The document summarizes and critiques a model of decision making called "decision making by objection" as applied to analyze decision making during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The key points are:
1) The model argues decision making during the crisis did not follow a standard goal-oriented process but involved discovering goals through debate as alternatives were proposed and objected to.
2) Findings from analyzing ExCom meeting records found alternatives were evaluated based on their probability of success or making the situation worse, not on clearly defined goals.
3) The model is critiqued for ignoring individual interests and overemphasizing shared goal generation, and for only using data from 4 of 13 ExCom meetings to develop the analysis
1. Decision making by Objection
and the Cuban Missile Crisis
Paul A. Anderson
Patcharawan Ubonleot
5710131001
23 September 2015
GSPA NIDA
2. Outline
• Significance and Background of the crisis
• Argument and Analysis
• Findings
Decision making by objection Model
• Critique
• Conclusion
2
3. Outline
• Significance and Background of the crisis
• Argument and Analysis
• Findings
Decision making by objection Model
• Critique
• Conclusion
3
4. Significance
Confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union during the Cold War making the two
superpowers came closest to nuclear conflict.
The crisis is unique in numerous ways ranging from
calculations and miscalculations as well as direct
and underground communications and
miscommunications between the two rivals.
It was principally played out at the White House
and the Kremlin level with little input from the
relevant bureaucracies.
U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian
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5. Background
In 1962 after U.S. (John F. Kennedy) failed to conquer Castro
regime it was found that Russia (Nikita Khrushchev) reached
an agreement to set up a missile site in Cuba.
U.S. (Kennedy) had options proposed by his top advisors-
either destroy missiles and attack Cuba or send
uncompromising warning to missiles removal
During the crisis several rigid and vague yet reconcilable
messages were conveyed by direct message, television
statement including discussion between Attorney General
Robert Kennedy that secretly met with Soviet Ambassador to
the United States.
The president finally decided to use naval quarantine.
Eventually, Soviet agreed to remove the missile from Cuba.
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6. Outline
• Significance and Background of the crisis
• Argument and Analysis
• Findings
Decision making by objection Model
• Critique
• Conclusion
6
7. Argument: Tradition decision making process
• Possible
alternatives
Search for
• Consequences
Examine
• Consequences
and desirable
objective
Evaluate
Go a l
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8. Argument
8
Organizational decision making
Capacity of
Human
Limited information
processing of human
to perform goals to
choice task because
the goal to choices
sequence is not
what decision maker
do
Problematic preferences
Vague goals
Fluid participation
Loss attention
Unclear technologies
Loss in means and ends
IN
C r i s i s o u t s i de o r g an i z at i o n
Irrationality decision making
Influence/
attention
of
politician
Individual
background
&
constraint
s i.e. time
Reckless
analysis
Organized anarchies
Problem
Solution
Actors
(Participants)
OUT
A Garbage Can Model
9. Outline
• Significance and Background of the crisis
• Argument and Analysis
Findings
• Decision making by objection Model
• Critique
• Conclusion
9
11. Analysis
11
Qualitative method
Coding the document, Determining binary net
Coding categories
Data
Archival records : position papers, notes, minutes
and summary records of the ExCom meetings
Unit of analysis
sentences from archival records
Results
Frequency of the different kinds of interactions
in the four meetings of the ExCom
12. Outline
• Significance and Background of the crisis
• Argument and Analysis
• Findings
Decision making by objection Model
• Critique
• Conclusion
12
13. Findings
• The evidence suggests
that the decision of the ExCom throughout the crisis did
not follow the standard description of decision making
task Not Goal oriented
• Instead,
decision makers discover goal throughout the course of
making decision. In fact, the decision makers do not
even seek a solution to a problem but a course of action
that do not have a high probability of making the
situation worse Solving problem is a minor concern
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14. • Decisionismade by groupdecisionmaking
via argumentation and debate
• Goal discovery occurs as a result of the
interaction of advocates of
conflicting views
• An alternative with a high possibility of
making matters worse will face
objections and rejected
• The process stimulates the
discovery of goals
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The decision is actually made by
Findings
It is deviated from the standard model !
15. Not always competing choices
but a sum of mixed choices
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Airstrike
Impose a
blockade
Military measure
Quarantine, inspection
at sea, surveillance
Blocking
import and export
Diplomatic pressure
Restriction of
Petroleum, oil and Fuel import,
UN Condemnation
1. Structure of alternatives
16. 2. Goal Discovery
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Global goal
(Moral/tradition)
Concern that
objects
proposed
option
Discussion &
Debate
Acceptable
alternatives
Go a l
“A surprise attack by a very large
nation against a very small one.
