atrocities like beheadings. It argues that ISIS represents a unique threat due to its state-building ambitions and that combating the group will test the US's ability to address future asymmetric threats that control territory and populations. The document concludes by outlining lessons from history that could inform how the US responds to ISIS, such as providing long-term military support to local forces and addressing
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) withdrew from al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt governorate, as coalition-backed Yemeni forces advanced on the port city. AQAP had controlled al Mukalla since April 2015, using the city as a base to support operations against the al Houthi-Saleh forces in western Yemen. AQAP likely seeks to retain its military capabilities and has redeployed forces to support zones in Abyan, Ma’rib, and possibly al Bayda. The loss of al Mukalla is a setback for the group, but AQAP has resurged from similar setbacks previously.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) vehicle in a suburb of Mogadishu. This is the first ISIS-claimed attack in Somalia, though the attack was not listed in the English editions of ISIS’s al Bayan provincial news bulletin and did not kill any AMISOM troops. It is possible that an al Shabaab cell in Mogadishu defected to ISIS. CTP assesses that there is a small pro-ISIS group in northern Somalia and a possible Mogadishu-based cell.
3. ISIS Wilayat Barqa withdrew the majority of its forces from Derna in eastern Libya. This is a significant loss for ISIS, which first established its Libyan affiliate in Derna and has been fighting to reclaim the city since June 2015. ISIS may be preparing to move its military assets to southwestern Libya, where it has been establishing lines of communication in recent weeks, especially as multiple Libyan armed groups and international actors prepare to attack ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte. There is mounting evidence that ISIS is using southwestern Libya to coordinate with Boko Haram, AKA Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyah, and extend its influence in the Sahel region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) controls the populated areas along the main road from Aden to al Mukalla, Hadramawt. It is reconstituting control over the territory it held in 2011 and 2012 and is further consolidating control in al Mukalla. AQAP seized Azzan city in Shabwah governorate, which served as one of its primary bases of operation in 2011-2012, and stoned a man to death in al Mukalla.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is increasing its territorial control along the central Libyan coast as Western forces prepare to launch airstrikes and possibly special operations to curb the group’s expansion. ISIS seized a village to the west of its stronghold in Sirte and continues to contest control of key infrastructure in the central Libyan oil crescent. The U.S., Britain, France, Italy, and Germany are preparing to target ISIS in Libya. Current discussions about military action in Libya do not include targeting al Qaeda-linked groups also active in the country.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is threatening to kill a Swiss nun taken hostage if demands for the release of AQIM members were not met. Among those AQIM lists is Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi, in the custody of the International Criminal Court. AQIM has successfully negotiated previous prisoner exchanges and those who have been released return to operations.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
The document provides an assessment and updates on critical threats from various regions around the world from January 19, 2016. It discusses developments in several areas including:
- Iran implementing its commitments under the nuclear deal and freeing prisoners in exchange for Iranians held in the US.
- The IRGC detaining and releasing US Navy sailors who entered Iranian waters, calling it a show of strength.
- Al Qaeda and al-Shabaab conducting attacks in Somalia, Yemen, and the Sahel region of Africa.
- Islamic State expanding its presence in Libya through attacks on oil infrastructure and consolidating control over territory.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Libyan counter-ISIS campaign will likely become a prolonged siege of city. Armed factions that support the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) are advancing on Sirte from the east and west. Some of these forces are shaping their offensive to cut off ISIS’s access to southwest Libya, the most likely route by which ISIS would attempt a tactical withdrawal should holding Sirte become untenable. ISIS is calling for reinforcements and dedicating significant resources to hardening the city’s defenses and delaying its enemies’ advance. The current Libyan forces lack the capability to take Sirte without support, and continued competition between rival Libyan militias and political powerbrokers will likely impede efforts to oust ISIS from its urban stronghold.
2. Al Shabaab attacks against Somali government and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) targets will likely surge during Ramadan month. Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on Mogadishu’s Ambassador Hotel on June 1 that killed at least 16 people, including two members of the Somali Parliament, following warnings that the group plans to increase its attacks during the Ramadan season. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate resiliency and attack capabilities despite a U.S.-backed campaign targeting its leadership. A U.S. airstrike killed senior al Shabaab military commander and intelligence chief Abdullahi Haji Da’ud on May 27, and U.S. advisers supported a raid that killed senior commander Mohamed Mohamud Kuno, who masterminded the April 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University, on May 31.
3. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) echoed guidance that had been issued by senior al Qaeda leadership. The group’s leader and its spokesman both issued statements that warned against killing Muslim civilians in attacks. AQIS emir Asim Umar encouraged fighters instead to attack “the head of the serpent,” and engage in the far war. AQIS spokesman Usama Mahmoud condemned the January 2016 Bacha Khan University and December 2015 Pakistan National Database and Registration Authority attacks.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
The document summarizes security developments in Yemen, Somalia, Libya, the Maghreb, and the Sahel region over the past month based on intelligence reports. It notes increased Iranian support for Houthi rebels in Yemen and clashes between militant groups in Libya, Somalia, and Mali. Contact information is also provided for analysts from AEI's Critical Threats Project who study security issues in these regions.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Kenyan intelligence reports that al Shabaab's Lower Jubba regional commander, Mohamed Mohamud Kuno “Dulyadeyn,” defected to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in late November, bringing with him approximately 1,200 militants. If true, Dulyadeyn’s defection is a significant inflection for al Qaeda-ISIS competition in East Africa, as well as a major internal schism for al Shabaab. He is an ethnic Kenyan with connections to radical pro-ISIS figures in that country, so his defection would likely lead to an uptick in pro-ISIS militant activity in Kenya.
2. The Saudi-led coalition initiated a seven-day ceasefire in support of UN-led peace talks that aim to end hostilities in Yemen. The ceasefire remains tenuous following an al Houthi-Saleh Tochka (SS-21) rocket attack on a coalition base that killed the commander of Saudi Special Forces in Yemen. Pro-coalition media have accused al Houthi forces of violating the truce in several locations, and the coalition may choose to respond to alleged violations by resuming military operations in Yemen.
3. Iranian officials condemned the clashes between the Nigerian army and Shia Muslims in northern Nigeria. The Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Nigerian chargé d'affaires on December 14 after soldiers besieged the house of Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), a pro-Iranian opposition group. The Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy (NSFP) Commission also released a statement claiming that “Iran considers it its duty to defend the people of Nigeria and that country’s Muslim scholars, particularly Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky.” Tehran will likely use these clashes as an opportunity to champion its role as the defender of the global Shia population.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing upwards of 22 people. The TTP's spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, refuted the claims that this was a TTP attack, indicating it was probably not directed by TTP leader Fazlullah's faction. The head of the TTP Tariq Geedar faction, Umar Mansoor, claimed this attack. Mansoor also claimed the 2014 Peshawar school attack. The TTP supported the 2014 attack, but was heavily criticized by al Qaeda for killing "non-combatants."
2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread unemployment protests broke out in Tunisia, mirroring the inciting events of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The suicide of a young protester ignited a week of violent clashes between police and demonstrators, accompanied by rioting, looting, and a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest threatens the weak Tunisian state.
3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections in February. While Rouhani strongly criticized the disqualifications in a televised speech, the secretary of the political body responsible for disqualifying candidates asserted that it “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also defended the disqualifications, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections.
The document summarizes the current US policy and alternatives for addressing the Islamic State (ISIS) militant group. The US is leading a coalition to degrade and destroy ISIS through military airstrikes against ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria, training and equipping Iraqi and Kurdish forces, and disrupting ISIS's financing. However, the Obama administration refuses to coordinate with the Syrian regime. The US has conducted over 2,000 airstrikes and deployed 3,100 military personnel to train Iraqi forces. It is also providing weapons and aid to Kurdish peshmerga forces. The goal is to support local forces in retaking ISIS-controlled territory and limiting the group's resources and ability to operate
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda issued a call for Muslims to mobilize to fight in
al Sham. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri urged Muslims to fight in Syria and for the factions in Syria to unify. Zawahiri described the Syrian uprising as the only one from the Arab Spring to have continued along the right path. He sought for Muslims to defend the gains made in Syria against other actors like Russia, Iran, and the West, and stated the objective of a governing entity establishing itself in the territory. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, echoed the call for mobilization. He also called on Muslims to unify in Iraq and Syria and for those who cannot travel to conduct lone-wolf attacks.
2. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cell attempted to weaponize anthrax and plan a mass-casualty attack similar to the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, according to Kenyan and Ugandan authorities. The cell’s ringleader may have communicated with ISIS militants in Libya and Syria, indicating an expansion of ISIS’s influence in East Africa. Governments seeking counterterrorism funding may also exaggerate ISIS’s presence, however.
3. ISIS resumed a territorial growth strategy in Libya after planned offensives on its stronghold in Sirte stalled. ISIS militants seized strategically located towns from Misratan militias to the west of Sirte as part of efforts to expand its contiguous zone of control in central Libya. ISIS is also bolstered by the support of tribal leaders and elders, representing factions of a large tribal federation that has suffered since the fall of Qaddafi. These tribal leaders are aligning with ISIS against opponents in both the Libyan National Army bloc in the east and the Misratan bloc in the west in order to protect their political and economic interests.
This document is a thesis submitted by Ali R. Malik for a master's degree in global affairs from New York University. It analyzes the spread of ISIS and its potential expansion into Pakistan. The thesis notes ISIS controls significant territory across 10-12 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. While Pakistan is currently absent from maps of ISIS influence, the document argues factors like radical madrassas and historical issues with security forces make Pakistan vulnerable to an ISIS invasion or expansion.
The summary provides the key takeaways from the document in 3 sentences:
The warring factions in Yemen continued fighting despite a ceasefire announcement ahead of UN negotiations. Al Shabaab announced a new fighting unit focused on Kenyan operations, indicating continued prioritization of attacks in Kenya. An AQIM attack on a gas plant in Algeria was likely part of its efforts to compete with growing ISIS influence in the Maghreb region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Iranian officials censured President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing the IRGC’s arrests of individuals suspected of promoting foreign influence, indicating that disagreements over how to block foreign influence will continue alongside greater crackdowns.
2. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya are high due to border disputes and allegations that Kenyan military figures participated in al Shabaab’s illegal smuggling operations. The Somali parliament passed a motion to expel both regular Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) units and the KDF’s African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent from Somalia. A breakdown in cooperation among security forces will provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand.
3. Malian forces under Operation Seno conducted successful clearing operations in central Mali, with particular success against the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), associated with the AQIM-affiliated Ansar al Din. The MLF will continue to retaliate against Malian and UN security forces.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 “terrorists,” including Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr and al Qaeda members, sparked attacks against the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, consolidation of the Gulf States behind Saudi Arabia, and vows of vengeance from al Qaeda supporters. The January 2 attacks in Iran will likely impair its attempts to strengthen its role in the international community. Senior Iranian officials condemned both the embassy attacks and the execution itself, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warning Saudi politicians that they will face “divine retribution” for the execution.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Wilayat Barqa may be close to success in its campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. The group advanced eastward from its base in Sirte, seizing Bin Jawad and launching suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks on Libya’s two largest oil export ports, al Sidra and Ras Lanuf. If ISIS Wilayat Barqa can effectively consolidate its territorial gains, it will likely continue to advance eastward and seek control of major oil fields.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) public stoning to death of a woman convicted of adultery in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, is an inflection point in how the group is enforcing its interpretation of shari’a law. AQAP has governed al Mukalla since April 2015, but has limited its implementation of shari’a in the city. The group rapidly enforced shari’a judgments in territory it controlled in Abyan in 2011, which fed a popular uprising against the group. The shift may be an indicator of AQAP’s confidence in its control of the population.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun confirmed their rumored re-unification, citing their combined November 20 attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali as proof. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of al Murabitoun, split from AQIM in December 2012. This reconciliation of al Qaeda affiliates, which likely stems from their desire to counter ISIS’s influence in the region, increases the security threat to northern Mali as the groups integrate their resources, personal networks, and lines of communication.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) assassinated its first high-profile target in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that killed the Governor of Aden and threatened to launch additional attacks on Yemeni government officials. ISIS will likely attempt to leverage this spectacular attack to drive recruitment in the region, possibly in competition with AQAP elements regenerating in neighboring Abyan governorate. ISIS's growing strength in Aden will threaten the Saudi-led coalition's efforts to secure the city and restore President Hadi's government there.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is likely to close its investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program following the release of its report on December 2. The report assesses that while Iran made a “coordinated effort” to develop a “nuclear explosive device” before the end of 2003, there are no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the IAEA Board of Governors in December.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. UN-led Yemeni peace talks collapsed as both sides continued to take offensive actions on the ground. Coalition-aligned forces seized key territory in northern Yemen and al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a Tochka missile at a coalition camp in Taiz, killing a Saudi officer.
