Comparing Public Spheres
Professor John Downey
Loughborough University
European University Institute
June 2014
The Idea of the Public Sphere
• Most famously associated with Habermas but
also in C20th Arendt and Dewey;
• Roots in an Aristotelian view of active citizenship;
• Normative as well as empirical concept –
specifying conditions for democracy – the only
force permitted is the force of the better
argument;
• The rise of the public sphere;
• And its fall?
• The public sphere in flux and subject to change.
Modes of ‘Publicness’
• The everyday – from the coffehouse to the public house ;
• The occasional – events, protests;
• The mass-mediated;
• ‘New media’;
• The private and the public;
• Intimate sphere; the sphere of the state; and that of
business;
• Colonization of the lifeworld and the public sphere by
economic and political elites;
• Ability of journalists to resist pressure from elites;
• Ability of resource poor groups to influence agenda;
• Mediatization thesis – power of media over politics.
Impact of news impact
• Are media the independent or the dependent
variable? Cause or effect? Or both?
• Media effects?
• Agenda-setting: media influence what we
think about rather than causing us to think in
particular ways;
• Complex causation;
• Valence and visibility.
Different models of the public sphere
• Deliberative – civility, internal pluralism, inclusive;
• Liberal – elite driven, civility, restricted pluralism;
• Republican – inclusive, external pluralism, uncivil;
• ‘Multicultural’ public sphere – inclusive, different
modes of discourse;
• Which models correspond best to historical and
contemporary manifestations of the public?
Comparison as a method
• Which unit of analysis? The national?
• But that may overlook differences (class, ethnic)
differences within the state;
• Class-based publics;
• And it may overlook transnational publics;
• Comparing apples with pommes;
• What to count? How to count?
• How to explain the results?
• Comparisons over time…much less common.
What to measure and how?
• Intensity of debate – driven by national elite dissensus;
• Political parallelism - varieties;
• Economic parallelism – ‘paid news’;
• External pluralism – intra-system;
• Is greater pluralism always a good thing?
• Internal pluralism – intra-institution;
• Inclusiveness of debate;
• Polarization of debate;
• Just the news media or popular cultural forms as well?
• Content analysis;
• Discourse analysis;
• Frame analysis – hard to operationalise for large data sets;
• Decline in news consumption.
European versus national public
spheres
• European Union is referred to the best
example of cosmopolitan citizenship;
• Limits to this ‘imagined community’?
• Also recognition of a ‘democratic deficit’ –
distance between citizens and institutions and
lack of a European ‘we’;
• Can a European public sphere be created that
helps to create this sense of we that is
essential to a strong democracy?
Institutional versus culturalist
approaches
• Institutional approach stresses importance of
pan-European political and media institutions;
• Culturalist approach looks at nationally
interlocking ‘national’ public spheres;
• But is there much evidence of a sense of ‘we
Europeans’ in the different European public
spheres?
Berlusconi
• Why choose Berlusconi? Seemed to be a
figure that united non-Italian European elite in
condemnation;
• ‘Gaffe’ prone;
• Kapo;
• How is the conflict framed? Left v Right?
Nation v Nation?
What we found?
• Discourse intensity much higher in Germany and Italy;
• Seen in national terms by both left and right in each
country;
• Newspapers in other countries see this as an opportunity to
use ethno-national stereotypes of both Germans and
Italians;
• Insult to victims and survivors of the Shoah hardly
mentioned!
• Essentially national public spheres;
• Predominance of ethno-national stereotypes in analysis of
European problems – Eurocrisis;
• Rise of neo-populism.
‘We Europeans’ united against ‘the
Other’? Turkish accession
• Islam and Ottoman Empire used historically as a
way to define European, Christian identity;
• Identification of frames:
• Clash of Civilisations, Christian/ethno-nationalist
version;
• Clash of civilisations, liberal version;
• Multiculturalist frame;
• Liberal individualist frame;
• Economic consequences.
What we found
• Intensity much higher in France, Germany, and
Turkey than in USA, UK, Slovenia;
• Why? Elite consensus in USA and UK? Distance?
