SlideShare a Scribd company logo
An ISS Technical White Paper




                Wireless LAN Security
                 802.11b and Corporate Networks




6303 Barfield Road · Atlanta, GA 30328   Tel: 404.236.2600 · Fax: 404.236.2626
WWireWireless Lan Security                                        802.11b Wireless LAN Security


Introduction
Although a variety of wireless network technologies have or will soon reach the general business
market, wireless LANs based on the 802.11 standard are the most likely candidate to become
widely prevalent in corporate environments. Current 802.11b products operate at 2.4GHz, and
deliver up to 11Mbps of bandwidth – comparable to a standard Ethernet wired LAN in
performance. An upcoming version called 802.11a moves to a higher frequency range, and
promises significantly faster speeds. It is expected to have security concerns similar to 802.11b.

This low cost, combined with strong performance and ease of deployment, mean that many
departments and individuals already use 802.11b, at home or at work – even if IT staff and
security management administrators do not yet recognize wireless LANs as an approved
technology. This paper addresses the security concerns raised by both current and upcoming
802.11 network technologies.

Wireless LAN Business Drivers
Without doubt, wireless LANs have a high gee-whiz factor. They provide always-on network
connectivity, but don’t require a network cable. Office workers can roam from meeting to meeting
throughout a building, constantly connected to the same network resources enjoyed by wired,
desk-bound coworkers. Home or remote workers can set up networks without worrying about how
to run wires through houses that never were designed to support network infrastructure.

Wireless LANS may actually prove less expensive to support than traditional networks for
employees that need to connect to corporate resources in multiple office locations. Large hotel
chains, airlines, convention centers, Internet cafes, etc., see wireless LANs as an additional
revenue opportunity for providing Internet connectivity to their customers. Wireless is a more
affordable and logistically acceptable alternative to wired LANs for these organizations. For
example, an airline can provide for-fee wireless network access for travelers in frequent flyer
lounges – or anywhere else in the airport.

Market maturity and technology advances will lower the cost and accelerate widespread adoption
of wireless LANs. End-user spending, the primary cost metric, will drop from about $250 in 2001
to around $180 in 2004 (Gartner Group). By 2005, 50 percent of Fortune 1000 companies will
have extensively deployed wireless LAN technology based on evolved 802.11 standards (0.7
probability). By 2010, the majority of Fortune 2000 companies will have deployed wireless LANs
to support standard, wired network technology LANs (0.6 probability).

Reality Check
For the foreseeable future wireless technology will complement wired connectivity in enterprise
environments. Even new buildings will continue to incorporate wired LANs. The primary reason is
that wired networking remains less expensive than wireless. In addition, wired networks offer
greater bandwidth, allowing for future applications beyond the capabilities of today’s wireless
systems.

Although it may cost 10 times more to retrofit a building for wired networking (initial construction
being by far the preferred time to set up network infrastructure), wiring is only a very small fraction
of the cost of the overall capital outlay for an enterprise network. For that reason, many
corporations are only just testing wireless technology. This limited acceptance at the corporate
level means few access points with a limited number of users in real world production
environments, or evaluation test beds sequestered in a lab. In response, business units and
individuals will deploy wireless access points on their own. These unauthorized networks almost
certainly lack adequate attention to information security, and present a serious concern for
protecting online business assets.

Finally, the 802.11b standard shares unlicensed frequencies with other devices, including
Bluetooth wireless personal area networks (PANs), cordless phones, and baby monitors. These
technologies can, and do, interfere with each other. 802.11b also fails to delineate roaming


An ISS Technical White Paper                                                                   Page 1
WWireWireless Lan Security                                       802.11b Wireless LAN Security


(moving from one cell to another), leaving each vendor to implement a different solution. Future
proposals in 802.11 promise to address these shortcomings, but no shipping products are on the
immediate horizon.

Wireless Security In The Enterprise
802.11b’s low cost of entry is what makes it so attractive. However, inexpensive equipment also
makes it easier for attackers to mount an attack. “Rogue” access points and unauthorized, poorly
secured networks compound the odds of a security breach.

The following diagram depicts an intranet or internal network that is properly configured to handle
wireless traffic, with two firewalls in place, plus intrusion detection and response sensors to
monitor traffic on the wireless segment. One firewall controls access to and from the Internet. The
other controls access to and from the wireless access point. The access point itself is the bridge
that connects mobile clients to the internal network.




The access point has a dedicated IP address for remote management via SNMP (Simple
Network Management Protocol). The wireless clients themselves – usually laptops or desktops
and handhelds – may also use SNMP agents to allow remote management. As a result, each of
these devices contains a sensor to ensure that each unit is properly configured, and that these
configurations have not been improperly altered. The network itself is regularly monitored to
identify access points in operation, and verify that they are authorized and properly configured.

While this paper focuses on the risk issues from a corporate network perspective, these same
issues apply to home networks, telecommuters using wireless, and “public use” networks such as
those being set up by Microsoft to allow wireless Internet access at select Starbucks locations.
Remote users are now able to access internal corporate resources from multiple types of foreign
networks. Even organizations without internal wireless networks must take wireless into account
as part of their overall security practices.


Known Risks
Although attacks against 802.11b and other wireless technologies will undoubtedly increase in
number and sophistication over time, most current 802.11b risks fall into seven basic categories:

§ Insertion attacks
§ Interception and unauthorized monitoring of wireless traffic
§ Jamming



An ISS Technical White Paper                                                                Page 2
WWireWireless Lan Security                                       802.11b Wireless LAN Security


§   Client-to-Client attacks
§   Brute force attacks against access point passwords
§   Encryption attacks
§   Misconfigurations

Note that these classifications can apply to any wireless technology, not just 802.11b.
Understanding how they work and using this information to prevent their success is a good
stepping stone for any wireless solution.

Insertion Attacks
Insertion attacks are based on deploying unauthorized devices or creating new wireless networks
without going through security process and review.

§ Unauthorized Clients – An attacker tries to connect a wireless client, typically a laptop or PDA,
  to an access point without authorization. Access points can be configured to require a
  password for client access. If there is no password, an intruder can connect to the internal
  network simply by enabling a wireless client to communicate with the access point. Note,
  however, that some access points use the same password for all client access, requiring all
  users to adopt a new password every time the password needs to be changed.

§ Unauthorized or Renegade Access Points – An organization may not be aware that internal
  employees have deployed wireless capabilities on their network. This lack of awareness could
  lead to the previously described attack, with unauthorized clients gaining access to corporate
  resources through a rogue access point. Organizations need to implement policy to ensure
  secure configuration of access points, plus an ongoing process in which the network is scanned
  for the presence of unauthorized devices.

Interception and Monitoring of Wireless Traffic
As in wired networks, it is possible to intercept and monitor network traffic across a wireless LAN.
The attacker needs to be within range of an access point (approximately 300 feet for 802.11b) for
this attack to work, whereas a wired attacker can be anywhere where there is a functioning
network connection. The advantage for a wireless interception is that a wired attack requires the
placement of a monitoring agent on a compromised system. All a wireless intruder needs is
access to the network data stream.

There are two important considerations to keep in mind with the range of 802.11b access points.
First, directional antennae can dramatically extend either the transmission or reception ranges of
802.11b devices. Therefore, the 300 foot maximum range attributed to 802.11b only applies to
normal, as-designed installations. Enhanced equipment also enhances the risk. Second, access
points transmit their signals in a circular pattern, which means that the 802.11b signal almost
always extends beyond the physical boundaries of the work area it is intended to cover. This
signal can be intercepted outside buildings, or even through floors in multistory buildings. Careful
antenna placement can significantly affect the ability of the 802.11b signal to reach beyond
physical corporate boundaries.