2. The December 17 signing Libyan Government of National Accord agreement and establishment of a new unity government is unlikely to unite factions on the ground and will probably further fracture the state. Delegates from Libya’s two rival governments, the Tripoli-based General National Congress and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, signed the accord, but did not represent their constituencies. Some Libyan armed groups may re-align themselves with the new government in order to increase their legitimacy among international observers.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) media arm countered the emergence of an Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham presence in Algeria with propaganda showing AQIM militants proselytizing to locals. Al Qaeda affiliates continue to build a base within populations through local outreach campaigns.
The Islamic State, also known as ISIS, controls territory in Iraq and Syria and seeks to establish a caliphate governed by its extreme interpretation of Sharia law. It has grown into a well-funded military organization with over 17,000 fighters and controls key infrastructure. The international community has responded by forming a coalition to counter ISIS through airstrikes, supporting local forces, cutting off financing, and addressing the humanitarian crisis.
The document discusses the long term survival of ISIS and the threat it poses to the United States. It finds that ISIS will remain a security concern for at least 5 years due to its access to recruits worldwide, including in the US and Europe. ISIS also has significant revenue sources from oil sales and extortion that will allow it to maintain influence. Additionally, instability in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen provides safe havens for ISIS operations and recruits. The biggest threat to the US is the potential for lone wolf attacks inspired by ISIS propaganda. The document recommends supporting Kurdish forces against ISIS, disrupting ISIS communications networks, and monitoring potential domestic threats.
(U fouo-les) dhs report- assessing isil’s lnfluence and perceived legitimacy ...RepentSinner
This document provides a summary of a field analysis report assessing the influence and perceived legitimacy of ISIL in the United States from a state and local perspective. Key findings include:
1) There was an increased volume of ISIL-related suspicious activity reports between June 2014 and January 2015, signifying greater recognition of ISIL after its declaration of a caliphate and use of social media.
2) ISIL's messaging is resonating with US violent extremists due to its promotion of establishing a caliphate and portraying attacks in the West as defensive, in contrast to al-Qaeda's priorities.
3) Ongoing ISIL military successes and messaging will likely sustain a high volume of suspicious activity
The document summarizes the rise of ISIS in Iraq and the ongoing conflict between Sunni and Shia sects. It describes how ISIS seized Mosul and other cities in Iraq in June 2014, exploiting Sunni discontent with the Shia-led government. ISIS seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate governed by Sharia law and now controls large parts of Iraq and Syria, posing a threat to the region, Western interests, and South Asia. Efforts are needed to curb ISIS's growing territorial control and prevent the conflict from engulfing the entire Muslim world.
Convergence of China's Economic Globalisation Strategy and Encroaching ISIS A...ISS Risk
Convergence of China’s Economic Globalisation Strategy and Encroaching ISIS Aspirations for the Asian Caliphate A thought provoking summary of the potential convergence of ISIS' global caliphate strategies and China's economic globalisation aspirations - and where they will collide in Asia. A must read for businesses operating throughout the region. ISS Risk has completed a thorough analysis of the trend trajectory and associated risks to Asian states and is the perfect partner for those operating in the region to get ahead of the pack and truly manage and mitigate your risks.
Convergence of China and the ISIS Caliphate Phill Hynes
A Threat Assessment by ISS Risk on the "Convergence of China's Economic Globalisation Strategy and Encroaching ISIS Aspirations for the Asian Caliphate".
Convergence of China's Economic Globalisation Strategy and Encroaching ISIS A...Jillian Claunch
ISS Risk Threat Assessment
Convergence of China’s Economic Globalisation Strategy and Encroaching ISIS Aspirations for the Asian Caliphate A thought provoking summary of the potential convergence of ISIS' global caliphate strategies and China's economic globalisation aspirations - and where they will collide in Asia. A must read for businesses operating throughout the region. ISS Risk has completed a thorough analysis of the trend trajectory and associated risks to Asian states and is the perfect partner for those operating in the region to get ahead of the pack and truly manage and mitigate your risks.
Saudi Arabia’s fight Against ISISIslamic State of Iraq and Syr.docxkenjordan97598
Saudi Arabia’s fight Against ISIS
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or rather ISIS can only be understood well if the origin and formation principles are sought. Zack’s article plays a role in showing the formation of the group. ISIS was formed as an extremist group after the war in Iraq started. The article illustrates that The United States, Gulf monarchs such as Saudi Arabia have played a role in the formation of ISIS. The article cites that ISIS is a movement formed by Sunnis who felt oppressed in Iraq after the fall of Saddam. They decided to hit back at Nour-Al Malik who favored Shiites over Sunnis. Al Malik used Saddam’s laws to demonize Sunnis and they had no alternative except joining ISIS. Most Sunnis fear that Al-Malik will not treat them well and he will always give preferential treatment to the majority Shiites. The effect is to frustrate his governance. Over the years, the Sunnis have been denied from demonstrating, going for government positions, openly expressing their democratic rights and even worship. They moved fast and joined efforts to form ISIS as a way of fighting the Iraq government. The article raises the question that the conflict in Iraq and Syria which was propagated by the United States and Gulf monarchs such as Jordan, Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Iraq Sunnis support the ISIS, but the Saudi government is eliciting fears on the entry of the movement into the nation.
Jonathan Broder’s article explains why Saudi Arabia fears ISIS. He offers the rationale behind Saudi Arabia’s urgency and response to eliminate ISIS. Saudi Arabia realized that all is not well when General Ouda al-Behawi, a commander of Saudi forces in the Northern region was killed by ISIS fighters. The article points that ISIS must have received a tip from people close to the General. Broder’s article raises the question on why Saudi Arabians support ISIS. ISIS is supported by Saudi Arabians in lower ranks see the movement as a champion of Sunni’s rights, and will revenge against the corrupt royal family. Broder’s article gives critical information on Saudi’s airstrikes on ISIS strongholds. Senior intelligence officers have gone to Washington to seek information and tactics on countering ISIS. Saudi is also training more than 5000 Syrian rebels to hit on ISIS. The killing of General Oudah sparked Saudi Arabia’s war against ISIS, which involves many efforts such as regional support and talks, fencing, among others, which will be discussed in the paper.
Micah Halpen’s article pinpoints the need for unity in Arab States in the fight against ISIS. Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia must stand in a coalition and fight ISIS. The main role of the article is to show the way shared intelligence is one of the most critical points in eliminating ISIS. Arab nations must act as a block or else ISIS will take up their states and lead with extremism. The article also questions on the role of Iran in fighting ISIS. Iran has always been on the forefront against ISIS giv.
The document recommends developing a global coalition to counter ISIS in the Middle East. It argues the current US policy of containment fails to address the root causes that led to ISIS's formation. A coalition that includes regional powers could help defeat ISIS by weakening its funding and addressing the economic and political grievances that fuel its growth. This would help stabilize the region and promote US interests like curbing Iran's influence and supporting allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia. However, Russia may be reluctant to join a US-led coalition so its concerns would need to be addressed.
This document summarizes a presentation by Queen's Global Markets on ISIS and the geopolitical situation in the Middle East. The presentation covers the origins and rise of ISIS, key players in the region including their strategic interests and responses to ISIS, and predictions about resolving the conflicts. It analyzes countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria and their stances. It argues the US must work with regional powers to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue to bring stability and defeat ISIS in the long run.
An enhanced train-and-equip program for moderate Syrian opposition is proposed as a middle option between direct U.S. military intervention and the current limited support. Such a program could (1) strengthen moderate opposition to pressure Assad into negotiations, (2) force ISIS to draw down forces in Iraq by pressuring them in Syria, and (3) deter adventurism by Assad, Hezbollah, or Iran. While not ending the war, it could shape outcomes by altering military balances and applying pressure on all sides to reconsider rejection of a diplomatic solution.
Policy Paper: Confronting the ISIS Threat in the United StatesBrett Champlin
Completed a twenty-page policy paper that presented three options confronting the threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in the United States:
1. maintain the status quo
2. target known ISIS sympathizers within the US
3. enhanced border restrictions.
Analyzed and researched current approaches by federal government to domestic terrorism
Presented research in a twenty five-slide PowerPoint to thirty students and two faculty
members
The document discusses the military tactics of ISIS, comparing them to those of Nazi Germany in the later stages of World War 2. Some key points:
- ISIS relies heavily on offensive operations and brief counterattacks even as they are largely on the defensive. This mirrors Nazi Germany's "cult of the offensive" late in the war.
- Like Nazi Germany, ISIS is tactically skilled but lacks an overall strategy to win. Their tactics involve brief gains followed by unsustainable counterattacks.
- In defending territory, ISIS uses delaying tactics like snipers and booby traps to slow enemy advances before pulling back most fighters. They avoid direct, fixed defenses where they would be vulnerable to air
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance may have limited effects. It will help to de-escalate the national conflict in Yemen, but will not resolve local fights or the conflict between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s alliance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on November 15 that the coalition and an al Houthi-Saleh delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities to begin on November 17. The agreement also includes a framework for negotiations. Previous ceasefires have not translated to progress in negotiations. Hadi’s administration did not participate in the talks and has voiced opposition to the agreement. The cessation of hostilities will likely include the coalition’s air campaign and al Houthi-Saleh attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts, including the battle for Taiz city, will likely continue despite the elite-level agreement. Southern Yemenis lack representation in the peace process and will likely resist it.
2. A brewing fight for control of oil ports in eastern Libya may reignite Libya’s civil war. A coalition of eastern Libyan leaders that opposes Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the dominant military force in eastern Libya, is reportedly rallying forces for an offensive to recapture oil ports controlled by Haftar’s forces. The anti-Haftar forces include Mehdi al Barghathi, the Minister of the Defense in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). An offensive lead by Barghathi, who is widely seen as the GNA’s chosen alternative to Haftar in eastern Libya, risks opening a new front in Libya’s dormant civil war. A battle for eastern Libya’s oil would provide an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, which have suffered recent losses in Sirte and Benghazi, to reconstitute and possibly regain control of terrain.
