Daesh Teaser 1

Copyright © Sanjay M. Matkar 2015-16
„Sardar‟ Sanjay Matkar
Mumbai, 2015
Showdown
at Dabiq
“DAESH AGAINST
THE ARMIES OF
ROME IN THE 21ST
CENTURY”……..

“The characterization of ISIS
(Daesh) is that they have 14th
century ethics and 21st century
weapons"
Dabiq is a town in northern Syria, administratively a
part of the A'zaz District of Aleppo Governorate,
located northeast of Aleppo. Nearby localities include
Mare' to the southwest. The town is the site of the
decisive battle of Marj Dabiq between the Ottoman
Empire and the Mamluk Sultanate in 1516. In Islamic
eschatology, it is believed that Dabiq is one of two
possible locations for an epic battle between invading
Christians and the defending Muslims which will
result in a Muslim victory and mark the beginning of
“the end of the world”.

INTRODUCTION:
Daesh is known by many names: The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (or ISIL), or
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (or ISIS), or the Islamic State in Iraq (or ISI), or the
Mujahideen Shura Council and currently self-described as the Islamic State.
When the Islamic State first stepped onto the world stage, there was a lot of speculation
about it without adequate research. Since then the group expanded rapidly, capturing
large parts of Syria and Iraq, and went on to declare a caliphate and receive pledges of
allegiance from various terrorists groups in the Middle East, North African and East
Asian countries, there is a need to deeply understand the origins of the group and its
goals.
This will require an in-depth research and the ability to go beyond the descriptive
general assumptions. Some analysts have presumed that this group is the natural
outcome of the current transformation of Arab societies, and is a reflection of their
internal political and economic divisions. Another strange analysis is that the group is a
puppet of external forces, creating chaos in this region. Many analysts have based their
research on comparisons between Daesh and Al- Qaeda, with one section claiming that
the differences are fundamental from ideological roots, while the other section claims
that the differences are superficial and that the two groups have the same views on the
use of violence and terror.
The Arabic world pejoratively calls the ISIS by the acronym Daesh, (ad-Dawlah al-
Islāmīyah fil 'Irāq wa ash-Shām, roughly "The Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria").
Daesh is a Jihadist terrorist group in Iraq and Syria with a CIA estimate of 20,000-
31,500 fighters, while intelligence organizations in the Mid-East and Asia estimate these
numbers as close to 200,000*.
*Given this range of estimates, questions naturally arise: Who is right? Which estimate is
closest to Daesh’s true numbers? To assess these questions, it’s necessary to consider
which parts of Daesh’s force the estimates are attempting to count, the total amount of
territory Daesh is occupying, and the attrition that coalition forces have inflicted upon
Daesh. Bearing in mind all of these factors, it becomes clear not only that the high-end

figures are plausible, but also that they are far more likely than the unrealistically low
numbers propounded by U.S. intelligence.
The figure of 200,000 Daesh fighters advanced by Fuad Hussein (Chief of Staff to
Kurdish President Massoud Barzani) includes support personnel (ansar), police-style
security forces (hisba), local militias, border guards, paramilitary personnel associated
with the group‟s various security bodies (mukhabarat, assas, amniyat, and amn al-
khas), and conscripts and trainees. The actual number of Daesh front-line and garrison
fighters is much lower, which are divided between their regular forces (jund), the elite
paramilitary (inghimasiyun), which alone may have up to 15,000 members, and death
squad (dhabbihah) personnel. Unless one is able to objectively evaluate these forces,
merely mentioning raw numbers is meaningless.
In 2014 Daesh seized a significant amount of territory in Syria and Iraq and declared the
territory under their control to be a sovereign state and a new Caliphate under the
leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Local jihadist bands in the non-contiguous areas of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sinai,
Khorasan (the historic region which lies mostly in parts of Iran, Turkmenistan,
Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan), Libya and Algeria have sworn allegiance to the
Caliphate and are considered by the Daesh as provinces. Nigeria's Boko Haram
movement has expressed support for Al- Baghdadi as Caliph and has been publicly
been accepted by Daesh as part of the Islamic State. Daesh also boasts legions of
lone-wolf operatives worldwide in the global jihad.