§ Wireless Packet Analysis – A skilled attacker captures wireless traffic using techniques
  similar to those employed on wired networks. Many of these tools capture the first part of the
  connection session, where the data would typically include the username and password. An
  intruder can then masquerade as a legitimate user by using this captured information to hijack
  the user session and issue unauthorized commands.

§ Broadcast Monitoring – If an access point is connected to a hub rather than a switch, any
  network traffic across that hub can be potentially broadcasted out over the wireless network.
  Because the Ethernet hub broadcasts all data packets to all connected devices including the
  wireless access point, an attacker can monitor sensitive data going over wireless not even
  intended for any wireless clients.



An ISS Technical White Paper                                                                 Page 3
WWireWireless Lan Security                                         802.11b Wireless LAN Security



§ Access Point Clone (Evil Twin) Traffic Interception – An attacker fools legitimate wireless
  clients into connecting to the attacker’s own network by placing an unauthorized access point
  with a stronger signal in close proximity to wireless clients. Users attempt to log into the
  substitute servers and unknowingly give away passwords and similar sensitive data.

Jamming
Denial of service attacks are also easily applied to wireless networks, where legitimate traffic can
not reach clients or the access point because illegitimate traffic overwhelms the frequencies. An
attacker with the proper equipment and tools can easily flood the 2.4 GHz frequency, corrupting
the signal until the wireless network ceases to function. In addition, cordless phones, baby
monitors and other devices that operate on the 2.4 GHz band can disrupt a wireless network
using this frequency. These denials of service can originate from outside the work area serviced
by the access point, or can inadvertently arrive from other 802.11b devices installed in other work
areas that degrade the overall signal.

Client-to-Client Attacks
Two wireless clients can talk directly to each other, bypassing the access point. Users therefore
need to defend clients not just against an external threat but also against each other.

§ File Sharing and Other TCP/IP Service Attacks – Wireless clients running TCP/IP services
  such as a Web server or file sharing are open to the same exploits and misconfigurations as
  any user on a wired network.

§ DOS (Denial of Service) – A wireless device floods other wireless client with bogus packets,
  creating a denial of service attack. In addition, duplicate IP or MAC addresses, both intentional
  and accidental, can cause disruption on the network.

Brute Force Attacks Against Access Point Passwords
Most access points use a single key or password that is shared with all connecting wireless
clients. Brute force dictionary attacks attempt to compromise this key by methodically testing
every possible password. The intruder gains access to the access point once the password is
guessed.

In addition, passwords can be compromised through less aggressive means. A compromised
client can expose the access point. Not changing the keys on a frequent basis or when
employees leave the organization also opens the access point to attack. Managing a large
number of access points and clients only complicates this issue, encouraging lax security
practices.

Attacks against Encryption
802.11b standard uses an encryption system called WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy). WEP has
known weaknesses (see http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html for more
information), and these issues are not slated to be addressed before 2002. Not many tools are
readily available for exploiting this issue, but sophisticated attackers can certainly build their own.

Misconfiguration
Many access points ship in an unsecured configuration in order to emphasize ease of use and
rapid deployment. Unless administrators understand wireless security risks and properly
configure each unit prior to deployment, these access points will remain at a high risk for attack or
misuse. The following section examines three leading access points, one each from Cisco,
Lucent and 3Com. Although each vendor has its own implementation of 802.11b, the underlying
issues should be broadly applicable to products from other vendors.




An ISS Technical White Paper                                                                    Page 4
WWireWireless Lan Security                                       802.11b Wireless LAN Security


§ Server Set ID (SSID) – SSID is a configurable identification that allows clients to communicate
  with an appropriate access point. With proper configuration, only clients with the correct SSID
  can communicate with access points. In effect, SSID acts as a single shared password
  between access points and clients. Access points come with default SSIDs. If not changed,
  these units are easily compromised. Here are common default passwords:

      “tsunami” – Cisco
      ”101” – 3Com
      “RoamAbout Default Network Name” – Lucent/Cabletron
      “Compaq” – Compaq
      “WLAN” – Addtron
      “intel” – Intel
      “linksys” – Linksys
      “Default SSID”, “Wireless” – Other manufacturers

  SSIDs go over the air as clear text if WEP is disabled, allowing the SSID to be captured by
  monitoring the network’s traffic. In addition, the Lucent access points can operate in Secure
  Access mode. This option requires the SSID of both client and access point to match. By
  default this security option is turned off. In non-secure access mode, clients can connect to the
  access point using the configured SSID, a blank SSID, or an SSID configured as “any.”

§ Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) – WEP can be typically configured as follows:

      No encryption
      40 bit encryption
      128 bit encryption

  Most access points ship with WEP turned off. Although 128 bit encryption is more effective than
  40 bit encryption, both key strengths are subject to WEP’s known flaws.

§ SNMP Community Passwords – Many wireless access points run SNMP agents. If the
  community word is not properly configured, an intruder can read and potentially write sensitive
  data on the access point. If SNMP agents are enabled on the wireless clients, the same risk
  applies to them as well.

  By default, many access points are read accessible by using the community word, “public”.
  3Com access points allow write access by using the community word, ”comcomcom”. Cisco
  and Lucent/Cabletron require the write community word to be configured by the user or
  administrator before the agent is enabled.

§ Configuration Interfaces – Each access point model has its own interface for viewing and
  modifying its configuration. Here are the current interface options for these three access points:

      Cisco – SNMP, serial, Web, telnet
      3Com – SNMP, serial, Web, telnet
      Lucent / Cabletron – SNMP, serial (no web/telnet)

  3Com access points lack access control to the Web interface for controlling configuration. An
  attacker who locates a 3Com access point Web interface can easily get the SSID from the
  “system properties” menu display. 3Com access points do require a password on the Web
  interface for write privileges. This password is the same as the community word for write
  privileges, therefore 3Com access points are at risk if deployed using the default “comcomcom”
  as the password.




An ISS Technical White Paper                                                                 Page 5
WWireWireless Lan Security                                       802.11b Wireless LAN Security


§ Client Side Security Risk – Clients connected to an access point store sensitive information
  for authenticating and communicating to the access point. This information can be
  compromised if the client is not properly configured. Cisco client software stores the SSID in the
  Windows registry, and the WEP key in the firmware, where it is more difficult to access.
  Lucent/Cabletron client software stores the SSID in the Windows registry. The WEP key is
  stored in the Windows registry, but it is encrypted using an undocumented algorithm. 3Com
  client software stores the SSID in the Windows registry. The WEP key is stored in the Windows
  registry with no encryption.

§ Installation – By default, all three access points are optimized to help build a useful network as
  quickly and as easily as possible. As a result, the default configurations minimize security.


Wireless Information Security Management
Process and technology are always easily confused, and never more so than with wireless
information security management. In fact, the same business processes that establish strong risk
management practices for physical assets and wired networks also work to protect wireless
resources. The following cost-effective guidelines help enable organizations to establish proper
security protections as part of an overall wireless strategy – and will continue to work in spite of
wireless networking’s rapid evolution. The following items are an introduction to this approach.

Wireless Security Policy and Architecture Design – Security policy, procedures and best
practices should include wireless networking as part of an overall security management
architecture to determine what is and is not allowed with wireless technology.