Geopolitical reasons? Dominance of
multiculturalist frame;
• France – dominated by liberal version of Clash of
Civilisation;
• Germany – ethno-nationalist version of Clash of
Civilisation thesis;
• Turkey – nationalist frames;
‘We Europeans’ united against ‘the
Other’? The USA
• Historical and contemporary reciprocal uses of
America and Europe to define identities;
• ‘Old’ and ‘new’ Europe and the invasion of
Iraq;
• Old – social democratic, anti-invasion;
• New – neo-liberal, pro-invasion;
• To what extent are these frames distributed
across Europe?
Sample
• Czech Republic, Germany, France, Slovenia,
UK, Switzerland, Slovakia;
• ‘quality’, finnce and regional/’tabloid’ papers;
• Using claims-making method and keyword
occurrence;
• Network analysis.
What we found
• New Europe – UK, Czech Republic, Slovakia;
• Old Europe – France, Germany, Slovenia;
• Prominence of national sources in each country;
• Leaders and followers – hierarchy of influence;
• Old Europe network and a new Europe network;
• Explanations: media as dependent and independent
variable;
• Models of capitalism and impact on public opinion;
• Resonates with reporting of Eurocrisis and responses to
it?
Debating the European Constitution
• Centrality of national elites to debate in each country;
• Intensity of debate higher in France and UK: elite
dissensus (but over different issues);
• Germany relatively low intensity (because of elite
national consensus);
• Advocacy papers of left and right but they report the
same issues and the same people;
• Inclusiveness – dependent upon political system –
majoritarian systems tend to be more exclusive;
• Big differences between elite and popular papers –
class-based publics. Not true for other issues eg
immigration.
Research Agenda
• Uneven rise of neo-populism in EU;
• Are ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ media implicated in
this? How?
• Complex causation with media reporting and
new media (possible) causal conditions (along
with others: unemployment, living standards,
immigration, electoral system, …)
• Method: Qualitative Comparative Analysis
doing longitudinal analysis.

Comparing Public Spheres

  • 1.
    Comparing Public Spheres ProfessorJohn Downey Loughborough University European University Institute June 2014
  • 2.
    The Idea ofthe Public Sphere • Most famously associated with Habermas but also in C20th Arendt and Dewey; • Roots in an Aristotelian view of active citizenship; • Normative as well as empirical concept – specifying conditions for democracy – the only force permitted is the force of the better argument; • The rise of the public sphere; • And its fall? • The public sphere in flux and subject to change.
  • 3.
    Modes of ‘Publicness’ •The everyday – from the coffehouse to the public house ; • The occasional – events, protests; • The mass-mediated; • ‘New media’; • The private and the public; • Intimate sphere; the sphere of the state; and that of business; • Colonization of the lifeworld and the public sphere by economic and political elites; • Ability of journalists to resist pressure from elites; • Ability of resource poor groups to influence agenda; • Mediatization thesis – power of media over politics.
  • 4.
    Impact of newsimpact • Are media the independent or the dependent variable? Cause or effect? Or both? • Media effects? • Agenda-setting: media influence what we think about rather than causing us to think in particular ways; • Complex causation; • Valence and visibility.
  • 5.
    Different models ofthe public sphere • Deliberative – civility, internal pluralism, inclusive; • Liberal – elite driven, civility, restricted pluralism; • Republican – inclusive, external pluralism, uncivil; • ‘Multicultural’ public sphere – inclusive, different modes of discourse; • Which models correspond best to historical and contemporary manifestations of the public?
  • 6.
    Comparison as amethod • Which unit of analysis? The national? • But that may overlook differences (class, ethnic) differences within the state; • Class-based publics; • And it may overlook transnational publics; • Comparing apples with pommes; • What to count? How to count? • How to explain the results? • Comparisons over time…much less common.
  • 7.