CHAPTER: 1:
Originally founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as the Group for Monotheism and Jihad,
Daesh became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004 and later the Islamic State, after the
withdrawal of U.S. troops. Daesh was disowned by al-Qaeda in April 2013 for excess
brutality toward civilians and the murder of al Qaeda representatives and commanders.
The group continues to hold its designation as a foreign terrorist organization by the
United States Department of State. Its current leader Caliph al - Baghdadi had broken
out of Abu Ghraib prison in July 2013, along with several hundred other experienced
jihadists. On June 30, 2014 they declared themselves a „Sunni caliphate‟ with al-
Bagdadi as the “Commander of the Faithful,” a term essentially declaring him leader of
all Muslims.
To understand the origins, impact and the future of Daesh, the focus of research and
analysis should be on multiple levels. The beginning should be with the Ideology of
Daesh and its intellectual origins, and connections to al- Qaeda, Salafis, and Salafi
Jihadi groups. The complexity of Daesh needs to be understood through the factors that
created it; its dependency on the religious texts through which it projects its unique
identity, its barbaric and ruthless approach to jihad, and its rigid and seemingly
unwavering ideological interpretations of Sharia; its psychological approach of sectarian
dominance, and its extreme brutality towards all those it considers as its rivals or the
infidels and apostates.
One problem that confuses the understanding of Daesh‟s appeal is that, Western
politicians tend to deliberately misrepresent the role of ideology to undermine the
group‟s propaganda, while objective observers often have no access to Daesh
associates beyond social media. As a result, a flawed understanding of the ideological
appeal of Daesh is common, despite its central role in the fight against it. Both the
commander of the American special operations forces in the Middle East, Major
General Michael Nagata, and the general in charge of leading the international coalition
against Daesh, John Allen, have emphasized that the ideology of Daesh is insufficiently
understood and that ideological de-legitimization is crucial in the effort to defeat it.

There are multiple factors which have been attributed to the sudden rise of Daesh.
Social issues like uncontrolled demographic growth, rampant unemployment, poor or no
educational standards, politics of severe tyranny in the Middle East (especially in Syria
and Iraq); failure of the earlier governments of this region in managing relationships
among various ethnicities; the failure in social, educational and cultural development; all
of which resulted in tyrannical circumstances of civil wars, massacres, imprisonment
and torture of the people of those lands. While all of the above factors can be
suggestive that the emergence of Daesh is a result of the long history of wars and
violence, it is unable to explain the factors for the ideological and intellectual structure,
and the spiritual premise of Daesh brand of jihad.
Is Daesh a product of the environment brought about by various factors such as
religious texts, social and psychological factors that impacted the psyche of the
jihadis or are jihadis themselves the creators of such environment and
circumstances?
The ideological foundation of global jihad is based on the aspect of “Ruling by God‟s
word and establishing Islamic Rule” (the Prophetic Methodology). This fixed and
absolute foundation produces all concepts and courses of action, and differences of
opinion amongst the jihadi groups. The public statements of al- Qaeda, Daesh and al-
Nusra Front (Jabhat al Nusra) have brought these differences into the open. Various
statements of Ayman al- Zawahiri (al- Qaeda), Abu Bakr al– Baghdadi and Abu
Mohammad al- Adnani (Daesh) and Abu Mohammed al- Jolani (al- Nusra Front) clearly
demonstrate these differences.
Religion more than anything else has been the driving force. Two demographic
components; the long-standing takfiris (radicals who adhere to teachings that declare
fellow Muslims as infidels) and young zealots, are more central for Daesh than other
members because they formulate the group‟s identity and ensure its resilience. In
addition, the appeal of Daesh outside its conflict zones tends to be primarily
ideologically driven. Ibn Taymiyyah (Sunni Islamic Scholar and Philosopher of the 13th