Treat Access Points As Untrusted – Access points need to be identified and evaluated on a
regular basis to determine if they need to be quarantined as untrusted devices before wireless
clients can gain access to internal networks. This determination means appropriate placement of
firewalls, virtual private networks (VPN), intrusion detection systems (IDS), and authentication
between access point and intranets or the Internet.

Access Point Configuration Policy – Administrators need to define standard security settings
for any 802.11b access point before it can be deployed. These guidelines should cover SSID,
WEP keys and encryption, and SNMP community words.

Access Point Discovery – Administrators should regularly search outwards from a wired
network to identify unknown access points. Several methods of identifying 802.11b devices exist,
including detection via banner strings on access points with either Web or telnet interfaces.

Wireless network searches can identify unauthorized access points by setting up a 2.4 GHz
monitoring agent that searches for 802.11b packets in the air. These packets may contain IP
addresses that identify which network they are on, indicating that rogue access points are
operating in the area. One important note: this process may pick up access points from other
organizations in densely populated areas.

Access Point Security Assessments – Regular security audits and penetration assessments
quickly identify poorly configured access points, default or easily guessed passwords and
community words, and the presence or absence of encryption. Router ACLs and firewall rules
also help minimize access to the SNMP agents and other interfaces on the access point.

Wireless Client Protection – Wireless clients need to be regularly examined for good security
practices. These procedures should include the presence of some or all of the following:

§ Distributed personal firewalls to lock down access to the client
§ VPNs to supplement encryption and authentication beyond what 802.11b can provide



An ISS Technical White Paper                                                                 Page 6
WWireWireless Lan Security                                      802.11b Wireless LAN Security


§ Intrusion detection and response to identify and minimize attacks from intruders, viruses,
  Trojans and backdoors
§ Desktop assessments to identify and repair security issues on the client device

Managed Security Services for Wireless – Managed Security Services (MSS) helps
organizations establish effective security practices without the overhead of an extensive, in-house
solution. MSS providers handle assessment, design, deployment, management and support
across a broad range of information security disciplines. This 24/7/365 solution works with the
customer to set policy and architecture, plus provides emergency response, if needed. These
services help an organization operating wireless networks to:

§ Deploy firewalls that separate wireless networks from internal networks or the Internet
§ Establish and monitor VPN gateways and VPN wireless clients
§ Maintain an intrusion detection system on the wireless network to identify and respond to
  attacks and misuse before critical digital resource are placed at risk.


Internet Security Systems Wireless LAN Solutions
Internet Security Systems products and services provide a robust security management solution
for wireless LANs. These rapidly expanding offerings encompass:

Security Software Products – Internet Security Systems’ security products already protect
wireless LAN environments against known security risks. ISS’ Internet Scanner™ network
vulnerability assessment product probes networks to detect unauthorized or poorly configured
wireless access points, as represented in the diagram below.




The RealSecure™ Protection System, deployed between a wireless access point and the
corporate network, recognizes and reacts to attacks and misuse directed over the wireless LAN
(below). In addition, ISS’ renowned X-Force™ research and development team continually
update these products.




An ISS Technical White Paper                                                                   Page 7
WWireWireless Lan Security                                    802.11b Wireless LAN Security




Managed Security Services – Internet Security Systems’ Managed Security Services protect
wireless LANS on a 24x7 basis through remote network assessments and tactical deployment of
remotely managed intrusion protection services. As new wireless protections are added to ISS
security products, Managed Security Services will deliver these additional capabilities to our
customers.

Security Architecture Consulting – Internet Security Systems’ Consulting Solutions Group has
in-depth security knowledge, expertise, and proven methodology required that helps
organizations assess, integrate, design, and configure their wireless LANs and surrounding
security infrastructure.

Wireless LAN Security Education – Internet Security Systems’ SecureU™ education services
organization has developed wireless LAN security content to help customers understand the
nuances of wireless LAN security and establish valid defensive techniques to minimize security
risks.

Product Updates – Internet Security Systems’ X-Force research and development team
continually adds product enhancements that deliver new protections against wireless LAN risks.
These X-Press Update™ enhancements quickly and easily integrate into existing product
installations.




An ISS Technical White Paper                                                            Page 8
WWireWireless Lan Security                                             802.11b Wireless LAN Security


About Internet Security Systems (ISS)
Founded in 1994, Internet Security Systems (ISS) (Nasdaq: ISSX) is a world leader in software
and services that protect critical online resources from attack and misuse. ISS is headquartered
in Atlanta, GA, with additional operations throughout the United States and in Asia, Australia,
Europe, Latin America and the Middle East.

Copyright © 2001 Internet Security Systems, Inc. All rights reserved worldwide.

Internet Security Systems, the Internet Security Systems logo, Internet Scanner, RealSecure, SecureU, X-
Force and X-Press Update are trademarks of Internet Security Systems, Inc. Other trademarks and trade
names mentioned are marks and names of their owners as indicated. All trademarks are the property of their
respective owners and are used here in an editorial context without intent of infringement. Specifications are
subject to change without notice.




An ISS Technical White Paper                                                                          Page 9

More Related Content

What's hot

Wireless network security
Wireless network security Wireless network security
Wireless network security
Aurobindo Nayak
 
Wireless Networking Security
Wireless Networking SecurityWireless Networking Security
Wireless Networking Security
Anshuman Biswal
 
Wireless LAN security
Wireless LAN securityWireless LAN security
Wireless LAN securityRajan Kumar
 
Wifi Security
Wifi SecurityWifi Security
Wifi Security
Shital Kat
 
Wireless security
Wireless securityWireless security
Wireless securityparipec
 
Wifi Security
Wifi SecurityWifi Security
Wifi Security
Agris Ameriks
 
WLAN Attacks and Protection
WLAN Attacks and ProtectionWLAN Attacks and Protection
WLAN Attacks and Protection
Chandrak Trivedi
 
Lecture 11 wifi security
Lecture 11 wifi securityLecture 11 wifi security
Lecture 11 wifi security
rajakhurram
 
Wireless security presentation
Wireless security presentationWireless security presentation
Wireless security presentation
Muhammad Zia
 
Workshop on Wireless Security
Workshop on Wireless SecurityWorkshop on Wireless Security
Workshop on Wireless Securityamiable_indian
 
Wi-fi Hacking
Wi-fi HackingWi-fi Hacking
Wi-fi Hacking
Paul Gillingwater, MBA
 
Wireless network security
Wireless network securityWireless network security
Wireless network security
Vishal Agarwal
 
Understanding WiFi Security Vulnerabilities and Solutions
Understanding WiFi Security Vulnerabilities and SolutionsUnderstanding WiFi Security Vulnerabilities and Solutions
Understanding WiFi Security Vulnerabilities and Solutions
AirTight Networks
 
Wireless Security null seminar
Wireless Security null seminarWireless Security null seminar
Wireless Security null seminar
Nilesh Sapariya
 
Wireless Network Security
Wireless Network SecurityWireless Network Security
Wireless Network Security
Gyana Ranjana
 
Security Delivery Platform: Best practices
Security Delivery Platform: Best practicesSecurity Delivery Platform: Best practices
Security Delivery Platform: Best practices
Mihajlo Prerad
 
Securing wireless network
Securing wireless networkSecuring wireless network
Securing wireless network
Syed Ubaid Ali Jafri
 