    What to measureand how? • Intensity of debate – driven by national elite dissensus; • Political parallelism - varieties; • Economic parallelism – ‘paid news’; • External pluralism – intra-system; • Is greater pluralism always a good thing? • Internal pluralism – intra-institution; • Inclusiveness of debate; • Polarization of debate; • Just the news media or popular cultural forms as well? • Content analysis; • Discourse analysis; • Frame analysis – hard to operationalise for large data sets; • Decline in news consumption.
  • 8.
    European versus nationalpublic spheres • European Union is referred to the best example of cosmopolitan citizenship; • Limits to this ‘imagined community’? • Also recognition of a ‘democratic deficit’ – distance between citizens and institutions and lack of a European ‘we’; • Can a European public sphere be created that helps to create this sense of we that is essential to a strong democracy?
  • 9.
    Institutional versus culturalist approaches •Institutional approach stresses importance of pan-European political and media institutions; • Culturalist approach looks at nationally interlocking ‘national’ public spheres; • But is there much evidence of a sense of ‘we Europeans’ in the different European public spheres?
  • 10.
    Berlusconi • Why chooseBerlusconi? Seemed to be a figure that united non-Italian European elite in condemnation; • ‘Gaffe’ prone; • Kapo; • How is the conflict framed? Left v Right? Nation v Nation?
  • 11.
    What we found? •Discourse intensity much higher in Germany and Italy; • Seen in national terms by both left and right in each country; • Newspapers in other countries see this as an opportunity to use ethno-national stereotypes of both Germans and Italians; • Insult to victims and survivors of the Shoah hardly mentioned! • Essentially national public spheres; • Predominance of ethno-national stereotypes in analysis of European problems – Eurocrisis; • Rise of neo-populism.
  • 12.
    ‘We Europeans’ unitedagainst ‘the Other’? Turkish accession • Islam and Ottoman Empire used historically as a way to define European, Christian identity; • Identification of frames: • Clash of Civilisations, Christian/ethno-nationalist version; • Clash of civilisations, liberal version; • Multiculturalist frame; • Liberal individualist frame; • Economic consequences.
  • 13.
    What we found •Intensity much higher in France, Germany, and Turkey than in USA, UK, Slovenia; • Why? Elite consensus in USA and UK? Distance? Geopolitical reasons? Dominance of multiculturalist frame; • France – dominated by liberal version of Clash of Civilisation; • Germany – ethno-nationalist version of Clash of Civilisation thesis; • Turkey – nationalist frames;
  • 14.
    ‘We Europeans’ unitedagainst ‘the Other’? The USA • Historical and contemporary reciprocal uses of America and Europe to define identities; • ‘Old’ and ‘new’ Europe and the invasion of Iraq; • Old – social democratic, anti-invasion; • New – neo-liberal, pro-invasion; • To what extent are these frames distributed across Europe?
  • 15.
    Sample • Czech Republic,Germany, France, Slovenia, UK, Switzerland, Slovakia; • ‘quality’, finnce and regional/’tabloid’ papers; • Using claims-making method and keyword occurrence; • Network analysis.
  • 16.
    What we found •New Europe – UK, Czech Republic, Slovakia; • Old Europe – France, Germany, Slovenia; • Prominence of national sources in each country; • Leaders and followers – hierarchy of influence; • Old Europe network and a new Europe network; • Explanations: media as dependent and independent variable; • Models of capitalism and impact on public opinion; • Resonates with reporting of Eurocrisis and responses to it?
  • 17.
    Debating the EuropeanConstitution • Centrality of national elites to debate in each country; • Intensity of debate higher in France and UK: elite dissensus (but over different issues); • Germany relatively low intensity (because of elite national consensus); • Advocacy papers of left and right but they report the same issues and the same people; • Inclusiveness – dependent upon political system – majoritarian systems tend to be more exclusive; • Big differences between elite and popular papers – class-based publics. Not true for other issues eg immigration.
  • 18.
    Research Agenda • Unevenrise of neo-populism in EU; • Are ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ media implicated in this? How? • Complex causation with media reporting and new media (possible) causal conditions (along with others: unemployment, living standards, immigration, electoral system, …) • Method: Qualitative Comparative Analysis doing longitudinal analysis.