Century) said “the foundation of this religion (Islam) is a book that guides and a sword
that brings victory".
“We guide and the sword brings victory. If someone opposes the message of the
prophet, he faces nothing but the sword. As the prophet spread the message
across the Earth, we are doing the same”, says Abū Muhammad al-Adnāni, the
Daesh spokesman.
The bickering between Daesh and al-Qaeda makes an interesting study. Both rivals
agree in principle to set up the „Islamic State in Syria” and declaring it a caliphate. But
this idea is radically opposed to the concept of the currently existing civil, democratic,
secular state(s); that though call themselves Islamic, are inevitably influenced by
Western powers and are an impediment to jihad.
Baghdadi's 9 April 2013 recording, in which he says, “Do not get rid of the injustice of
dictatorship for the sake of the injustice of democracy”, as well as Jolani’s 24 February
2014 recording, in which he mentions groups that became apostates and infidels, such
as the Syrian coalition and those in charge of the “national army” project. In an interview
with Sami al-Auraidi, the spiritual leader of al-Nusra on 21 October 2013, he divides rule
into two categories: godly and jahili (ignorant). He added that most (jihadi) groups want
to rule according to God's word and establish a Muslim state; the ones that want a
secular civil state are few, and “we call upon them to come back to reason and learn
their lesson”. And, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, “This Has Not Been our Method and Shall
Not Be” statement of 17 April 2014, followed by Ayman al-Zawahiri's response on 2 May
2014, followed by Adnani's reply titled, “Excuse me, emir of Al Qaeda”, 11 May 2014..
In terms of indoctrination, Daesh generally does not expose new members to teachings
that are not derived from Sharia texts. New members are almost exclusively exposed to
religious books, while established members or commanders can study manuals such as
“Management of Savagery”, a book on jihad, written by an Abu Bakr Naji, who said that
one should distinguish between jihad and other religious tenets in that „jihad is not about
mercy but about extreme retaliatory violence to deter enemies’. The restriction of
religious training to religious texts is in line with the group‟s rhetoric that it is an
extension of authentic Islam rather than a new group with its own set of teachings.

All jihadi groups agree that secularism, nationalism, patriotism and democracy are
“clear infidelity and apostasy that contradicts Islam and leads to excommunication”. The
communications between Daesh and al- Qaeda show that al- Zawahiri considered
Daesh as part of al- Qaeda, because it had pledged allegiance and followed the broad
policy of al- Qaeda on matters related to jihad. However, al- Adnani disagreed, and
stated that Daesh had parted ways with al- Qaeda based on methodological reasons
and that al- Qaeda was no longer the base of jihad and its leadership was considered
an impediment in the Islamic State project and the formation of the caliphate. Despite
al- Adnani‟s attempts to project this rift as methodological, it was not about visions and
principles, but about organization of jihad and its practical issues. Daesh held al-
Zawahiri in contempt for staying away from the battlefields, and considered al- Qaeda‟s
lack of action on-the-field as an „appeasement policy‟. The rift between Daesh and al-
Qaeda originates from the issue of declaring the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” and
the inclusion of the al- Nusra Front in it, without consulting al- Zawahiri. Further, the
timing and the manner of declaring the caliphate, practically amounted to a revolt
against al- Qaeda and declaring itself free from al- Zawahiri‟s monopoly on worldwide
jihad, which according to Daesh, he no longer had a right upon. This break-off allowed
Daesh to declare a singular caliph who would rule according to God‟s word.
Daesh insisted on establishing their state, disregarding Zawahiri's demand to dismantle
it and disengage IS in Iraq from Nusra in Syria. On 15 June 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
publicly stated, “The state shall remain”, and Adnani's stated on 30 July 2013, “For the
sake of establishing the Islamic State, we shall fight all who fight us”.
The establishment of a caliphate was supposed to finish the discord between various
jihadi groups over the leadership of the jihad and give it legitimacy. However, al- Qaeda
ideologues were concerned about the breakaway of Daesh from the guidelines of jihad
that had been set up earlier. This included the concept that jihad should not be turned
into a vendetta based struggle for revenge, judicious use of excommunication and
taking into account the difference between infidel lands (where the majority of residents
are infidels) and the non-infidel, infidel lands (where the majority are mostly Muslims,
but not true followers of the faith). The other issue was that in the early days of jihad in