Wireless hacking and security
Wireless hacking and securityWireless hacking and security
Wireless hacking and security
Adel Zalok
 
Wifi security
Wifi securityWifi security
Wifi security
Dooremoore
 
Module 6 Wireless Network security
Module 6  Wireless Network securityModule 6  Wireless Network security
Module 6 Wireless Network security
nikshaikh786
 

What's hot (20)

Wireless network security
Wireless network security Wireless network security
Wireless network security
 
Wireless Networking Security
Wireless Networking SecurityWireless Networking Security
Wireless Networking Security
 
Wireless LAN security
Wireless LAN securityWireless LAN security
Wireless LAN security
 
Wifi Security
Wifi SecurityWifi Security
Wifi Security
 
Wireless security
Wireless securityWireless security
Wireless security
 
Wifi Security
Wifi SecurityWifi Security
Wifi Security
 
WLAN Attacks and Protection
WLAN Attacks and ProtectionWLAN Attacks and Protection
WLAN Attacks and Protection
 
Lecture 11 wifi security
Lecture 11 wifi securityLecture 11 wifi security
Lecture 11 wifi security
 
Wireless security presentation
Wireless security presentationWireless security presentation
Wireless security presentation
 
Workshop on Wireless Security
Workshop on Wireless SecurityWorkshop on Wireless Security
Workshop on Wireless Security
 
Wi-fi Hacking
Wi-fi HackingWi-fi Hacking
Wi-fi Hacking
 
Wireless network security
Wireless network securityWireless network security
Wireless network security
 
Understanding WiFi Security Vulnerabilities and Solutions
Understanding WiFi Security Vulnerabilities and SolutionsUnderstanding WiFi Security Vulnerabilities and Solutions
Understanding WiFi Security Vulnerabilities and Solutions
 
Wireless Security null seminar
Wireless Security null seminarWireless Security null seminar
Wireless Security null seminar
 
Wireless Network Security
Wireless Network SecurityWireless Network Security
Wireless Network Security
 
Security Delivery Platform: Best practices
Security Delivery Platform: Best practicesSecurity Delivery Platform: Best practices
Security Delivery Platform: Best practices
 
Securing wireless network
Securing wireless networkSecuring wireless network
Securing wireless network
 
Wireless hacking and security
Wireless hacking and securityWireless hacking and security
Wireless hacking and security
 
Wifi security
Wifi securityWifi security
Wifi security
 
Module 6 Wireless Network security
Module 6  Wireless Network securityModule 6  Wireless Network security
Module 6 Wireless Network security
 

Viewers also liked

Wireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best Practices
Wireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best PracticesWireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best Practices
Wireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best Practices
Cisco Mobility
 
WIRELESS INTERNET BY SAIKIRAN PANJALA
WIRELESS INTERNET BY SAIKIRAN PANJALAWIRELESS INTERNET BY SAIKIRAN PANJALA
WIRELESS INTERNET BY SAIKIRAN PANJALA
Saikiran Panjala
 
The Escalation of Wireless Internet
The Escalation of Wireless InternetThe Escalation of Wireless Internet
The Escalation of Wireless Internet
rjtw
 
Comparative Analysis of Power System Stabilizer using Artificial Intelligence...
Comparative Analysis of Power System Stabilizer using Artificial Intelligence...Comparative Analysis of Power System Stabilizer using Artificial Intelligence...
Comparative Analysis of Power System Stabilizer using Artificial Intelligence...
ijsrd.com
 
Power Quality Enhancement in Power Distribution system using Artificial intel...
Power Quality Enhancement in Power Distribution system using Artificial intel...Power Quality Enhancement in Power Distribution system using Artificial intel...
Power Quality Enhancement in Power Distribution system using Artificial intel...
sundar balan
 
Wireless lan
Wireless lanWireless lan
Wireless lan
Fʑɭ Rɘʜɱʌŋ
 
Mahakal institute of technology
Mahakal institute of technologyMahakal institute of technology
Mahakal institute of technologyOman Jangir
 
802.11 Wireless LAN Vulnerability Assessment (ITSPSR-21A)
802.11 Wireless LAN Vulnerability Assessment (ITSPSR-21A)802.11 Wireless LAN Vulnerability Assessment (ITSPSR-21A)
802.11 Wireless LAN Vulnerability Assessment (ITSPSR-21A)
Sunghun Kim
 
IRIS BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION SYSTEM EMPLOYING CANNY OPERATOR
IRIS BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION SYSTEM EMPLOYING CANNY OPERATORIRIS BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION SYSTEM EMPLOYING CANNY OPERATOR
IRIS BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION SYSTEM EMPLOYING CANNY OPERATOR
csitconf
 
Artificial Intelligence Techniques In Power Systems Paper Presentation
Artificial Intelligence Techniques In Power Systems Paper PresentationArtificial Intelligence Techniques In Power Systems Paper Presentation
Artificial Intelligence Techniques In Power Systems Paper Presentation
guestac67362
 
Blue Brain Seminar Report
Blue Brain Seminar ReportBlue Brain Seminar Report
Blue Brain Seminar Report
Varun A M
 
Basic Concepts in Wireless LAN
Basic Concepts in Wireless LANBasic Concepts in Wireless LAN
Basic Concepts in Wireless LAN
Dr Shashikant Athawale
 
Artificial intelligene (1)
Artificial intelligene (1)Artificial intelligene (1)
Artificial intelligene (1)
Siddhu gowda
 
Airtificial Intelligence in Power System
Airtificial Intelligence in Power SystemAirtificial Intelligence in Power System
Airtificial Intelligence in Power SystemPratik Doshi
 
Wireless LAN Security-Bimtek Kominfo
Wireless LAN Security-Bimtek KominfoWireless LAN Security-Bimtek Kominfo
Wireless LAN Security-Bimtek Kominfo
M.Syarifudin, ST, OSCP, OSWP
 
Artificial intelligence in power system
Artificial intelligence in power systemArtificial intelligence in power system
Artificial intelligence in power system
Bittu Goswami
 

Viewers also liked (16)

Wireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best Practices
Wireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best PracticesWireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best Practices
Wireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best Practices
 
WIRELESS INTERNET BY SAIKIRAN PANJALA
WIRELESS INTERNET BY SAIKIRAN PANJALAWIRELESS INTERNET BY SAIKIRAN PANJALA
WIRELESS INTERNET BY SAIKIRAN PANJALA
 
The Escalation of Wireless Internet
The Escalation of Wireless InternetThe Escalation of Wireless Internet
The Escalation of Wireless Internet
 
Comparative Analysis of Power System Stabilizer using Artificial Intelligence...
Comparative Analysis of Power System Stabilizer using Artificial Intelligence...Comparative Analysis of Power System Stabilizer using Artificial Intelligence...
Comparative Analysis of Power System Stabilizer using Artificial Intelligence...
 
Power Quality Enhancement in Power Distribution system using Artificial intel...
Power Quality Enhancement in Power Distribution system using Artificial intel...Power Quality Enhancement in Power Distribution system using Artificial intel...
Power Quality Enhancement in Power Distribution system using Artificial intel...
 
