The document summarizes a presentation on safety issues related to mechanical equipment at mines. It discusses trends showing equipment will become larger, more complex, and automated. It also reviews past accidents and failures involving winders, gas explosions, electrical arcs, and longwall automation to identify risks that could lead to future fatalities if not addressed. The presentation calls for proactively managing risks from new technologies, learning from incidents, and regularly reviewing and improving safety practices.
This webinar describes some of the challenges faced when monitoring a large fleet of wind turbines. Factors such as different turbine and gearbox types, different condition monitoring systems (CMS), geographically dispersed sites and variations in maintenance practice all make the job of a monitoring engineer a difficult task. Romax utilize in-house software called InSight Fleet Monitor to provide condition monitoring services for over 2 GW of assets globally. Using a single software platform enables the CMS engineers to effectively monitor a huge number of wind turbines efficiently.
This webinar uses some recent examples and case studies to demonstrate fleet-wide condition monitoring in practice. Examples focus on main bearing and gearbox fault detection and, most importantly for the operator, methods for predicting the remaining useful life or ‘time to repair’ for key components.
View this webinar to learn:
-How condition monitoring can be effectively rolled out for large, disparate fleets of wind turbines.
-Valuable insights from recent examples in the field, particularly relating to gearbox and main bearing faults.
-Predicting ‘time to repair’ for major components.
In this presentation you will learn about:
Past Earthquakes that have Affected Oregon
Oregon Structural Specialty Code History (OSSC)
City of Portland Seismic Code Requirements - Title 24.85
Seismic Upgrade Triggers and Evaluations
This webinar describes some of the challenges faced when monitoring a large fleet of wind turbines. Factors such as different turbine and gearbox types, different condition monitoring systems (CMS), geographically dispersed sites and variations in maintenance practice all make the job of a monitoring engineer a difficult task. Romax utilize in-house software called InSight Fleet Monitor to provide condition monitoring services for over 2 GW of assets globally. Using a single software platform enables the CMS engineers to effectively monitor a huge number of wind turbines efficiently.
This webinar uses some recent examples and case studies to demonstrate fleet-wide condition monitoring in practice. Examples focus on main bearing and gearbox fault detection and, most importantly for the operator, methods for predicting the remaining useful life or ‘time to repair’ for key components.
View this webinar to learn:
-How condition monitoring can be effectively rolled out for large, disparate fleets of wind turbines.
-Valuable insights from recent examples in the field, particularly relating to gearbox and main bearing faults.
-Predicting ‘time to repair’ for major components.
In this presentation you will learn about:
Past Earthquakes that have Affected Oregon
Oregon Structural Specialty Code History (OSSC)
City of Portland Seismic Code Requirements - Title 24.85
Seismic Upgrade Triggers and Evaluations
In this presentation a brief introduction is given on parts of wind turbine, classification of wind turbines, importance of wind turbines, current status like installed capacity (annual and cumulative) . Then there is a explanation on theory behind the design of wind turbine blades i.e, AERODYNAMICS OF WIND TURBINES which includes explanation about shape of an aerofoil, its different parameters, lift force, drag force, different equations about lift drag force, NACA profiles, Blade Element Momentum Theory, etc.
The observation of safety guidelines are essential to the well being of any worker and the productivity of the said workers. this presentation will offer a clear guideline for those within the building industry.
QAR (Question Answer Relationship) is a reading comprehension strategy that is good for standardised test such as NAPLAN. This presentation explains the strategy and its benefits for students.
In this presentation a brief introduction is given on parts of wind turbine, classification of wind turbines, importance of wind turbines, current status like installed capacity (annual and cumulative) . Then there is a explanation on theory behind the design of wind turbine blades i.e, AERODYNAMICS OF WIND TURBINES which includes explanation about shape of an aerofoil, its different parameters, lift force, drag force, different equations about lift drag force, NACA profiles, Blade Element Momentum Theory, etc.
The observation of safety guidelines are essential to the well being of any worker and the productivity of the said workers. this presentation will offer a clear guideline for those within the building industry.