3. The Sahel region and southwestern Libya will be a critical front in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups in 2017. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurgent in the Sahel region of West Africa, and there are early indicators that ISIS may develop ties with a militant group in the region. AQIM maintains a safe haven in southwestern Libya, where airstrikes targeted a senior AQIM leader on November 15. ISIS may also be making inroads into southwestern Libya. Salafi-jihadi groups use these regions to support attacks in neighboring states, as well as train recruits and exploit lucrative smuggling and trafficking routes.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Written Congressional StatementTisha Wright
This document is General Joseph Dunford's posture statement before the House Appropriations Committee regarding the state of the US armed forces and current security environment. It summarizes key strategic challenges posed by Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations. It notes capability shortfalls in the US military and the need for continued investment to address these challenges. General Dunford advocates for funding in the FY2017 budget to improve readiness, deter adversaries, and ensure US military dominance.
1) The document discusses the arming of Iraqi security forces by countries like the US, Iran, and Russia in an effort to stem the advance of ISIS in Iraq.
2) It outlines US efforts to modernize and train the Iraqi security forces since 2003, but notes the forces have struggled with sectarianism and faced challenges in countering ISIS.
3) Iran has also played a significant role in arming and advising Iraqi security forces and Shiite militias in their fight against ISIS, expanding Iranian influence in Iraq.
Fighting the Islamic State - Matthew Gulino_01Matthew Gulino
This document provides an analysis of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the U.S. response. It discusses the history and nature of ISIS, analyzing their strategy, environment, popular support, organization, and lack of external state support. The document evaluates the U.S. government response and recommends continuing current strategies while advocating for Sunni welfare and autonomy in Syria and Iraq.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS.
3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
This document provides an overview and analysis of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). It discusses ISIS's ideology and tactics, and how the organization has evolved over time. Key points include: ISIS was formed in 2003 and split from al-Qaeda in 2013 over strategic differences; under new leader al-Baghdadi, ISIS has focused on establishing a caliphate through violence and unrest in Iraq and Syria; unstable conditions following the US withdrawal from Iraq created an environment for ISIS recruitment and growth; and ISIS uses brutal tactics like torture to assert control while also engaging communities through social media propaganda.
View the latest commentary on Iraq from The PRS Group. Now more a decade on from the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq remains deeply troubled by dangerous ethnic and sectarian divisions, woeful security conditions, and chronic political instability in Baghdad that has undermined the
केरल उच्च न्यायालय ने 11 जून, 2024 को मंडला पूजा में भाग लेने की अनुमति मांगने वाली 10 वर्षीय लड़की की रिट याचिका को खारिज कर दिया, जिसमें सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की एक बड़ी पीठ के समक्ष इस मुद्दे की लंबित प्रकृति पर जोर दिया गया। यह आदेश न्यायमूर्ति अनिल के. नरेंद्रन और न्यायमूर्ति हरिशंकर वी. मेनन की खंडपीठ द्वारा पारित किया गया
Youngest c m in India- Pema Khandu BiographyVoterMood
Pema Khandu, born on August 21, 1979, is an Indian politician and the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh. He is the son of former Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Dorjee Khandu. Pema Khandu assumed office as the Chief Minister in July 2016, making him one of the youngest Chief Ministers in India at that time.
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Essential Tools for Modern PR Business .pptxPragencyuk
Discover the essential tools and strategies for modern PR business success. Learn how to craft compelling news releases, leverage press release sites and news wires, stay updated with PR news, and integrate effective PR practices to enhance your brand's visibility and credibility. Elevate your PR efforts with our comprehensive guide.
Howard Fineman, Veteran Political Journalist and TV Pundit, Dies at 75
Rand pe228
1. Perspective
Expert insights on a timely policy issueC O R P O R A T I O N
A
ny strategy to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) must begin with a clear-eyed assessment
of the challenge at hand. ISIL’s recent loss of territory
represents progress in addressing that challenge, but
does not change the fact that the United States and its allies con-
front a long-term global violent jihadist threat that preceded ISIL
and will outlive ISIL.
Our recommended strategy focuses on addressing ISIL as a
transregional threat. The nature of the threat suggests the need
to prioritize the security of Americans in the homeland, but does
not imply placing the United States on a continuous war footing.
Rather, U.S. government actions overseas should focus on disrupt-
ing the transregional network supporting ISIL. Practically speak-
ing, this means increasing the operational hurdles for terrorists
both inside and outside the United States, giving more attention
and resources to intelligence and law enforcement, and emphasiz-
ing airstrikes and Special Operations Forces (SOF) raids on ISIL
leadership and training camps in Iraq and Syria. Figure 1 presents
an overview of our proposed counter-ISIL strategy.
ISIL poses a serious security threat, exploiting unrest to desta-
bilize both Iraq and Syria and its far-flung “provinces” and taking
advantage of its proto-state to engage in an effective worldwide
social media campaign. ISIL’s appeal is relatively narrow but born
out of grievances that show no sign of being remedied.
Weak states, poor governance, a lack of security, and—in
some situations—sectarianism abetted by the Iranian-Saudi rivalry
sustain ISIL and other violent jihadi groups. The U.S. counter-ISIL
strategy overseas should be designed to improve these conditions to
the extent possible, but strategists must recognize that the United
States has limited leverage to affect these conditions, and improve-
ments will require years to accomplish. Since ISIL operates in the
Middle East, North Africa, South and Central Asia, and West
A Strategy to Counter ISIL as a Transregional Threat
Lynn E. Davis, Jeffrey Martini, Kim Cragin
2. 2
Africa, any strategy cannot ignore bolstering stability in those
areas. However, the United States will find that it is impossible to
restore regional stability just by removing the ISIL threat.
To avoid fueling regional conflicts and to reduce support for
jihadi groups, the United States should be cautious in its support
of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and peshmerga
in its counter-ISIL military campaign. Relying heavily on the
Kurds in both Iraq and Syria to defeat ISIL’s physical caliphate
risks undermining U.S. interests in gaining Sunni Arab support
for the military campaign, as the Kurds use this opportunity to
expand their territory. Kurdish ambitions also risk serious conflict
between the Kurds and Turkey in Syria and between the Kurds
and the Shia-led ruling coalition in Iraq.
The military campaign will continue to be a critical part of
the U.S. counter-ISIL strategy, but military forces can only play a
narrow role in achieving certain U.S. objectives. The military plays
an essential role in eroding ISIL’s physical territory; however, U.S.
military involvement generates little leverage in affecting political
change unless it is coupled with strong conditions under which
U.S. assistance is provided. In this case, military effectiveness is
also limited by the specific nature of the threat—ISIL exists as a
transregional network, in which military targets are scarce. Intel-
ligence, law enforcement, and border security are more important
in fighting ISIL as a transregional network. Military operations
also can be counterproductive to the long-term goal of reducing
ISIL support if they result in large numbers of refugees or civilian
casualties.
Consistent with this view of the role of military forces, we
support continuation of U.S. military activities, including air
strikes and the training and equipping of partner forces, while
Figure 1. Overview of Proposed Counter-ISIL Strategy
RAND PE228-1
Prioritize the security of the
U.S. homeland
• Increase operational hurdles for
terrorists
• Place more attention and resources
on intelligence and law enforcement
• Emphasize airstrikes and precision
SOF vs. ISIL leadership and training
camps in Iraq and Syria
Reduce support for ISIL and
al Qaeda among Sunni
Arabs in Iraq and Syria
• Press Iraqi central government on
inclusivity and reconciliation with
Sunni Arabs
• Use limited influence in Syria to
promote political change in ways to
make it difficult for ISIL to take
advantage of Sunni Arab grievances
• Maintain tight restrictions on military
operations to avoid civilian casualties
and be highly discerning in the use
of close air support and ground
forces
Balance support for Kurds
in counter-ISIL campaign
with avoidance of fueling
regional conflicts
• Condition assistance to Kurds in
liberating Mosul and Raqqa on their
conducting operations in support of
Sunni Arab forces
• Curb Kurdish territorial ambitions
Address ISIL as Transregional Threat
with Sustained Disruption Campaign
3. 3
maintaining the constraint on U.S. forces operating in an “accom-
pany” mission that could put U.S. forces in harm’s way and impli-
cate them in the activities of local ground forces. Our proposed
strategy calls for holding U.S. deployments at current levels
(5,200 in Iraq and about 500 in Syria), and it does not change the
mix of forces (SOF and noncombat).
Based on our assessment of the ISIL threat, we take exception
to the Obama administration’s tendency to measure success pri-
marily in terms of reducing ISIL-held territory.1
That metric is an
attractive one because it provides a positive, easily comprehended
message. What it obscures, however, is that ISIL will continue to be
a regional menace even if it is reduced from a proto-state to a guer-
rilla movement, because a change in territorial control would not
change the underlying conditions that feed Sunni Arab grievances.
Even if ISIL is destroyed, as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was presumed
to have been destroyed nearly a decade ago, the Middle East will
spawn a new standard bearer for global jihad.
Finally, given the prospect of a long-term jihadi threat and the
limits of U.S. influence and leverage, political leaders need to be
realistic in their strategic goals and responsible with the U.S. public
in setting expectations and presenting the risks that lie ahead.
Our recommended counter-ISIL strategy has similarities and
differences with that of the Obama administration. See Table 1 for
a comparison between our recommended strategy and current U.S.
strategy as of January 20, 2017.
In the presentation that follows, we begin with a description
of the ISIL threat and then outline the overarching principles of
our recommended strategy: reducing support for violent jihadist
groups and increasing the difficulty for terrorists to execute attacks.
In addressing the ISIL threat as a transregional network, we turn
to the major ISIL hubs (Iraq and Syria) and offer recommenda-
tions for political and military policies in these countries. Next, we
describe steps to counter ISIL’s threat to the U.S. homeland, involv-
ing actions both inside the United States and abroad. One aspect of
the ISIL threat—its expansion into other countries or ISIL prov-
inces—is not included in our strategy, for reasons of space and the
need for very tailored policies in each of the ISIL provinces (given
the very different situations on the ground). The report concludes
with our overall recommendations for a counter-ISIL strategy.
ISIL Threat: Capabilities and Intentions
ISIL gained widespread attention when it launched an offensive in
June 2014, overrunning Mosul and pressing south to the outskirts
of Baghdad. Although the offensive and subsequent declaration of a
caliphate amounted to ISIL’s “coming-out party,” the organization
has existed in other forms dating back to at least the mid-2000s.
After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, an ISIL precursor orga-
nization emerged in the form of AQI, which later declared itself
Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). The 2011 uprising in Syria provided ISI
an opportunity to expand control over the jihadist movement in
both countries.2
Although ISIL has not succeeded in its aspiration
to unite the broader jihadi movement, it competes with al Qaeda to
lead this movement and has clearly been the ascendant brand since
2014.
Eradicating the global violent jihadist threat,
including ISIL, is not possible as long as the
underlying conditions that feed Sunni Arab
grievances continue.
4. 4
ISIL’s shocking brutality can hamper sober evaluation of the
group. Like any adversary, the threat posed by ISIL is best under-
stood as a function of its capabilities and intentions. An assessment
of ISIL’s capabilities depends on the point of comparison; the group
possesses weak capabilities relative to serious state adversaries, but
it has advanced capabilities relative to other terrorist and insurgent
groups.3
ISIL fields an estimated 18,000–22,000 foreign fighters in
Syria and Iraq. Some of these fighters lack formal military training.
Others, such as ISIL’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, have served in
Table 1. Comparison of Current U.S. Strategy with Recommended Strategy
Current U.S. Strategy Our Recommended Strategy
The counter-ISIL campaign is structured along nine lines of effort that
assign different agencies a lead or supporting role in different aspects
of the campaign.
While lines of effort are a useful mechanism for running an interagency
campaign and deconflicting overlaps in responsibilities, they are no
substitute for articulating a strategy that sets clear priorities for policies
and allocating resources.
Our strategy calls for prioritizing homeland security with more
government coordination across domestic and national security
operations and allocates more resources to the goal of disrupting the
transregional transit hubs used by terrorists to move people, money,
and weapons.