Iraq, Abu Musab al- Zarqawi‟s lack of resilience prevented him from assimilating into al-
Qaeda and coming under the command of Osama bin Laden. It is interesting that in the
specific case of al- Zarqawi, the failure to adhere to the guidelines of jihad as set by al-
Qaeda, would produce groups that “heed no rules in fighting, and go against the
interests of jihad, and failing to distinguish between its interests and shortcomings”.
Similarly, in the case of al- Baghdadi, Daesh had caused disadvantage to jihad in two
ways; it caused a split in the process of jihad, and turned the conflict inwards into
infighting between jihadi groups, to a point that within six months, Daesh conflict with al-
Nusra front turned from a dispute over the emir-ship of the jihad, into a all-out religious
war. The idea that Daesh is singularly unique is based on the considerations of its rigid
vision on the spiritual and sectarian aspects of jihad, the excessive magnitude of its
brutality that was criticized by al- Qaeda, and its advanced pragmatism and
opportunism that caused Daesh to fight other jihadi groups for supremacy; while
accepting allegiance from criminal jihadi elements to expand its support base. These
considerations indicate a change in policy whereby Daesh will adhere to the original
path of jihad, whereby the “jihadis shall not let go of their weapons until there is
surrender to Sharia”, and that “they shall fight for the establishment of an Islamic state,
where jihad as a armed and violent struggle is a duty”. The original policy of al- Qaeda
as outlined by al- Zawahiri starts with expelling the Americans from Iraq, establishment
of an Islamic Emirate that would be developed into a caliphate, control of large portions
of Iraq as possible, especially Sunni Arab areas, spreading jihad to bordering secular
states and finally “confronting Israel, since Israel was created only to thwart any
emerging Islamic entity”.

CHAPTER: 2:
The difference between Daesh and al- Qaeda can be noted from their approach to
politics. Al- Qaeda is shrewd while Daesh believes in aggressive confrontation. Global
jihad‟s aim is to establish an Islamic State, and believe that the only way this can be
achieved is through armed conflict. The doctrine of al- Qaeda is that “jihad is ongoing
until the Day of Judgment, with or without an imam (leader); and every believer must
wage jihad against the enemies of God, even if he was the last man standing”. Al-
Jolani, the leader of al- Nusra Front defined the struggle as one between Muslims (on
one side) and Jews and Christian crusaders on the other; Shia on the second side and
global superpowers on the third side. He calls it the “sectarian struggle”.
Whatever that the jihadi groups may define as their ideology for jihad, in reality, both
Daesh and al- Qaeda are as hard-line or as pragmatic, as circumstances require. For
example, al- Qaeda was pragmatic making a truce with Iran after the Afghan war.
Daesh itself accepted orders from al- Qaeda and did not engage in hostilities towards
the Shia in Iran, to uphold the interests of al- Qaeda. However, Daesh did not obey
these orders within the territory it controls, indicating that their hard-line approach is
used on in circumstances that go against the established norms. Pragmatism is used to
their advantage and to avoid any impediments to their interests. When ISIS declared the
caliphate, it labeled its opponents as tyrants that had to be deposed. Al- Qaeda argues
against the legitimacy of the caliphate, stating that Daesh reneged on its allegiance to
al- Qaeda, thereby turning the argument from one of politics to that of doctrine. With the
occupation of Iraq by the Americans, al- Qaeda changed from being an idea into a
project, where strategy changed according to its members and on-ground
circumstances. Al- Zarqawi deemed it necessary to target the “sects of apostasy” (Shia
and other Muslims) and not restrict the jihad to waging war against the Americans. He
developed new techniques for his concept of warfare of jihad; which included suicide
attacks, excessive labeling of apostasy, and slaughter of the apostates.