Wireless lan
Wireless lanWireless lan
Wireless lan
 
Mahakal institute of technology
Mahakal institute of technologyMahakal institute of technology
Mahakal institute of technology
 
802.11 Wireless LAN Vulnerability Assessment (ITSPSR-21A)
802.11 Wireless LAN Vulnerability Assessment (ITSPSR-21A)802.11 Wireless LAN Vulnerability Assessment (ITSPSR-21A)
802.11 Wireless LAN Vulnerability Assessment (ITSPSR-21A)
 
IRIS BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION SYSTEM EMPLOYING CANNY OPERATOR
IRIS BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION SYSTEM EMPLOYING CANNY OPERATORIRIS BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION SYSTEM EMPLOYING CANNY OPERATOR
IRIS BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION SYSTEM EMPLOYING CANNY OPERATOR
 
Artificial Intelligence Techniques In Power Systems Paper Presentation
Artificial Intelligence Techniques In Power Systems Paper PresentationArtificial Intelligence Techniques In Power Systems Paper Presentation
Artificial Intelligence Techniques In Power Systems Paper Presentation
 
Blue Brain Seminar Report
Blue Brain Seminar ReportBlue Brain Seminar Report
Blue Brain Seminar Report
 
Basic Concepts in Wireless LAN
Basic Concepts in Wireless LANBasic Concepts in Wireless LAN
Basic Concepts in Wireless LAN
 
Artificial intelligene (1)
Artificial intelligene (1)Artificial intelligene (1)
Artificial intelligene (1)
 
Airtificial Intelligence in Power System
Airtificial Intelligence in Power SystemAirtificial Intelligence in Power System
Airtificial Intelligence in Power System
 
Wireless LAN Security-Bimtek Kominfo
Wireless LAN Security-Bimtek KominfoWireless LAN Security-Bimtek Kominfo
Wireless LAN Security-Bimtek Kominfo
 
Artificial intelligence in power system
Artificial intelligence in power systemArtificial intelligence in power system
Artificial intelligence in power system
 

Similar to Wireless Lan Security

Wireless+LAN+Technology+and+Security+Vulnerabilities
Wireless+LAN+Technology+and+Security+VulnerabilitiesWireless+LAN+Technology+and+Security+Vulnerabilities
Wireless+LAN+Technology+and+Security+VulnerabilitiesYogesh Kumar
 
SECURING IEEE 802.11G WLAN USING OPENVPN AND ITS IMPACT ANALYSIS
SECURING IEEE 802.11G WLAN USING OPENVPN AND ITS IMPACT ANALYSISSECURING IEEE 802.11G WLAN USING OPENVPN AND ITS IMPACT ANALYSIS
SECURING IEEE 802.11G WLAN USING OPENVPN AND ITS IMPACT ANALYSIS
IJNSA Journal
 
The Network Impact of 802.11ac White Paper
The Network Impact of 802.11ac White PaperThe Network Impact of 802.11ac White Paper
The Network Impact of 802.11ac White Paper
Aerohive Networks
 
Wireless deployment strategies in WNS-is
Wireless deployment strategies in WNS-isWireless deployment strategies in WNS-is
Wireless deployment strategies in WNS-is
ssuser5b84591
 
Module 15 (hacking wireless networks)
Module 15 (hacking wireless networks)Module 15 (hacking wireless networks)
Module 15 (hacking wireless networks)
Wail Hassan
 
3852_wlan_revised
3852_wlan_revised3852_wlan_revised
3852_wlan_revisedBalaji Ravi
 
Ichci13 submission 104 (1)
Ichci13 submission 104 (1)Ichci13 submission 104 (1)
Ichci13 submission 104 (1)Saravana Kumar
 
Latest Developments in WirelessNetworking and Wireless Security
Latest Developments in WirelessNetworking and Wireless SecurityLatest Developments in WirelessNetworking and Wireless Security
Latest Developments in WirelessNetworking and Wireless Security
IOSR Journals
 
Wireless LAN Deployment Best Practices
Wireless LAN Deployment Best PracticesWireless LAN Deployment Best Practices
Wireless LAN Deployment Best Practices
Michael Boman
 
You have persuaded XelPharms CIO that wireless networking would be.pdf
You have persuaded XelPharms CIO that wireless networking would be.pdfYou have persuaded XelPharms CIO that wireless networking would be.pdf
You have persuaded XelPharms CIO that wireless networking would be.pdf
arpittradersjdr
 
The definitive guide for evaluating enterprise WLAN networks
The definitive guide for evaluating enterprise WLAN networksThe definitive guide for evaluating enterprise WLAN networks
The definitive guide for evaluating enterprise WLAN networks
Aerohive Networks
 
Pentesting Your Own Wireless Networks, June 2011 Issue
Pentesting Your Own Wireless Networks, June 2011 IssuePentesting Your Own Wireless Networks, June 2011 Issue
Pentesting Your Own Wireless Networks, June 2011 Issue
Ishan Girdhar
 
Wi fi presentation
Wi fi presentationWi fi presentation
Wi fi presentationdayansaji
 
Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
Wi-Fi Wireless FidelityWi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
Gurpreet Singh
 
Research Inventy : International Journal of Engineering and Science
Research Inventy : International Journal of Engineering and ScienceResearch Inventy : International Journal of Engineering and Science
Research Inventy : International Journal of Engineering and Science
inventy
 
Wi Fi
Wi FiWi Fi
wi-fi.pptx
wi-fi.pptxwi-fi.pptx
wi-fi.pptx
HemanthGowdaN1
 

Similar to Wireless Lan Security (20)

Wireless+LAN+Technology+and+Security+Vulnerabilities
Wireless+LAN+Technology+and+Security+VulnerabilitiesWireless+LAN+Technology+and+Security+Vulnerabilities
Wireless+LAN+Technology+and+Security+Vulnerabilities
 
SECURING IEEE 802.11G WLAN USING OPENVPN AND ITS IMPACT ANALYSIS
SECURING IEEE 802.11G WLAN USING OPENVPN AND ITS IMPACT ANALYSISSECURING IEEE 802.11G WLAN USING OPENVPN AND ITS IMPACT ANALYSIS
SECURING IEEE 802.11G WLAN USING OPENVPN AND ITS IMPACT ANALYSIS
 
Wireless
WirelessWireless
Wireless
 
The Network Impact of 802.11ac White Paper
The Network Impact of 802.11ac White PaperThe Network Impact of 802.11ac White Paper
The Network Impact of 802.11ac White Paper
 
Wireless deployment strategies in WNS-is
Wireless deployment strategies in WNS-isWireless deployment strategies in WNS-is
Wireless deployment strategies in WNS-is
 
Module 15 (hacking wireless networks)
Module 15 (hacking wireless networks)Module 15 (hacking wireless networks)
Module 15 (hacking wireless networks)
 
3852_wlan_revised
3852_wlan_revised3852_wlan_revised
3852_wlan_revised
 
3852 wlan revised
3852 wlan revised3852 wlan revised
3852 wlan revised
 
Wi fi technology
Wi fi technologyWi fi technology
Wi fi technology
 
Ichci13 submission 104 (1)
Ichci13 submission 104 (1)Ichci13 submission 104 (1)
Ichci13 submission 104 (1)
 
Latest Developments in WirelessNetworking and Wireless Security
Latest Developments in WirelessNetworking and Wireless SecurityLatest Developments in WirelessNetworking and Wireless Security
Latest Developments in WirelessNetworking and Wireless Security
 
Wireless LAN Deployment Best Practices
Wireless LAN Deployment Best PracticesWireless LAN Deployment Best Practices
Wireless LAN Deployment Best Practices
 
You have persuaded XelPharms CIO that wireless networking would be.pdf
You have persuaded XelPharms CIO that wireless networking would be.pdfYou have persuaded XelPharms CIO that wireless networking would be.pdf
You have persuaded XelPharms CIO that wireless networking would be.pdf
 