While noting the need for diminishing the long-term jihadi threat,
specific steps to promote Sunni-Shia reconciliation within Iraq or
reduce Sunni Arab grievances in Syria have been set aside as the
military campaign proceeds.
Our strategy elevates these political goals and reforms; different types
of military assistance will be conditional on reducing support for ISIL
and al Qaeda among Sunni Arabs in Iraq and Syria.
Our strategy calls for the United States to reduce its assistance to
actors blocking these goals, even if it means sacrificing speed in
achieving the military goals of the mission.
The Obama administration has placed few conditions on Kurdish
military operations in Iraq or Syria despite the peshmerga and
YPG’s territorial ambitions and treatment of Arab populations, which
increases the risks that their actions will fuel broader regional conflicts.
Our strategy would place stronger conditions on Kurdish participation
in the military campaign against ISIL—specifically, that the United
States gain an agreement that the Kurdish groups will not use the
campaign to expand their control.
The administration has measured success primarily in terms of reducing
ISIL territory.
Our strategy gives prominence to the long-term threat of violent
jihadism and would measure success using additional metrics that the
communities from which ISIL recruits have identified as priorities to
them, such as inclusive governance and access to justice.
5. 5
the armed forces, and some are battle hardened from years of “on-
the-job training.”4
In addition to men under arms, ISIL controls an
estimated 75,000 square kilometers of territory in the Euphrates
River Valley (although that number is dropping by the day), as well
as scattered territory in North and West Africa, the Arabian Pen-
insula, and Central Asia.5
ISIL derives financial resources from oil
revenue, taxation of commerce in the territory it controls, and trade
in contraband, among other sources.6
These resources, while modest in state terms, are marshaled by
ISIL in support of an ambitious project. ISIL’s immediate goal is to
expand its self-declared caliphate and attrite the far enemy through
external operations as well as by inspiring lone-wolf attacks.7
All the
while, ISIL is preparing for the end times, which it believes will be
ushered in by a final apocalyptic battle in northern Syria. In attempt-
ing to overthrow the state order that is the basis of the current inter-
national system, ISIL can be considered one of the more revisionist
groups operating today. However, a comparison of ISIL’s capabilities
and intentions reveals a shortfall with no credible path for ISIL to
bring the two into balance. The group does pose a serious security
threat, but that threat is more modest than its outsized ambition.
The Ideological Dimension
The ideological dimension of the ISIL threat encompasses the
group’s critique and prescription of the current order. Between the
two, the critique is more threatening in that it tracks with widely
held beliefs among the populations that ISIL targets for recruit-
ment. Similar to its violent jihadi predecessors, ISIL’s essential
critique is that states are a Western construct that divide the umma
(Muslim community) and elevate the judgment of men over the
edicts of God.8
ISIL points to the oppression of Muslims by foreign
powers and local leaders, the degradation of Islamic values within
society, and infighting within the Muslim community as evidence
of the deleterious effects of this arrangement.9
What makes ISIL
dangerous is that this critique appeals to many, including Sunni
Muslims, and by speaking to Sunni Muslims, ISIL is addressing
the overwhelming majority of the Muslim world.10
The appeal of ISIL’s critique, which is similar to critiques by
other violent jihadi organizations it has superseded (including al
Qaeda), suggests two important implications for the counter-ISIL
campaign. The first is that the threat posed by the jihadi move-
ment is a long-term challenge that will exist so long as underlying
conditions—insecurity, poor governance, sectarianism abetted by
Iranian-Saudi rivalry, etc.—continue to provide fertile ground. The
second implication is that ISIL, defined as a group that possesses a
leadership structure and a self-proclaimed caliphate, is only the lat-
est standard bearer of a broader violent jihadi movement that will
continue to exist after ISIL is degraded.
Although ISIL’s critique may be appealing, its actual prescrip-
tion and approach to achieving its goals alienate those it seeks
to win over. The group enjoys a small and committed following
of true believers, but large majorities of local populations hold
unfavorable views of ISIL. For example, in Lebanon, 95 percent of
Sunnis have an unfavorable view of ISIL.11
The limited appeal of ISIL’s approach is further degraded by
ISIL practices that create a backlash against it. ISIL’s challenging of
ingrained social structures—such as tribal hierarchies; its punish-
ment of behaviors like smoking; and its heavy-handed tactics, includ-
ing forced marriages and the imposition of protection rackets—can
wear out its support in the communities where it embeds itself. Since
these practices appear to have played a major role in the marginaliza-
6. 6
tion of predecessor organization AQI, some believe ISIL has learned
this lesson.12
But evidence suggests many of those same practices are
still in effect and may be exacerbated by the counter-ISIL military
campaign, which has led ISIL into self-destructive behaviors, such as
increasing local taxation to make up for loss of revenue and purging
perceived informants to rationalize battlefield losses.
ISIL has shown itself capable of exploiting unrest to further
destabilize Iraq, Syria, and its farther-flung “provinces.” In Iraq
and Syria, ISIL plays on Sunni Arab grievances that arose largely
because of insecurity and poor governance (see Figure 2 for Sunni
Iraqis’ views of governance).13
Sunni disenfranchisement, exempli-
fied by Alawi rule in Syria and Shia majoritarianism in Iraq, angers
the Sunni Arab communities ISIL recruits among in these two
countries. ISIL also has the advantage of facing off against weak
states hollowed out by corruption, penetrated by foreign powers
(e.g., Russia, Iran), and in some cases, tolerant of ISIL presence
because the threat of terrorism can be used to justify harsh treat-
ment of broader opposition.
Figure 2. Iraqi Sunni Views of the State
RAND PE228-2
Percentage
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Fairly
represented in
Abadi government
Unfairly
represented in
Abadi government
Iraqi Army
represents
all Iraqis
Iraqi Army only
represents Shia
Sectarianism
getting better
Sectarianism
getting worse
SOURCE: Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, “Lack of Responsiveness Impacts Mood August—September 2015 Survey Findings,” undated.
36
58 58
29
61
28
7. 7
ISIL also has the advantage of operating as an alternative to
the Assad and former Maliki regimes. So while ISIL practices are
abhorrent, in Syria, they are compared with a regime that uses
chemical weapons and barrel bombs against its own population.
In Iraq, ISIL finds traction among a population that controlled the
instruments of the state before the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hus-
sein but is now subject to sectarian retribution. These conditions
are ripe for ISIL insofar as the group can exploit existing grievances
while the outrage of regime practices distracts from ISIL’s own
brutality.
ISIL Provinces
ISIL also has gathered a collection of local insurgent groups into
its transregional network.14
Approximately 50 such groups have
pledged their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and many of
these groups have been accepted as “provinces” of the so-called
Islamic State.15
Many of these provinces are clustered in areas
already struggling with conflict, widespread grievances, and a
weak central government. In Libya, ISIL found a haven in the
central coastal city of Sirte. Not coincidentally, Sirte is home to the
Qadhadhfa tribe, which was a key support base of former leader
Muammar al-Qadhafi and lost out in his removal from power.16
In Egypt, an ISIL affiliate called Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis has found
fertile ground in the Sinai, a neglected region that operates in the
Lake Chad Basin of West Africa, and smaller ISIL-affiliated groups
exist in South and Central Asia (see Table 2).
These groups receive several benefits from aligning with ISIL.
By associating with the preeminent brand in the violent jihadi
movement, they receive boosts in recruitment, help with propa-
ganda generation and distribution, and potentially access to addi-
tional funds (although it is unclear how much financial support
ISIL has provided to its provinces). On the other hand, affiliation
with ISIL is not always a reflection of strength.17
When Boko
Haram pledged its allegiance to Baghdadi in 2015, it was rapidly
losing territory.18
In addition, the decision to align with ISIL can
lead to splits within the ranks; when Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis pledged
allegiance to ISIL, it led to a schism between the “Sinai State” and
its Nile Valley network.19
Most of the political violence conducted by these aligned
groups has been directed at local security forces, other government
assets, and civilian targets; some of these groups control territory
and govern as proto-states. But these groups also have attacked
foreign targets, as in October 2015, when fighters from the Islamic
State in the Sinai placed a bomb on a Russian charter airplane as it
departed Egypt; the attack killed all 224 passengers.20
Other groups
had expanded their target set to include foreign interests before
aligning with ISIL. For example, Boko Haram attacked a UN facil-
ity in Abuja in September 2011.
There are other differences among the provinces. Boko Haram
is far and away the most lethal of the ISIL affiliates. In 2014, Boko
Haram actually outpaced ISIL on the number of deaths attributed
to its attacks.21
On the other end of the spectrum, ISIL Khorasan
has had minimal impact on the conflicts in Afghanistan and Paki-
stan and has yet to carry out a spectacular attack. Another differ-
ence is in the level of coordination between these groups and ISIL’s
core leadership in Iraq and Syria. Public information on operational
links is spotty, but many analysts are dubious that Boko Haram has
much contact with ISIL core or has truly subordinated its organiza-
tion to ISIL’s command. The North African affiliates, on the other
hand, are coordinating among themselves with Ansar Bayt
8. 8
al-Maqdis, using Libyan territory as a refuge; ISIL leadership
may view Libya as a “fallback option” should its caliphate in the
Euphrates River valley collapse.22
ISIL Threat to West
ISIL leaders have taken advantage of its proto-state to engage in
an extensive social media campaign aimed not only at local audi-
ences inside Syria and Iraq but also at Muslims worldwide.23
ISIL
makes extensive use of Twitter, Telegram, and Tumblr to com-
municate with a global audience.24
As part of this campaign, ISIL
has encouraged Muslims to travel to Syria and Iraq to either fight
or help build the caliphate. If they cannot migrate to the Levant,
ISIL instructs its followers to join groups that have established
provinces. If that is impossible, ISIL urges sympathizers to conduct
local attacks, especially in North America, Western Europe, and
Australia.25
Table 2. ISIL Provinces
Branch
Main Areas of
Operation
Estimated
Number of
Fighters Examples of Attacks Claimed
The Libyan provinces—ISIL actually
claims three—include fighters who
previously belonged to Ansar
al-Sharia. Many foreign fighters,
particularly Tunisians, are also
believed to make up its ranks.
Derna, Benghazi 1,000 Beheadings of Egyptian and Ethiopian Christians in
February and April 2015; attack on Westerners in
the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli in January 2015
The so-called Sinai State was
established by Ansar Bayt
al-Maqdis as part of its allegiance
to ISIL.
The Sinai, particularly Arish,
Rafah, and Sheikh Zuwayd;
sporadic attacks in Cairo,
the Nile Delta, and Upper
Egypt.
Up to 1,000 Downing of Russian airliner departing Sharm
el-Sheikh in October 2015; assassination of Egyptian
prosecutor general in June 2015
ISIL Khorasan is made up of former
members of Tehrik-e Taliban
Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban.
Southern Nangarhar
Province in Afghanistan
About 1,000 Best known for turf battles with the Taliban
Boko Haram Lake Chad Basin (includes
parts of Nigeria, Niger,
Cameroon, and Chad)
4,000–6,000 Massacre in Baga that may have killed up to
2,000 people in January 2015; abduction of nearly
300 Nigerian schoolgirls in April 2014
SOURCES: U.S. State Department Counterterrorism Bureau, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015,” June 2016; Congressional Research Service, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram:
Frequently Asked Questions,” March 29, 2016; Missy Ryan, “U.S. Strikes Islamic State Stronghold in Libya for First Time,” Washington Post, August 1, 2016; “U.S. Launches
Airstrikes in Libya Targeting ISIS: Pentagon,” Military.com, August 1, 2016.