Daesh presents the “mainstream” Islam practiced by Muslims today, as impure .To
unravel this so-called invented Islam, Daesh deliberately digs deep into Islamic sharia
and history to find the most arcane teaching and then magnify it. It does so to shock its
potential recruits and demonstrate that it is preaching a “pure and true Islam” that has
been obscured by the mainstream. Take, for example, the group‟s punishment for
individuals accused of homosexuality. In a series of incidents in recent weeks, Daesh
has thrown individuals accused of being homosexual from the highest buildings. This
method as a sharia punishment is unheard of, even in countries where sharia brutal
justice is openly practiced, such as in Saudi Arabia.
The two prominent issues about Daesh are its brutality and its uncanny ability to expand
into and capture new territory. The many former Baath party officers who joined Daesh
play a significant role in these respects. The brutality started with Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi (aka: Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal al-Khalayleh), who was influenced by the writings
of Abu Abdullah al – Muhajir (aka Abdurrahman al- Ali), whose book on the jihad states
that “any country deferring to the rule of man-made law is a land of infidelity that
Muslims are obligated to leave”. He further stated that there is complete agreement on
the unconditional bloodshed of infidels, unless he / she are under the protection of
circumstances as stipulated in Sharia. His other teaching stated that Islam does not
differentiate between military and civilians, and that “the brutality of beheading is
intended and even delightful to God and his Prophet”.
The influence on al- Zarqawi by Abu Bakr Naji, whose book “Management of Savagery”
provided the strategy for al- Qaeda and other jihadi groups towards the creation of the
new Islamic caliphate. Naji believes that jihad is the primary path to lead people to
Islam; that jihad is “brutality, terror, displacement and massacre” and that “shedding the
blood of the people of the Cross, their apostate supporters and their soldiers is an
absolute prime duty” of the jihadist.

Daesh is not a mere collection of psychopaths. It is a stringently religious group with
carefully considered beliefs, chief among them that it is a key agent of the coming
apocalypse. Daesh grew strong during the ongoing Syrian civil war by occupying
territories other opponents of the Assad regime gained and were worn down in the
fighting with Assad. Daesh staged a blitzkrieg over large swathes of territory between
Syria and Iraq, obliterating the World War I era Sykes-Picot line and using weapons
abandoned by fleeing Iraqi and Syrian soldiers, looting banks, money and property,
including oil production facilities. While occupying the second largest city Mosul (pop.
1,000,000) Daesh claims to have seized 39.151 kg (about 88 pounds) of nuclear
materials from the university's physics department.
The speed and efficiency with which Daesh captured and controls new territory can be
understood through the context of the changes that swept throughout that region in the
period between the Iraqi occupation by America and the Arab Spring. Daesh entered
the vacuum created by the inaction of weak nation- states, the tyranny that prevailed in
Iraq during and after the occupation; and the utterly brutal reaction of Bashar al-
Assad‟s regime to the Syrian uprising, which has turned it into an on-going civil war. The
Syrian revolution removed all barriers for the jihadists and people started to bear arms,
making the jihadi doctrine easy to accept. Such circumstances are ideal conditions for
the strategy of “the management of lawlessness” as put forth by Abu Bakr Naji, where a
given State collapses and lawlessness prevails in the country, paving the way for Salafi
jihadi forces to move in, take over, restore law and order, and provide an alternate
authority that manages the needs of the population; establishing security, settling
disputes and securing borders, etc.
In a broader context; Naji‟s diagnosis of the issue starts with the fall of the Ottoman
caliphate, ratification of the Sykes- Picot agreement and the global political
demarcations post world-war 2. In his opinion, these circumstances gave rise to
regimes that imposed values that were contradictory to the social values of their
societies and against the religion of Islam. He adds that societies started to ignore God
through their system of citizenship, nations‟ borders and printed currency notes. Naji
proposes that the only way for Islam to rise out of its debased condition and progress