This, I said, could not be undertaken
by the U.S. if we were to maintain
our moral position at home and
around the globe” Robert Kennedy
discovery is a social process in which the causal
texture link objectives, constraints, and
imperatives with alternatives and their
consequences through discussion and debate.
17. 3. Evaluation of Alternatives
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Good high probability of producing a positively
valued and a low probability of producing
a negatively valued state of affairs.
Bland low probabilities of producing either
positively or negatively valued states of
affairs.
Mixed high probabilities of producing positively
or negatively valued states of affairs.
Poor low probability of producing a positively
valued and a high probability of
producing
a negatively valued state of affairs.
Paradoxical about a good," "optimal," or satisfactory”
Bland alternatives,
those with low
probabilities of either
success or failure, will
be acceptable when
no good alternative
is readily available
18. Reformulating
Decision making by objection Model
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1. A problem is defined and a global goal is also identified.
A Rough description of an acceptable resolution of the problem.
2. A course of action is proposed.
The alternative will be accompanied by an argument describing
the positive outcomes related with undertaking the action.
3. Possibility of one of three responses:
3.1 lf there is agreement it will be ratified.
3.2 If there is no support/formal opposition the alternative will die.
3.3 If there is an objection to the alternative and the effect is to
propose constraints, beyond the global goal, that further
define an acceptable resolution.
4. If there is disagreement over the newly introduced constraint
A secondary discussion on the merits of the new goal may arise.
Only if there is an imperative to act will a competing course of
action be proposed.
5. In the absence of an imperative to act
the original alternative is generally discarded and a different
independent course of action is proposed.
19. Key features of
Decision making by Objection
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3F e a t u r e s
Ambiguity and change in
preferred courses of action.
As new goals discovered,
preferences change, and
as options are proposed,
individuals change
arguments they make-
Lack of reference from
competing action
Ambiguous, ever-
changing set of options
Confusing process and
loss of leadership
20. Outline
• Significance and Background of the crisis
• Argument and Analysis
• Findings
Decision making by objection Model
• Critique
• Conclusion
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21. Critique
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The Cuban missile crisis is also investigated and explained by many
scholars such as Allison through three different lens: rational actor
model, Organizational Process" model, and the
“Bureaucratic/Governmental Politics" model. Action and its
consequences are both products of administration between
organizations and interaction of players whose interests are typically
mixed.
Anderson ignores extensive explanation of each key actors in term of
personal interests and values but emphasize it as a power to generate
shared goal and courses of action.
However, its emphasis on the decision environment influencing goal
generation helps understand and predict the expected degree of
courses of action.
Framework for Analysis
Research method and Quality of data collected
Qualitative method for analysis is to some extent appropriate for
documentary analysis. However, only data from four meetings were used.
22. Critique
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Benefits for organization analysis
Obvious benefits for foreign policy analysis
We attempt to study and use different method i.e. cost- benefits,
multi-criteria etc. for searching, analyzing and evaluating possible
alternatives.
And end up with policy decision that is heavily inherently determined
by social interaction and arrival of mutually shared norms, interests
and values.
Findings and its power to generalization
The data used are based on 4 ExCom (5-8) meetings. 2,3,4 and 9
meetings are classified. The first meeting was not recorded. Was there
crucial evidence for goal and alternative initiation?
The author assumes that the actors shared goal in national interests.
If personal motive involved, it must have been justified. This could
undermine the framework of analysis.
23. Outline
• Significance and Background of the crisis
• Argument and Analysis
• Findings
Decision making by objection Model
• Critique
• Conclusion
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24. Conclusion
• Human is irrational actor trying to preserve rights to
survive which usually exploits others’ rights and
interests.
• But in scarce resources and complex situation
human has limited capability in processing and
analyzing information particularly where many
actors involve.
• Decision makers do not always seek optimal
solution particularly when facing constraints. They
usually seek satisfying options that provide minimum
risk of failures.
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25. Conclusion
Therefore.......
• The decision made is rather a product of social
interaction associating with personal values, goals
and interests.
• Organization decision is not intellectual as one
anticipate. It is not linear. And it is hard to predict.
• So if one seeks to understand how a policy is
shaped not only in chaotic situation , this model
should not be ignored.
• Even this is only findings drawn from one case, one
should compare with similar phenomenon, find the
fit and apply it appropriately.
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