9. 9
Recent attacks in Europe and the United States reveal the
different types of threats that ISIL poses. On November 13, 2015,
Paris came under attack by ISIL-associated terrorists. One hundred
and twenty-nine people died as a result of these attacks.26
Fur-
ther investigations revealed that the attack leader, Abdel Hamid
Abaaoud, had traveled to Syria from Belgium to fight with ISIL
against the Assad regime in early 2014. Abaaoud subsequently
returned to Europe—primarily Greece and Belgium—and was
linked by authorities to four of six terrorist plots disrupted in
France between March and October 2015.27
Less than a month later, on December 2, 2015, 14 people were
killed in an attack in San Bernardino, California.28
The San Ber-
nardino attackers had not fought in Syria; they instead indicated
sympathy with ISIL on social media. This appears to be the case in
the shootings in Orlando, Florida, and in Nice, France, although
caution is warranted given that individuals who appear to be lone
wolves are sometimes later revealed to have deeper operational ties
to ISIL than initially presumed.29
The precise number of foreign fighters who have joined ISIL is
not known, but estimates tend to fall between 30,000 and 40,000.30
The breadth of fighters’ origin countries is staggering; the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs has noted that foreign fighters have arrived from
at least 145 countries. In terms of geographic distribution, a little
more than half of ISIL’s foreign fighters are believed to have origi-
nated from the Middle East and North Africa, with Europe and the
former Soviet republics making up the bulk of the remainder.
What is less well known is how the evolution of ISIL’s recruit-
ment strategy and the counter-ISIL campaign are affecting the
flow of foreign fighters over time. According to the Soufan Group,
between June 2014 and December 2015, between 15,000 and
19,000 foreign fighters joined the ISIL—roughly 1,000 foreign
fighters a month. U.S. officials believe that the number of foreign
fighter arrivals has decreased in recent months, with the flow only
a quarter of what it was at its peak.31
Some of these fighters have
been killed on the battlefield, and some likely have no intention of
returning to their countries of origin.
U.S. military strikes against financial institutions and oil facili-
ties have placed a serious financial strain on ISIL leadership, with
reports of cash shortages to pay recruits and the raising of taxes
and fees on the population. In addition, a number of high-ranking
financial officials have been killed.32
The effect of ISIL’s reduced territory and resources on the
foreign fighter threat to the West is very unclear. The reported
dramatic decline in the flow of foreign fighters has led to worries
that would-be fighters might choose to attack at home, rather than
abroad, and that battle-hardened veterans might seek out new
places for conflict.33
A Strategy to Disrupt ISIL’s Transregional Network
As we have detailed, ISIL poses several different threats to U.S.
interests. These include its destabilizing presence in Syria and Iraq
as well as outside of the Levant, its ability to attract and direct
foreign fighters, and its inspiration of “lone wolves.” However, strat-
egy design requires a more focused look at what can be achieved
reasonably, given limited resources. Therefore, we have chosen to
prioritize homeland security in our strategy and focused on efforts
to mitigate the risk of ISIL external operations or ISIL-inspired
attacks inside the United States, Western Europe, and Australia.
In prioritizing homeland security, we are not arguing that the
ISIL threat outside Iraq and Syria is growing, even though some
10. 10
experts argue that the reduction in the ISIL caliphate could lead to
more attacks outside Iraq and Syria.34
It is also true that the threat
since 9/11 has been considerably less than many predicted, prob-
ably as the result of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investiga-
tions and pressure overseas. In the future, we believe that homeland
security deserves priority in terms of attention and resources, as the
global threat of violent jihadism will remain.
Our strategy calls for sustained pressure against ISIL in multi-
ple regions. Pressure against a transregional network, such as ISIL,
can take many forms at the tactical level, but it should be guided
by two principles. First, the strategy should reduce support for ISIL
and al Qaeda among Sunni Arabs in Iraq and Syria. Second, the
strategy should increase the difficulty of executing terrorist attacks
against the United States and other Western countries. Of course,
sometimes trade-offs exist between these two guiding principles.
The following sections outline the components of such a strategy
and attempt to set priorities when trade-offs arise.
Responding to Major ISIL Transregional Hubs in Iraq and
Syria
Even though our strategy prioritizes protecting the U.S. homeland,
ISIL’s major network hubs are in Iraq and Syria, so we begin with
our ideas for how to respond in these countries.
The U.S. strategy to defeat ISIL emphasizes efforts to dimin-
ish its control over people and territory in Syria and Iraq. The map
of areas of control of ISIL and others in Iraq and Syria is constantly
changing. Figure 3 offers a snapshot of Baghdad’s increasing con-
trol; it has retaken Ramadi, Fallujah, and Tikrit, and the military
campaign to liberate Mosul is well under way. Figure 3 also shows
how Kurdish-controlled territory has expanded beyond the autono-
mous zone in Iraq. The map in Syria is especially dynamic, with
recent Turkish military operations along its border cutting off ISIL’s
flow of supplies and foreign fighters.
While we agree that Syria and Iraq should remain central to
any strategy against ISIL, we disagree somewhat with the U.S.
approach. Namely, our proposed strategy adheres to the guiding
principle of reducing the attraction of ISIL for Sunni Arab popu-
lations, even as military operations proceed. In Iraq, this means
improving governance and reaching some reconciliation between
the Shia-led central government and the country’s Sunni Arab
community. In Syria, this means reducing human suffering and
promoting political change in a way that, likewise, makes it dif-
ficult for ISIL to take advantage of Sunni Arab grievances.35
The strategic implication of our approach is that U.S.-
supported forces would ensure that territory seized from ISIL is
kept out of the hands of jihadist groups in the longer term. “Libera-
tion,” in this sense, needs also to lead to an improvement in the
population’s security and access to basic services. The U.S. govern-
ment learned these lessons during Operation Iraqi Freedom, but
U.S. forces are not in the lead in Syria or Iraq today, nor should
they be. The problem is that local ground forces have, for the most
part, not met such standards in operations in Ramadi and Falluja
in Iraq and in Tal Abyad and Manbij in Syria.36
Each of these cities should be treated as a test case in which the
rule of law and improvement in living conditions encourages other
communities under ISIL control to seek liberation. Heavy-handed
control by Shia and Kurdish militias against civilians and a lack of
government responsiveness to basic needs undermines the momen-
tum of the military campaign and sets the conditions for future
reversals.
11. 11
Iraq
Press for Reconciliation
In our proposed strategy, the United States would calibrate support
relative to the Iraqi central government’s inclusivity and reconcili-
ation with Sunni Arabs. Specifically, the United States should
press for changes in Iraqi laws that would open a path to political
accommodation with the country’s Sunni Arabs. Among the rec-
onciliation initiatives being considered—which include the general
amnesty law, federal court law, and national guard act—polling
suggests that Sunni Arabs care most about the general amnesty
law.37
Sunnis also say that “ensuring a fair judicial process” and
“equitable sharing of resources among sects” are important to them.
The United States should not prioritize other measures that Wash-
ington has previously championed—such as the national guard act
or decentralization—but should respect what Iraqi Sunnis say are
their priorities. In this case, that appears to be amnesty, judicial
reform, and equitable distribution of resources.
The United States has rarely tried withholding support to
achieve political goals in Iraq, but when it has (e.g., withholding
assistance until Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stepped down), it
has had an impact. While Maliki’s removal happened as a result of
his losing the support of Iran, it happened. We recommend that the
United States seek to use its limited leverage in this area to achieve
these political goals.
While the United States has an interest in seeing reconcili-
ation, it is not the right mediator to broker between the central gov-
ernment and Iraq’s Sunni Arab community. Doing so would be too
reminiscent of the 2003–2011 period and signal an expanded U.S.
role that would generate popular opposition, something Muqtada
al-Sadr is already trying to exploit. In addition, U.S. brokering
would inevitably be read as championing one sect over another and
thus sustain divisions within the country. It is possible that circum-
stances could arise where third-party mediation could promote rec-
onciliation. Oman is one candidate for such a role, given its record
as a regional bridge builder. Qatar and Kuwait also have experience
mediating recent intra-Arab disputes.
In continuing to support the training of Iraqi security forces,
the United States would make clear the need for initiatives from
Baghdad to integrate Sunni Arabs into those forces.38
The United
Figure 3. Map of Iraq and Syria
SOURCE: Karen DeYoung and Louisa Loveluck, “Fearing Abandonment by Trump,
CIA-Backed Rebels in Syria Mull Alternatives,” Washington Post,
December 3, 2016; Liz Sly and Karen DeYoung, “Violence Quickly Mars Deal in
Syria,” Washington Post, September 13, 2016.
RAND PE228-3
Raqqa
Latakia
Hama
Homs
Palmyra
Damascus
Daraa
Aleppo
Idlib
IDLIB PROV.
Lebanon
Syria
Jordan
Deir al-Zour
Baghdad
Ramadi
Fallujah
Rutbah
Tikrit
Mosul
Irbil
Kirkuk
Basra
Iraq
Israel
Mediterranean
Sea
Euphrates Tigris
Assad regime
ISIL
Sunni insurgents
Kurdish groups
Iraqi government
12. 12
States would not take steps to train and equip Sunni groups (such
as National Mobilization forces) separate from the ISF so as not to
inhibit integration or fan Sunni hopes of a return to the pre-2003
status quo.39
Supporting militias outside of a national framework is
a tempting proposition to achieve short-term gains, but it is not a
sound approach to sustaining the outcome. Since the jihadi threat
is a long-term challenge, it is time for the United States to be more
disciplined about limiting its tactics and training resources to those
designed for durable results.
Curb Role of Iraqi Kurds
The United States should support the peshmerga’s involvement in
liberating Mosul and other Iraqi cities only insofar as the peshmerga
operates in support of the Iraqi government and Sunni Arab forces.
The peshmerga should not have the lead in liberating any areas
except where Kurds are the majority community. Since Mosul is esti-
mated to be roughly 60 percent Sunni Arab, it is critical that Sunni
Arab forces are involved in both clearing and holding the city.40
The United States needs also to address how to balance its
counter-ISIL goals in the military campaign to liberate Mosul,
given the possibility of violence between Shia and Kurds. Kurdish
leaders have vowed to hold territory acquired in the counter-ISIL
campaign.41
Baghdad and the Shia militias aligned with it are
determined to prevent the Kurds from keeping this territory. The
United States needs to gain firm commitments from the Kurds on
the limits of their territorial ambitions, given the role of the pesh-
merga in the military campaign to liberate Mosul.
Iran’s primary interest in Iraq is to consolidate its influence in
Baghdad, and it sees the United States as the Iraqi government’s
alternative patron. While the United States and Iran share an
interest in rolling back ISIL, cooperation between Washington and
Tehran is limited by competition for influence in Iraq. The United
States cannot expect that Iran will moderate Shia militia actions in
the Iraqi military campaign to liberate Mosul, making it even more
difficult to achieve the long-term goal of countering jihadi support
among the country’s Sunni Arabs.
Syria
The United States finds itself with very little influence in Syria both
in creating a counter-ISIL coalition and in affecting the insurgency
aimed at deposing the Assad regime.
No State Partner Against ISIL in Syria
Unlike Baghdad—which is a partner, if an imperfect one—the
United States lacks a regional state that it can count on to lead the
counter-ISIL campaign in Syria, and there are no prospects on the
horizon.
Riyadh prioritizes Assad’s departure ahead of defeating ISIL
and also sees Syria, like Iraq, as an arena of strategic competition
with Iran, supporting groups with a sectarian tinge (e.g., Jaysh-al-
Islam). Doha’s top priority is also the anti-Assad campaign, not so
much out of a regional power competition with Tehran, but out of
solidarity with Syria’s Sunni community and a further preference
for Islamist factions (Ahrar al-Sham) within it. While Iran views
Since the jihadi threat is a long-term
challenge, the United States needs to be more
disciplined about limiting its tactics and
training for durable results.