towards enlightenment, would be on the path of Salafi jihad, because it is the only one
that has the comprehensive understanding of managing world affairs as per the Sharia.
He intensely criticizes Sahwa (awakening), salafism (which he considers identical to the
doctrine of Muslim brotherhood), the Muslim Brotherhood itself, and the Hassan al-
Turabi –led brotherhood, which he believes promoted secular values while discarding
the values of God. Basically, Naji is against the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood,
and its variations.
The core doctrine of global jihadis is “Ruling in accordance with God‟s Word”. Towards
this goal is built the vision and legitimacy of their actions, based on Sharia (Islamic
divine law), which they consider synonymous to „figh‟ (the Islamic doctrine). While the
Muslim Brotherhood and Daesh have opposite viewpoints, both base their actions on
the same Islamic jurisprudence; which means that Islamic religious texts and
jurisprudence cannot by themselves explain the actions of Daesh, particularly since the
texts are centuries old and Daesh is a relatively new jihadi organization. Religion was
politicized initially by the Muslim Brotherhood, with the hope that it would help in setting
up an Islamic State in accordance to Sharia. Based on the ideology propagated by
Sayyid Qutb (Egyptian author, Islamic theorist and leading member of the Muslim
Brotherhood); ideas like “Jahiliya” (Ignorance of God’s word), and rule of “divine
sovereignty” permeated into global jihad. Daesh and al- Qaeda added a third kind of
Tawheed (Unity with God); the “Hakimiya” (Unity of sovereignty) to the original two of
“Uluhiyya” (Unity of Godhood) and “Rububiyya” (Unity of Lordship); as stated by Ibn
Taymiyyah (Islamic scholar of the 13th
century).
Global jihadis follow the concept of “ruling in accordance with what God Revealed”; and
this concept starts with excommunication, which then diversifies into the apostasy of
rulers who govern according to secular law, the apostasy of those who accept such
secular rule, and the apostasy of those who did not excommunicate people in the first
two categories. This hypothesis further continues that countries in which secular law
prevails are lands of the infidels where Islam is alien and therefore there have to be
„wars of apostasy‟, similar to those in the early history of Islam. This ensures that jihad
becomes the main pillar of Islam. The next part of this hypothesis states the course of

action to be followed by the „purest jihadis‟, and that is to disobey infidel rulers and fight
them at all costs and under any circumstances; ignoring all contemporary laws and
political systems. The last part is to establish the rule of Islam, implement Sharia and
declare a caliph.
Daesh is responsible for the ethnic cleansing of all sects and races they disagree with,
as well as consistent civilian causalities. They give all civilians the option of forced
conversion to their particular interpretation of Islam so as to be extorted, or death and
sometimes they execute converts to keep them "pure." The ignorance of the world
towards Daesh is understandable. It is an isolated State, known only for its savagery
and the willingness of its people to die for their brand of Islamic religion. The Caliphate
of Daesh rejects peace as a matter of principle. It hungers for and finds power in
genocide, and its views makes it incapable of civilized types of changes, even if such
changes might ensure its survival and it considers itself the prominent player in the
imminent end of the world.
Daesh seized Mosul (Iraq) in June 2014 and now rules an area larger than the United
Kingdom. Its leader, Abu Bakr Al- Baghdadi has transformed from being a little known
captive of the U.S. during the occupation of Iraq, to being the Caliph of Daesh and
thereby the leader of all Muslims worldwide. After he delivered his first and only sermon
to date, from the pulpit of Great Mosque of Al- Nuri in Mosul; the inflow of jihadists from
around the world, is unprecedented and growing in volume. The strategy of Daesh has
to be studied in great detail and understood to its core, for the civilized world to ensure a
correct response that will diminish its power and influence.

Daesh Teaser 1

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