The definitive guide for evaluating enterprise WLAN networks
The definitive guide for evaluating enterprise WLAN networksThe definitive guide for evaluating enterprise WLAN networks
The definitive guide for evaluating enterprise WLAN networks
 
Pentesting Your Own Wireless Networks, June 2011 Issue
Pentesting Your Own Wireless Networks, June 2011 IssuePentesting Your Own Wireless Networks, June 2011 Issue
Pentesting Your Own Wireless Networks, June 2011 Issue
 
Wi fi presentation
Wi fi presentationWi fi presentation
Wi fi presentation
 
Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
Wi-Fi Wireless FidelityWi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
 
Research Inventy : International Journal of Engineering and Science
Research Inventy : International Journal of Engineering and ScienceResearch Inventy : International Journal of Engineering and Science
Research Inventy : International Journal of Engineering and Science
 
Wi Fi
Wi FiWi Fi
Wi Fi
 
wi-fi.pptx
wi-fi.pptxwi-fi.pptx
wi-fi.pptx
 

Recently uploaded

Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
BookNet Canada
 
GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the Possible with Graph - Q2 2024
GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the  Possible with Graph - Q2 2024GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the  Possible with Graph - Q2 2024
GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the Possible with Graph - Q2 2024
Neo4j
 
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
James Anderson
 
GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...
GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...
GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...
Neo4j
 
20240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 2024
20240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 202420240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 2024
20240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 2024
Matthew Sinclair
 
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
sonjaschweigert1
 
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...
SOFTTECHHUB
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 preview
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 previewState of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 preview
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 preview
Prayukth K V
 
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software FuzzingRemoving Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Aftab Hussain
 
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase TeamPCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
ControlCase
 
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...
DanBrown980551
 
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportEpistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Alan Dix
 
Microsoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdf
Microsoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdfMicrosoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdf
Microsoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdf
Uni Systems S.M.S.A.
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Albert Hoitingh
 
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR EventsMonitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Ana-Maria Mihalceanu
 
PHP Frameworks: I want to break free (IPC Berlin 2024)
PHP Frameworks: I want to break free (IPC Berlin 2024)PHP Frameworks: I want to break free (IPC Berlin 2024)
PHP Frameworks: I want to break free (IPC Berlin 2024)
Ralf Eggert
 
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FME
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FMEEssentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FME
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FME
Safe Software
 
The Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform EngineeringThe Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform Engineering
Jemma Hussein Allen
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
 
GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the Possible with Graph - Q2 2024
GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the  Possible with Graph - Q2 2024GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the  Possible with Graph - Q2 2024
GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the Possible with Graph - Q2 2024
 
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
 
GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...
GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...
GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...
 
20240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 2024
20240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 202420240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 2024
20240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 2024
 
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
 
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
 
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 preview
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 previewState of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 preview
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 preview
 
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software FuzzingRemoving Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
 
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase TeamPCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
 
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...
 
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportEpistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
 
Microsoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdf
Microsoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdfMicrosoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdf
Microsoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdf
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdf
 
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
 
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR EventsMonitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
 
PHP Frameworks: I want to break free (IPC Berlin 2024)
PHP Frameworks: I want to break free (IPC Berlin 2024)PHP Frameworks: I want to break free (IPC Berlin 2024)
PHP Frameworks: I want to break free (IPC Berlin 2024)
 
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FME
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FMEEssentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FME
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FME
 
The Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform EngineeringThe Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform Engineering
 