13. 13
ISIL as an enemy, it prioritizes bolstering the Assad regime, consoli-
dating its influence in Syria, and keeping a supply line to Hezbol-
lah. Russia has joined the conflict in Syria with a military force that
primarily, but not exclusively, takes the form of an air campaign
supporting the Assad regime.
Ankara’s top priority is containing Kurdish autonomy in
northern Syria, as it fears an autonomous area will provide sanctu-
ary for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated U.S.
foreign terrorist organization, and set a precedent of autonomy
that could be sought by its own sizable Kurdish minority. Turkey’s
recent military operations into Syria with the Free Syrian Army
against ISIL were nominally aimed to protect the Turkish border
from ISIL, but in fact were primarily directed at preventing the
YPG from seizing that territory. Closing off the border to ISIL
and foreign fighter flows is an important step, but future Turkish
involvement in Syria against ISIL is uncertain and will always be
defined by its implications in the conflict with the Kurds.
This leaves the United States with the YPG and the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF), which is YPG-led and only partially
Arab, as its primary partners in the military campaign to clear
Raqqa of ISIL fighters.42
To reduce ISIL’s appeal, and not just its
territorial control, the United States needs to make clear that a
Kurdish-led force is not the appropriate vehicle for holding Raqqa,
if the military campaign succeeds. Given the connections between
the PKK and the YPG, the United States should not provide mili-
tary assistance directly to the YPG.
The United States needs to continue to push for integration of
Arabs into the SDF, while recognizing that the SDF is still viewed
by Syrian Arabs as a Kurdish force. The recent campaign in Manbij
provides a test case for future operations against Raqqa. The Kurd-
ish Democratic Union Party’s efforts to dominate the notables
council established for post-liberation governance, as well as a
perception by Arab residents that the Kurdish Democratic Union
Party shows favoritism to Kurds in the provision of security and
public services, should be a warning against replicating this experi-
ence in Raqqa.
In partnering with the Kurds as a local ground force in Syria,
the United States now confronts the serious risk that Kurdish ter-
ritorial gains will lead to direct conflict with Turkey and potentially
others. The most sensitive area is the swath of territory west of the
Euphrates and east of the so-called Marea line. The liberation of
Manbij in this territory was a positive development for the counter-
ISIL campaign but contributed to the Turkish military interven-
tion, given how the YPG is using the cover of the counter-ISIL
campaign to unite the cantons of Kobane and Afrin, a Turkish
redline. The YPG’s need to protect its gains in Manbij from the
Turks has also had the effect of distracting them from the military
campaign against ISIL in Raqqa, which again shows that the U.S.
priority of defeating ISIL in Syria is not shared by others.
Asking both the YPG and Turkish-supported groups to stand
down is a start, but the United States needs to do more and hold
the Syrian Kurds to earlier commitments to focus on Raqqa, rather
than seeking to control northern Syria. If the YPG persists, the
United States should consider withholding air support, as well as
training and equipment—despite the challenge that would intro-
duce to the counter-ISIL campaign.43
Keep Low Profile in Syria’s Civil War
With the fall of Aleppo to the regime, Assad forces are in the
midst of a brutal conquest of the western spine of the country and
14. 14
are supported in this endeavor by Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah.
The diplomatic/military paths being pursued are all unlikely to
resolve the conflicts, including the most-recent talks convened by
Russia, Turkey, and Iran, which consciously excluded the United
States and other Western powers.44
The Assad regime is consolidat-
ing gains, but only with the support of outside powers. Prospects
of a negotiated political settlement are dim, primarily because of
Assad’s intransigence. Military options to compel the Assad gov-
ernment to negotiate seriously essentially disappeared when Russia
came to its defense. No opposing group is able to function beyond
some limited amount of territory, and each has enemies seeking
its destruction. Continuing to support and arm moderate groups
fighting Assad is becoming less viable with their military losses.
Efforts to make Russia responsible for moderating Assad’s behav-
ior in terms of barrel bombing and starvation of rebel-held areas
concedes acceptance of the survival of the Assad regime and have
failed, notwithstanding the U.S. proposal to ground the Syrian Air
Force in designated areas and facilitate coordination between the
United States and Russia in striking Jabhat an-Nusra and ISIL.45
This leaves the United States with no alternative but to pursue
diplomacy and tactical steps to establish a ceasefire, reduce human-
itarian suffering, and promote change in a way that makes it dif-
ficult for ISIL to take advantage of Sunni Arab grievances.46
Until
the situation changes, the United States should keep its expecta-
tions low, as well as its profile.
Making Homeland Security the Priority
Given the very real limitations of U.S. influence inside Syria and
Iraq, the United States cannot rely primarily on success in these
countries to mitigate the risk of external operations or inspired
attacks. The strategy must also include substantial efforts to
reduce ISIL and al Qaeda’s appeal beyond populations in Syria
and Iraq, especially those in North America and Western Europe.
In this context, any strategy to reduce the appeal of ISIL and al
Qaeda must address ISIL’s ability to inspire sympathizers to act
independently.
The United States has been working with local partners, such as
the United Arab Emirates and Malaysia, to expand efforts to coun-
ter ISIL messaging outside the United States. Within the United
States, it also has begun an initiative to partner with local civil
society groups to counter violent extremism. The United Nations
and European Union also have developed programs to disseminate
lessons learned in counter-radicalization efforts. But history has
demonstrated that counter-radicalization is very much a localized
process and can be difficult to implement, especially among margin-
alized populations, such as those in some parts of Western Europe.
Moreover, the United States is hampered somewhat in its efforts to
help civil society groups at home and abroad by legal restrictions on
advocating for or against religious tenets. Thus, while our proposed
strategy does include countering violent extremism as a component,
it focuses on the risk posed by foreign fighters and their roles in
external operations, as well as ISIL-inspired attacks.47
Specifically, the United States should prioritize efforts to
minimize ISIL’s ability to recruit foreign fighters from the West or
other visa waiver countries.48
Much has been done in this area. The
United Nations has worked with its member countries to adjust
their legal frameworks to make both foreign fighter recruitment
and traveling overseas to fight illegal. The U.S. government should
build upon these efforts and expand technical assistance to relevant
countries so they are able to gather advance passenger information
15. 15
not only on outbound travel but also on returnees.49
In addi-
tion, the United Nations should be encouraged to emphasize the
challenges posed by recidivism, identify lessons learned, and help
member states put programs in place now—before they experience
an unmanageable surge of returnees.
Indeed, the primary gap is in the treatment of returnees.
Returnees represent potential operatives, facilitators, and recruiters.
But countries have different ways of dealing with this threat: Some
imprison returnees, some put returnees through deradicalization pro-
grams, and others revoke their citizenship. This haphazard approach
to foreign fighter returnees presents the possibility that ISIL will be
able to use foreign fighter returnees to rebuild its facilitation net-
works. The United Nations should, therefore, lead an effort to stan-
dardize or at least unify the international communities’ approach to
foreign fighter returnees. As a corollary, the United States should also
assist other countries, including countries such as Kosovo, Tunisia,
and Indonesia, as they attempt to reabsorb foreign fighter returnees.
Such support would likely differ by country, but it could include
encouraging countries to strengthen legal frameworks that allow for
the reintegration of reformed fighters, share intelligence, or commit
resources to programs that counter violent extremism.
Increasing Operational Hurdles for Terrorists
Eroding the appeal of ISIL to Sunni Arabs globally is clearly a
long-term effort. Therefore, the U.S. government must also create
policies that increase the difficulty of external terrorist operations
and inspired attacks. The FBI and other law enforcement agencies
have been very aggressive over the past two years in attempting to
disrupt inspired plots within the United States, and such actions
need to continue. The FBI has come under criticism for its use of
informants to disrupt these plots, as well as its desire for commer-
cial companies to create “back doors” for their encrypted software
and handheld devices. We acknowledge that strict adherence to
civil rights and civil liberties are required. Nonetheless, a successful
strategy of “protecting the homeland” needs to include sufficient
resources devoted to identifying, investigating, and disrupting ISIL
plots within the United States. Other essential security measures,
such as airport security, are needed to minimize the number of
casualties from attacks.
At the same time, the U.S. government cannot rely solely on
domestic security measures to protect the homeland. These mea-
sures should be coupled with counterterrorism pressure against
ISIL overseas. The first operational hurdle is to make it difficult
for ISIL to recruit operatives. We already addressed this some-
what in the contexts of eroding the appeal of ISIL and al Qaeda
and of FBI investigations, but another option also exists. The U.S.
military has indicated that it would like to use digital weapons to
reduce ISIL’s ability to reach global audiences.50
If ISIL ideologues
struggle to reach audiences, then the actual appeal of their mes-
sages to populations within North America, Western Europe, or
Australia, matters less.
The United States needs to improve its countermessaging
against ISIL and al Qaeda, and potentially for use against other
transregional networks. Multiple departments and agencies currently
The United States should prioritize efforts
to minimize ISIL’s ability to recruit foreign
fighters from the West or from other visa
waiver countries.
16. 16
play a role in what is called strategic communications, information
operations, or countermessaging. But significant opportunities exist.
For example, defectors from ISIL have begun to speak out. Refugees
also have told their stories of horrible treatment and losses, which
undermine ISIL’s claim to be a legitimate caliphate. And, just as
social media platforms assist ISIL and al Qaeda, they also can be
used to gauge the nature and the extent to which ISIL and al Qaeda
messages resonate with local populations around the world. But the
United States will need to put in place appropriate authorities, struc-
tures, resourcing, and plans to take advantage of these opportunities.
The second operational hurdle is to make it difficult for ISIL
to transfer resources, including operatives, funds, and weapons,
to combat zones. One way to do this is to focus on surveillance
and interdiction in transit hubs that are commonly used by ISIL
logisticians as way points to reach the physical caliphate. Inevitably,
some foreign fighter recruits from the West and other visa waiver
countries will make it to Syria, Iraq, or other ISIL provinces. The
U.S. government should work to minimize the ability of ISIL to
send these operatives, along with accompanying resources, back
home to conduct attacks.
The United States has emphasized countering terrorist financ-
ing for the past decade, but gaps remain in the broader effort to
disrupt ISIL logistics. Specifically, the United Nations has identi-
fied “broken travel”—operatives taking multiple, indirect routes
between countries—within Europe as a challenge. The United
States should prioritize efforts to overcome these challenges to
diminish ISIL’s ability to conduct attacks in the West. Further, as
a corollary, special attention should be given to finding ways to
reduce ISIL’s ability to transfer funds and weapons among the con-
flict zones in Syria/Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan.
The third operational hurdle is to make it difficult for ISIL to
train operatives for external operations, such as the November
2015 attacks in Paris. History suggests that some foreign fighters
will likely still make it to Syria and Iraq, then return home with
the intention of conducting attacks. Thus, for the third hurdle, the
United States should try to ensure that these operatives do not have
the capability to conduct sophisticated attacks. The most realistic
way to accomplish this objective is to prioritize attacking train-
ing camps in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and other countries
that harbor foreign fighters. Of course, some of these camps are
makeshift and difficult to find. Foreign fighters do not always train
in camps, nor are they always highly capable themselves. The best
example is Umar Farouk Abdullamutallab, who boarded North-
west Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit in December
2009, intending to detonate a suicide belt. Authorities eventually
discovered that the sophisticated bomb had been developed by
Ibrahim al-Asiri, a member of al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen. Attacks
on training camps, nevertheless, represent a third hurdle for ISIL as
it attempts to attack the West.