QAR (Question Answer Relationship) is a reading comprehension strategy that is good for standardised test such as NAPLAN. This presentation explains the strategy and its benefits for students.
E-call ( a call b/t life and dead ) the total details about this presentation is shown on slides we enjoyed a lot while presenting this ppt and this topic is also well colorful one... so then viewers prepare well and present well.... t.c - s.n(sameer nani)
Many aviation accidents, both commercial and private, are caused by defective equipment. If it can be shown that equipment failure or a defective plane component resulted in an aviation accident that caused injury or death, it may be possible to file a lawsuit against the liable parties. So to file your case contact http://alabama.attorney-group.com/airplane-accidents/
The Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), together with the Ministry of Electricity and Energy of the Union of Myanmar, launched Myanmar National Energy Statistics 2019 in Nay Pyi Taw on 11 March 2019.
in his presentation, Mr Shigeru Kimura, ERIA’s Special Adviser to the President on Energy Affairs, discussed the basic concept of energy balance tables, analysis of the energy demand supply situation in Myanmar, as well as the key findings and policy implications of the study.
The death of a truck operator in the USA in 2018 at a Peabody mine as a result of a fire highlights the importance of installing fire suppression systems. Firestorm has been involved in the world's largest retrofit of fire supression systems on buses. While buses may be considered simple for fire protection versus a mining machine, buses can carry up to 100 passengers and typically there is a lack of mechanical protection with the majority of the body made of fibreglass, wood and plastics that burn very quickly and are highly toxic. The risk for multiple deaths is therefore a much higher factor compared with a mining machine with one operator. The risk assessment required in AS5062-2016 needs to consider the egress paths available for an operator/passenger to safely evacuate the machine and consideration for actuators and fire extinguishers along this path.
Changes to laws in 2016 required the removal of PFAS and PFOS in both Queensland and South Australia with penalties noe effective for non-compliance. Several NSW mines have been put on notice by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to prevent further contamination of waterways. Firestorm is now moving away from exposing our own people to PFAS/PFOS systems to ensure we are providing best practice even though laws are not yet in place for NSW. This presentation looks at what it means if you choose to move away from PFAS/PFOS systems.
Every organisation has a culture, and every culture is different. Every organisation has a culture around safety, which can often conflict with the culture around hydraulic systems.
Since the inception of the NSW Resources Regulator's MDG 41 - Guidleine for fluid power safety at mines there has been an explosion of interest in the safety of hydraulic systems. From the early days of MDG41 there was a significant drop in hydraulic incidents reported to the Regulator.
Recently there has been a spike in fluid power-related incidents around the industry, which suggests there is a disconnect between the perceived and real dangers of fluid power systems. As we now see the industry growing and less experienced workers joining the industry we must ensure that we demonstrate the correct culture when dealing with hydraulic systems.
Liberty Industrial was engaged by Glencore to complete the demolition of a former coal preparation plant on a redundant mine site in Teralba NSW. While the mine was non-operational and formerly underground, many of the mine systems, plant pass-in and permitting requirements were based on on the site being an operational underground mine. Both Liberty Industrial and Glencore worked together during the planning phase to ensure that both parties understood the work, the design-related aspects and aspects of the Glencore systems that were not appropriate for this type of work. The teams worked together to develop a risk-based approach that satisfied the Glencore internal systems while maintaining efficient execution processes.
Preliminary findings _OECD field visits to ten regions in the TSI EU mining r...OECDregions
Preliminary findings from OECD field visits for the project: Enhancing EU Mining Regional Ecosystems to Support the Green Transition and Secure Mineral Raw Materials Supply.
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
ZGB - The Role of Generative AI in Government transformation.pdfSaeed Al Dhaheri
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The 2024 World Health Statistics edition reviews more than 50 health-related indicators from the Sustainable Development Goals and WHO’s Thirteenth General Programme of Work. It also highlights the findings from the Global health estimates 2021, notably the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on life expectancy and healthy life expectancy.
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Presentation by Jared Jageler, David Adler, Noelia Duchovny, and Evan Herrnstadt, analysts in CBO’s Microeconomic Studies and Health Analysis Divisions, at the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Summer Conference.