Wireless Lan Security

  • 1. An ISS Technical White Paper Wireless LAN Security 802.11b and Corporate Networks 6303 Barfield Road · Atlanta, GA 30328 Tel: 404.236.2600 · Fax: 404.236.2626
  • 2. WWireWireless Lan Security 802.11b Wireless LAN Security Introduction Although a variety of wireless network technologies have or will soon reach the general business market, wireless LANs based on the 802.11 standard are the most likely candidate to become widely prevalent in corporate environments. Current 802.11b products operate at 2.4GHz, and deliver up to 11Mbps of bandwidth – comparable to a standard Ethernet wired LAN in performance. An upcoming version called 802.11a moves to a higher frequency range, and promises significantly faster speeds. It is expected to have security concerns similar to 802.11b. This low cost, combined with strong performance and ease of deployment, mean that many departments and individuals already use 802.11b, at home or at work – even if IT staff and security management administrators do not yet recognize wireless LANs as an approved technology. This paper addresses the security concerns raised by both current and upcoming 802.11 network technologies. Wireless LAN Business Drivers Without doubt, wireless LANs have a high gee-whiz factor. They provide always-on network connectivity, but don’t require a network cable. Office workers can roam from meeting to meeting throughout a building, constantly connected to the same network resources enjoyed by wired, desk-bound coworkers. Home or remote workers can set up networks without worrying about how to run wires through houses that never were designed to support network infrastructure. Wireless LANS may actually prove less expensive to support than traditional networks for employees that need to connect to corporate resources in multiple office locations. Large hotel chains, airlines, convention centers, Internet cafes, etc., see wireless LANs as an additional revenue opportunity for providing Internet connectivity to their customers. Wireless is a more affordable and logistically acceptable alternative to wired LANs for these organizations. For example, an airline can provide for-fee wireless network access for travelers in frequent flyer lounges – or anywhere else in the airport. Market maturity and technology advances will lower the cost and accelerate widespread adoption of wireless LANs. End-user spending, the primary cost metric, will drop from about $250 in 2001 to around $180 in 2004 (Gartner Group). By 2005, 50 percent of Fortune 1000 companies will have extensively deployed wireless LAN technology based on evolved 802.11 standards (0.7 probability). By 2010, the majority of Fortune 2000 companies will have deployed wireless LANs to support standard, wired network technology LANs (0.6 probability). Reality Check For the foreseeable future wireless technology will complement wired connectivity in enterprise environments. Even new buildings will continue to incorporate wired LANs. The primary reason is that wired networking remains less expensive than wireless. In addition, wired networks offer greater bandwidth, allowing for future applications beyond the capabilities of today’s wireless systems. Although it may cost 10 times more to retrofit a building for wired networking (initial construction being by far the preferred time to set up network infrastructure), wiring is only a very small fraction of the cost of the overall capital outlay for an enterprise network. For that reason, many corporations are only just testing wireless technology. This limited acceptance at the corporate level means few access points with a limited number of users in real world production environments, or evaluation test beds sequestered in a lab. In response, business units and individuals will deploy wireless access points on their own. These unauthorized networks almost certainly lack adequate attention to information security, and present a serious concern for protecting online business assets. Finally, the 802.11b standard shares unlicensed frequencies with other devices, including Bluetooth wireless personal area networks (PANs), cordless phones, and baby monitors. These technologies can, and do, interfere with each other. 802.11b also fails to delineate roaming An ISS Technical White Paper Page 1
  • 3. WWireWireless Lan Security 802.11b Wireless LAN Security (moving from one cell to another), leaving each vendor to implement a different solution. Future proposals in 802.11 promise to address these shortcomings, but no shipping products are on the immediate horizon. Wireless Security In The Enterprise 802.11b’s low cost of entry is what makes it so attractive. However, inexpensive equipment also makes it easier for attackers to mount an attack. “Rogue” access points and unauthorized, poorly secured networks compound the odds of a security breach. The following diagram depicts an intranet or internal network that is properly configured to handle wireless traffic, with two firewalls in place, plus intrusion detection and response sensors to monitor traffic on the wireless segment. One firewall controls access to and from the Internet. The other controls access to and from the wireless access point. The access point itself is the bridge that connects mobile clients to the internal network. The access point has a dedicated IP address for remote management via SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol). The wireless clients themselves – usually laptops or desktops and handhelds – may also use SNMP agents to allow remote management. As a result, each of these devices contains a sensor to ensure that each unit is properly configured, and that these configurations have not been improperly altered. The network itself is regularly monitored to identify access points in operation, and verify that they are authorized and properly configured. While this paper focuses on the risk issues from a corporate network perspective, these same issues apply to home networks, telecommuters using wireless, and “public use” networks such as those being set up by Microsoft to allow wireless Internet access at select Starbucks locations. Remote users are now able to access internal corporate resources from multiple types of foreign networks. Even organizations without internal wireless networks must take wireless into account as part of their overall security practices. Known Risks Although attacks against 802.11b and other wireless technologies will undoubtedly increase in number and sophistication over time, most current 802.11b risks fall into seven basic categories: § Insertion attacks § Interception and unauthorized monitoring of wireless traffic § Jamming An ISS Technical White Paper Page 2
  • 4. WWireWireless Lan Security 802.11b Wireless LAN Security § Client-to-Client attacks § Brute force attacks against access point passwords § Encryption attacks § Misconfigurations Note that these classifications can apply to any wireless technology, not just 802.11b. Understanding how they work and using this information to prevent their success is a good stepping stone for any wireless solution. Insertion Attacks Insertion attacks are based on deploying unauthorized devices or creating new wireless networks without going through security process and review. § Unauthorized Clients – An attacker tries to connect a wireless client, typically a laptop or PDA, to an access point without authorization. Access points can be configured to require a password for client access. If there is no password, an intruder can connect to the internal network simply by enabling a wireless client to communicate with the access point. Note, however, that some access points use the same password for all client access, requiring all users to adopt a new password every time the password needs to be changed. § Unauthorized or Renegade Access Points – An organization may not be aware that internal employees have deployed wireless capabilities on their network. This lack of awareness could lead to the previously described attack, with unauthorized clients gaining access to corporate resources through a rogue access point. Organizations need to implement policy to ensure secure configuration of access points, plus an ongoing process in which the network is scanned for the presence of unauthorized devices. Interception and Monitoring of Wireless Traffic As in wired networks, it is possible to intercept and monitor network traffic across a wireless LAN. The attacker needs to be within range of an access point (approximately 300 feet for 802.11b) for this attack to work, whereas a wired attacker can be anywhere where there is a functioning network connection. The advantage for a wireless interception is that a wired attack requires the placement of a monitoring agent on a compromised system. All a wireless intruder needs is access to the network data stream. There are two important considerations to keep in mind with the range of 802.11b access points. First, directional antennae can dramatically extend either the transmission or reception ranges of 802.11b devices. Therefore, the 300 foot maximum range attributed to 802.11b only applies to normal, as-designed installations. Enhanced equipment also enhances the risk. Second, access points transmit their signals in a circular pattern, which means that the 802.11b signal almost always extends beyond the physical boundaries of the work area it is intended to cover. This signal can be intercepted outside buildings, or even through floors in multistory buildings. Careful antenna placement can significantly affect the ability of the 802.11b signal to reach beyond physical corporate boundaries. § Wireless Packet Analysis – A skilled attacker captures wireless traffic using techniques similar to those employed on wired networks. Many of these tools capture the first part of the connection session, where the data would typically include the username and password. An intruder can then masquerade as a legitimate user by using this captured information to hijack the user session and issue unauthorized commands. § Broadcast Monitoring – If an access point is connected to a hub rather than a switch, any network traffic across that hub can be potentially broadcasted out over the wireless network. Because the Ethernet hub broadcasts all data packets to all connected devices including the wireless access point, an attacker can monitor sensitive data going over wireless not even intended for any wireless clients. An ISS Technical White Paper Page 3
  • 5. WWireWireless Lan Security 802.11b Wireless LAN Security § Access Point Clone (Evil Twin) Traffic Interception – An attacker fools legitimate wireless clients into connecting to the attacker’s own network by placing an unauthorized access point with a stronger signal in close proximity to wireless clients. Users attempt to log into the substitute servers and unknowingly give away passwords and similar sensitive data. Jamming Denial of service attacks are also easily applied to wireless networks, where legitimate traffic can not reach clients or the access point because illegitimate traffic overwhelms the frequencies. An attacker with the proper equipment and tools can easily flood the 2.4 GHz frequency, corrupting the signal until the wireless network ceases to function. In addition, cordless phones, baby monitors and other devices that operate on the 2.4 GHz band can disrupt a wireless network using this frequency. These denials of service can originate from outside the work area serviced by the access point, or can inadvertently arrive from other 802.11b devices installed in other work areas that degrade the overall signal. Client-to-Client Attacks Two wireless clients can talk directly to each other, bypassing the access point. Users therefore need to defend clients not just against an external threat but also against each other. § File Sharing and Other TCP/IP Service Attacks – Wireless clients running TCP/IP services such as a Web server or file sharing are open to the same exploits and misconfigurations as any user on a wired network. § DOS (Denial of Service) – A wireless device floods other wireless client with bogus packets, creating a denial of service attack. In addition, duplicate IP or MAC addresses, both intentional and accidental, can cause disruption on the network. Brute Force Attacks Against Access Point Passwords Most access points use a single key or password that is shared with all connecting wireless clients. Brute force dictionary attacks attempt to compromise this key by methodically testing every possible password. The intruder gains access to the access point once the password is guessed. In addition, passwords can be compromised through less aggressive means. A compromised client can expose the access point. Not changing the keys on a frequent basis or when employees leave the organization also opens the access point to attack. Managing a large number of access points and clients only complicates this issue, encouraging lax security practices. Attacks against Encryption 802.11b standard uses an encryption system called WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy). WEP has known weaknesses (see http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html for more information), and these issues are not slated to be addressed before 2002. Not many tools are readily available for exploiting this issue, but sophisticated attackers can certainly build their own. Misconfiguration Many access points ship in an unsecured configuration in order to emphasize ease of use and rapid deployment. Unless administrators understand wireless security risks and properly configure each unit prior to deployment, these access points will remain at a high risk for attack or misuse. The following section examines three leading access points, one each from Cisco, Lucent and 3Com. Although each vendor has its own implementation of 802.11b, the underlying issues should be broadly applicable to products from other vendors. An ISS Technical White Paper Page 4