An added benefit of attacks against training camps is that they
can minimize ISIL’s ability to create alternative safe havens out-
side Syria and Iraq. That said, these attacks also have drawbacks:
They undermine the sovereignty of allies or partners and, in some
instances, generate animosity among Sunni Muslim populations
worldwide. Direct attacks by the U.S. military should, therefore, be
conducted judiciously. An approach that the United States is using
is to work through local partners, either nation-states or irregular
forces, to conduct these attacks. For example, the United States was
a strong advocate for the unity government in Libya that succeeded
in attracting Misratan militias to liberate Sirte from ISIL control.
17. 17
But when necessary, the United States has also taken direct action,
such as its air strike against an Islamic State camp in Sabratha.
The fourth operational hurdle is to make it difficult for ISIL
to plan for and execute sophisticated attacks. Ultimately, it is pos-
sible that ISIL will be able to recruit foreign fighters, gather sufficient
resources, provide the fighters with appropriate capabilities, and send
them home to conduct attacks. So the United States should also pri-
oritize efforts to ensure that they cannot plan for or execute sophis-
ticated attacks. Multiple avenues exist to accomplish this objective;
most fall under the more traditional category of “counterterrorism.”
They include the use of human and signals intelligence to identify
plans by foreign terrorist groups to attack the United States. They
also include efforts to capture foreign terrorist leaders, planners, and
skilled bombmakers. These types of activities essentially make terror-
ists “run and hide,” so that they cannot exert sufficient resources to
planning or executing sophisticated attacks.
Policy Shifts Needed to Disrupt ISIL’s Transregional Network
To implement our proposed strategy of disrupting ISIL’s trans-
regional network, some changes in current policies will be needed.
Resources for the counter-ISIL strategy today are allocated
within the individual budgets of the national security and domestic
agencies, which leads to funding emerging without an overall set
of priorities for the counter-ISIL strategy. Our strategy calls for
prioritizing homeland security with more government coordination
and resources being allocated to the goal of disrupting the trans-
regional transit hubs used by terrorists to move people, money, and
weapons.
Better coordination of domestic and overseas U.S. govern-
ment activities and resources is needed to implement our proposed
strategy of focusing on ISIL as a transregional network overseas.
While there have been major improvements since 9/11, too many
stovepipes still exist—among embassy regional and counterterror-
ism experts (U.S. Agency for International Development officers,
Central Intelligence Agency station chiefs, FBI legal attachés, and
SOF elements) as well as among law enforcement entities (the FBI,
the Drug Enforcement Agency, Customs and Border Protection,
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement).
Outside the United States, U.S. embassy–led country teams
remain the primary instruments of foreign policy. These country
teams include representatives from U.S. diplomatic, intelligence,
law enforcement, and military communities. This model has a
major shortcoming when it comes to a transregional counter-ISIL
strategy (and counterterrorism strategy in general): Country-
specific strategies only deal with national manifestations of
transregional threats. The need, then, is to knit together an over-
arching strategy that can be easily translated and implemented
at a national and local level. One possible way to facilitate such a
strategy would be to regularize coordinating calls among relevant
country teams (ambassadors). These coordinating calls should be
facilitated by regional bureaus in the State Department, as well
as the regional offices in the Office of Secretary of Defense and
relevant Joint Staff planners. The combatant commands would
participate as necessary.
Special attention should be given to interdict-
ing the transit hubs used by ISIL logisticians
to transfer operatives, funds, and weapons to
and from the combat zones.
18. 18
Beyond coordination, the United States needs to expand the
access and placement of assets from the intelligence community, law
enforcement, and SOF. The intelligence community needs increased
investment in low-intensity-warfare human intelligence collection, as
well as a greater emphasis on partnering with irregular forces, invest-
ing in vetting these forces, and coordinating with SOF. The presence
of FBI legal attaches needs to be expanded in countries both with
and without SOF presence. These assets should be fully resourced
and have access to Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.
There should be expanded placement and access overseas for the full
range of SOF forces, not just in task forces, but in the Special Opera-
tion Command (Forward) in Yemen and Pakistan. There is also a
need to modify the logistics infrastructure (mostly in the Air Force)
to provide such forward SOF forces with defensive close air support,
emergency evacuation, etc.
Finally, the air campaign against ISIL in Syria and Iraq
should emphasize attention and resources on destroying the ISIL
leadership and training camps in Iraq and Syria, as well as ISIL’s
command and control and logistics flows of weapons and foreign
fighters.51
This targeting would be deliberate and prosecuted as a
sustained campaign. In military operations, very tight constraints
would be kept on civilian casualties, to avoid backlash and giving
ISIL an advantage in social media and recruitment. The United
States also needs to be highly discerning in the use of close air sup-
port, given the dubious character of U.S. “partners” on the ground.
Critical Elements of Future U.S. Counter-ISIL
Strategy
The debate over counter-ISIL strategies has tended to focus on
rather stark alternatives that are based on different ways to employ
U.S. military forces: disengagement, containment, and aggressive
rollback using combat forces. Our strategy seeks to broaden the
focus to policies beyond the military dimension.
The U.S. strategy in countering ISIL needs to recognize the
long-term nature of the global violent jihadi threat and make its
central focus reducing the appeal of ISIL and other such groups (al
Qaeda, Jabhat an-Nusra, and any future groups) in Iraq and Syria
through both diplomatic and military efforts. This goal should
be used to set expectations and measure success, even if it is less
headline-grabbing and more difficult to achieve than changes in
the map of ISIL-controlled territory.
The threat from violent jihadi groups is global, and so a suc-
cessful strategy needs to focus on ISIL’s transregional network.
Protecting the U.S. homeland deserves priority, even if the threat
has so far been less than predicted and relatively limited. While the
counter-ISIL coalition may erode ISIL’s control of major population
centers in Iraq and Syria, other aspects of the threat will endure,
including terrorist attacks on the West, and these will require a
concerted campaign of intelligence, law enforcement, and military
disruption.
Even though U.S. leverage is limited to affect the political
situations in Iraq and Syria, the United States should focus on
removing the underlying conditions—the lack of security, justice,
and political representation—sustaining ISIL and other militant
groups. In addition, the United States needs to re-evaluate how to
balance the aims of the counter-ISIL campaign with the territo-
rial and political ambitions of the Kurds, given the risk of violence
between Shia and Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and the YPG in Syria.
In the absence of commitments on the part of the Kurds to limit
their territorial ambitions, and to avoid fueling conflict across the
19. 19
region, the United States should be cautious in the ways it supports
the YPG and peshmerga in its counter-ISIL military campaign.
Keeping expectations realistic is essential in carrying out a
counter-ISIL strategy, for the U.S. interest in achieving regional
stability in the Middle East and elsewhere confronts not only the
long-term jihadi threat but also the political and economic fragil-
ity of many of the states involved. In addition, the U.S. priority in
defeating ISIL is not shared by other states in the region, and the
interests of the Russians and the Iranians will sharply diverge with
those of the United States.
The U.S. strategy in countering ISIL needs to recognize the long-term nature of the global
violent jihadi threat and make its central focus reducing the appeal of ISIL and other such
groups in Iraq and Syria through both diplomatic and military efforts. This goal should be
used to set expectations and measure success, even if it is less headline-grabbing and more
difficult to achieve than changes in the map of ISIL-controlled territory.
20. 20
Notes
1
The Obama administration’s use of territory as a measure of its success in the
counter-ISIL campaign can be seen in the Department of Defense’s mapping of
how ISIL’s areas of influence were reduced from August 2014 to April 2016 (see
Department of Defense, “Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Areas of Influence, August 2014
Through April 2016,” web page, undated. As of January 16, 2017:
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2014/0814_iraq/docs/
20160512_ISIL%20Areas%20of%20Influence_Aug%202014%20through%20
Apr%202016%20Map.pdf). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Francis
Dunford Jr. suggested that the appropriate metrics for measuring success were
the erosion of ISIL territory, the constraining of ISIL resources, and the flow of
foreign fighters (Jim Garamone, “Dunford Lists Ways to Measure Counter-ISIL
Success,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, web site, undated. As of
January 16, 2017: http://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News-Display/Article/857786/
dunford-lists-ways-to-measure-counter-isil-success).
2
At this point, ISI adopted the name of al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq wa al-
Sham, which is rendered in English as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Daesh (an Arabic acronym).
3
Taking a regional state adversary as a point of comparison, Iran has roughly
half a million men in its active military forces, ballistic missiles, and growing air
defense capabilities (see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance, 2016, pp. 327–331). Taking an insurgent group as a point of comparison,
the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reported that
“(8.8 percent) [of districts] within 15 provinces were under insurgent control or
influence, and 104 districts (25.6 percent) were ‘at risk’” (Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to Congress,”
July 30, 2016, p. 86).
4
The estimate cited in this report comes from CIA Director John Brennan’s
testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee (Brennan, testimony before
the Senate Intelligence Committee, Washington, D.C., June 16, 2016). A week
earlier, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest and Special Presidential Envoy
Brett McGurk put the figure of foreign fighters at 19,000–25,000 (Earnest and
McGurk, press briefing at the White House, Washington, D.C., June 9, 2016. As
of January 16, 2017: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/10/
press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-and-special-presidential).
5
Department of Defense, undated.
6
Keith Crane, “The Role of Oil in ISIL’s Finances,” testimony before the Senate
Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Washington, D.C., December 10,
2015.
7
Lina Khatib, “The Islamic State’s Strategy: Lasting and Expanding,” Carnegie
Middle East Center, June 29, 2015. As of January 16, 2017:
http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/06/29/islamic-state-s-strategy-lasting-and-
expanding-pub-60511; Christopher Blanchard and Carla Humud, The Islamic
State and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, June 27, 2016.
8
“The replacement of Allah’s law in some area of the world with the laws of men
or causing that—by supporting those who fight against the Islamic State ruling by
the Shari’ah—is kufr that expels its perpetrator from the religion and this ruling is
from that in which no Muslim should have any doubt.” “The Laws of Allah or the
Laws of Men,” Dabiq [ISIL’s online magazine], No. 10, 2015, pp. 53–54.
9
“The tyrant rulers who rule your lands in the two holy places [i.e. Saudi Arabia],
Yemen, the Levant, Iraq, Egypt, the Maghreb, Khorasan, the Caucasus, India,
and Africa . . . they are allies of the Jews and Crusaders. Indeed, they are their
slaves and servants. They are no more than watch dogs.” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,
audio message, al-Battar Media Foundation, May 2015.
10
Sunni Muslims are estimated to represent 85–90 percent of the Muslim world.
11
Jacob Poushter, “In Nations with Significant Muslim Populations, Much
Disdain for ISIS,” FactTank, Pew Research Center, November 17, 2015.
12
Michael Knights, “ISIL 3-24: Do They Do Counter-Insurgency?” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, September 30, 2014.
13
As ISIL leadership argues, “Sunnis, know that you are the only ones targeted,
what is this war if not against you and against your religion? When you return to
your religion and your jihad, then you will recover your glory, might, rights and
sovereignty.” Baghdadi, 2015.
14
Liam Stack, “How ISI[L] Expanded Its Threat,” New York Times, November 14,
2015. As of January 16, 2017: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/14/
world/middleeast/isis-expansion.html
15
Some fighters from al-Qaeda affiliates have defected to ISIL. See Greg Miller,
“Fighters Abandoning al-Qaeda to Join the Islamic State, US Officials Say,”
Washington Post, August 9, 2014. As of January 20, 2017:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fighters-abandoning-
al-qaeda-affiliates-to-join-islamic-state-us-officials-say/2014/08/09/c5321d10-
1f08-11e4-ae54-0cfe1f974f8a_story.html
16
In this respect, the situation is similar to Iraq, where the insurgency is particu-
larly strong in Saddam Hussein’s old power base of Salah ad-Din Governorate.