PNRR MADRID GREENTECH FOR BROWN NETWORKS NETWORKS MUR_MUSA_TEBALDI.pdf
What does the future hold for mechanical equipment? Wally Koppe
1. 25th Mechanical Engineering
Safety Seminar
What does the future hold for mechanical
equipment?
25th Mechanical Engineering Safety Seminar
Presented by: WJ Koppe – Inspector of Mechanical Engineering
Resources and Energy – Mine Safety
9 & 10 September 2015
2. What does the future hold for mechanical
equipment?
We expect equipment used at mines to:
Become larger
More complex
Have lower factors of safety
Have more sensors and warning devices
Have automatic functioning
Involve more electronics / computer control
Require more specialised electrical and mechanical maintenance personnel
Require more involvement of suppliers
Be involved in future fatalities
3.
4. What can be used to predict the probability of
future fatalities?
A review of:
Incidents including near miss events
Accidents
Equipment limitations
Competence assessment
Compliance to standards / guidelines
Risk analysis / management
Fatality database
5. What equipment has been involved in
fatalities?
Surface mines and quarries
Trucks
Excavators
Tyres
Elevated Work Platforms
Walkways
Overhead Power lines
7. Underground Coal Mines
Gas ignitions from Brakes, friction, sparking
High Pressure hydraulics
Canopies of Continuous Miners
Canopies on LHD’s
Drift Haulage
Rail Haulage
Conveyors
Drill Rigs
Vehicle Park Brakes
8.
9. What suggests more winder fatalities may
occur?
Recent incidents where winder ropes were substantially
below the minimum factor of safety
A design issue where the brakes were inadequate because
of reliance on braking effect of the worn reducer
The age of some of the equipment
The lack of knowledge of some of the responsible
personnel
The safety equipment / standards of some of the
equipment used for shaft sinking
The need to have power on for some maintenance tasks
The complexity of the systems
10. Winder Incidents
Year 2011 – 12 2012 – 13 2013 – 14 2014 – 15 Total
Coal Mine 22 13 20 12 67
Metal Mines 2 7 1 3 13
Total 24 20 21 15 80
11. Coal U/G 2011 – 12 2012 – 13 2013 – 14 2014 – 15 Total
Southern mine A 4 2 4 4 14
Northern mine B 1 0 0 0 1
Western mine C 1 1 0 1 3
Northern mine D 0 0 1 0 1
Western mine E 1 0 0 1 2
Western mine F 3 0 6 0 9
Northern mine G 1 0 0 0 1
Western mine H 9 7 6 4 26
Western mine I 2 2 3 1 8
Northern mine J 0 1 0 1 2
Total 22 13 20 12 67
Winder Incidents
12. Metals U/G 2011 – 12 2012 – 13 2013 – 14 2014 – 15 Total
Metal mine A 2 2 0 0 4
Metal mine B 0 0 0 1 1
Metal mine C 0 2 0 0 2
Metal mine D 0 3 1 2 6
Total 2 7 1 3 13
Winder Incidents
13. Significant Winder Incidents
Material falling down shafts during operation
– Head frame steelwork
– Concrete from head frame
– Skip wheel
Wet brakes
Moisture in controls
Travel in wrong direction
Dump brake failures
Failed to decelerate near end of wind
Collision between skips
Failure to enter guides
Control failures
Pre torque out of adjustment
14. What Suggests More Gas / Coal Dust
Explosion Fatalities May Occur?