  • 6. WWireWireless Lan Security 802.11b Wireless LAN Security § Server Set ID (SSID) – SSID is a configurable identification that allows clients to communicate with an appropriate access point. With proper configuration, only clients with the correct SSID can communicate with access points. In effect, SSID acts as a single shared password between access points and clients. Access points come with default SSIDs. If not changed, these units are easily compromised. Here are common default passwords: “tsunami” – Cisco ”101” – 3Com “RoamAbout Default Network Name” – Lucent/Cabletron “Compaq” – Compaq “WLAN” – Addtron “intel” – Intel “linksys” – Linksys “Default SSID”, “Wireless” – Other manufacturers SSIDs go over the air as clear text if WEP is disabled, allowing the SSID to be captured by monitoring the network’s traffic. In addition, the Lucent access points can operate in Secure Access mode. This option requires the SSID of both client and access point to match. By default this security option is turned off. In non-secure access mode, clients can connect to the access point using the configured SSID, a blank SSID, or an SSID configured as “any.” § Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) – WEP can be typically configured as follows: No encryption 40 bit encryption 128 bit encryption Most access points ship with WEP turned off. Although 128 bit encryption is more effective than 40 bit encryption, both key strengths are subject to WEP’s known flaws. § SNMP Community Passwords – Many wireless access points run SNMP agents. If the community word is not properly configured, an intruder can read and potentially write sensitive data on the access point. If SNMP agents are enabled on the wireless clients, the same risk applies to them as well. By default, many access points are read accessible by using the community word, “public”. 3Com access points allow write access by using the community word, ”comcomcom”. Cisco and Lucent/Cabletron require the write community word to be configured by the user or administrator before the agent is enabled. § Configuration Interfaces – Each access point model has its own interface for viewing and modifying its configuration. Here are the current interface options for these three access points: Cisco – SNMP, serial, Web, telnet 3Com – SNMP, serial, Web, telnet Lucent / Cabletron – SNMP, serial (no web/telnet) 3Com access points lack access control to the Web interface for controlling configuration. An attacker who locates a 3Com access point Web interface can easily get the SSID from the “system properties” menu display. 3Com access points do require a password on the Web interface for write privileges. This password is the same as the community word for write privileges, therefore 3Com access points are at risk if deployed using the default “comcomcom” as the password. An ISS Technical White Paper Page 5
  • 7. WWireWireless Lan Security 802.11b Wireless LAN Security § Client Side Security Risk – Clients connected to an access point store sensitive information for authenticating and communicating to the access point. This information can be compromised if the client is not properly configured. Cisco client software stores the SSID in the Windows registry, and the WEP key in the firmware, where it is more difficult to access. Lucent/Cabletron client software stores the SSID in the Windows registry. The WEP key is stored in the Windows registry, but it is encrypted using an undocumented algorithm. 3Com client software stores the SSID in the Windows registry. The WEP key is stored in the Windows registry with no encryption. § Installation – By default, all three access points are optimized to help build a useful network as quickly and as easily as possible. As a result, the default configurations minimize security. Wireless Information Security Management Process and technology are always easily confused, and never more so than with wireless information security management. In fact, the same business processes that establish strong risk management practices for physical assets and wired networks also work to protect wireless resources. The following cost-effective guidelines help enable organizations to establish proper security protections as part of an overall wireless strategy – and will continue to work in spite of wireless networking’s rapid evolution. The following items are an introduction to this approach. Wireless Security Policy and Architecture Design – Security policy, procedures and best practices should include wireless networking as part of an overall security management architecture to determine what is and is not allowed with wireless technology. Treat Access Points As Untrusted – Access points need to be identified and evaluated on a regular basis to determine if they need to be quarantined as untrusted devices before wireless clients can gain access to internal networks. This determination means appropriate placement of firewalls, virtual private networks (VPN), intrusion detection systems (IDS), and authentication between access point and intranets or the Internet. Access Point Configuration Policy – Administrators need to define standard security settings for any 802.11b access point before it can be deployed. These guidelines should cover SSID, WEP keys and encryption, and SNMP community words. Access Point Discovery – Administrators should regularly search outwards from a wired network to identify unknown access points. Several methods of identifying 802.11b devices exist, including detection via banner strings on access points with either Web or telnet interfaces. Wireless network searches can identify unauthorized access points by setting up a 2.4 GHz monitoring agent that searches for 802.11b packets in the air. These packets may contain IP addresses that identify which network they are on, indicating that rogue access points are operating in the area. One important note: this process may pick up access points from other organizations in densely populated areas. Access Point Security Assessments – Regular security audits and penetration assessments quickly identify poorly configured access points, default or easily guessed passwords and community words, and the presence or absence of encryption. Router ACLs and firewall rules also help minimize access to the SNMP agents and other interfaces on the access point. Wireless Client Protection – Wireless clients need to be regularly examined for good security practices. These procedures should include the presence of some or all of the following: § Distributed personal firewalls to lock down access to the client § VPNs to supplement encryption and authentication beyond what 802.11b can provide An ISS Technical White Paper Page 6
  • 8. WWireWireless Lan Security 802.11b Wireless LAN Security § Intrusion detection and response to identify and minimize attacks from intruders, viruses, Trojans and backdoors § Desktop assessments to identify and repair security issues on the client device Managed Security Services for Wireless – Managed Security Services (MSS) helps organizations establish effective security practices without the overhead of an extensive, in-house solution. MSS providers handle assessment, design, deployment, management and support across a broad range of information security disciplines. This 24/7/365 solution works with the customer to set policy and architecture, plus provides emergency response, if needed. These services help an organization operating wireless networks to: § Deploy firewalls that separate wireless networks from internal networks or the Internet § Establish and monitor VPN gateways and VPN wireless clients § Maintain an intrusion detection system on the wireless network to identify and respond to attacks and misuse before critical digital resource are placed at risk. Internet Security Systems Wireless LAN Solutions Internet Security Systems products and services provide a robust security management solution for wireless LANs. These rapidly expanding offerings encompass: Security Software Products – Internet Security Systems’ security products already protect wireless LAN environments against known security risks. ISS’ Internet Scanner™ network vulnerability assessment product probes networks to detect unauthorized or poorly configured wireless access points, as represented in the diagram below. The RealSecure™ Protection System, deployed between a wireless access point and the corporate network, recognizes and reacts to attacks and misuse directed over the wireless LAN (below). In addition, ISS’ renowned X-Force™ research and development team continually update these products. An ISS Technical White Paper Page 7
  • 9. WWireWireless Lan Security 802.11b Wireless LAN Security Managed Security Services – Internet Security Systems’ Managed Security Services protect wireless LANS on a 24x7 basis through remote network assessments and tactical deployment of remotely managed intrusion protection services. As new wireless protections are added to ISS security products, Managed Security Services will deliver these additional capabilities to our customers. Security Architecture Consulting – Internet Security Systems’ Consulting Solutions Group has in-depth security knowledge, expertise, and proven methodology required that helps organizations assess, integrate, design, and configure their wireless LANs and surrounding security infrastructure. Wireless LAN Security Education – Internet Security Systems’ SecureU™ education services organization has developed wireless LAN security content to help customers understand the nuances of wireless LAN security and establish valid defensive techniques to minimize security risks. Product Updates – Internet Security Systems’ X-Force research and development team continually adds product enhancements that deliver new protections against wireless LAN risks. These X-Press Update™ enhancements quickly and easily integrate into existing product installations. An ISS Technical White Paper Page 8
  • 10. WWireWireless Lan Security 802.11b Wireless LAN Security About Internet Security Systems (ISS) Founded in 1994, Internet Security Systems (ISS) (Nasdaq: ISSX) is a world leader in software and services that protect critical online resources from attack and misuse. ISS is headquartered in Atlanta, GA, with additional operations throughout the United States and in Asia, Australia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Copyright © 2001 Internet Security Systems, Inc. All rights reserved worldwide. Internet Security Systems, the Internet Security Systems logo, Internet Scanner, RealSecure, SecureU, X- Force and X-Press Update are trademarks of Internet Security Systems, Inc. Other trademarks and trade names mentioned are marks and names of their owners as indicated. All trademarks are the property of their respective owners and are used here in an editorial context without intent of infringement. Specifications are subject to change without notice. An ISS Technical White Paper Page 9