17
Daniel Milton and Muhammad al-Ubaydi, “Pledging Bay‘a: A Benefit or
Burden to the Islamic State,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8, No. 3, March 2015.
21. 21
18
Alex Thurston, ‘The Disease is Unbelief’: Boko Haram’s Religious and Political
Worldview, Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper No. 22, January 2016.
19
Mokhtar Awad and Samuel Tadros, “Bay‘a Remorse? Wilayat Sinai and the Nile
Valley,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8, No. 8, August 21, 2015.
20
Andrew Roth, “Russia Confirms Sinai Plane Crash Was the Work of Terrorists,”
Washington Post, November 17, 2015. As of January 17, 2017:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
russia-confirms-sinai-crash-was-the-work-of-terrorists/2015/11/17/
496286f4-8d05-11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html
21
The Global Terrorism Index estimates that Boko Haram attacks killed 6,644 in
2014, as compared with ISIL attacks, which killed 6,073. Of the 50 deadliest ter-
rorist attacks of 2014, 27 are believed to have been perpetrated by Boko Haram.
See Institute for Economics and Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2015,”
November 2015.
22
David Kirkpatrick, Ben Hubbard, and Eric Schmitt, “ISIS’ Grip on Libyan
City Gives It a Fallback Option,” New York Times, November 28, 2015.
23
See, for example, Charlie Winter, “The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding
Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy,” Quilliam Foundation, July 2015. As of
January 17, 2017: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/
publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-
strategy.pdf, and Aaron Zelin, “New Video Message from the Islamic State:
‘Victory from God and an Imminent Conquest—Wilayat al-Khayr,’” Jihadology,
May 11, 2015. As of January 17, 2017: http://jihadology.net/2015/05/11/
new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-victory-from-god-and-an-imminent-
conquest-wilayat-al-khayr/
24
John O. Brennan, statement as prepared for delivery before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, June 16, 2016.
25
Rukmini Callimachi, “How ISIS Built the Machinery of Terror Under Europe’s
Gaze,” New York Times, March 29, 2016. As of January 17, 2017:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/world/europe/
isis-attacks-paris-brussels.html; Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, “This is the Promise
of Allah,” statement released by al-Hayat Media Center, June 30, 2014; “Chechen
IS Fighter Calls for Lone Wolf Attacks in US, Europe,” SITE Intelligence Group,
December 17, 2014. As of January 17, 2017: https://news.siteintelgroup.com/
Jihadist-News/chechen-is-fighter-calls-in-video-for-lone-wolf-attacks-in-america-
europe.html
26
Andrew Higgins and Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, “Paris Attack Suspect Killed
in Shootout Had Plotted Terror for 11 Months,” New York Times,
November 19, 2015. As of January 17, 2017: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/
world/europe/paris-attacks.html?ref=liveblog&_r=0
27
Higgins and Freytas-Tamura, 2015.
28
Missy Ryan, Adam Goldman, and Abby Phillip, “San Bernardino Shooters Had
Been Radicalized ‘for Some Time,’ FBI Says,” Washington Post,
December 7, 2015. As of January 17, 2017: https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/san-bernardino-shooters-had-been-radicalized-for-
some-time-fbi-says/2015/12/07/d88f8cd6-9d2d-11e5-a3c5-c77f2cc5a43c_story.
html?hpid=hp_rhp-top-table-main_sanbernardino-315pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory
29
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “The Myth of Lone-Wolf
Terrorism: The Attacks in Europe and Digital Extremism,” Foreign Affairs,
July 26, 2016. As of January 17, 2017: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
western-europe/2016-07-26/myth-lone-wolf-terrorism
30
Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign
Fighters into Syria and Iraq, December 2015; James Clapper, Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, statement for the record, report pre-
pared for the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2016.
31
Top defense officials have declined to provide a precise number of current flows
but have noted they are declining. See Ashton Carter and Joseph Dunford, “U.S.
Strategy Against ISIS,” testimony before the Senate Arms Services Committee,
April 28, 2016. Lower-ranking officials have estimated the current number as in
the low hundreds per month. “U.S. Military Softens Claims on Drop in Islamic
State’s Foreign Fighters,” Reuters, April 28, 2016. As of January 17, 2017:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-recruiting-idUSKCN0XP33K
32
Joby Warrick and Liz Sly, “U.S.-Led Strikes Putting a Financial Squeeze on the
Islamic State,” Washington Post, April 2, 2016. As of January 17, 2017:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
us-led-strikes-putting-a-financial-squeeze-on-the-islamic-state/2016/04/02/
e739a7be-f848-11e5-a3ce-f06b5ba21f33_story.html
33
Griff Witte, Sudarsan Raghavan, and James McAuley, “Flow of Foreign Fighters
Plummets as Islamic State Loses Its Edge,” Washington Post, September 9, 2016.
As of January 17, 2017: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/flow-of-
foreign-fighters-plummets-as-isis-loses-its-edge/2016/09/09/
ed3e0dda-751b-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story.html
34
Witte, Raghavan, and McAuley, 2016.
35
In its counter-ISIL strategy, the Obama administration did include the aim of
“setting the conditions for a political solution to the civil war in Syria and to work
towards inclusive governance in Iraq as the only durable means to prevent a future
22. 22
terrorist organization like ISIL from re-emerging in the region,” but then focused
on destroying ISIL in Iraq and Syria and its expansion globally, with a few lines
about supporting political reforms in Iraq and the peace process in Syria. For the
Obama administration’s counter-ISIL strategy, see Office of the White House,
“Section 1222 Report: Strategy for the Middle East and to Counter Violent
Extremism,” March 2016. As of January 17, 2017: https://armedservices.house.
gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/
Section%201222%20Report.pdf
36
For a description of reports of abuses in Falluja on the part of the Shia militias,
see Ned Parker and Jonathan Landay, “Special Report:
Massacre Reports Show U.S. Inability to Curb Iraq Militias,” Reuters,
August 23, 2016. As of January 17, 2017: http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-iraq-massacres-falluja-special-report-idUSKCN10Y1VD
37
Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, “Lack of Responsiveness Impacts Mood
August–September 2015 Survey Findings,” National Democratic Institute, 2015.
As of January 17, 2017: https://www.ndi.org/files/
August%202015%20Survey_NDI%20Website.pdf
38
As of August 2016, the United States had trained more than 13,500 members
of the Iraqi security forces, including more than 4,000 Iraqi Army soldiers, 1,500
counterterrorism service soldiers, 6,000 peshmerga, almost 1,000 federal police,
and 300 border guards. See Sean MacFarland, Department of Defense press brief-
ing, August 10, 2016.
39
Not to be confused with al-hashd al-sha‘bī, or the popular mobilization forces
that are the better-known Shia militia groups.
40
This is consistent with what the commander of U.S. Central Command has
stated—the operation would not proceed until there are plans to stabilize the city,
provide political leadership, and deal with humanitarian issues. Damian Paletta,
“Pentagon Allies Jailed in Turkey Amid Coup Backlash, General Says,” Wall Street
Journal, July 28, 2016. As of January 16, 2017: http://blogs.wsj.com/
washwire/2016/07/28/pentagon-allies-jailed-in-turkey-amid-coup-backlash-
general-says/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=Mil%20EBB%207.29.16&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Military%20
-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief&cb=logged0.7979132289320245
41
According to Falah Mustafa, head of the Iraqi Kurdish region’s foreign relations
department, “all areas that have been liberated by the peshmerga forces, our
(Kurdish) forces will stay there.” The Kurdish forces are estimated to have taken
territory equivalent to around 50 percent of the size of their recognized autono-
mous zone. Susannah George and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “Mosul Fight Is Already
Redrawing the Map of Northern Iraq,” Associated Press, August 27, 2016. As
of January 17, 2017: http://bigstory.ap.org/article/5271b7f7d7e244e5a9be57
3ea8919058/mosul-fight-already-redrawing-map-northern-Iraq?
utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=
New%20Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report
42
Andrea Taylor and Aaron Stein, “Revisiting Train-and-Equip in
Syria to Clear the Manbij Pocket,” War on the Rocks, blog, May 30,
2016. As of January 16, 2017: http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/
revisiting-train-and-equip-in-syria-to-clear-the-manbij-pocket
43
Former Vice President Joseph Biden noted, “We have made it absolutely clear
to the elements that were part of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the YPG that
participated [in the operation against Manbij], that they must move back across
the [Euphrates] river. They cannot, will not, and under no circumstances get
American support if they do not keep that commitment, period.” Joseph Biden
and Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, press conference remarks, Ankara,
Turkey, August 24, 2016.
44
For a practical way to end the fighting in Syria that would focus on securing
an immediate ceasefire, accompanied by an international agreed arrangement for
its enforcement, see James Dobbins, Philip Gordon, and Jeffrey Martini, A Peace
Plan for Syria, Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, PE-182-RC, 2015. As of
January 16, 2017: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE182.html
As a sequel, these authors describe how decentralization of governance could be
contribute to the goal of an inclusive, unified, and democratic Syria, in Dobbins,
Gordon, and Martini, A Peace Plan for Syria II: Options for Future Governance,
Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, PE-202-RC, 2016. As of
January 16, 2017: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE202.html
45
Jabhat an-Nusra recently changed its name to Jabhat Fatah-al-Sham, claiming to
have severed its ties with al Qaeda. The Washington Post released the terms of ref-
erence of a proposal for a U.S.-Russian Joint Implementation Group to coordinate
procedures for targeting Jabhat an-Nusra and ISIL in Syria, deconflict their air
strikes, and exchange information on the grounding of Syrian aircraft in desig-
nated areas. “Terms of Reference for the Joint Implementation Group,” posted on
Washington Post, July 13, 2016. As of January 17, 2017:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2016/07/13/
Editorial-Opinion/Graphics/terms_of_reference_for_the_Joint_
Implementation_Group.pdf
46
At the time of writing, UN Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura was still seeking
resumption in peace talks, but most analysts doubted that was possible, as fighting
had escalated in Aleppo.
47
For the Obama administration’s joint countering violent extremism strat-
egy, see White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: The White
House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism,” February 18, 2015. As of
23. 23
January 16, 2017: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/
fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism
48
There is no definitive open-source estimate of the number of foreign fighters
that fit this category, given that it is not known which national contingents are
among the surviving foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Now-dated estimates put
the figure of Western foreign fighters at 2,000–3,000. Daniel Byman and Jeremy
Shapiro, “Be Afraid, Be a Little Afraid,” Brookings Institution, November 2014.
49
“Action Against Threat of Foreign Terrorist Fighters Must Be Ramped Up,
Security Council Urges in High-Level Meeting,” United Nations Security Coun-
cil Press Release No. 11912, May 29, 2015. As of January 17, 2017:
http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11912.doc.htm
50
Spencer Ackerman, “Pentagon Admits It Is ‘Looking to Acceler-
ate’ Cyber-Attacks Against ISIS,” The Guardian, February 29, 2016. As
of January 17, 2017: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/
pentagon-admits-cyber-attacks-against-isis
51
Around 90 percent of U.S. bombs are dropped on ISIL fighters and
other battlefield targets. For a description of the U.S. air campaign,
see Eric Schmidt, “U.S. Says Its Strikes are Hitting More Significant
ISIS Targets,” New York Times, May 25, 2016. As of January 17, 2017:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/us/politics/us-strikes-isis-targets.
html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0