Gas trips
Gas exceeding 2.5%
Cable arcs
Failure of explosion protection (Electrical)
Failure of explosion protection (Diesel engines)
Fires underground
More conveyors and equipment in return airways
Deeper mines / higher production
Frictional ignition
Spontaneous combustion
Higher voltage equipment on longwalls
Gas outbursts on the increase
26. 2011 – 12 2012 – 13 2013 – 14 2014 – 15 Total
Mine A 4 2 9 3 18
Mine B 2 0 0 1 3
Mine C 5 2 3 3 13
Mine D 7 9 16 40 72
Mine E 2 0 4 3 9
Mine F 3 3 3 3 12
Mine G 1 0 0 0 1
Mine H 0 2 0 0 2
Mine I 0 9 8 14 31
Mine J 3 1 7 3 14
Mine K 0 2 0 0 2
Mine L 5 1 2 0 8
Mine M 3 11 11 18 43
Mine N 4 15 10 0 29
Mine O 12 8 8 5 33
Mine P 1 2 0 0 3
Explosion Protection Failures - Electrical
27. 2011 – 12 2012 – 13 2013 – 14 2014 – 15 Total
Mine Q 2 15 9 12 38
Mine R 4 4 2 3 13
Mine S 0 3 5 7 15
Mine T 0 1 4 1 6
Mine U 1 9 4 2 16
Mine V 3 2 4 1 10
Mine W 1 5 5 11 22
Mine X 7 8 11 4 30
Mine Y 1 0 0 0 1
Mine Z 3 4 8 6 21
Mine AA 1 0 3 16 20
Mine AB 1 7 5 2 15
Mine AC 5 6 11 1 23
Mine AD 4 13 17 16 50
Mine AE 7 3 4 8 22
Total 92 147 173 183 595
Explosion Protection Failures - Electrical
28. Area North East South East Total
Cable Arcs 168 89 257
Explosion
Protection
Failures –
Mechanical
283 407 690
Explosion
Protection
Failures-
Electrical
232 363 595
Continued next slide
29. Area North East South East Total
Conveyor Fires 1 4 5
Drill Rig Gas
fire
1 0 1
Coal Self
Heating
2 1 3
Total Reported
Potential
Issues
686 864 1551
30. Potential Ignition Sources – NOT
reported
Strata support bolt failures
Conveyor idler bearing failures
Conveyor belt rubbing
Drill flushing failures
Failures detected when equipment is not in
operation
31. Gas Outbursts – in 4 years
Incidents
– Shot firing 23 at mine A
– Remote Mining 2 at mine A
Note: a number of shot firing related outbursts involved
the ventilation tripping from high methane.
The gas outbursts also involved release of significant
coal dust.
32. Gas Trips - Longwall
Area North East South East Total
298 359 657
33. Gas Trips Total
2011 – 12 2012 – 13 2013 – 14 2014 – 15 Total
285 224 222 179 910
Note:
Gas trips not reportable from 1 February 2015 unless >
2.5% CH4.
Rarely identified if gas concentration is in explosive range.
34. What has improved over 4 years?
Compliance with stone dust requirements has
improved generally now + 95%.
NOT at a large gassy South Coast mine
Stone dust requirements increase on 1 November
2015
35.
36. What suggests longwall automation will result
in fatalities?
Experience with remote control of LHD’s at metal mines
and continuous miners at coal mines
Increase on speed of chock advance
Limited walkway
Reliance on personnel to constantly move in order to
remain in the ‘safe zone’
Failure to provide proximity detection to ensure personnel
are not in ‘no go zone’
Failure to use proximity detection where provided
37. Failure to adequately control software by mines
and OEM’s
Failure to adequately test and commission the
controls after changes made or components
changed
Failure to act on OEM safety alerts relating to
identified issues
Having too many unknown ‘cooks’ making
changes
Lack of competence of supervisors
Production pressure
38. Necessary interaction between personnel
and the automated equipment
Failure to adhere to basic principles covering
access of personnel into automated
operational equipment areas
Failure of electrical controls due to ingress of
water
Wear of hydraulic components
39. The following accidents / incidents have occurred
on operational longwalls
When sprays were activated shield lowered
because solenoids were swapped
40. Unplanned Chock Movements
Mine No
Mine A 2
Mine B 1
Mine C 3
Mine D 1
Mine E 5
Mine F 2
Mine G 1
Mine H 1
Mine I 1
Mine J 4
Mine K 4
Total 25
41. Management recommendations
Don’t bog down in everyday issues
Identify high risk issues
Learn from others
Ask questions
Identify trends
Don’t leave everything to OEM’s
Communicate
Initiate improvements
Monitor change
Regularly review your areas